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The study which follows is intended, primarily, to contribute 
to historical debate on the development of the British labour 
movement in-a critical decade during and after the Great War; 
I hope that, incidentally, it may have implications for other 
areas of discussion. It is intended as a sociological contrib- 
ution to historical debate. Existing historical literature is 
subjected to theoretical and methodological criticism. I have 
attempted to develop a theory concerning the sources of working 
class political action; a theory whose explanatory value should 
by implication - not be limited to the particular historical 
events and period here considered. The theory rests, in large 
measure, on a reading of Gramsci, but is tempered by insights 
drawn from several areas of sociological literature. The order- 
ing of levels of explanation and the relationships between 
explanatory factors suggested by the theory underlie the 
remainder of the study. I ýave-tried, in short, to construct 
a sociological account of labour's development in an historical 
period. 
My purpose, in this preface, is not to summarise the theory, 
nor the historical argument; neither do I wish to explain the 
structure of the volume, save to mention that the first chapter. 
consists chiefly of historiographical and theoretical criticism, 
whilst the bulk of the next is concerned with elaborating the 
theory mentioned above. (Toward the end of chapter 2 the 
structure of the thesis is explained in more detail; the essentials 
of argument and structure are set down in the abstract which 
follows this preface. ) Rather, my intention here is to outline the 




In the beginning, I-hoped that the three years in which 
theses were 'normally' completed (as the-Departmental prospectus 
had it: abnormally, I fondly imagined, perhaps four) would 
give me the opportunity to engage in-sustained study-of several 
issues. I hoped they could be 'married', as, it were, in the 
research topic. These concerns ranged from very generalised, 
essentially theoretical, questions (why people believe what they 
do; how-their beliefs relate to their interests, and to political 
action), to more specific historical-matters. For instance, I 
intended to concentrate on the inter-war years since I found 
working class quiescence and political stability in that period 
of high unemployment problematical - in retrospect, an assumption 
which seems both naive and historically specific; and I wished to 
study the labour movement. 
Looking back, it is possible to discern seven more or less 
distinct phases to my endeavour. Although I have some hesitation 
in describing them (for I can see some personal advantage in 
pretending that the project was pursued with a consistency of 
purpose, and with clear objectives, throughout), it will, I think, 
by of more use to others, not to say more truthful, to record these. 
(1) The first phase lasted perhaps eighteen months, 
during which I undertook a programme of reading which was at the 
same time wide-ranging,. eclectic, and directionless. This' 
involved not merely acquainting myself with much of the literature- 
directly relevant to my chosen area of study Un-history, industrial 
relations, politics, and so forth), but'also attempting to'gain a 
grounding in socio2ogy (which I had not previously studied). -Over 
these months certain problems were clarified, in my-mind: * thus-l-- 
became, for example, unhappy with the school of thought --then more 
dominant-in labour history even than it is today -which saw a 
distinction between leaders and members as thenDst important concept 
13 
in explaining the behaviour of the-labour movement and its 
-various elements. Buti very often, I had not arrived at 
satisfactory solutions, - even at a theoretical levels to these 
problems; and I remained in some respects unclear about the 
objectives and methods of my enterprise. 
(a) Nevertheless, I had determined to pursue a local 
study, and for various reasons Edinburgh-was a suitable area 
to carry these out. It was, in any case, -important to begin the 
process-of researching historical records. So I spent eight months 
reading, and noting, the minutes of the Edinburgh Trades Council 
for the years 1918-1939. This proved a far larger task than I 
had anticipated; yet at the same time it confirmed my view that, 
alone, these minutes were an inadequate source. In addition, I 
began to doubt the usefulness of treating the inter-war years as 
a whole: I developed a feeling that my study should encompass, 
rather, merely the immediate post-war years, and that consideration 
of the impact of war was unavoidable. 
(3) 1 therefore faced a dilemma. I had been researching 
for seven terms: perhaps slightly more. I could now recast my 
objectives, in the light of my intense research in a narrow field, 
to produce an institutional study of the development of a Trades 
Council and Trades and Labour Pouncil in the inter-war years. 
Alternatively, I could follow the logic of the instinct I had 
developed whilst at the Trades Council: this would mean a further 
period of research, probably delaying completion until well over 
three years were passed. Eventually, I decided for the latter 
course; only, however, after two or three months' work had made the 
dilemma clear, and had shewn the near-impossibility of any other 
approach. 
(4) The fourth phbLse, then, involved a return to labour 
records, but a contraction in the time period to (roughly) 1917-1927; 
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this was seven or eight months' work. 
(5) When this was completed-, I began writing. By this 
time, however, my three years' grant had expired; I was 
unemployed, and my morale was low. In addition, I was faced 
with the need to find paid employment, albeit temporary or 
part-time. As a result, I was unable to tackle writing-with 
any success; and after several more months' vain labour, I 
returned tolistorical records, 'and to attempting to clarify 
my ideas through reading. Although I was later to find the 
research done in this perioi cf value, it was at the time 
useful chiefly becxase it was Isomething which 
I could achieve. 
(6) -Eventually, after fotz-ý-and-a-half years in Edinburgh, 
I was appointed a tutor/organiser with the WEA in north Kent. 
Involving a substantial responsibility for trade union education% 
this led to importaat deýelopments in my understanding of the 
labour movement. The thesis which folloWs would undoubtedly be 
different, and I think weaker, but for this experiýnce- It did 
mean, however, that for over two year3 I did next to no work on 
the thesis, which became but a distant worry. 
(7) Finally, I resolved to complete-the thesis: this 
has meant two years and more of hard labour. It has involved 
two -types of work: firstly, reading (for not only was my 
knowledge of the literature some three years old, but I haa also 
revised my essential outlook in ways which needed theoretical 
elaboration); and, secondly, writing. 
This thesis has been a long time - too long - a-growing: over that 
period, I have-accumulated many debts. I should like to thank 
the staff of the libraries at the Universities of Edinburgh and Kent; 
I' 
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of the Dartford Public Library; of the British Library of 
Political afLd Economic Science; of-the Labour Party, 
Communist Party, and TUC libraries; and especially of the 
National Library of Scotland and the Edinburgh City Library. 
The Edinburgh District Committee of the Amalgamated Union of 
Engineering Workers (Engineering Section) kindly allowed me 
to consult certain of their records held by the National 
Library of Scotland. The Edinburgh-Trades Council not only 
allowed me to consult their records, but made ine more than 
welcome at their offices for seven or eight months: I am most 
grateful to the Council, to the then Secretary, Mr. John Henry, 
and to his assistant, Mrs. Nan Francis; Mr. Henry's successor, 
Mr. Des Loughney, has responded willingly to one or two postal 
requests for photocopies, and I should thank him for this. 
Miss Isobel Geddie of the University of Edinburgh's 
Social Science Faculty has patiently dealt with my case for More 
years than she must have anticipated: I trust-she will shortly 
be able to close what must now.. be a dusty file. I should also 
like to thank Miss Violet Laidlaw who has treated me similarly 
on behalf of the Department of Sociology. My research was made 
possible during 1974-1977 by a studentship from the Social 
Science Research Council; and for a toLal of perhaps fifteen 
months thereafter I was dependent upon the good offices of the 
Department of Health and Sociai Secullby: I ara grateful toboth. 
At quite an early stage, Ian MacDougall gave me the 
benefit of his enormous knowledge of Scottis h labour records: 
more recently, I have learnt, from his exhaustive Catalogue, 
how accurate his early guidance was. Over the years I have been 
helped in varicus ways by Mike Anderson, Trevor Jones, Bob Morris, 
and and Guy Neave, of the University of Edinburgh*V by Bill Kennedy of 
the University of Essex. I am grateful to them, and to others 
whom I may inadvertently have omitted. My supervisors, too, 
deserve mention: John Orr was my main adviser during the first 
9' 
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two or three years. Since then, Gianfranco Poggi has been 
immensely helpful: encouraging, critici. sing, as appropriate, 
over six years. 'It is astonishing what foolish things: one 
can temporarily believe if one thinks too long alone', wrote 
Keynes, 'particularly in economics (along with the other moral 
ScIeLice-B)': 
1 this thesis has been, written largely alone, and 
if I have both completed it and avoided folly, Gian. may claim 
much of the credit. 
The thesis has been typed by Sue Dyde, to whom I am most 
grateful: she has borne with my pedantry (which must, on occasions 
have seemed obsessive) without complaint, and with great patience 
and friendliness throughout. 
During my years in Edinburgh, I gained much - both 
personally and intellectually -from the friendship and comradeship 
of Caroline Bamford, Jean Casey, Tom Conlon, Diane Dixon, Michael 
Gold, Fiona Pirie, Dinah Robertson, and John and Pain Rodger. 
Michael and John'embarked on sociology PhDs at the same time as 1: 
with them I-have engaged in many a long hour of profitable 
discussion; from them, I have re-ceived inuch valuable encouragement 
and advice. The late Margot Hoare wrote an encouraging letter to 
me at a particularly difficult time. I learnt much about the 
Edinburgh labour movement through working with the Edinburgh Chile 
Solidarity Committee: I am grateful to it, and to the members of the 
Chilean community in Edinburgh. Since coming to Kent, I have 
profited from working with Harold Goodwin, who has been 
persistently encouraging and supportive, and with John Thirkell 
of the University of Kent; I sfiould also acknowledge my debt to my 
students in WEA and TUC classes, from whom I have learnt much. 
J. M. Keynes, 'The General Theory of Employment Intere3t and 
Money (London 1936), vii. 
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Michael Gold preceded me to, south-cast England: his friendship 
and encouragement have continued to be invaluablo. 
My greatest debt, however, is twofold: firstly, to 
my parents, who brought me to the point where I cwuld under- 
take the project, and who encouraged me throughout; my father, 
despite illness, also read the thesis in manu. -#cri-pt, and made 
a number of helpful suggestions. Secondly, to mywife, Hilary 
Rankin, who has lived with it very nearly as long as I yet has 
probably suffered more. Despite the pressiAres of her own degree, 
and subsequent qualification and practice as-a solicitor, she has 
provided unceasing encouragement and support. Without these, 
the thesis would never have been written. Not only has she 
been of invaluable assistance in reading and correcting-the 
typescript: she has read my manuscripts at every stage, and 
in total. The thesis would be the weaker but for the criticisms 
and suggestions she has made. 
Finally, I am required to declare (a) that I have composed the 
thesis, and (b) that the work is my own. The debts acknowledged 








Existing accounts of the development of labour in britain during 
the Great War and the following decade are problematical in 
several respects. Some of these problems may be overcome by 
specifying more precisely the relationship between class ucnscious- 
ness and political actioni Gramscils-notion of 'contradictory 
consciousness' provides a basis for*a theory of political motiv- 
ation, ' stressing the fragmentary nature of consciousness. Other 
problems can be. surmounted by shifting the focus of re", earch from 
national to local institutions an4 processes. A study of the 
development of-the labour movement in Edinburgh, grounded-in the 
above theory, allows*an argument to be developed as follows. 
Advances by the working class movement during and, just after 
the war were based in part on changes in economic, social, and 
political structures, which increased the relative strength--of 
resources available to the movement. --But-fundamental to the 
advances, and especially to their character, * was a shift in the 
language by which action could be motivated. The terminology of 
'nationalism' became more open to use in the working class inýrest; 
notions such as lorganisation' and 'efficiency' found their-- 
meanings increasingly within a national, x-ather than in a market, 
context; the importance of planning lent legitimacy to some 
versions of socialism. 
Important reorganisation of the local labour movement (1918- 
1921) was made possible by the strength and breadth of this language 
within the movement.. But the language also influenced strongly 
the nature of the reorganisation achieved (in particular, it was 
based on 'mechanistic' images of organisation), and this had last- 
ing effects. 
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From late 1920 economic factors shifted the balance of 
power in industry away from labour. Shifts also occurred in the 
language of motivation. These increased employers' ability to 
act in their own interests, whilst reducing workers' ability to 
defend themselves through industrial action. Unions responded 
through propaganda and, when this failed to ensure membership 
commitment, through tighter organisational discipline. At the 
same time, -the basis of industrial action as a political strategy 
was eroded, weakening the Marxist element ofthe movement: this 
now became. influential only in periods of heightened militancy 
(e. g., 1926). 
From about 1921 onward, labour politics were increasingly 
directed by an informal alliance of economistic Olabourist! ) trade 
unionism and reformist socialist ('Labour Socialist') politics. 
Helped by the weakening of Marxist influence, this was based on 
two central principles: a cleýir distinction between industrial 
and political action, and a definition of the latter in electoral- 
parliamentary terms. Electoral politics offered not only an 
apparently viable strategy to power, but also one which did not 
ask unions to jeopardise their fragile industrial position. In 
addition, it permit'ted the creation of institutions 
(especially 
the Labour Party) which wre relatively stable: something Marxist 
strategies could not achieve. 
The thesis is divided into four parts. The first criticises 
various'accounts of the development of the labour movement in 
this period, and outlines the alternative theory. In part II 
asp ects of Edinburgh's social and industrial structure are 
explored, shewing inter alia that while the working class was 
highly fragmented, this was reduced in certain respects. Part III 
concerns labour's industrial strength: some accounts of capital- 
ist development are criticised; work and union organisation in 
four industries is explored; variations in union strength are 
explained. Finally, the development of labour's political 
alliances and institutions is discussed. 
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Part One Introductory 
'to fix one's mind on the military model 
is the iftark of a fool: politics ... mUst 
have priority over its military aspect, and 
only politics creates the possibility for 
manoeuvre and raovement. ' 
Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, 232- 
'What Darwin achieved in biology and Herbert 
Spencer attempted in philosophy, Marx 
accomplished in sociology. ... Marx has 
furnished the Labour Movement with a great 
tactical lesson., "Man makes his own 
history, but he does not make it out of 
the whole of the cloth; he does not make 
it out of conditions chosen by himself, but 
out of such as he finds close at hand. The 
tradition of all past generations weighs like 
an alp on the brain of the living ... 11 1 
Michael Marcus, B. L. 9 




Labour 1917-1927: in History and Theory 
1.1 Labour and political instability 1906-1927 
The years surrounding the Great War in Britain were understood by 
contemporaries, and have been explained by historians, in the 
language of change, of instability, of crisis. Interpretations 
have differed; and there have, of course, been those who have 
denied either the instability or its significance. But the weight 
of evidence is overwhelming. Politically, the period saw the 
decline of the Liberal Party from its massive victory of 1906 to 
relative insignificance by the mid-twentico; the weakening of the 
House of Lords; the extension of the franchise to all adult males 
(and some women); and the growth of the Labour Party from 42 MPs in 
1910 to government in 1924. This last is itself associated with-the 
deep restructuring of'the working 61ass movement, and has some 
relationship - however uneasy - with the Ilabour unrest' of 1910- 
1914 and of the war years. The economy was in the midst of its long 
transformation from nineteenth century 'laissez-faire' capitalism: a 
transformation marked in particular by the development of new 
technologies, by the extension of the factory system and the consequent 
need for reorganisation of production processes, by the development of 
the mass working class market, and by the concentration of industrial 
ownership and the growth in the size of enterprises. And, of course, 
there was the war. 
Fundamental to an understanding of this period is an awareness 
of the-growing strength of the working class and of labour politi cs. 
The late nineteenth century saw the re-emergence of working class 
political activity independent of Liberalism after nearly half a 
century's dormancy. The formation of the Labour Representation 
Committee in 1900 was the major event in the process by which the 
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labour movement broke - organisationally, at least - with Liberalism. 
This process began in the late 1880's with the formation of the 
Scottish Labour Party, and then the Independent Labour Party, 
continuing (at least) until the Labour Party succeeded in winning 
the Miners' MPs in 1910. But although the existence of an 
independent Labour Party clearly affected the parameters of the 
British political process its effect, in its early years, was at Lhe 
margin. Even at its pre-war peak, in December 1910, Labour could 
return only 42 MPs, and that after the mass defection to the Party 
of the (previously Liberal) Miners' MPs; it won just over seven per 
cent of-the votes at the election. - And whilst the Party was thus 
growing only slowly, most of its victories were the product of a tacit 
understanding with the Liberals. 
Before the war, then, the Labour Party posed only a distant 
threat-to the political order; indeed, it has been argued that the 
Liberal Party had effectively reconstructed its politics in the pre-war 
period, enabling it to retain the working class support which the 
Labour Party thrýatened. On this analysis, Labour was contained (and 
might well have been reintegrated by Liberalism) had it not been for 
the - contingent and unpredictable - events of wartime, which led to the 
demise of the Liýeral Party. As the major proponent of thi, s view has 
succinctly written, 
class had already clearly emerged as the 
bedrock of voter alignments in the pre-war 
period, yet at this stage the Liberals 
had been able to benefit from the process 
It was'only after 1916 that Labour made an 
qffective independent bid for power - and 
did so at a time when Asquitý and Lloyd George 
obligingly dealt the Liberal Party a series 
of stunning blows. I 
Although there is much to be said against this viewpoint, 
2 the apparent 
threat to the political order in the years before the Great War 
incontestably came not from tho Labour Party but from the industrial unrest 
r 
P. F. Clarke in The Times Literary Supplements 27 AuguOt 1976, quoted 
by_A. Howkins, 7Edwardian Liberalism and Industrial Unrest: a class 
y Workshop J. 4 149. iýiew'of the degline of Liberalisrrý" Histor, sý977' 
2. See, e. g., Howkins, 143 61; P-Waller, rev16i of P. F. Clarkej 
Lancashire and the New Liberalism (Cambridge 1971).. Eng. Hist. Rev. 
07,1972,843-6. 
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of iq1o-1qi4: what became known as the 'Labour Unrest'. Articulated 
and given direction by the advocates of syndicalism and industrial 
unionism, this unrest represented clear evidence of the breakdown of 
the (relatively) peaceful relationship between trade unions and the 
state which had prevailed since the defeat of Chartism; and it 
implicitly challenged, and raised doubts about the extent of popular 
commitment to, the parliamentary system. 
3 
The 'Labour Unrest' also raisod serious questions about the 
appropriate 
overall strategy/for labour. Nor were these raised only implicitly. 
Syndicalist theory, though not the cause of the unrest, lent direction 
to the movement and a rationale to its methods. In return, of courset 
syndicaliý= gained strength as a theory oi labour: it was no accident 
that substantial theoretical debate emerged during the period of the 
industrial unrest for the first time within the mature British labour 
movement. Syndicalists of Tom Mannl. s stature were able to evoke 
responses from the 'big guns' of the official Labour Party, notably 
Ramsay MacDonald,. Philip Snowden and the Webbs - and responses which were 
not merely dismissive, but which en8: aged the syndicalists in theoretical 
debateý 
When war broke out in 1914, therefore, both the Labour Party's 
electoral strategy, and syndicalism, had records of success - at least 
in their own terms - behind them. The war divided socialists throughout 
Europe, and not least in Britain, but the divisions cut. across the entire 
spectrum of labour thought - including the Labour Party and syndicalism. 
Royden Harrison suggests a typology of labour attitudes to, the war, 
dividing them into four categories: there were 'the Hun-hating Jingos 
and ultra-loyalists'; the'sane patriots'; those whose opposition to the 
. 
war was reflected in 'renunciation, dissociation and withdrawal'; and the 
'revolutionary defeatists'. Even this is to simplify: the ultra-loyalists, 
for, instance, included trade unionists such as Havelock Wilson, but also 
the veteran Marxist H. M. Hyndman; among the 'sane patriots' were numbered 
3. B. Holton, Britiah Syndicalism 1900-1914. M 
(London 1976), esp. 74-76. 
ths and Realities 
Seeý)e. g., P. Snowden, Socialism and Syndicalism(London and Glasgow 
191 this and other contributions to the debate are discussed 
by R. Holton, 'Syndicalist theories'of the State, ' Sociol. Reva 
28,198025-21. 
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such trade union leaders as Fred Bramley of the Railwaymen as 
well as political intellectuals, as the Webbs; Ramsay MacDonald 
was unenthusiastically anti-war, as was Bob Smillie of the Mine- 
workers. Similarly, labour political organisations and movements 
were split between these various Attitudes: Tom Mann, for instance, 
probably the leading syndicalist figure, was if anything a 'sane 
patriot!; James Connolly, by contrast, was clearly a 'revolutionary 
defeatist 1.5 Parallel divisions within the British Socialist Party 
and the UP are well documented. 
6 
Such divisions 'inevitably prevented the labour movement's 
developing-a worthwhile anti-war organisation, and implied a strong 
susceptibility (and in many cases, inclination) to respond to the 
imperatives of war. So the War Emergency: Workerd National 
Committee was set up, to be 'responsible for safeguarding working 
class interests during the "Emergency"', while the TUC's leaders 
signed the so-called Treasury Agreement, in effect suspending many 
trade-union rights and standards for the duration. 
7 Implicitly, of 
course, these moves reflected not simply a response to the war, , 
but also an assumption that the working class could be defended 
most effectively 
WIRý5ýiations with government. The 
a 5 R-Harrison, 'The War Emergency Workers' National Committee, 
1914-1920, ' in A. Briggs and J. Saville (eds. ), Essays_in 
Labour History 1886-1923 (London 1971), 217-24. 
6. W. Kendall, The Revolutionary Movement in Britain 1900-21 
(London 1969), esp. 84-104; R. Dowse, Left in the Centre. The 
Independent Labour Party 1893-1940 (London 1966), esp. 20-34. 
7. These developments are reviewed by K. Middlemas, politics in 
Industrial Society. The experience of the Britigh System 
since 1911 (London 1979), 71-93; Harrison, 211-59. 
labour leaders were to become 'the diplornatic representatives 
of the wage-earning class'. 
8 
Such thinking also, no doubt, lay 
behind the decision of Arthur Henderson and other Labour MPs to take 
office in Lloyd George's Government in 1916. To an extent, they 
were correct. As Ralph Miliband observes, 
The war immediately gave Labour's leaders, 
particularly its industrial leaders, a 
very different and nrach enhanced status. 
For now they came to be needed (and, as 
the war dragged on, s6roly needed) as 
brokers and intermediaries between the 
Government and a labour force whose 
acceptance of a new industrial discipline 
was an essential condition of military 
success. 9 
Therie were, of course, limitations, as Henderson was to discover in 
1917-10 But there is no question that the war - or, more precisely, 
the production imperatives It implied - required a far more active 
integration of the working class into the national effort: production 
and efficiency became overnight matters of national, and not just 
private or coamiercial, interest. The involvement of tho working class 
in industry could no longer be left to individual employers, with the 
state playing a background, supportive role - for instance, by 
asserting and enforcing a legal framework for the economy, or by 
protecting the 'political' realm against incursions of 'industrial' 
conflict, as during the 'Dibour Unrent'. 
It was against this background that the labour movement entered 
a remarkable period of development. Trade union membership grew at an 
unprecedented rate; when this growth began to be reversed in the early 
'twenties, major regrouping and oreanisational restructuring took place 
among the unions. Not only were amalgamations commonplace; in many 
cases, and above all in the case of the TUC, unions' management 
structures were thoroughly revised. In the final year of the war 
the Labour Party agreed a new constitution and programme, which led 
e Unionism (London 1920) 8. S. and B. Webb, The flill3tory of Trad 
quoted in R-Milibands Parliameatnry Socialism. A Study in 
the politics of'labour-TL-ondon 1973), 47- 
9. Mi-liband, 47- 
10. On Henderson's expulsion from the War Cabinet, see J. 
M. Winter, 
'Arthur Hendersofi, the Russian Revolution, and the recon- 
struc-tion of the Labour Party', Hist. J. 15, ý972,753-73-ý 
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over the following decade - to a radical revision of the movement's 
political org. 4nisation. Although this occurred less immediately than 
Miliband assumed, over the following decade or so it 
transformed the Labour Party from a 
loose federation of affiliated , 
organisations into a centralised, 
nationally cohesive Party, with its 
own individual members, organised 
in local constituency parties, and 
subject to central party discipline. 11 
It. also had a profound effec. t on the , roles 
of the ILP and the 
various Marxist parties. (In 1921 the latter themselves regrouped 
in the new Communist Party. ) By the later 1920s, therefore, the 
institutional structure ofthe labour movement was, broadly, that 
which persisted for the following half century. So the decade 
starting-in about 1917 moulded, in large part, the character of 
labour politics for laýer generations. 
That decade, however, was far from stable, Both economic 
and political spheres were constantly in flux, and the pattern of 
labour politics which at length emerged was the result not just 
of the interaction between the different elements of the movement. 
For thisinteraction took, place in a changing pblitical and economic 
context which could rapidly alter the relationships between these' 
various elements. For example, when war broke out, many attitudes 
relating to nationalism and internationalism (which had previously 
been of little practical*importance within the movement) became 
those on which political allegiances of central importance turned. 
-If other contextual changes were often slower or less dramatic, 
some were still more significant. 
11. Miliband, 60. 
F 
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Our purpose is to examine the process by which labour 
politics, in the broadest sense, were remoulded in the decade 
after 1917- In order -to do so, however, we must examine also the 
changing context in which this process occurred: the development 
of the economy, of social relationships, of politics beyond the 
labour movement. Yet labour was-a major actor in this environment, 
and one which was widely seen as the main threat to the stability - 
even the continuance - of the political and economic order; as a 
result, the story of how labour politics were remoulded must 
inevitably be interwoven with the story of how political 
restabilisation took place. It is to a discussion of the latter 
story that we now turn. 
1.2 
- 
The political incorporation of the working class 
The period surrounding the Great War in Britain was one of political 
crisis, instability, and restabilisation. In this section, we 
examine a number of theories which attempt to explain how the 
instability was overcome during the decade from about 1917. Before 
doing so, however, we look at how the stability of the previous 
period has been explained: this is essential for an adequate 
understanding of our period. 
We shall divide attempts to account for the political 
development of the working class after Chartism into two broad 
categories, representing different theoretical traditions: Marxist 
and non-Marxist. Both are concerned to explain the quiescence 
of the working class; both do so by suggesting that it was in 
some way incorporated into the established political system. Beyond 
this, however, they diverge substantially: incorporation is above all 
I 
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problematic for Marxism which must account for the failure of the 
working class to develop a revolutionary character. 
For the classic non-Marxist explanation of working class 
incorporation we may turn to T. H. Marshall. Many working historians 
tacitly assume the adequacy of his account: Marshall's strength 
is his making the theory explicit. It is, he maintains, possible 
to distinguish a 'basic human equality', citizenship, which 
indicates 'full membership of a community's 
12 from other types of 
(essentially economic) equality.. Thus equality in the sense of 
citizenship is quite compatible with other forms of social 
inequality. Given this premise, - Marshall argues that although 
social inequality clearly has not been eliminated, the period 
since the mid-nineteenth century has seen the systematic extension 
of citizenship rights to the working classes. Through measures 
such as the extension of the franchises and the secret ballot, 
political or electoral rights were extended; 
13 
whilst the 
recognition of collective bargaining as a 'normal and peace- 
ful market operation' 
14 had 'created a secondary system of industrial 
citizenship parallel with and supplementary to the system of 
political citizenship'. 
15 These processes were facilitated by the 
reduction in economic inequality, and hy the 'great extension of 
the area of common culture and common experience. 116 In 
I 
12. T. H. Marshall, 'Citizenship and social class' in his Sociology 
at the Crossroads and otherEssays (London 1963), 72. 
13- Ibid., 93. 
14. Ibid., 117- 
15. Ibid., 98. 
16. Ibid., 121. 
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this way citizenship has been universalised and enriched, with 
the result that the working class could be expected to continue to 
accept the basic principles of the political and institutional order. 
It hav. been pointed out thatthis, ana similar accounts, 
17 
as sume the existence of 
an anxious, but nonetheless wise and open 
political elite who, sustained by a pro- 
pitious set of institutions dating from 
medieval times and with liberal traditions, 
responded to just working class claims by 
introducing a series of reform measures 
which swept away political, privilege and 
served to stave off 'extremist' movements. 18 
Thus emphasis is placedlon the one hand, on the social conscience of 
the political. elite, and on the other on its ability to rely on 
existing working class attitudes of deference and respectability, and 
on the integratine normative aspects of religion, lembourgeoisement', 
propaganda, and so forth. I-n other words, as Marshall rather quaintly 
puts it, 
as the social conscience stirs to life, 
class abatement, like smoke abatement, 
becomes a desirable aim to be pursued as 
far as is compatible with the continued 
efficiency of the social machine. 19 
But this desire to bring the working class into the political 
establishment involves potential instabilities. These are overcome 
through the operation of existing social values, which are then 
complemented or replaced by the value consensus centred around the 
new universal citizenship* Yet, as H. F. Moorhouse has suggested, 
20 
17. E. g., R. Bendix, Nation-Bailding-and Citizenship (New York 
1964); R. McKenzie and A. Silver, Angels in Marble (London 
1968). 
18. H. F. Moorhouse, 'The political incorporation of the British 
working class: an interpretation', SociologY 7,1973,342. 
19. Marshall, 90. 
20. Moorhousp, 341-3- 
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the heavy dependence on value consensus and integrated meaning 
systems in these historical accounts contrasts sharply with the 
ucight of recent research which has cast doubt on the significance 
of these factors in modern Britain. 
21 Of course, it may be that 
value dissensus and inconsistency of meaning syatems are peculiarly 
modern phenomena, though this is prima facie unlikely; even so, the 
modern rosearch casts doubt on these historical accounts in so far as 
they assume political consensus to be the result of the historical 
processes they describe. 
Another feature on these accounts is a certain tendency to 
historical oversimplification and telescoping: for instance, there is 
a concentration on the purely formal sources of political power, such 
as the franchise, but little concrete discussion of working. class 
political development, or of the real sources of power. Moreover, there 
is little or no discussion of periods of crisis in this process, which 
is seen as an eoneentially smooth progression. 
22 
The typical K-Arxist attempt to account for the quiescence of the 
working class is very different; 'above all, Marxists have rarely 
attempted a theoretical overview of the entire period. There is 
almost invariably a sense of profound discontinuity, with-the turning 
point somewhere around the Great War. This largely reflects a shift 
in the immediate object of explanation:, whereas for the nineteenth 
century the question at issue is the quiescence of the working class, 
in the post-war period it is the quiescence of the Labour Party, or at 
least its failure to mobilise the working class in any significant non- 
electoral way. Much of the theory is not explicitly articulated by its 
authors, and must be reconstliicted from work in which it is implicit. 
21. E. g. 3 M. Mazin, 'The social cohesion of 3. iberal democracy, Amer. Sociol. Rov- 35,1970,423-39; J. Westergaard, 'The 
rediscovery of the cash nexus. Some recent interpretations 
of trends in British class structure, ' Socialist Re7ister 
1970,111-138. 
22. Moorhouse, 343-4. 
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So far as the nineteenth century working class : L3 concerned, 
the main explanatory concept for Marxists has been the 'labour 
aristocracy'. This seems to have originated in popular usage in the 
1840s and 1850s, 
23 
wgs given rigour by Lenin in his work on 
24 
and was certainly a staple of Briti3- imperialism, ýh Harxism in the 
inter-war period. 
25 In recent years it bus been the subject of 
substantial methodological and empirical debate: 
26 
we need not 
review this, but it is useful to summarise briefly two main versions 
of the theory of the labour ariBtocracy. 
27The 
classic version holds 
that there was an identifiable stratum of the working class) 
distinguished by greater wealth and elitist values, which was 
responsible in some way for the retardation (and often betrayal) of 
the working class as a whole. It is often associated with, firstly, 
the Leninist theory of imperialism, the labour aristocracy being 
'bribed' or, lbought off' by a section of the profit deriving from col- 
onial exploitation - and also with a highly conspiratorial and 0 
manipulative view of bourgeois rule. This perspective, with its 
intimate links with political debate, has inevitably involved a 
23. M. Shepherd, 'The origins and incidenco of the term I'labour 
aristocracy'll, BSSLH 37,1978,51-67; J. Melling, 'Aristocrats 
and Artisansl,. BSSLH 39,1979,16-22; Shepherd, ILAour 
aristocracy:. a reply', BSSLH 40,1980,16-18. 
24. E. Hobsbawm, 'Lenin and the "aristocracy of labour", 
Marxism Today 14,1970,2077210. 
25. S. Macintyre, 'British labour, Marxism and working class 
apathy in the. nineteen twenties's Hist. J., 20,1977, esp.. 
490-93. 
26. The most recent round of debate was stimulated by 
H. F. Moorhouse, 'The Marxist theory of the labour 
aristocracy', Social'HistorY 3,1978,61-82; among the 
valuable contributions in subsequent issues, see esp. 
A. Reid, 'Politics and economics in the formation of the 
British working class: a response to H. F. Moorhouse', 
Social HistorY 3,19781 347-61. 
27- This distinction is made by G. McLennan, "'The labour 
aristocracy" and "incorporation": notes , on some 
terms in 
the social history of the working class', Social aisLary 
6,1981, esp. 72-3* 
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pejorative chacterisation of the labour aristocracy. The 'revised' 
version has been concerned to dissociate historical analysis from 
this emotive and pejorative heritage. Whilst it accepts the existence 
of a labour aristocracy as a distinct stratum, it sees the latter's 
privileges as the'result of struggle ratherthan conspiracy; and it 
sees the labour aristocratic values (of respectability and so on) as 
negotiated rather than imposed - the result of an active engagement 
by a section of the working class with dominant bourgeois values. In 
this version, the laboul- aristocracy io often seen as an element in the 
achievement of 'hegen: ony-I in a Gramscian sense: 
Hegemorrj over the working class should 
therefore not be seen in terms of a re- 
moulding of the 'respectable' skilled 
strata in the bourgeois image. It arose 
from a complex set of social relations, in 
which bourgeois reform aimed at imposing 
social discipline was one, but only one, 
element. It would be equally true to say 
that rela4ons of hegemony involved the 
imposition on the bourgeoisie of some 
form of representation, at Ftl-L levels of 
social practice, of working class interests 
(especially, but not exclusively, those of 
the labour aristocracy). 28 
Now exponents of both versions of the theory accept that the 
labour-aristooracy, as a distinct stratum, had disappeared (or at 1ea3t 
undergone substantial change) by 1918, and had lost much of its 
stabilising role. 'The period from 1914 on was to see a collapse of 
the old labour -aristocracy', according to Eric Ilobsbawin, 
29 
while for 
John Foster 'the device of, bribing a whole stratum "through the market" 
was becoming'both economically difficult and politically unreliable' 
30 
28. R. Gray, 'Bourgeoir, hegqmony in Victorian Britain', in 
J. Bloomfjqld (ed. ), Class, flogemony and Party (Lpndon 1977), 
29. 'The labour aristocracy in nineteenth-century Britain' in 
I ý? Hobsbawm, Labouring, Men: Studies in the History f 
Labour 
(Lpndon 1968), 300. 
30, Foster, 'British Imperialism and the labour aristocracy' in 
q. Skelley. (ed. ), The General Strike 1926 (London 1976),. 20. 
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from the late nineto, ýnth century onward. 
Certainly the period after the Great War was very different 
from the late Victorian years. In particular, whilat in the earlier 
period the working class had not developed class-based political 
organisations, by the 1920s these were well-established: if the 
labour aristocracy was still important, it was effective in a very 
different way. But the very development of class-based political 
organisations seems to bave led to a major theoretical shift. The 
theory of the labour aristocracy explicitly seeks to explain working 
class consciousness and activity by reference to capitalist economic 
development, at least in large part. At a certain stage, it suggests, 
capitalism fragments the working class in a particularly significant 
manner, so that one stratum can receive (or win) iinportLuit privileges: 
this has important implications for working class politics. The 
existence of the Labour Party appears to have led to an assumption 
that adequate explanations of working class consciousness and action 
may be found in a study of the Party itself: 
31 
rather than seeking 
to explain 1. -he development of working class politics by reference to* 
economy and social structure, reference is made to the organisational 
and other characteristics of the labour movement. Of course, the 
character off the Labour Party and'the other institutions of the. 
movement must be a factor in an account of political restabilisation; 
-but to make it the major factor explaining working class consciouýsness 
and action comes close to circularity. 
Yet the main theoretical approaches to the development of labour 
-politics in the 1920s come dangerously close to doing just this: they 
31. The titles of G. D. H. Cole's classic worixs of labour history 
illustrate this assumption: British Working Class Politics 
1832-1914 (London '1941), but he saw A History of the Labour 
Party from 1914 (London 1948)'as being an adequate sequel. 
To a lesser extent, the existence of the Communist Part. y, 
and the growth of the trade unions, have had analogous 
effects. I 
34 
are strong on the nature of political organisations, but short of 
sustained discussion olf the sources of class conscioueness. In 
consequenco, they tend to oversimplify the crucial, but highly 
complex, relationship betwe, -n organisatiihnal factors and class 
mobilisation. We can distinguish four main theoretical approaches; 
they differ more in their area of study than in nethodology. Their 
common element is a thesis that the 'incorporation', or 'integration', 
by various means, of working class, leadern was effective in hindering 
or preventing the adoption by the labour movement (or the working 
class) of a revolutionary socialist perspective. Let us examine these 
in turn. 
The first approach stresses the role of trade union leaderships. 
This clearly has ito origins in the political debates within the left 
. 
in the 'twenties 32 but has alo'o formed the backbone of some, more 
recent, writing. In the 'twenties, many clements of the political left 
adopted the view that trade union leaders diverted discontent into 
harmless channels; the Communist Party went so far as to claim this 
was the chief purpose of the leadership, particularly in the period 
after the General Strike. 
33 This did not necessarily go hand in hand 
with the assumption that the working class was incipiently militant or 
revolutionary (though, especially in some simplified accounts, this was 
a tendency). Even in popular versions, however, theret could be a 
certain bizarre logic: leaders w'ere traitors, but the workers were 
fools for allowing themselves to be duped. In the more sophisticated 
32. See, e. g., R. Palme Dutt's 'Notes of the Month' in Labour 
Monthly during 1921-23:. 'The premise of theso. excellent 
criticisms of Labour is the immediate coming of a Social 
Revolution, prevented only by the backwardness and 
treachery of Labour leaders' (Plebs League, 1ýýt to Read. 
A guide for worker students (London 1923), 377 
ýBee also 
MacintTTýe, -494-. 5. Criticism of leaders was, of course, a 
long-established trad,, ý union tradition: sees e. g., 
Unofficial Reform Committee, The Miners' Next St2p 
(Tonypandy 1912; new edition Londcn 1973)- 




writLigs, such as Trotsky's, an ideological characterisation of the 
leadership was interwoven with a description of working class 
conscioucness: 
We see the traits of conservatism, 
religiosity, and nation arrogance in 
all the present-day official leaders.... 
It would be a great error to underestimate 
the powers of resistance and tenacity of 
theae conservative peculiarities of the upper 
ranks of the British workine. claus. By this, 
of course, we have no wish to imply that 
clerical and conservative-national tendencies 
are completely foreipn to the inassiDs. But at 
the same time, while the boargeois-national 
traits have entered into the flesh and blood 
of the leaders..., in the working masses, they 
have had an immeasurably less profound and 
stable character. 34 
The assumption, then, remained that the workinE; class vias potentially, 
at least, more militant than its leaders. 
This approach-has been bolstered by some historians; the case. 
is particulariy well put by James Hinton and Richard Hyman. They 
argue that, in the early 'twenties, the effoct of economic depressiortýun- 
-employment, deteriorating work: Lng conditions was demoralisation, 
uncertainty and defensiveness. The rank and file confidence 6f the 
previous decade was reversed. For shop floor trade unionismi there was 
I, 35 a new relationship of dependence on the union bureaucracies, whose 
strength was enhanced further by the enormous increase in size of 
the major unions (chiefly through amalgamation), and by the growth of 
national bargaining. 
36 As a reuilt, in the 1920s, 'the role of the 
union bureaucracy was more central to industrial relations than in 
any other period of British labour history'. 
37 Now clearly this can 
34. L. Trotsky, Where is Britain Going? (London 197o: first 
edition, 1925), 40. 
35- J. Hinton and R. lVinan, Trade Unions and Revolution. 
The Tndustrial Politics of the Early British Lommuniist 
Party don 197.5)s 16- 
36. Ibid. j 18-19. 
37- * Ibid. l 22. 
36 
be distinguished from the debateS Of the 'twenties by its assertion 
that there was little -rank and file militancy for the new 
bureaucracy to stifl--.,; others, however, have combined similar 
estimates of the growth of a trade union bureaucracy with a profound 
belief in the militancy ofthe rank and file. As Brian Pearce writes$ 
wide sections of the workers became aware 
that the militant policy their new 
circum5tances urgently demanded was being 
sabotaged by their officials- 38 
These more modern versions are subject to one or both of two 
tellinE; criticisms. First, the tarm Ibureaucracyl is employed in a 
manner which conflates the noiion of a body of officials with that of 
the modes of behaviour and the internal relationships characteristic 
of bureaucracy in a Welyx&n Yet a body of officials can have, 1 : eense. p 0) . 3.1 a 
,a 
pLiLori, no particula. 3/ role; and whilst there are many reasons fox- 
tupposing that bureaucratic behaviour and relationships developed, 
there is no reason to presume that these were limited to full time 
trade union officials. Second, those who see the growth of 
bureaucracy as a means of restraining the militRncy of the union 'rank 
and file' tend to focus their empirical research on certain key 
struggles, such aa the General Strike. They find that these confirm 
their belief that militant members were betrayed by union leaders. 
Yet such findings are methodologically unsound: key struggles are, 
almost by definition, periods of militancy; and to focus on them 
encourages aii excessive concern with tactics while ignoring. 2and even 
obscuring, the vital issue of how militant attitudes develop. 
The second theoretical approach to labour in the 'twenties is 
often associated with the first. It in that the period-saw a failure 
of revolutionary socialist leaderships and that this failure can be 
attributed to the political inadequacies of the British Communist Party, 
38. Pearce, 'Somo Past Rank and File Movements' in M. Woodhouse 
and B. Pwýrce, Essays on the History of Communism, in Britain 
(London 1975), 109. 
37 
or the Communist International (or both). 
39 Clearly vach a case 
must rest on the promise that the working class was in some way 
inherently revolutionary; ad-herents of thin perspective also tend to 
concentr ate their renearch in poriods and places where militancy can 
be taken as read, iind are subject to the same criticism. 
The third approach, is inore substantial; it is implicit in much 
work on the early Labour Party. During the Itwentiest of course, the 
Labour Party began to accumulate large-scale'electoral support; there 
has been a widespread assumption that it rapidly became a mass 
membership party after 1918.4o Assuming these to be'true, it is 
reasonable to argue that the political orientations of the leaders of 
the Labour Party are a significant factor in the development of the 
politics of the working clans after the Great War. Several writers 
have argued such a case. In his Parliamentary Socialism, a work that 
can truly be termed seminal, Miliband avers that 
of political parties claiming socialisir, 
to be their aim, the Labour Party has 
always been one of the most dogmatic - 
not about socialism, but about the 
parliamentary system. Empirical and 
flexible about all else, its leaders have 
always made de, ýotion*to that system their 
fixed point of reference and the condition- 
ing factor of their political behaviour.... 
-the leaders of the Labour Party have always 
rejected any kind of political action (such 
zs industrial action for political purposes) 
which fell, or which appeared to them to 
fall, outaide the framework and conventions 
of the parliamentary system. 41 
Certainly, in pursuing this theme through sixty years of the Party's 
history, the point is well taken. But Miliband is above all concerned 
39- Woodhouse and Pearce, 1-178. 
4o. E. g., R. McKenzie believed that 'local Labour Parties grew 
rapidly in. number ... after 1918': British 
Political Parties 
(London 1963), 482. 
41 14iliband,. 13, 
38 
to prove his point: he is not primarily concerned to show why tho 
Labour'Party adopted this'position (though, incidentally, he makes 
some use. "Cul sugFestioijs); nor does lie demonsirate that, had the 
Party encouraged - say - industrial action for political purposes, it 
would have experienced any significant success. 
Similar criticism may be directed at those who share Miliband's 
broad approach. Leo Panitch largelY succeeds in his attempt to show 
fluit the essential 'ideology' of the Labour Party has always been 
'integrationist' rather than, ldisintegrationist' - that is, it sees 42 
8oci6ty as essentially a ur2-ty, rather than a; 3 basically fissured. 
But this explanation of how this became aij; nificant for the working 
class (through union/party links) is simplistic and undeveloFed. 
David Coates does addreas the problem of working class conservatism and 
lack of revolutionary tradition, but his responses are merely 
preparatory to a similar essay in proving 
that Labour Party politics cannot, and will 
not, culminate in the creation of a 
genuinely socialist society; and that, on the 
contrary, the Labour Party and its claims are 
a major blockage.... 43 
His responses to the problem of working class conservatism (that is, to 
the claim that the Party's pollt#c reflected working class political 
attitudes and bellaviour, 'rather than influencing them) are not pursued 
in any depth: ho merely contends that, at certe. in times in the 
twentieth century, the British working class ? might well have resrorlded 
to very radical political leadership indeed', - 
44 
and that the Labour 
Party itself has played an important role in shaping working class 
moderation, by providing definitions of 'politics' and 'working class 
interests' associated with parliamentary*tactics and vocial reform. 
45- 
42. L. Panitch, 'Ideology and integration: the case of the British 
Labour Partyt, Political Studies 19,1971,184-200. 
43- D. Coates, The Laboulr Part. 1 and the Struggle-for Soci,. --tl'.,. -sm (Cambridge 1975), V-vi- 
44. Ibid., viii. 
45. ibid., viii-ix. 
f 
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So, though these points are no doubt - to aome extent - brue, like 
Miliband's and Panitch's, Coates's argument is ab: 3tracted from 
discussion of working class consciaLisnezis, theoretical or historical. 
There is a fourth approach to the development of British labour 
in the 1920s: this concentrates on the role of the state in preserving 
the political order. Two substantial theoretical contributions deserve 
our attention here: those of Foster and Keith Middlemas. 
46 
As 
we have seen, Foster is one of the chief adherents of the theory 
of the labour aristocracy, and his discussion of the post-war 
situation is made somewhat arcane by his determination that this is 
best considered in terms of a version of that theory. 
Lenin never used the terin f'labour 
aristocracy'-7merely sociologically, 
to describe. a stratum within the work. - 
force. He was talIking about a 
historical'process, and a very specipjI. 
ona: howafter labour had formed its 
class organisations, and after the ariti- 
capitalist logic within them had started 
to become explicit, this 'conscious element' 
was nonetheless excluded and the dominance 
of bourgeois ideas maintained. 47 
Clearly, such'a definition of Ilabour aristocracy', whether or not 
Lenin's, is so broad as to make a nonsense of the term. However, if 
we ignore this qubzi-theological elements we are left with a 
substantial contribution at the level of state strategies. According 
to Foster, the. strategy developed 
was to surround the labour movement with 
a loose institutional framework that left 
it both apparently 'free' and 'autonomous' 
but at the same time decisively. limited its 
scopee 48 
This was to be achieved at a national levels and in contrast to the 184os 
46. We discuss Middlemas's account here, since it shares several 
important characteristics with the Mar: Ust contributions; 
- properly, of course, it constitutes an alternative to Marshall's non-Marxist account. 
47. Foster, 29-31- 
48. Ibid. i 32. 
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the containment of the conscious 
element rested far more directly on 
ideological and organisational man- 
ipulation (and hardly at all on the 
creation of distinct sectional cultures)* 
Mainly it seems to have been ideological. 
A climate of opinion would be created by 
a growing battery'of mass. influence - 
newspapers, radio, the church, education, 
and the government itself. The laboýir 
leadership would be persuaded to adopt a 
course of action which would enable it to 
'win' this public opihion. In doing this 
the leadership would both endorse the same 
assumptions within the labour movement and 
find itself forced into confrontation with 
those anti-capitalist elements that still 
opposed. Slowly, attitudes would be re- 
moulded, come into line with those peddled 
by the establishment - even though re- 
maining distinct and 'Labour'. 49 
This strategy, says Foster, was worked out in three phases. From - 
1918-1922 Lloyd George was intent on maintaining some form Of 'Lib-Lab' 
alliance, through reýorm and informal contacts with Labour leaders, 
which would prevent the emergence of a political Labour identity, 
retain the mass allegiances of the traditional partieslaid leave the 
labour movement as a sectional, trade union, body. By 1922 this had 
failed: Labour's gains at the election encouraged Baldwin and Bonar 
Law to pursue a policy of 'educating labourl into constitutional 
channels, and encouraging the right throughout the Labour Party and 
the movement. While this was initially successful (leading-to the 
failure of the Labour Government, and the return of 
, 
the Tories with a 
large majority), the left in the trade unions made-more progress than 
expected, producing the shook of 'Red Friday' in 1925. The result 
was that the Government adopted a new strategy: preparing for a short, 
head-on, assault on the Miners, to defeat the left in the unions and 
carry through a general attack on wages. This culminated in the 
General Strike, 50 
49. Ibid. 
50- Ibid., 31-45; for a critical di6cuSsion, see*A. Reid and' 
S. Tolliday, 'The General Strike, 19261, Hist-J. 20,1977, 
1001-1012. 
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Middlemast discussion of the 1920s is in the context of an 
analysis of a period of 'political harmony' in Britain which lasted 
from the early 'twenties to the late 1960s: 'a continuum almost without 
precedent in post-Reformation history. 
51 But Middlemas appreciates. 
that this period was constructed out of a severe crisis of the state, 
lasting at least from 1911 to 1916 (and associated, inte alia, with 
industrial militancy, which was overcome in large part through pz-ý-ofound 
developments in Government policy, especially over the years 1916 to 
1926. The new policy was to promote the leading organisations of the 
two sides of industry from the status of interest groups to that of 
-'governing institutions' - bodies whichhave devolved upon them functions 
previously carried out by government, which-share the government's 
basic assumption about 'national interests', and which accept-broady 
similar aims to those laid down by governments. 
52 Initially, this 
process was pursued in a formal manner, through-the 1919 National 
Industrial Conference; but after the latter's failure it was continued 
thDugh more flexible, informal methods. By-1926 there existed a-tri-. 
angular system-of collaboration between TUC, employers' organisations, 
and government. 
But in return for this recognition by government, the -'governing 
institutions' were expected to accept national aims-and (in practice, 
if not always in rhetoric) to shun class struggle; in-addition, they 
were to discipline those elements-within their-ranks whose-militancy 
had made the new political structure necessary. - Conflict-was thus 
displaced: rather than being manifested between the state and leading 
social institutions, it became internal-to the latter. (In the case of 
the labour movement the disputes were increasingly between-the TUC and 
the Parliamentary Labour Party on the-one side, and union members, and 
workplace and local union organisations, on the other . 
)53 
For our purposes, the overall validity of Middlemas's thesis is 
51! Middlemas, 15- 
. 
521 Ibidli 373. 
53- Ibid., 120-213- 
I 
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of little significance: 
54 
we need not establish that the 
TUC and its employers' analogues in fact become 'governing 
institutions', nor that the political system can be 
accurately characterised by the term 'corporate bias'. 
Instead, what is of value is his description of govern- 
ment strategy, and his analysis of its objectives. In 
this, there is substantial common ground between Middlemas 
and Foster: 
55and it may be significant that both accounts 
54. Substantial criticism, touching on the value of Middlemasis 
concepts, on his 'numerous errors of fact', and on his 
methodology, is to b. - found in R. Lowe, 'The Ministry of 
Labour: fact and fiction', BSSLH 41,1980,23-7, and 
in the review essay. by M. Dintenfass in. BSSLH 41,1980 63-5. ' 
55. #ate Those who argue that a clear/strategy toward labour was 
carried through during 1918-1924 have been implicitly 
criticised in a series of articles by R. Lowe: 'The failure of concensus in Britain: the National Industrial 
Conference, 1919-1921,1 Hi'st. J 21,1978, 
* 
649-75; 'The 
erosion of state intervention in Britain, 1917-24', 
Econ. Hist. Rev- 31,1978,270-89; and 'Ministry of 
Labour'. In effect, Lowe suggests that a central reason 
for the shift away from attempts to integrate labour, 
and toward a more aggressive attitude, was the structure 
of the civil service: in particular, the new Ministry 
of Labour was too weak, lacking 'the administrative 
resource and political weight to. develop new policies and 
challenge the Treasury in Cabinet and in Whitehall' ('Erosion', 285). This is a valuable corrective to some 
arguments. which err toward viewing the state as a fully 
rational agent; but although he may differ from other 
accounts in his explanation of government policies, his 
description and periodisation of these policies is not 
significantly different from Foster and Middlemas. 
If 
are empirically grounded in cabinet papers and the diaries 
of Tom Jones. 
56 But one corollary of concentrating thus on 
governmental strategy is the - almost inevitable - temptation 
to accept official assessments of the working class threat. 
One critic haswritten of Middlemas's '(unspoken) assumption 
that the British working class remained at the doorstep of 
insurrection for virtually forty years', being held back solely 
by 'corporate bias'. 57 This is unfair, since Middlemas sees 
'corporate bias' as fundamental, rather than epiphenomenal; 
but so far as the early 'twenties are concerned, it is a 
pointer to the'truth. For neither Middlemas nor Foster attempts 
seriously to analyse working class consciousness, and both 
have a tendency to assume that the working class has a revolut- 
ionary essence whose emergence is prevented solely by factors 
external to the class itself. 
These accounts, in the Marxist tradition 
', 
of the develop- 
ment of labour after the Great'War, together with Middlemas'st 
have, then, two main strengths: they direct our attention to 
problems of political crisis. and restabilisation, rather than 
treating them as unnatural and unimportant departures from an 
essentially ordered, peaceful, liberal. evolution; and they 
have. ]ýrovided justification for important and 
56. T. Jones, Whitehall Diary vol-11 1916-1925, edited by 
-I K. Middlemas7London., 1969). 
57a Dintenfass, 65. 
f 
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revealing research into union development, the national politics of 
the Labour-Party and, state strategies. But they have several 
weaknesses, -as we have seen: one they all share, and this is 
fundamental. They lack an adequate theory of the nature and 
generation of class consciousness: consequently, the subject of 
each study (union leaders, the Labour Party, the state, and so forth) 
is rendered f' or that study the independent variable on which working 
class political behaviour is dependent. 
This failing is associated with, and in large measure permitted 
by, a methodological limitation of the studies discussed. Most 
concentrate on political developments at national level, whether in 
government, unions, or Labour Party: this is, ipso facto, to discount 
the importance of local political ýehaviour. Yet it is only by 
detailed, local, research that we can discover-how political - 
institutions and strategies relate to the experience of-class, 
producing forms of-action - or inaction. Of course, every-local study 
is particular and partial; but studies-of national political-behaviour 
must make 
, 
assumptions about local experience. ---In the absence-of-proper 
local researcht there are a number-of very real-dangers. -Contemporary 
leaders'. or administrators' definitions of criteria will inevitably be 
accepted, even if critically. Contemporary assessments of popular mood 
may be accepted, for want of any other. Important differences between 
various groups or localities may be glossed over. 
Our study attempts to overcome these two limitations in-the 
. 
existing literature. We examine the development of the-labour movement, 
and its role in political crisis and restabilisationl--by means of a 
local study; and we do so in the light of-a-theory which-relates-the 
movement and its institutions to the-development and nature of class 
consciousness. It is with the elaboration of this theory that our 




Consciousness, Action, and Labour 
2.1 Introductory 
This chapter has two purposes. Firstly (in sections 2.2-2-5) it 
expounds a theory, at a quite general level, which grounds our study. 
This theory is concerned with how working people, and the institutions 
of the labour movement, are motivated to act collectively and 
politically. Throughout our study we concentrate on the motivation 
and mobilisation of labour; our theory therefore deals primarily with 
these matters. We are only incidentally concerned with the processes 
by which labour i#oses its will on, or is dominated by, other social 





belief, in two respects: 'consciousness' is seen as consisting of 
many varied, and not necessarily consistent, elements; and classes 
are seen as consisting of groups, each with (potentially diverse) 
consciousnesses. Secondly, in section 2.6, the argument, of the 
remainder of our study is outlined. 
2.2 Motives and political action 
Like all political organisations, labour organisations exist in order 
to achieve certain objectives. In order to do so, in a class-divided 
society, they must generally induce representatives of the ruling 
class to concede these objectives. To this end, they can adopt 
two methods: they can argue a case effectively to those who hold 
or exercise power; or they can themselves mobilise power resources. 
This is not, however, a simple matter of a dichotomy between reason 
and coercion, for these two elements are almostinvariably inter- 
mingled. In particular, the mobilisation of power resources is - 
especially for working class politics - itself an ideological process: 
that is, one requiring engagement with the beliefs and assumptions of 
those people who constitute the power resources of labour. 
The term 'ruling class' is used in a very generic 
(but essent- 
ially Marxist) sense; no attempt is made to distinguish 
between 
different categories of dominant group 
(cp, e. g., A. Giddens, 
The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies 
(London 1973), 
118-27), although some general statements are 
made about how a 
ruling class asserts and maintains power. 
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For the fundamental source of power for labour politics is the 
working class itself or, more precisely, action that the working 
class takes. This can enable labour to impose its objectives, in 
certain'circumstances, on groups which would not willingly accede to 
them. Of course, the working class need not always be mobilised as a 
whole. Sections, too, have power, and they can exercise it either in 
their own interest (as when, say, a trade union organisation induces 
its members to strike for a pay increase) or in the interest of other 
sections of the working class (as in 'solidarity' action), or of the 
class as a whole. Clearly, too, the type of mobilisation varies: the 
Labour Party, for instance, has characteristically been interested in 
allimited mobilisation (to vote 'Labour') of the entire working class 
(and other social groups also); shop stewards, however, may seek a 
more militant response from a more limited membership. But, whatever 
the 'constituency' the political organisation may seek to mobilise, it 
must'confront the'problem of Ilegitimising' the action desired (or, 
indeed, any action): that is, it must justify the proposed course of 
action in the eyes of thoselconstituents' from whom action is demanded. 
Producing legitimising arguments in this'way is not, in principle, 
different from producing arguments which will legitimise the objectives 
desired by the labour organisation-in the eyes of a ruling class group: 
here . again, it"is a matter of justifying action, though perhaps action 
of a different kind, and in relation to a group with different social 
and political outlooks. 
We should not, however, build up a picture of political 
organisations identifying objecti7es in a rational, scientific, WaY 
, and then 
developing the ideological resources required to achieve them. 
Such an image would distort and oversimplify. For while objectives can 
be simple, obvious, and universally agreed within an organisation, they 
are perhaps more often complex, unclear, and contested. We should 
distinguish ultimate aims from immediate objectives. The former, 
though important, are not our central concern. Their relevance to us 
here is that, having been agreed, they constitute a source of arguments 
justifying action on immediate objectives. But these, short term, 
objectives should not be seen as rationally selected 
(that is, as though 
the selection of the objectives normally precedes the search for 
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effective means of legitimising them). Rather, the selection of an 
objective by an organisation (or by an individual) is preceded by its 
emergence as an issue, and this is, of course, a highly ideological 
phenomenon. Thus there is, for instance, an enormous number of 
political developments which would be in the interest of the labour 
movement, but which are not pursued because there is no realisation 
(collective or individual) that they are matters of significance - 
that is, they are not perceived as issues. Yet, failing this, they 
cannot become objectives for organisations. 
At this point it is useful to consider the concept of a 
Ilegitimising principle'. In a valuable contribution to the literature 
of workplace. industrial'relations, P. J. Armstrong, J. F. B. Goodman and 
J. D. Hyman suggest 
that in any cultural setting there are 
certain acceptable motives for action 
(what we will call 'legitimising principles') 
which are, in turn, embedded in the 
characteristic world view (ideology) of that 
culture. 2 
This 'vocabulary of motives' - stock of legitimising principles - is 
limited in any instance (though not immutable). Thus, for example, 
a trade union activist, in attempting to mobilise his members, must 
couch his policies in terms of motives acceptable to them: if he does 
not (or cannot) his policies will not gain the desired support. The 
position is essentially similar in relation to a political activist - 
but rather more complex. Conversely, if a trade unionist is attempting 
to gain a concession from his employer without resorting to coercive 
methods, he must engage with the latter's 'vocabulary of motives's 
which is unlikely to be identical with his own; a political organisation 
hoping, say, to gain a concession peaceably from a local council must 
2. P. J. Armstrong, J. F. B. Goodman, J. D. Hyman, Ideologj and Shop Floor 
Industrial Relations (London 1981), 36. At several points in 
ss. 2.2 and 2.4 our discussion draws on this valuable studY Of 
motivation and mobilisation in three medium-and small-sized 
factories. 
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similarly engage with their stock of legitimising principles. 
We must bear in mind, however, that trade union and political 
activists, and the organisations to which they belong, are not 
external to these 'cultural settings': thus their vocabularies of 
motives are likely, - to a greater'or'lesser degree - to coincide 
with the latterl, s. This is, though, to simplify, for even politically 
active individuals and organisations are actors within these 
'cultural settings', shaping them to some extent. In many respects, 
the role of the political organisation is to criticise and develop 
the vocabulary of motives available to a social group. Certainly this 
is true of a radical (as opposed to a populist) political body, which 
is concerned to lead the social group to which it relates in a direction 
the latter. would not otherwise take. Thus the position both of the 
individual political activist, and of the political organisation, is 
complicated. The individual's set of legitimising principles is 
likely to draw both from his-or her own social group, and from the 
political organisation; the political organisation will draw on both 
its members' vocabulary of motives, and on other sources (for instance, 
a local political party will draw on the propaganda of its national 
institutions). 
We are here approaching the problem, much-discussed by Marxist 
writers, of 'spontaneity and conscious leadershipl: 
3 
of howfar the 
working class is able to take action without the intervention and 
leadership of a 'conscious element', and of how conscious elements can 
operate most effectively. We cannot formulate an adequate response to 
this problem without discussing class consciousness; before turning to 
such a'discussion, however, it is necessary to re-emphasise one point 
which, thus far, has only been implicit. Legitimising principles have 
both private and public roles. In the absence of appropriate legitimation, 
3- This phrase is from A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks (London 1971), 196; the classic Marxist discussion is, 
of course, V. Leninj 'What is to be done? ' in Select'e_d Works,. VqleI 
(Moscow 1976), esp. 141-97, but see also. G. Lukaoss spontaneity of 
the Masses , 4ctivity Of the Party' in his Political. WLitinfLs 
1919-1929 ýLondon 1972), 95-105. 
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grievances may not even be capable of articulation in a person's mind, 
let alone adequate to constitute mobilising iSsUeS'fOr groups. Even 
where the individual is clear in his own mind, and able to find 
legitimation which satisfies him, mobilisation will be ineffective 
unless this source of legitimisation (or some other which works) is 
shared by relevant others. Similarly, grievances or demands may be 
legitimised by principles accepted only by relatively small groups 
(say, by a local community), and thus incapable of producing 
mobilisation adequate to effect change, or they may fail because the 
, legitimising principles, though widely accepted, are generally judged 
in the particular case to be outweighed by others. 
2.3 Contradictory consciousness and class action 
The dominance of theories of value consensus in the explanation of 
social stability has been severely eroded in recent years. This erosion 
has come from two directions. Within the mainstream of sociology, a 
series. of empirical and critical works has shown precisely the lack of 
value consensus in modern capitalist societies. 
4 
At the same times 
the advocates of the notion of 'false consciousness 
5 (which asserts the 
existence of value consensus , but denies it validity)-have had 
their 
central position within the Marxýst tradition challenged through the 
increasingly widespread and sophisticated awareness of Gramscils 
writings. 
6 
In his survey of the sociological literature, Michael Mann 
found four 'trends' emerging: 
1*. 
5. 
Mann, 'Social cohesion', and Westergaard, 'Cash nexus', survey 
much of this literature; 
E. g., G-Lukacs, 'Reification and the Consciousness of the 
Proletariat', in. his History and Class Consciousness, Studies in 
Marxist Dialectics (London 1971) 83-222;. H.. MA3Zcuse, One Dimensional 
Man (Lor; d-on -19-7-2ýY. 
_- 
Initiýilyq Gramscils notion of 'hegemony' was widely perceived as 
4 version of false, consciousness: e. g.,. G. Williams, 'Gramsci's 
concept-of Ilegemoniall, J. of the History of Ideas 21,1960,586799; 
J. M. Maravall, 'Subjective conditions and revolutionary 'conflict: 
Pome remarksl,. Brit. i. Sociol. 27*, 1976,. 21-ý4. The literature on 
Gramsci is now immense... 
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1. value consensus does not exist to 
any significant extent; 
2. there is a greater degree of consensus 
among the middle class*than among the 
working class; 
3- the working class is more likely to 
support deviant values if those values 
relate either to concrete everyday life 
or to vague populist concepts than if 
they relate to an abstract political phil- 
osophy; 
4. working class individuals also exhibit 
less internal consistenc in their values 
than middle class people. 7 
Now there is, clearly, no reason, a priori, why such trends should 
apply in an earlier period, although Gramscils (albeit less method- 
ologically sound) observations echo these. More important, Gramscils 
work provides the fundamentals of a theory which would lead us to 
regard 'a profound dualism in the worke2s situation and his 
consciousness' 
8 
as normal in a capitalist society. According to 
Gramsci, the worker's 'practical activity', his class situation, 
'involves understanding the world in so far as it transforms it', 
but does not require or produce a 'clear theoretical consciousness, of 
this activity, nor of his class situation. 
9 Indeed, Gramsci suggests 
that the latter can be 'historically in opposition' to the former, 
continuing: 
One might almost say that he fthe worker2 
has two theoretical consciousnesses (or one 
contradictory consciousness): one which is 
implicit in his activity and which in reality 
unites him with his fellow-workers in the 
practical transformation of the real world; and one, 
superficially'explicit or verbal, which he has 
inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed. 10 
The importance of this 'verbal' consciousness is that it provides the 
7. Mann,, 432- 
8. M. Mann, Consciousness and Action among the Western WorkLIIS 
Class (London 1973), 68. 
g., Gramsci, 333; 'CP Mann, 'Social Cohesion', 435- 
10. Gramsci, 333, 
I 
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basis for general attitudes and explanations, for theoretical under- 
standings of the wider world: 
It holds together a specific social group, 
it influences moral conduct and the direction 
of will, with varying efficacity 1; i2c but 
often powerfully enough to produce a 
situation in which the contradictory state 
of consciousness does not permit of any 
action, any decision or any choice, 
and produces a condition of moral and 
political passivity. 11 1 
This 'passiVityl, however, is its product chiefly in the case of the 
worker, the 'active man-in-the-mass', for it is among the working 
class that the greatest contradiction between 'practical' consciousness 
and 'verbal' consciousness is to be found. 
Whati then, are the sources of these two theoretical 
consciousnesses? Gramscils answer seems to be that verbal consciousness 
normally represents the values of the ruling class: the working class 
has 'for reasons of submission and intellectual subordination, adopted 
12 
a conception. which is not its own but is borrowed from another group'. 
Practical consciousness, on the other hand, is generated by. the re- 
quirements of working class life under capitali sm: a verbal conscious- 
ness derived from superior social-groups is (almost literally) 
unrealistic for the working class, which modifies its elements to make 
them more relevant to its own real world. 
13 Practical consciousness is 
thus not untheoretical, nor are its elements incapable of articulation 
(though they may be inconsistent, one with another). Indeed, the 
importance of practical consciousness is above all that it is, for the 
working class, the form of consciousness which governs action: 
110 Ibid. 
12. Ibid., 327. 
13- Cp F. Parkin's notion of a 'subordinate value system' as 'a 
lin. egotiated. version'lof-the. dominant value system': Class 
Inequal#y and Political Order (St. Albans 1972), es 1-2. 
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It silpiifies that the social group in 
question may indeod have its own 
conception of the world, even if only 
embryonic; a conception which manifests 
itself in action, but occasionally and 
in flashes - when, that is, the group is 
acting as an organic totality# 14. 
The problem with such a consciousness is that it is inevitably 
limited, for four maiii reasons. First, because it is devcRoped in the 
actual experience of the working class under capitalism, its relevance 
is to relatively specific and localised cultures (local communitiesq 
workplaces, industries, and so on), rather than to the working class 
as a whole. Secondly, the practical consciousnesses of different working 
plass groups are unlikely to be consistent, and are often contradictory. 
Third, for these reasons it lacks generality and cannot be opposed to 
a verbal consciousness developed by a social class with national power 
through national institutions; finally, it in any case lacks comparable 
institutional strength. So whilst there is a constant tension between 
practical and verbal consciousnesses, the former is severely limited. 
Broadly similar interpretation has led others to conclude that 
'Surges of class consciousness are continually undercut by economism, 
And capitalism surVives'. 
15 Gramsci is not so latalistic. There is 
'a struggle of political "hegemonies" and of-opposing directionS, first 
in the ethical field and then in that of politics proper'. 
16 For in 
14. Gramsci, 327- 
15- Mann, Consciousness and Action, 68. 
16. Gramsci, 333. The terms 'hegemony' and 'direction' here originate 
in Gramscils assertion 
* 
that class power and bourgeois power in 
western societies in particularIcannot be based solely on coercion. 
'Force can be employed against enemies, but not against a part of 
gnela own side which one wishes rapidly to assimilate, and whose 
"good will" and. enthusiasm one needs'. (Grarnsci, 168). 
. 
Capital#t production, of courso, does need at least some 
working classIgood will' - certainly it operates less efficiently 
without it. $o it is necessary to base capitalist rule on a system 
which wins the consent of the subordinate (ruled) class: such a 
system Gramsci terms 'hegemony' or 'direction', as opposed to 
forms of Idomination's. based on. coercion. (On this distinction 
see P-Anderson, 'The-antinomies of Antonio Gramsci', NLR 100, 
1976-77,21-5; Gramsci, 57-8). The need to achieve direction, in 
this sense, does not imply that class rule involves no important 
element of coorci7on-. * 
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addition to the limited 'direction' which can be given to the working 
class by 'practical consciousness', Gramsci sees in the working class 
political party a source of oppositional 'verbal consciousness' as well 
as of political direction in the more immediate, Leninist,, sense. The 
role of the party is to develop and support a systcm of values which 
legitimises action in the interests of the working class, 'to raise 
the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral 
levell. 17 as well as to lead the action itself. However, these two 
elements are directly and intimately related, for several reasons. 
First, the party is not simply a receptacle of revolutionary knowledge 
and consciousness, which is passed over to the unconscious working class: 
on the contrary, there is an essential continuity between sectional 
consciousness, practical consciousness, and class consciousness: 
it is not a question of introducing from 
scratch a scientific form of thought into 
everyone's individual life, but of 
renovating and making I critical an already 
existing activity. 18 
This is achieved, moreover, in an 'educational relationship', wherelthe 
relationship between teacher and pupil is active and reciprocal 3o that 
every teacher is always a pupil and every pupil a teacher'. 
19 The party 
thus develops, but also learns from, spontaneous class activity, from 
the 'flashes' of class consciousness; for "'pure'. ' spontaneity does not 
exist in history... 1: 
in such, movements there exist multiple elements 
of 'conscious leadership', but no one of them 
is predominant or transcends the level of a given 
social stratum's 'popular science( - its 'common 
sense' or traditional conception of the world. 20 
Thirdly, the'party is itself formed in this interactions as is its OutlOOki 
17- Gramsci, 258. 
18. Ibid. i 331- 
19. Ibid., 350. 
20. Ibid., 196-7; see also 198. 
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its 'philosophy': and 
creating a group of independent 
intellectuals is not an easy thing; 
it requires a long process, with 
actions and reactions, coming 
together and drifting apart and the 
I-x new growth of very numerous and compla 
formations. 21 
This approach, then, treats the Marxist party not as a fixed, 
unchanging historical subject, but as an active participant in historical 
processes; more important, perhaps, it allows us to treat the party as 
an entity with characteristics in common with other elements of working 
class 'conscious leadership'. Moreover, we should not necessarily 
identify Gramscils notion of 'the party' with the Comintern model: 
whilst Gramsci subscribed to the latter in practice, the party's role 
and development, rather than its specific organisational form, are 
central to his theoretical discussion, which often stretches the Leninist 
theory of the party (not to mention the Comintern version of Leninism) 
1 22 to its limits, or beyond. So alth6ugh we must guard against the 
tendency to conflate different forms of 'conscious leader . ship' and 
different forms of class consciousness and activity, we are dealing with 
a theory which recognises such different forms - treating their role 
as an historical questionj and not. a priori. In particular, whilst 
Gramsci accepts broad categories of working class leadership (trade 
unions, reformist parties, Marxist parties), 
23the 
categorisation of any 
particular organisation is an empirical questions requiring a study of 
its political activity and development. 
Let us summarise the discussion of this section. Working class 
consciousness is highly fragmented, but involves two key elements, verbal, 
consciousness (normally adopted from the ruling, or hegemonic, class)) 
and'pract'icall c onsciousness, which originates in the realities of 
working class-life under capitalism. The former tends to cement nations 
21. Ibid., 395-6. 
22. M. qohnstone, 'Marx and Engels and the Concept of the PartYli 
Socialist Register 1967,121-58, is a useful corrective to. the 
view that. Lenin merely made explicit a*single, Marxists notion 
of 'the Pqrtyl. 
23. E. g., Gramscis 52,181-2. 
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around central, institutional, values, and militates against working 
class adoption of consistent, oppositional values. The latter tends 
to'structure working class action, generally of a sectional kind, but 
the contradiction between these two consciousnessec hinders this, and 
makes structured, national action highly problematic. The role of the 
party is to develop a 'verbal consciousness' which legitimises workiAg 
class action in its. own interests, and thus to enable the working 
class to become a hegemonilc, direýtive class: in order to achieve 
this, it must engage with the 'practical conscioasness' of the working 
class. 
2.4 Legitimising principles and contradictory-consciousness 
Following this digression into the world of ideology, we are in a 
position to pick up the threads of our earlier discussion. -One problem 
with the schematic presentation of the-last s6ction is that, whilst. it 
stresses the fragmentary character of-class consciousness, it gives us 
no concrete idea of its contenti nor-of-the specific forms in which 
consciousness relates to act!: 6n-. --This is-the-value of-the concept 
of Ilegitimising principle', introduced in section 2.2-i for theý - 
legitimising principle is an element of conscioýsness which precisely 
legitimises action, and action of a (more or less) specific kind. 
Before turning to the legitimation of working class action, we 
should consider the implications-of-our-discussion of-ideology for the 
legitimation of capitalist class action . We have noted the essential- 
coherence and consistency of the-system--of dominant values; and we have 
noted, the stý3ýength of the institutions which generate a-. Id reproduce it. 
This tends to-make the exercise of power ideologically relatively 
unproblematic. For example, -rights over-property-, --buttressed by the 
legal system, themselves legitimise-a variety--of-actions in defence - 
of property: definitions are relatively--clear, and even the-possible 
coursesýof-action-are often-specifiedý-Inzddition, of course, -we have 
seen that dominant values are in many cases-reproduced in the verbal, 
consciousness of-the working-class. - This has--the-effect of#oviding 
further legitimacy for the values or principles concerned, and tends to 
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weaken oppositional trends among the values of dominant social groups. 
More importantly, as we have seen, it undercuts working class 
opposition to ruling class action, for it tends to legitimilse such 
action in the eyes of workers. 
This picture may'suggest, that a dominant value system, in the 
sense proposed by Frank Parkin, 
24 legitimises all, or most, ruling class 
action, and prevents working class resistance. It has, thus far, many 
of the characteristics of a theory of false consciousness, of a 
dominant ideology accepted by the working class. We have seen that 
the reality is far more complex; this applies to dominant values, as 
well as to working class consciousness. To begin with, dominant values 
do not constitute a system (in the sense of a coherent and consistent 
set of principles which directly reflect class interest). Partly, no 
doubt, this is due to thelistorical development of the ruling class, 
and particularly to the tensions between its capitalist and aristocratic 
(or feudal) elements; it i6 also the result of occasional working class 
action. In many cases this has led to the growth of 'a secondary 
strubture of supportive argument 125which can limit class action. It 
is, for example, one thing to assume the prerogatives of property; 
it is another to argue that these are necessary to the national well- 
being or individual freedom. Whil*st the latter additions may render any 
action taken more acceptable to the subordinate classlit also increases 
the problems of mobilisation - it makes action more problematic. 
Moreover, there appear to be principles within the consciousness of 
both classes which do not obviously reflect class interests: consistency, 
relevance, precedent, for example. These also have some effect in 
restricting action, though they may have more impact in situations of 
strongly institutionalised conflict - in workplgce industrial relations, 26 
for example. 
24. Parkin, 82-8. 
25- Armstrong et al., 41. 
26. For a discussion of these in a workplace contexts see ibid., 95-107. 
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There are, then, constraints on the types of ruling, class action 
for which legitimisation is available: by the same token, there is 
r oom for working class groups to legitimise resistance by reference to 
principles which are common to ruling and working classes. It is not 
necessary for all working class resistance to be explicitly based in 
oppositional values, in the 'practical consciousness' of the. working 
class (although it may be that the basic motive is to be located there): 
indeed, unless power resources are to be mobilised, it is essential to 
engage with the dominant vocabulary of motives if resistance is to be 
successful. This may be seen as, and may in some cases consciously be, 
a strategic deployment of certain dominant values by workers: very often, 
however, the legitimising principles deployed are motives for workers 
themselves, and are not simply used instrumentally. 
The working class is n ot, however, dependent solely on iýs 
ability to exploit contradictions among ruling class values - 'theoret- 
ical consciousness'. Legitimation for action can also draw on principles 
associated with the 'practical consciousness' of the working class. 
But 
the limitations of such consciousness impose several limitations on the 
range of action which can be legitimised, particularly when contrasted 
with the extent of legitimation available for-ruling class action. 
Whereas: the latter-is more or less consistent, largely representative 
of class interests, the legitimation available to the working class is 
contradictory and fragmented. In contrast to the generality of many 
legitimising principles available to the ruling class, the working class 
must normally make use of principles which are relatively specific, and 
of limited application. Only abnormally are there available to the 
working class legitimising principles-which -. in their generality - 
compare with principles such as order, profit, natit? nal interest, and 
so forth, which are commonly available to the ruling class and its 
subgroups. 
Finally, we should emphasis6 one central faqtj which is implicit 
in Gramscils notion of contradictory consciousness: legitimation is 
often contested. Principles which might legitimise action are 
58 
available to many parties: which, if any, eventually do lead to 
action depends on the character ofthe principles concerned (together 
with certain factors which we discuss in the next section). For 
example, an employer may attempt to persuade his employees to accept 
a wage cut by referring to principles such as profit, the power of 
the market, and the need to be-efficient; a union may respond by 
referring to notions of equity, a living wage, and so forth. Both 
are potentially effective legitimisers of action (or passive acceptance). 
Taken overall, the principles available to the ruling class tend to 
outweigh those available to the working class, but this is by no means 
an iron law: workers very frequently do take action which their 
rulers or employers oppose. Moreover, the relationship between the 
principles available to opposing social groups shifts from time to 
time; it is sometimes useful to refer to this relationship as a 
'balance of legitimation', and the nature and direction of alterations 
in this balance form an important element in our study. 
2.5 Power resources and class structure 
We now turn to two factors which affect the actual power which a 
social group' I 
is able to exercise; for the existence of a principle 
I 
which legitimises action says, in itself, nothing about the. success or 
failure of the)action' taken. These factors are, firstlyl the cohesion 
of the social groups'and, secondly, the nature of the institutional 
resources available to it. 
Politically, the importance of the legitimising principle is that 
it moýivates collective action: our interest, therefore, is in 
principles which are acceptabýýe motives to aggregates of people. 
But 
motives are valid only in specific contexts: 
Motives are of no value apart from the 
delimited societal situations for which 
they are the appropriate terminologies. 
They must be situated. ... Motives vary 
in content and character with historical 
epochs and societal structures. 27 
27. C. Wright Mills. 'Situated actions and vocabularies of motive's 
Amer. Sociol. Rev- 5,1940,913. 
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Of course, some motives are acceptable more widely than others, as the 
motives of nationalism often transcend class . But even within social 
classes, we cannot assume the universal validity of politically imp- 
ortant motives for action, since classes themselves contain a multitude 
of structural fragmentations, on some of which important social groups 
are based. The latter develop, to a greater or lesser extent, social 
institutions and understandings - in short, 'practical consciousnesses'-; 
and if a class is to take concerted action, principles must be found 
which constitute valid motives for all or most of these groups* 
As a general rule, therefore, classes (and groups) are more 
likely to act in concert when they are internally relatively 
homogeneous, rather than when they are highly differentiated. This is, 
of course, something of a commonplace. But while any class is riven 
with -intersecting - structural fragmentations, the most significant 
are those which form the basis of groups with their own peculiar modes. 
of behaviour and views of the world. T here are two complicating 
factors here., First, highly cohesive groups may be exceedingly effective 
at legitimising action in their own interest, while their very cohesion 
intensifies their distinctiveness from other groups: in short, strong 
group loyalties may weaken class identification. We may perhaps view 
the labour aristocracy as an example of this (although the case would 
be arguable). Secondly, just as many fragmentations in class structure 
intersect, so individuals may belong to a number of different groups: 
at work, in their local communities, at home, and so forth. Where 
several different groups (as judged by their structural bases) share 
the same members in large measure, it may be appropriate to refer to a 
single'group for some purposes; for they may share a common vocabulary 
of motive. We may take the 'occupational community' to be an example 
here',, where the social relations. of work intersect closely with those 
outside work. 
28 
Very often, therefore, the mobilisation of the working class (or 
substantial sections of it) involves the deployment of principles, which 
28. Cp, e. g., D'Lockwood, 'Sources of variation in working class images 
of society': Sociol. Rev. n. s. 14,1966,249-67, and the literature 
stemming from this seminal contribution. 
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will legitimise action for highly diverse groups; by implication, it 
also involves the development or discovery of such principles. Butj 
so far as an organisation (says a political party or a trade union) 
which is attempting to achieve class or group action to a common end 
is concerned, a problem may exist . There may be no effective 
principle which will legitimise action to a desired end by a sufficiently 
large number of groups: it may therefore be necessary to mobilise to 
a somewhat different end by deploying a somewhat different principle, 
but one which will be more widely effective.. We may regard this as a 
process of negotiation, in which ' alliances or 
coalitions are formed: 
these exist on the basis of a limited range of commonly valid motives 
(sometimes very few), but may enoompass a wide spectrum of social 
groups, even transcending class divisions. 
There are, then, difficulties involved in the mobilisation of 
highly diverse-groups of people. Even if action can be achieved$ 
however, its success will substantially depend on the resources available. 
We can perhaps best approach this factor by way of a simplification. 
Any social group has-available to it, at any one time, a specific set 
of resources (social, political, and economic institutions, people, and 
so on). A legitimising principle can, at best, enable all of these to 
be mobilised to a common end: more commonly it will mobilise only some 
of the resources available. Perhaps more important, no legitimising 
principle can mobilise resources which do not exist, so a social group 
which is small in number, and which lacks significant institutional 
sources of strength, will remain weak however utited it is in its 
sense of grievance. Of course, the reality is somewhat more complex. 
The resources available-*to social groups are not fixed, and indeed the 
effect of some-principles is-just to enable new resources to be formed 
(a trade union, for instance, once formed, constitutes a lasting 
institutional resource for workers). On occasion, the set of resources 
can expand, contract, or change in character,. with great speed. But 
the essential point remains valid: no-motive, however strong and 
widely felt, can mobilise resources which are absent. 
I 'Institutions', of course, are of many kinds: to treat them 
unambiguously as sources of strength is highly misleading. Taken 
together, the institutions of a social group determine how that group 
will respond to any situation: some constitute sources of political 
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strength. Thus a trade union for a group of workers; thus a political 
party for an entire class. But institutions which are strong for one 
purpose may be ineffective for others, or may induce a group to respond 
to a situation in a specific way - say, by encouraging images of the 
situation which are inappropriate. 
Finally, we should sound one note of caution. No institution is 
an island, unaffected by its cultural and political setting. This 
applies as much to the political institutions with which we shall be 
largely concerned (parties, trade unions, and the rest) as to any other 
despite the self-images, of autonomy and independence of . thought, which 
the former often have. Naturally this does not imply that all 
institutions are identical: but each must be studied in its context; 
and each will 're8pond to, certain motives, but not to others. 
2.6 , The historical argument 
Our theory, -then, proposes that working class consciousness is most 
profitably to be viewed as highly fragmented: consisting of widely 
varying, and often mutually inconsistent, beliefs and assumptions about 
aspects of the world. Some are adopted from the ruling class, and form 
the basi's-Ior-generally expressed attitudes-(verbal-consciousness); 
others are generated by working class institutions themselves, but tend 
therefore to be specific to their class or group situation (practical 
consciousness). The structure-of the working class intensifies this 
fragmentation of consciousness, for each group within the class develops 
its own (more or less) different practical consciousness. Political 
action is thus most effective when a motive for action (what we have 
termed a legitimising principle) is shared by a wide-spectrum of groups; 
but it is also deeply influenced by the relative strength -both 
institutional and ideological - of opposing classes, groups, or 
organisations. Parties (in the widest sense:, encompassing trade 
unions and similar bodies) develop and deploy legitimising principles 
so as to encourage action to certain-ends. Very often, this requires 
the deployment of principles which appeal-to the-leading institutions 




This theory forms the basis of our study; although it is 
necessary, from time to time, to elaborate on it in various ways. 
Our historical argument runs thus. During and immediately after the 
Great War, the working class movement in Britain made significant 
advances. In part, these were based on changes in economic, social 
and political structures, which increased the relative strength of 
the resources available to workers. But fundamental to the advances, 
. 
and particularly to their characterwas a shift in the terms of 
legitiination. There were several aspects to this shift, of which three 
are outstanding. Firstly, the experience of war altered the term- 
inology of nationalisrA: the meaning of the 'nation' was inevitably 
expanded, and the purchase of the working class on the legitimising 
principles. associated with the language of 'nation' increased. In 
short, there was a distancing of this language from the ruling class9 
and consequently its ability to mobilise around this set of principles 
became more problematic: conversely, the working class was more able 
to mobilise in its own interests around such principles. Secondly, the 
war involved a substantial erosion of the legitimacy of 'profit'. 
Much of the linguistic apparatus of capital, which-can normally be 
treated as virtually synonymous with profitability,. developed relatively 
independent meanings: lorganisation', 'efficiency', associated now 
increasingly with national interest rather than profit (and with a 
national interest more open to working class interpretation), came to 
be used in attempts to mobilise for the war effort. This was a 
managerial language through which there was greater - though still 
highly circumscribed - room for the legitimation of self-interested 
working class action. Thirdly, this language, associated with and 
bolsýered by the apparatus of wartime planning, inevitably lent some 
legitimacy to versions of socialism, and thus to the development of the 
labour movement. 
i 
- But just as the strength of these notions opened up opportunities 
for the labour movement, so they strongly influenced the movement's own 
development. The language of planning, efficiency, organisation, and 
so forth, provided the essential meaning-system through which other 
radically significant influences were interpreted. The Russian 
Revolution of October 1917, for example, which might have been seen 
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from the perspective of workers' control and denocracy, 
29 became an 
instance of efficient class organisation and planning. These notions 
also grounded many of the important changes in the structure of the 
Labour movement during our period, especially up to 1921 or 1922. 
Restructurings of the Labour Party, of the trnde union movement, and 
of Marxist organisation, were all significantly motivated by the strength 
of this language among the working class. 
The extent of the working class advance was not sufficient to 
overturn the essential power structure: and from 1920 onward a number 
of economic factors began to shift the balance of power away from 
labour. The strength of many of the legitimising principles generated 
by the war was eroding, making working class mobilisation more difficult; 
whilst economic developments brought the language of 'efficiency' once 
more into a close liaison with 'profit' (at least in industrial usage), 
making managers' tasks less-arduous. At the same time, the counter- 
attack against labour could, in general, not be based upon the same 
principles as had been used before the war, so that (especially outside 
industry) labour was able to achieve significant mobilisation. The 
legitimising principles which were used in the counter-4ttack were 
based around notions'of constitutionalism and democracy: this had the 
effect of strengthening an important element of the labour movements 
and encouraging it t6 concentrate on a parliamentary strategy. 
Broadly, 
therefore, labour was again brought under some control, but only by 
virtue 6f allowing it important areas of legitimate advance. 
Interwoven with this argument are a number of related themes. 
Two deserve mention atýthis stage Firstly, an argument is developed 
concerning notions of organisation and their impact on labour. We 
0,4he ; anguage 
c suggest, that the strenvgk of organisation' was associated with severely 
limited images of organisation: this meant that the entire labour move- 
ment could concur, in the years just after the war, cn organisational 
'advances' which were later to be used most effectively in strengthening 
the rigýt within the movement (at the expense of the left). Secondly, 
29. Cp - O. Anweilers The Soviets. The Russian Workers' 
Peasants' 
and Soldiers? Councils, 1905 - 1921 (New York 1974); J. Hinton, 
The First Shop Stewards Movement (London 1973), 298-329. 
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we examine the shifting pattern of allegiances within the labour 
movement; we argue that alliances and coalitions were based around 
key sets of understandines, and that the immediate post-war years were 
a key period of reassessment of these. By the mid-1twenties a network 
of alliances had grown up within the movement, with important institut- 
ional supportq which (in most situations) guaranteed the dominance of 
parliamentary and reformist politics. 
Oar argument is constructed in the following way. Part II 
introduces the social and economic context of the study. In chapter 3 
we see that Edinburgh's working class was relatively highly fragmented, 
although this fragmentation declined in some respects after 1900, and 
especially during and after the Great War; we see that its middle classes 
were also far from cohesive; and we see that in many respects the city's 
economic performance from 1917 until 1927 mirrored that of the national 
economy. In chapter 4 we examine, on the one hand, the economic 
foundation of certain structural fragmentations, and conclude that these 
were-significantly eroded during the war and the post-war-years with 
which-we are concerned. We are thus able to suppose that, during these 
years, the working class was becoming more-receptive to concerted 
political mobilisation (although we cannot, on this basis alone, say 
that such nobilisation would necessarily take place, nor specify its 
form). On the other hand, we look at certain aspects of the working 
class standard of living, and suggest how these might have influenced 
the ability and inclination of the working class to take action at 
various times during our period. - 
In part III we are concerned with the processes by which labour's 
industrial strength waxed and waned during and after the war. It is 
necessary inchapter-5, to take issue with a 'conventional wisdom' 
concerning the development of the capitalist economy in later nineteenth 
and early twentieth century Britain: we argue that it ignores the 
central importance of short-term factors in the development of work 
organisation; and that it obscures the extent of uneven development, 
and the importance of lessladvanc'ed' sectors of industry. We also 
criticise the notion that there is a simple, linear direction of 
capitalist development, especially as it affects the orSanisation of work. 
And vie examine the development of management, thought (in relation to 
work. organisation), and contrast it with the reality of work organisation 
in our period. In the lieht of this we are able, in chapter 6,, to 
examine the development of work organisation in four. of Edinburgh's 
main industries. This has three purposes: it illustrates the extent 
of differentiation between (and even within) industries; it shews how 
various industries and strategies had to confront essentially similar 
economic conditions, and how they didso; and it prepares the ground for 
an informed investigation of union organisation and mobilisation, which 
is the function. of chapter ?. Here the argrunient concerning the 
availability and deployment of legitimising principles is developed, 
in relation to trade unions: we see how advances were made between 
1917 and 1920, but we also identify profound limitations in the advances 
achieved - limitations which were exposed during the 'twenties. We 
also suggest that, in certain respects, images of organisation then 
available limited the ability of the trade union movement to overcome 
these limitations in the 'twenties. 
Finally, in part IV, vie examine the grovith of labour politics. 
Chapter 8 begins by discussing the relationship between trade union and 
political action; it then briefly surveys the origins and growth of 
labour and socialist politics in Edinburgh, before showing how the war 
shifted their institutional and motivational context. We argue that 
this shift led to the development of two definitions of political action: 
one stressed the power of the state (and had an optimistic attitude to 
Labour's ability to win control of it); the second stres6ed the political 
role of trade union action. These definitions cut across both the normal 
division between left and right, and the wartime alliances grouped 
around attitudes to the War. In chapter 9 we shew how a number of 
factors combined to permit the reorganisation of the labour movement 
between 1917 and 1921; vital factors were the manner in which the 
intersection of bases of allegiance had weakened pre-war alliances 
within-the movement (, and pre-war organisational boundaries), and the 
strength of the motivational language of 'efficiency' and lorganisation, 
in all sectors of the movement., In chapter 10-we explore the processes 
whereby two shifting, but essentially coherent, coalitions built up 
within the movement by the mid-'twenties. The weaker, in general, was 
F 
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that whose core was the Communist Party, but which drew on traditions 
of 'direct action'. That which emerged to dominate drew on the language 
of parliament, democracy arid the constitution, and assumed the 
viability of an electoral strategy. In part, the latter's dominance 
was due to the increasing erosion of the motivational basis of direct 
action: from 1920 onward this ceased to be credible, save as a 
primarily industrial strategy in periods of heightened industrial 
conflict. 
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Part Two Edinburgh: Social Structure and Economy, 
'A war of position is not, in reality 
constituted by the actual trenches, but 
by the whole organisational and industrial 
system of the territory which lies to the 
rear of the army in the field. ' 
Granisci, Prison Notebooks, 234. 
'The workers should note the important fact 
which is established in the Z Roya12 
Commissioners' Report, that in the past 
the majority of workers did not receive 
sufficient wages to provide them with 
adequate accommodation, and that in the 
future the problem will be increased. '. 
Edinburgh Trades COUn'cil, 
Annual Report 1918,16. 
'Slums and slum-dwellers are the products of 
a system which perpetuates poverty, adds 
daily to the number of poor, and makes it the 
easiest thing in the world for the poor to 
remain poor. ' 




Edinburgh after the Great War 
I 
3.1 Introductory. 
Our study is, then, essentially concerned with three related 
categories of questions: about the nature of class domination 
during and-after the Great War; about the role of labour, in 
particular, in the processes of domination and subjection; and 
about how the labour movement, operated and developed within this 
context. It is, a local study because this seems an effective 
method of addressing these questions, and one which (as we saw in' 
chapter 1) has been too rarely employed. Although our conclusions 
from such a study can, at best, be only illustrative, the choice of 
Edinburgh is not wholly arbitrary. As we shall see, k1here were a 
number of respects in which Edinburgh was not untypical of other 
towns - although, of course, in some ways it wqs unique. Above allt 
Edinburgh was not a city of exemplary working class militancy, nor a 
city in which the Labour Party made substantial advances in municipal 
government between the wars: in contrast to the majorit. -. y of existing 
studies of the local development of the labour movement. 
1 
This chapter sets the scene for the remainder of our study. We 
look at Edinburgh's urban development and how this-affected the city, s 
working class. We discuss the city's middle class, their political 
attitudes and institutions. We look at its industrial structure, and 
the structure of tho working class. And, finally, we examine how 
Edinburgh's economy fared during the years of out study. 
I 
Cp, e. g., Hinton, First Shop Stewards Movement; S. Iflacintyre, 
Little Moscows. Communism and Working-class MilLtancv in Inter- 
war Britain (London 1980); and the conference papers by T. Lindley, 
K. Teanby, H. Mathers, and J. Rowett reported in BSSLH 39,1979,10-13- 
I 
69 
3.2- Urban development 
By the turn of the. century, Edinburgh had passed its period of most 
rapid growth. Between 1851 and ý901, in a 'typically Victorian as 
well as dintinctively local' experience, 
2 the city's population had 
risen by 86 per cent: rather less than that of more heavily 
industrialised Scottish cities, such as Glasgow and Dundee, but 
reflecting the. same factors - the development of its industry, and 
3 the depopulation of rural Scotland. By 19C1 over 300,000 people 
lived within the municipal burgh (over 380,000 if Leith was included), 
but thereafter the population stabilised: indeed that of 'Edinburgh 
proper', the parliamentary burgh (excluding Leith and Portobello) 
actually fell by 1.5 per cent over the decade 1901-11. The census 
figures suggest that this essential stability persisted through the 
two decades, 1911-31, which are most relevant to our study: although 
on certain definitions the population began to grow again, the growth 
was exceedingly modest in comparison with the Victorian pattern (see 
table 3-1)- 
Table 3-1 Ponlation of Edinburgh 1821,1931 
1891 1901 191,1921 1931- 
Population 338114 384732 385016 
Inter-censal population 





13i8 Oil 2; 2 3; 
3'9 0.7 5.1 4.3) 
10.2 
. . -4.. 
7 72.5 -0-7) 
Notes: Parliamentary burghs; 'Edinburgh' includes Leith and 
Portobello, but excludes Musselburgh (part of East 
Edinburgh-parliamentary division from 1918). 
Source: Census of Scotland, 1931- 
Post-war Edinburgh was, therefore, in an important sense a 
Victprian artefact. Along with the population's growth had gone marked 
2. R. Gray, The Labour Aristocracy in Victorian ý! ýinbuEgh (Oxford 1976), 
3. 
10.1 
But the difference is not so'great as Gray . implies; Glasgow's 
population rose 89 per cent., Dundee's 101-5 per cent, but a 
misprint gives the Edinburgh figure as only 80 per cent. (Ibid. ) 
F 
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changes in its spatial distribution and social composition. In the 
Old Town of the eighteenth century, 
The social'ranks were not segregated by 
street or quarter but simply by the level 
of the tenement they occupied, with the 
wealthier or nobler families living in 
middle floors high enough to be spared 
the worst of the smells which filled the 
streets and lower apartments but not so 
far up the stairs as to make for a 
wearisome climb. 4 
During the early nineteenth century the construction of the New Town 
planned for the wealthy, reduced (although it did not eliminate) 
5 'unpleasant contact between the classes', a trend which was intensified 
during the second half of the century 'by the development of middle-class 
suburban estates largely to the south of the city. At the same time, 
and especially during the 1870s and 1880s, the construction of working- 
class housing began: and it followed the pattern of-class segregation 
now set. Uniformly working-'class areas were created, grouped around 
railways and industry in such districts as DalrY , Gorgie, Abbeyhill, 
Easter Road; and, with the middle-class emigration from the Old Town, 
it too became more uniformly working class. 
6 
The pattern of social 
segregation set before the turn of'the century was little altered before 
the outbreak of War. Coinciding with the stagnating population growth 
the years 1900-1914 saw a profound slump in house-building in Edinburgh, 
and it was working-class housing, heavily dependent on s-mall, . 10-cal 
capital and quick sales, that suffered most: 
7 'buildings lay 
8 
unfinished 
and potential landlords kept their money in their pockets. ' 
B. Elliott and D. McCrone, Urban Development in Edinburgh: _a 
contribution to the political economy of place (Paper presented To the 9th Wcrld Congress of Sociology-, 1978)(mimeo, University 
of Edinburgh), 1. 
5- T. Adams, 'Town'Planning and Housing', supplement to Architectural 
Review May 1910,311-16, quoted in H. Richardson, J. Vipond, R. Furbey, 
Housing and Urban S atial Structure; A Case Study (Farnborough, 
Hants. 1975). 
6. Richardson et al., 9-10. 
7- Elliott and McCrone, 17-20. 
8. Ibid., 20. 
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The continuity of secular trends may obscure significant, 
shorter-term, developments; and it is probable that the discussion 
above underý-states, by omission, the importance of the war. The 
wartime inter-censal decade saw, as table 3-1 shows, a very modest 
rise in the population of Edinburgh. During the war, however, there 
was a substantial influx of workers into the city, as Rosyth, a 
major base and dockyard for the Grand Fleet, mushroomed; as lesser 
units of the fleet were stationed at other ports on the Forth, such 
as Granton; 
9 
and as wartime production took off generally-10 No clear 
figures are available as to the precise size of this immigration: it 
was sufficient, however, to place acute pressure on housing in the 
city, and to necessitate the Admiralty's planning a new town at 
Rosyth. 11 The pressures of wartime also affected the extentof social 
segregation within the'city. Accounts of urban spatial development 
generally stress the extent to which the Victorian trends were 
intensified in the 1920s, as 
open development allow/W of the 
creation of coherent areas of dev- 
elopment not only housing one social 
stratum of the City's community but 
separated by open space. 12 
Yet this emphasis on continuity telescopes two periods of intensifying 
spatial segregation: the intervening period, in which social segreg- 
ation was somewhat eroded during the war, is eliminated. And, in fact, 
the post-war programmes, which led to the creation of :. suburban areas 
13 
of working class housing, made little impact until the later 'twenties. 
9. A. J. Marders From the Dreadnoug_ýt to ScapaFlow, vol-3 (Oxford 1966), 
228, vol-5 (Oxford 1970), 130,144; J. R. Jellicoe, The Grand 
Fleet 1914-16. Its creation, develooent and work (London 1919), 78. 
100 Cp B. Waites, 'The effects of the first world war on the economic 
and social structure of the English working class', SLHSJ 12, 
1978, esp. 21-2. 
11. TC AR 1917,12- 
12. D. Keir (ed. ), The Third Statistical Account of S. -otland. The 
City of Edinburgh ýGlasgow 1966), 374. 
13- See s. 4.6. belowe, 
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F 
Nevertheless, the essential pattern of population growth and 
social segregation had been well-set: post-war Edinburgh was, in 
social-geographical terms, polarised between, on the one hand, a 
bourgeoisie resident in the New Town and the suburban south of the 
city; and, on the other, a working class occupying housing on land of 
relatively low value hard by the industrial areas. The main working 
class areas thus formed a band running from Leith in the north-east, 
through Easter Road, Abbeyhill and Meadowbank in the east, and then 
14 onward through the Old Town to Gorgie and Dalry in the west. 
The housing in the central areas was a mixture of the former 
dwellings of the wealthier townspeople, now departed to New Town and 
suburbs, and newer, often ill-constructed, speculative tenement blocks 
custom-built as working-class housing. 
15 The former, 
0. ivided and. sub-divided until a five or six 
apartment house has become, five or six dwellings, 
and six or eight houses entering from one stair 
have become thirty or forty, with a population 
often over one hundred persons, 16 
had lost their former glory: the latter had no pretensions to lose. 
Within these areas, the problems characteristic of Victorian urban 
deprivation persisted: overcrowding, inadequate sanitation, poor and 
deteriora ting states of repair. Along with these went higher death, 
infant mortality, and morbidity rates, a fact which was the subject of 
several surveys, as well as recurring annually in the reports of Medical 
Officers of Health and Chief Sanitary Inspectors. In 1919, for example, 
seven of the city's sixteen wards had population densities greater than 
78 per acre; of the remainder, only one had a density greater than 37 
per acre. In St. Leonard's, the figure was 243 per acre and, in certain 
a reas, o ver 6oo. 
17 A sense of the living conditions in such areas is 
well-conveyed in the report of a parish minister in 1922: 
14. G-Gordon, 'The Status Areas of Edinburgh: a historical 
analysis' (PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1971)1 172; 
Richardson et al., 24-5- 
15. By 1900 there were also about 1,400 houses built for workers by 
the Edinburgh Co-operative Building Society: but many of these 
were too expensive for many workers. Gordon, 94-5- 
16. A. W. Ritchie, Chief Sanitary Inspector of Edinburgh, Housing: 
Improvement and Clearance Schemes in Populous Areas FEdinburgh 
n. d. Cc-19302), 2- 
17. Edinburgh Public Health Department, Annual Repor 1919; a Joint- 
Committee of the. Presbytery of Edinburgh and of the United Free 
Church Presbyter'y of Edinburgh, The Housing of the Poor in 
Edinburgh (Edin. 1922), 6. 
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within sight of the South Bridge, No. 
Street, an old tenement, is the dwelling 
of about 70 persons. It has four flats of 
, 
one-room , and 
two-room houses, with seven 
tenants in each flat. ... the walls of 
passages are decayed. The stairs are 
filthy and littered. In not a single 
apartment is there water, gas, a press, 
or a meat safe. @*# In each lobby is one 
sink and one water-closet; there are three 
or four families in each lobby. Men 
coming home from a day's work wash at the 
cold water tap in view of anyone passing. 18 
Another minister described conditions for the eighty or ninety residents 
of a tenement built about 1860. 'The whole building is in a state of 
disrepair, the walls of the rooms cracked and dirty, and the ceilings 
ready to fall'. 'Bugs' had 'a firm lodgement in the cracked walls and 
ceilings and in the floors; ' even fumigation, apparently, gave relief 
only for 'a week or so, the livestock temporarily emigrating to a 
neighbouring house, only to return when they were at liberty to do so. ' 
19 
There were few improvements in these condit, ions during or after 
the war: such improvements as there were are revealed statistically, 
rather than as a procýss whose reality was evident to contemporaries. 
The city's Chief Sanitary Inspector, writing at the end of the Itwentiess 
considered that efforts to improve housing since 1890 had been 'meagre 
in the extreme 
they have only touched the fringe of 
the problem, and have failed to alter 
the position very much for the slum 
dweller. 20 
The Public Health Department's figures for population density show a 
steady downward trend after the War (as they show a marked increase 
between 1914 and 1919) for the central, working class, wards of the 
city; 
21 these, however, were based on estimated ward populations about 
which there must be some doubt. The only other available statistical 
indicator of overcrowding (and in many ways an heuristically more valuable 
18. Ibid. j 10. Firphasis in original. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Ritchie, 4. 
21. See table -4.19. 
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one) suggests that in some respects the problem intensified: it 
shows-a rise in the number of households living in just one, or two, 
rooms, both during and after the war. 
22 Most of the statistical data, 
published annually by the Public Health Departments is also based on 
the dubious population figures; one exception (the infant mortality 
rate: see table 3.2) does show some improvement during the post-war 
decade. If 
Table 3-2 Infant mortality in Edinburgh, 1914-30, 
(rates ner 1000 births) 
. 
1914 
Edinburgh (a) 110 





St. Andrew's 125 
St. Giles' 151, 
Dalr*y 115 





11919 1922 1925 . 
1928 1930 
1i7 85 94 70 78 
91 96 75 82 
127 log 113 61 lo8 
82 65 86 31 13 
87 30 58 40 47 
134 91 144 91 lo8 
150 141 146 ill io6 
114 72 80 71 64 
16o 92 119 88 102 
14o 128 100 93 
. 128 107 
86 58 
20 75 12 74 
Notes: (a) pre-1920 boundaries.;, (b) post-1920 boundaries: viz, 
including Leith, and Liberton, Colinton, and Ccmtorphine and 
Cramond wards. 
Sources: Edin. Public Health Department Annual Reports, each year. 
any conclusion can be reached from so confused and contradictory a 
set of data, it is perhaps that where improvements in the health, of the 
population were achieved over our period, they were achieved by reason 
of factors other than improvements in the purely physical environment: 
22. See table 4.20. 
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by changes in diets welfare facilities, income, attitudes, and so on. 
23 
Edinburgh between 1918 and 1926 wass therefore, the product of 
Victorian growthtempered by the pressures of war. There had, ' 
howevert been very important developments in transport and communications, 
concentrated in the first decades of the twentieth century (and the last 
of the nineteenth), but also tak#g place during the 'twenties. 
By the 1860s Edinburgh's rail links with London had been estab- 
24 lished: its first suburban railway line was not opened until 1884, 
however, and although the bulk of the suburban network was built by 
the turn of the century, it was noý quite completed even in 1914.2-5 
Essentially this network provided links between middle-class residential 
aieas, 
26 
allowing the further suburban development of the city. It 
seems that the railways were not especially successful at securing working 
class passengers, except on specific routes (most notably, the journey 
to Rosyth): 27 and this 
. 
problem intensified during the 'twenties as the 
road network improved. Several stations, and two branch lines, were 
closed to passengers between 1920 and 1925- 
28 
Transport in and between working class districts was therefore 
provided-chiefly by tram and-'bus. At the end of the war the Edinburgh 
tramways, a steam-driven cable network, was, the fourth largest in the 
23- On these factors, see J. M. Winter, 'The impact of the first world 
war on civilian health in Britainl,, Econ. Hist. Rev. 301 1977, 
487-507- 
24. Keir, 428. 
25- Richardson et al., 25- 
26. Ibid. l 26. 
27. Until December 1922, free transport was provided by the Admiralty 
for employees of Rosyth Dockyard who livpd in Edinburgh. When 
these were discontinued Oon the ground that it was no longer 
justified as the necessity for employing men residing in Edinburgh 
was passed': T&LC minutes, 9 January 1923) the fare rose to 8s6d. 
See also T&LC minutes 19,26 December 1922,16 January 1923. 
28. D-Hunter, Edinburgh's Transport (Huddersfield 1964), 162-6, 
discusses rail fares and the threat from' roads. See also 
ss. 6.8-6.9 below. 
I 
world, with 36 miles of track. By 1925, converted to electric 
traction, the network had grown to 391 miles, and continued to expand. 
29 
The first corporation motor 'buses arrived in the city in January 1914, 
eight years after the Scottish Motor Traction Co. had begun to operate 
in the surrounding area. Serious development only began after the war: 
by 1925 there were 37 miles of routes in the city; 
30 by 1939 there 
were 69ý miles, and 18 services. 
31 In addition to providing more 
relemant routes than the trains, the trams in particular were required, 
by, law, throughout this period, to provide cheap fares for the liabouring 
classes' before 8 a. m. and after 5 P. m. 
32 This relative price advantage 
did not extend to 'buses, a fact which may account for the 'pro-tram' 
attitude of the local labour movement; though its attitude to 'buses 
was also coloured by the corporation's determination that their mainý 
terminus should be at the foot of the Mound - precisely where labour, 
and socialist, open-air meetings had long been held. 
33 
Without doubts the working class was more mobile within the city: 
Edinburgh had never, of course, been large enough to make journeys within 
it impractical on foot; but speed was now increased. It was quite 
possible, for instance, for a man comfortably to live in Dalry and travel 
daily to work in Leith; or for a man living in Edinburgh to commute to 
Rosyth. 34 By the same token the distinction between Edinburgh and Leith 
29. Ibid., 92; Keir, 406; M. F. Huq, 'The Urban geography of the heart 
of a city: with special reference to Edinburgh' (PhD thesis, 







Ibid., ch-7; Keir, 407- 
Keir, 41o-ii. 
Cp T&LC minutes, 17 September 1918; 21 June, 19 August 1921. 
A corollary was that engineering employers refused, after 1923, 
to pay accommodation allowances to outworkers working in nearby 
towns. During negotiations on this, the employers' representative 
asked: 'is it such a dreadful hardship to sit in aZ tram_/ car 
with your morning paper 22 1 suppose you do take time to read ZV 
To these sallies, the AEU negotiator responded 'You cannot read in 
the Edinburgh cars; it is impossible! ESAE&I and AEU, Local 
, 




became increasingly artificial: as it became possible for the 
inhabitants of the port to travel into central Edinburgh simply for 
a meeting, so the political institutions of the two towns merged. The 
amalgamation of the Leith and Edinburgh Trades Councils in 1921 was 
simply an acceptance of the new reality. 
This improvement in transport facilities had an important effect 
on the labour movement: it made possible, still more than previously, 
the hastily-summoned meeting. 0' ne other condition was necessary for 
this, however: rapid communication. This was, perhaps, par excellence, 
the period of rapid postal services, especially within the city. The 
secretary of the Trades Council could, for instance, summon an evening 
meeting of his executive committee by dispatching letters or postcards 
in the morning. This 
Table 3-3 
., 
Trade Union Telephones in Edinburgh 
Year ending Týades and*iiaýour Trad*e'Union secret- 
31 March Council officials. aries and organisers 
1ý23 00 
1924 0 
1925 0 .1 1926 1* . 17 
1ý27 18 
1j28 7*+ 2ý 
1929- 5 -23 
in" legal a4viser, a Notes: - 
clud, 
,e*s and abour , 
Council' 
, s. solicitor, at his office. 
+: includes Trades-and-Labour-Council secretary. 
Source: TUC Annual Reports, each year. 
was unusual-. - --but*even-excluding the--possibilitie ,s 
ofýthe telegrams 
messages-could--be rapidly-conveyed. ----During-the-early Itwenties., howeveri 
few of-Edinburgh's--trade unionists-were frequent users of the telephone. 
The first--telephones had been-installed-in-the-city as-early as 1879, 
by--1911--there-were about-12,000 in Edinburghýdnd Leith. By 1925 this 
figurp-had--grown-to-20,0001-and in-October 1926ýthe-first. automatic 
exchanges were installed -a process which permitted a doubling of the 
I 
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number of telephones over the following decade-35 -But very few of 
these belongea to trades unionists, as table 3.3 shows. 
ý. 3 The middle class and its politics 
Edinburgh's reputation as/*OLnon -industrial town, as a centre of law, 
medicine, teaching, ran deep; and not least in the consciousness of its 
labour movement, for whom it was both an explanation of non-achievement, 
and a cause for extra self-congratulation at what was achieved. In the 
mid-1930s Arthur Woodburn, a prominent product of the Edinburgh labour 
movement, identified - in the course of a brief 'anti-history' of the 
city - four key social groups which had created 'Edinburgh and its 
atmosphere': the Church, the Law, Medicine, and commerce. 
36 'Labour's 
he obse3Zved, 
has not found it easy to make headway 
in this atmosphere of tradition, 
authority and middle-class culture. 
> Even in the case of most working-class 
families, some of their members are 
connected with occupations quite outside 
trade union or socialist influence. 37 
Amongst these occupations supposedly immune to trade union influence he 
included the professions, domestiQ service, shop assistants and (perhaps 
ironically, in the light of his own background) clerks. 
Woodburn's analysis of the city's structure accords in many ways 
with the picture offered by census records. (See table 3.4). The pro- 
portion of the population occupied in administration, the professions, 
and personal services was considerable, at least in relation to other 
Scottish cities. Edinburgh housed the Scottish Office, and therefore 
35. Huq, ch. 6; Keir, 254-5. 
36. A. Woodburn, 'Edinburgh and Social Progress' in The Labour Party 
Annual Conference Edinburgh 1936 (souvenir brochure and 
programme), 13-18- Woodburn was by then Scottish Secretary of 
the Labour Party; he was Secretary of State for Scotland, 
1947-50. 
37. Ibid., 19. 
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a large civil service; and whilst the absolute size of the pro- 
fessional-group was accounted for largely by lower-status occupations 
(such as teachers and nurses), in relation to other cities, the 
proportion of lawyers was remarkable - reflecting the capital's role 
in the Scottish legal system, but also serving the city's commercial 
and financial institutions. For 
Table, 3.4 Administration, Commerce, Professions and Personal 
Service as percentage of total occupied populations 1921 
Edinburgh Glasg 
Commerce and finance 11.82 lo. 84 
Public administration and defence 4. o8 1.83 
Professional occupations 7-29 3-59 
Personal service 12-34 7.23 
of which: 
Ministers, clergymen 0.28 
Lawyers 0.47 
Physicians and surgeons 0-30 
Sick nurses 1.00 
Teachers 2-17 
Civil Service 1.85 
Commercial travellers 0.85 
Finance and insurance 0.63 
Domestic servants 7-38 










was also a major centre of finance, insurance and banking: 
'probably the largest centre of industrial capital in the world in 
relation to its size', 
38 
according to Woodburn -a judgement which may 
have been tinged with a perverse local patriotism, but was not incredible. 
During the early 'twenties there were at least ten major insurance 
companies with head offices in the city, 
39 
as well as 'some of.. the world's 
largest Investment Trusts... and the Head Offices of several B-: ýnksO' 
0 
38. Ibid., 17. 
39- J. Reid, The New Illustrated Guide'to Edinburgh Historical and 
Antiquarian (Edin. n. d. Z c. 19211)1121; Keir 580-2. 
40. Woodburn, 17- Woodburn was. a well-known popular author on finance: 
cp, e. g., The Banks and The'Workers N CLC, London, 1925) and 
An Oýitline of Finance (NCLC, London, n. d.., Z_c. 1928,7). See also 
Keir, 575-8,583-5- 
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Leith, a major port with by far the largest overseas trade on the 
east coast of Scotland. (and-in the early 'twenties rivalling Glasgow 
in the value of its imports, though not its exports), 
41 
also sustained 
a significant commercial middle class. 
Woodburn's analysis omiited one important factor in the 
formatioh of Edinburgh's middle class, however. The city's system 
of private education was unusually highly-developed. The Merchant 
Company schools were its core: formed from the seventeenth century 
onward for the education of the daughters and sons of the city's 
merchants, they were reorganised after 1870 to service the children of 
the new middle class of Victorian, industrialised, Edinburgh* 
42 
It was this middle class which the 
reformedL2erchant Company 
. 17schools were intended to serve, and the education 
provided ... appealed to the needs and desires of that class in Scotland. 43 
By our period the capital's private schools could provide an education 
for virtually all the children of the middle class, and generally a child 
redeived his or her tuition at a single school from the age of five 
onward. So it was both a purposeful schooling, committed to the est- 
ablishment and maintenance of a middle class, and - within this class - 
universally available. Perhaps the single most telling indicator of 
the size' of Edinburgh's midd16 class is provided by the numbers employed 
in domestic service. These were considerably greater, as a proportion 
of the occupied population, than in Glasgow; and although there was some 
tnndency to convergence between the cities during the 'twenties, even 
in-1931 Edinburgh's proportion was over 50 per cent greater. The out- 
standing feature, however, was the-rapid decline in numbers of domestic 
servants during the war years: even after a steady rise through the 
'twenties, fewer domestic servants were employed in Edinburgh in 1931 
44 
Ahan in 1911. 
41. See. b. e. low, 8*3.4 
42. ýJ. St'ewart, 'The rganisation of Education in Edinburgh (Edin. 1925) 
39-743;. Keir, 774-9. 
43ý S. tewart, 41.. 
44. tn 
. 
1ý*2,1* 21'985 were employed in 'Personal S. ervicel in Edinburgh; 
in 1931,. ý27,876 were -*a rise of*26.8 pqr cent... In. Glasg9w, the 
rise. was 38-0 per cent,. but. the percentages of the industrial 
p9pulations : ýý Personal Service were 15-0 in 'Edinburghl. 9.? in 
Glasgow in 1931- See N. Mililes, *k Study of 
and the Surrounding Area 1923-1934 7London 1936), 36-4b. 
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The city's middle class was far from homogeneous: it 
encompassed professionals administrativej commercial and industrial 
elements. - During the-nine. teenth century, the divisions between these 
sections had been marked. 
A section of the professional middle class 
retained an identity linked to the tradition- 
al role of the city in national, life, as a 
centre of law and administration, and a focal 
point in the social life of the 1, anded class; 
other professional and business groups were 
associated with the economic changes of the 
Victorian period. The city's notDrious 
snobbery seems to have derived from the social 
and political rivalries encouraged by this 
heterogeneity of the wealthier classes. 4.5 
This 'snobbery' was as marked - or, at least, as remarked upon during 
the 1920s. 'Of course we have a good share of snobbery here, ' wrote 
the Trades and Labour Council's secretary in 19271 
46 
whilst an Edinburgh 
sociologist recorded in 1936 that 
The West End of Edinburgh, though only 
too ready to welcome the casual stranger, 
acts rather differently to those who live 
within the city. Here in fact, social 
classes are sharply defined, status may 
almost be said to exist. 47 
Yet at the same time there do appear to have been changes. The standard 
of living of the mst wealthy seems. to have suffered, and there is some 
suggestion that the compartmentalisation of the various sections - the 
law, medicine, banking, and so on - began to break down after the Great 
War. 
48 
It is indeed probable that the city's internal 'snobbery' was 
associated with its apparently cosmopolitan-establishment. Edinburgh 
was a cultural metropolis, particularly for the Scottish bourgeoisie, in 
a manner unrivalled by other cities, but this was in large part 
dependent upon the openness of its bourgeoisie to outside-influences. 
45- Gray, Labour ArLstocracy. 20. 
46. G. W. Crawford, 'Foreword' in Edinburgh T&LCSouvenir of he Trades 
Union Congress. at the Synod Hall Edinburgh (Edin., 1927), 6. 
47- Milnes, 4-5- 
48. Cpj e. g., the comments of Lord Cameron in Keir, 453-6. 
I 
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In fact, the legal profession in the city fulfilled national functions, 
whilst the medical had if anything a wider frame of reference. The 
city's financial institutions in this period were relating more and 
more to international - rather than local, or even Scottish - areas for 
investment. 
Whilst the cosmopolitan establishment of the city may have 
played a central role in maintaining the key institutions which gave 
the city its peculiar 'atmosphere' or 'culture', it does not appear 
to have concerned itself greatly with Edinburgh's day-to-day management. 
Two major (though by no means mutually exclusive) groups dominated the 
affairs of the Town Council. (See tables 3-5 and 3.6). In 1925,57 per 
cent of councillors were owners of property (housing, land, or commercial) 
other than their own homes; whilst 53 per cent were businessmen: of the 
latter, it seems that many were of the petite bourgeoisie, shcpkeepers 
and the like, whose horizons would rarely have been raised wider than the 
city. In 
Occupations of Edinburgh Town Councillors 1905-1935 
Percentages of all councillors: 
1905 1925 1935 
Professionals 20 20 9 
- lawyers (12) (6) 
(3) 
Businessmen 52 53 55 
- retailers (25) (20) (26) 
Craftsmen 23 10 7 
Higher administrative 
workers 2 
White collar workers -46 
Manual workers - 10 
Housewives -3 10 
Not given 3 10 4 
No. of councillors: 50 70 71 
Source:. B. Elliott, D,. McCrone and V. Skeltons 'Property and Politics: 
Edinburgh 1875 to 197.5', table 4. 
Table 3-5 
contrast the professions were a relatively small (and declining) 
grouping oft the Council; and many of them appear to have been members 
of lower-status professions, such as estate agents. There was, however, 




property interest was declining (and its representation shifting 
in the direction of managers, rather than owners, of property), the 
proportion of businessmen was growing, 
Table 3.6 Property ownership by Edinburgh Town Councillors 
1205 -1935 
Percentage of all councillorst 
1905 1925 1935 
Owning any property 
other than own 
residence: 72 57 
Total no. of 
properties owned: 1370 631 
Source. Elliot McCrone and Skelton, table 1. 
45 
512 
Increasingly, therefore, local affairs were conducted by men 
(there were very few women) of local orientation, whose concern was for 
the efficient administration ofýthe city; although they borrowed from 
theintellectual elite a sense of the city's history and greatness, this 
was interpreted in the light of axioms of efficiency and good govern- 
ment which owed as much to principles of sound business administration 
as to any coherent political philosophy. Indeed, a major claim of the 
ruling groups on the Town Council was that they were ! non-political'; 
and the effectiveness of this claim is well shown by its ability to 
restructure bourgeois politics in Edinburgh in 1928 (creating the 
Progressive Association from a number of loose-knit groups of Tories, 
Liberals and independents). 
49 
The immediate mobilising issue in this 
was the growth of Labour representation on the Council, with its 
greater discipline and more clearly articulated policies, which was - 
in the majority's terms - bringing politics into local government. 
Paradoxically, of course, this more intense sense of the localism and 
non-political nature of city administration occurred precisely during the 
49. From c. 1920 onward these groups had been co-operating, by mutual 
tacit agreement, on an anti-socialist basis: see ch. 10 below. 
f 
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period when central government was'requiring local councils to become 
far more the agents of national policies, and national policies which 
were increasingly contentious. Housing was the main case in point: 
local councils had both to provide public housing and encourage 
speculative development; but in addition its responsibilities for 
relievingqqo_v, . erty, and the distress caused by unemployment, were 
becoming ever more onerous during the 'twenties. And, with the growth 
of national labour and trade union institutions capable of articulating 
policies in relation to these, and with greater Labour representation 
locally, it became more difficult for the local council to escape charges 
of being 'political', and operating in its own interests. 
50 
3.4 The Working Class 
The formation, and constant regeneration, of a working class is 
intimately associated with the development of economic and industrial 
structures. Edinburgh's working class had been formed in a city whose 
industrial structure was ... heterogeneoup, 
with a considerable amount of smaller-scale, 
labour intensive industry and a consequent 
diffusion of ownership. The relationships 
of industrial employment did not figure 
prominently in local affairs. 51 
In its early twentieth century development, the city remained true to 
this essence. As we have seen, its political leade. ýship did not, in 
general, come from industrialists; and although the proportion of the 
working population employed in relatively large-scale concerns (such as 
rubber manufacture, brewing, engineering) seems to have grown, the city's 
industrial units remained small in national terms. The largest single 
50. The final two paragraphs of this section draw heavily on B. Elliottj 
D-McCrone and V. Skelton, Property and Politics: Edinburgh 1875 . to 1975 (mimeo, University of Edinburgh, n. d. &c. 1970, esp. 16-24. 
51. Gray, Labour Aristocracy, 21. 
0 
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employer, for example, w, as St. Cuthbert's Co-operative Association, 
whose workers were mostly employed in its small branches; the largest 
industrial employer (The North British Rubber Co. ) had a workforce of 
rather less than 5000 at its largest during the period 1923-1934.52 
Table 3-7 Size of firms in Edinburgh 
Among firms employing 20 or. more: 
Group Total No. ' No. of Average No. Highest and 
of Insurýd S-ep-arate of insured Lowest Nor-I 
Workers Firms Workers per firm employed by 
any Firm 
Building and 
contracting 4777 102 47 590 14 
Printing 5426 48.113 621 20 
Bread and 
biscuit 
manufacture 2134 14 152 1010 20 
Rubber 4221 7 603 3270 42 
Engineering 3190 31 103 549 21 
Drink 
(irianufacture) 2694 29 93 588 21 
Paper, etc. 2611 11 237 580 29 
Oils, etc. 3731 15 249 721 30 
Shipbuilding 932 3 311 515 117 
Construction 
and repair of 
motor vehicles 1121 18.62 188 25 
Cardboard box, 
etc. 498 6 83 151 38 
Furniture etc. 776 18 43 146 20 
Chemicals 305 4 76 170 20 
Hemp. etc. 561 1 561 -- 
Cocoa, choc. and 
sugar manufact., 
confectionery 837 7 105 497 20 
Hosiery 442 3 147 384 26 
Note: The figures refer to 1931- 
Source: N. Milnes, Industrial Edinburgh, 1936 117. 
In table 3-7 we have perhaps the clearest indication of the size of 
workplaces in Edinburgh's manufacturing industry: it is evident from 
52. Milnes, 114. 
I 
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this that the Castle Mills of the North British Rubber Co. was very 
much the exception in a pattern of medium-to-small-sized industrial 
plants. 
In this important respect, the city, though perhaps not so 
untypical of British towns as a whole, does not coincide closely with 
the common view of the industrial structure of early twentieth-century 
Britain, in which the basic industries of Victorian capitalism (ship- 
building, engineering, textiles, and so on) dominate towns and cities, 
bringing workers together in increasingly large units of production 
wherein the antagonistic relationships between capital and labour are 
more clearly defined; 
53 
and in which the relationships (of heirarchy, 
for example) origi . nating within the workplace are carried in a fairly 
simple and direct way into the social structure of the working class 
community. 
54 In Edinburgh, on the contrary, the bourgeoisie, though 
conspicuous, was not clearly and directly associated with employment 
and exploitation; the working class was structurally highly fragmented, 
and not only in terms of stratification within a handful of industries 
. it was also divided between industries, and a large number of enterprises 
and workplaces within each of these. As one local managing director put 
it, in Edinburgh 
It frequently happens that a working class 
family of father and several sons and 




So although one important study found 'a strong degree of workplace- 
residence association' in Edinburgh's working class areas, 
56 these cannot 
usefully be thought of as 'occupational communities' unproblematically 
supporting attitudes of 'proletarian traditionalism'. 
The distinctive industriAl structure of the city can be gauged 
by comparing it with Glasgow's at the same time (see table 3.8). 
53. Cp, e. g., E. J. Hobzbawm Industry and Empire (Harmondsworth 1969), 
174-6, for such a view of the growth of factory production* 
54. Cp, e. g., J. E. Cronin, 'Coping with Labour, 1918-1926' in J: Cronin 
and J. Schneer (eds), Social Conflict and the Political Order in 
Modern Britain (London 1982), esp 0-25; C. Chamberlainj 'The 
growth of support for Labour Party in Britainý Brit. J. SociOl 24,1973, 
474-89. 
55- J. Waterston, 'Labour in Edinburgh' in T. Stephenson(ed), Industrial 
Edinburgh (Edin. 1921)192. 
56. Gordon, 174; the main (partial) exception to this was the concent- 
ration of railway and brewery workers in the Meadowbank-Abbeyhill area. 
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Of some of the major differences we are already aware: there was in 
Edinburgh,. a far greater proportion employed in the professions, and 
in personal service. 
Table 3.8 Distribution of working-popula ion by industry, 12 1 (per cent) 
Edinburgh Glasgow 
I Fishing 0.45 
II Agriculture 1-57 
III mining, quarrying 1.97 
IV Bricks, Glass, pottery 0-54 
V Chemicals, dyes 1-07 
VI Metals, machines 9.63 
VII Textiles, textile goods' 1-33 
VIII Skins, leather goods o. 40 
Ix Clothing 3-09 
X Food, drink, tobacco 5.26 
X1 Woodworking 2,07 
x1i Paper, printing 5.61 
XIII Building, decorating 3-97 
XIV Other manufacturing 3-07 
XV Gas, water, electricity 0.90 
XVI Transport, communication 9.65 
XVII Commerce, finance 19-70 
XVIII Public administration 9.94 
XIX Professions 7.98 
XX Entertainments, sport 0.77 
XXI Pbrsonal service 10-93 
XXII Other industries 0.09 
Total 99-99 
Total industrial population 201224 

























In many industrial groups (for instance, transport and communications, 
mining and quarrying, foods drink and tobacco manufacture) there was 
little to choose between the two cities. However, Glasgow had roughly 
twice the proportion of its working population occupied in clothing 
and textiles; whilethe most substantial difference came in the category 
described by the census as 'manufacture of metals, machines, etc., $ but 
which, may, without excess simplification, be referred to as the 
engineering industry. This uiiderý-representation of engineering meant, 
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on the one hand, that Edinburgh had no major concentration of its 
working population in a single manufacturing sector, with which to 
offset the employment in commerce, finance and the professions. More 
significantly, however, engineering was an industry central not(nly to 
technological innovation, but to the innovations in industrial organisation 
of the period '57 and it was also the industry which, above all, con- 
stituted the infrastructure of an industrial economy. Enterprises with- 
in industrial centres based on a single industry, and above all within 
those based on engineering, tended to be highly inter-connected and - 
inter-dependent: Edinburgh, lacking such concentration, did not develop 
such intense inter-relationships. By the same token, it did not build 
up a working class with a close experience or understanding of other 
major enterprises in the city: there were inevitably not the same 
opportunities for mobility between jobs in different industries; neither 
could those remaining within one enterprise have so clear a conception 
of working conditions in other local firms. 
. 
Edinburgh's working class was, then, highly fragmented, both by 
industry and by'workplace. Although many had, no doubt, some knowledge 
of a variety of industries and occupations, the basis for a deep common 
experience was abýent. Before turning to examine Edinburgh's economic 
performance in the 1920s, however,. we may tentatively point to one 
further dimension of fragmentation. Lord Provosts and similar civic 
dignitaries are no doubt prone to make comments on the 'justifiable 
pride' they feel in their cities' 'existing industries and the quality 
of their products', with 'craftsmen ... capable of holding their own 
anywhere'. 
58 But'even more independent investigators found it 'obvious 
This reputation had been developed in the nineteenth century, when the 
city's middle dass had been an unusually large luxury market, encouraging 
small-scale, craft production. After the Great War, the reputation had 
been detached from its origins, being applied now to manufacturing industry. 
- that, pride in good workmanship is a main characteristic' of EdinburghO59 
57. Hobsbawm, Industry 
- and 
Empire, 289-90; idems custom, Wages and 
Work-load in Nineteenth Century Industry' in Labouring Men, esp. 
359-69. 
58. Sir W. J. Thomson, 'Edinburgh as an Industrial Centre' in Scottish 
Chamber of Commerce, Trade and Commerce between Scotland and the 
Empire (Glasgow '1934), 11. 
59- Milnes, 15. 
f 
But it does serve as a reminder that Edinburgh's (relatively under- 
capitalised) industry was unusually dependent upon skilled labour. 




Edinburgh's economy, 1917-1922 
Surveying Edinburgh's economic record during the 1920s from a standpoint 
in the mid-Ithirti 
, 
es, Nora Milnes was struck by its close approximation 
to national trends: her work is permeated by a sense that Edinburgh 
wasa microcosm of the British economy. This assumption was based, 
largely, on the city's industrial heterogeneity, and on the statistical 
finding that 
From 1923 Z-when her study began_. 7 to the 
middle of the year 1929 the curve of un- 
employment from the Edinburgh area is 
practically that which represents the 
experience of Great Britain as a whole. 60 
In fact, inter-war Edinburgh's industrial structure was not identical 
with that of the national economy; indeed, according to one study, 
Within the field of the 38 basic 
industries, ... a higher average 
expansion than for Britain as a whole 
could be expected to apply to Edinburgh, 
on account of a favourable industrial 
structure. 61 
In'this section we examine how Edinburgh's economy stood up to the 
economic winds of our period, and some of the reasons why this optimistic 
expectation was not fulfilled. 
Edinburgh's strength was not uniform -a fact which Milnes' 
gnneralisation tends to obscure. ' In summing up the employment otperience 
of the Edinburgh area, she included the coal-mining areas of the Lothians 
whose induatrial politics impinge but rarely on our study. More 
important, she swept Leith into Edinburgh -a move which draws our 
attention away from the important differences between Edinburgh and its 
port. As a more recent study recorded, 
6o. Ibid., 12-13. 
61. C. E. V. Leser and A. H. Silvey, 'Scottish Industries during the inter- 
war period', Manchester School 18,1959,165. 
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in the days of depression, the Port of 
Leith suffered much like a Clydeside 
town, though its Siamese relationship 
to Edinburgh obscured, statistically at 
any rates the extent of its economic woes. 62 
Leith's economy was closely bound up with its pomt (the largest on 
the east coast of Scotland), and with shipbuilding and ship repairing: 
its industrial structure was far more akin to that typical of the went 
of Scotland. If, therefore, we now examine the direction of the economic 
winds, and their temperature, we do so in the knowledge that their effect 
throughout the city was not uniform. 
The outbreak of war in 1914 brought an initial dislocation to the 
Scottish economy, so largely dependent upon exports and international 
, trade. 
There were redundancies, for instance, in the paper industry, 
as manufacturers feared for their supplies of imported timber and esparto 
grass. In Edinburgh, E20,000 was raised for a fund for the unemployed. 
But, in the longer term, the war brought many benefits. The war effort 
sustained a high level of demand, even if it originated in government 
spending, and brought inflation. In the war materiel sector, investment 
was encouraged - even if this meant a switch away from other sectors. 
Yet the latter was hardly a matter for serious immediate concern: the 
war eliminated competitiom from the industries of major competitors 
in overseas markets as at home; and at home this led to demands for 
substitutes where imports were no longer available. The demand for labour 
outstripped standard sources of supply, encouraging the recruitment of 
women and other relatively untapped reserves. Of course, there were also 
adverse factors, not least thoseof raw material supply; and many of these 
wartime benefits would not survive the war - they were the gains of 
protection and high government spending. But, though their direction 
may have led to adverse structural changes which boded ill for the 
future, the economic winds of war blew warm'and strong. 
63 
The-post-war boom lasted through 1919 until, perhaps, the summer 
of 1920. It was based ona number of factors. The government, partly 
62. Keir, 603- 
63. This paragraph draws especially on C. Harvie, No Gods and Precious 
Few Heroes. Scotland-1914 - 1980 (London 1981)-, 16-1 , and B. Lenman, An Economic History of Modern Scotland 1660 - 1976 (London 1977), 208-14. 
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because it could not instantaneously rid itself of responsibilities 
taken on during the war, partly as 'an insurance against Bolshevism and 
revolution', 
64 
maintained public expenditure at an unprecedentedly high 
peacetime level. Demand in certain staple industries - ship-building 
especially, and by extension steel, iron and coal - remained high into 
1920, largely because the disruption caused by war created an apparent 
shipping shortage in 1919 much greater than the real shortfall in tonnage: 
when the disruption was overcome, shipbuilding and shipping rates coll- 
apsed. 
65 It seems likely that the general extent of dislocation in 
markets, especially abroad, was not immediat. ely appreciated, and that 
business expectation remained unjustifiably high for a short period; 
66 
it is also probable that British traders held a relative advantage in 
the short term, for the dislocation to the trade of Germany and some other 
competing nations was even greater. Edinburgh shared in this transient 
prosperity. Indices of industrial activity and individual prosperity 
rose: incomes, imports and exports were up, hours of work fell. 
67 
But 
the boom soon passed. 
The overall causes of the slump have been much discussed; we need 
only explore certain aspects of the Edinburgh experience. A valuable 
insight into the dimensions of the slump in Edinburgh can be found in 
data about Leith's overseas trade (see table 3-9). Both imports and 
e. xports passing through the port reflected the post-war boom. 
64o W. Astor' Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health, 
Hansard: 5, cxiv, col. 1956,8 April 1ý19, quoted by M. Swenarton, 
'An"Insurance against Revolution": Ideological objectives of the 
Provision and Design of Public Housing in Britain after the First 
World War', Bull. Inst. Hist. Res. 54, ig8i, 94. Swenarton's 
article clearly demonstrates the political imperatives which 
underlay the improvements in provision between 1919 and 1921; 
these advances were abandoned as the imperatives (essentially, 
fear of working-class unrest) subsided after 1920-21. The 'Out 
of Work Donation' (on which cp. ch. 4 below)may also be seen in 
this light; see A. Deacon, In search of the Scrounger. The 
Administration of-Unemployment Insurance in Britain, 1220 - 1931 
(Occasional Paper on Social Administration No. 60) (London 1976) 
13-14; N. Whiteside, 'Welfare'legislation and the unions during the 
First World War', Hist. J. 23,1980, esp. 870-2. 
65. Lenman, Economic History, 212. 
66. Cp. A. L. Bowley, I Some Economic Consequences of the Great War 
(London 1930), 9ý--6- 
67. See below, and ch. 4. 
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The pattern of imports shows a slump in 1921, when they fell by one- 
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Source: M. W. Flinn, 'The Overseas Trade of Scottish Ports, 1900 - 19601, 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy '13,1966 1 232- 
In large part this reflected the progress (paradoxically) of Scottish 
agriculture, for much of Leith's import trade was in foodstuffs, 
particularly grain and dairy produc*e calling for specialised handling 
facilities. 
68 This produce was for consumption not only in Edinburgh, 
but in 
an extensive domestic market in West and 
Mid Scotland, the North Eastern, Southern 
and Border Counties, and in North of 
England territory - all linked up by an 
indispensable railway sýptem. 69 
Certainly a comparison between the post-war importing records of three 
Scottish ports (see figure 3-10) indicates the stronger basis which 
foodstuffs gave to Leith's import trade - and this impression is 
strengthened by the relative stability, and high levelsof foodstuff 
68. M-W-Flinn, 'The Overseas Trade of Scottish Ports, 1900 - 19601, 
Scot-J-Pol. Econ. 13,1966,226. On Scottish agriculture, cp 
Lenma4l Economic'History, 213-14,227-8. 
69. Scottish Chamber of Commerce, 32. 
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Figure 3-10 Overseas trade of three 
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Source: cýtlculated from M. W. Flinn, 
'The overseas trade of Scottish ports, 
19co-196ol, Scot. J. Political Economy 13, 
1966,231-2. 
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imports in comparison with tile volatility, and often relatively low 
level, of raw material imports for industry. 
In exports, the depression is more clearly marked. Leith had 
benefitted from the post-war boom (although in exports, as in imports, 
the impact of inflation should, not be forgotten). But recession camp 
sooner, and bit deeper. Again, the explanation lies partly in the 
structure of the port's exports. The overwhelming preponderance of 
these was-cdall passing through not only from. the Lothian field, but 
frodi throughout central Scotland. 
70 Before the war, coal was exported 
in large quantities to Germany, Russia, and other Baltic destinations: 
this trade was lost in 1914 and, with the civil war in-Russia (not to 
mention British hostility to, the Bolshevik government), and the collapse 
of the German economy in 1923, the loss was not recovered. The entire - 
Baltic trade, in which Leith had specialised, suffered similarly. 
71 It 
may be that the superior exporting records of Glasgow and Dundee reflect 
a greater proportion of manufactured goods 
(cp figure 3-9), and in 
particular of engineering products. 
The reductions in Government expenditure, spurred by the anti- 
waste campaign waged by the Beaverbrook and Northcliffe press against 
Isquandermaniall affected the general level of purchasing power. The 
Out-of-Work Donation was phased out by 1921, and unemployment insurance 
was not an adequate substitute. 
72 The 'Addison' housing programme was 
73 
guillotined: a severe blow to the labour-intensive building industry. 
After 1918, the naval base and dockyard at Rosyth, to which thousands of 
workers had been drawn during the war, was gradually run down: by 1922 
all ýion-establishedl workers had been paid off, and most of the 'established' 
transferred to bases in England. This had a significant effect on Edinburgh's 
701 Ibid. 
71- Harvie, No Gods, 13-14,25-6. Also cp Bowley, Economic Consequences 
95ý-7; F. Douglas, Zero Hour for the Forth (Edinburgh, n, d-L C-19420P 
12, makes the case for the importance of British intervention in 
Russia in forceful terms. 
72. See below, ch. 4. 
73. Swenarton, "'Insurance against Revolution", 97-8. 
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economy, for many-of its workers had commuted daily from the city 
on special-trains. 
74 But blows such as this only-hint at the effect 
of the ending of-war production, which-had sustained demand in a wide 
variety of-industries: - -many-factory owners who may have carped at 
being required to make products outside their normal range. under 
Ministry of-Munitions direction during the war, -began in these years 
to appreciate the advantages of assured markets. 
-- The depression of 1921 deepened during. 1922;, thereafter recovery 
came--only-slowly-and fitfully. -We are hampered-here by-the absence of 
fully adequate-indicators of the local position. -We-have already seen 
that recovery in Leith's overseas trade was, at best, faltering. The 
employment statistics are more ambiguous. Unemployment in Edinburgh -- 
(excluding Leith)-fell through 1923 to a low'p61nt of 8 per cent in -1924, 
rising--thereaftor; in-Leith it fell,. through-1923-and 1924, to a low point 
of-17 per-cent in 1925, before rising again. (Unemployment is treated in 
greater detail-in chapter 4 .) Yet-throughout these years-the total- 
number-of-those counted as 'effectively employed' was-rising: the problem 
was that the working population (as measur6d-by the-total number insured) 
was-at-times rising faster (see table 3-11). -And as-the discussion in 
chapter 4 also shows, there is some evidence that, after-, a decline between 
1921 and-1923, - real wages (if--not necessarily real incomes) edged upwards 
through the remainder of our period - 
WorkinK Population and Employment in Edinburgh -- 
1925- . 19271- 
(a) Inq4red. ýersons 1ý0; 930 124; 830 126050 
(b) Eff 
, e, , qti, ýply employed 
107; 873 11,11700 114; 6,81 
(c) Un: qppýoyed.. (W-W) 13)957 13,130 11,469 
(d) Unemployed 
---(percentage) 10.8 9.1 
Source: N. Milnes, -ý_ýtuýy 6f'Indýsirial Edinbu'r'gh'aý .d the 
surroundingarea 1923 - 34 (London 1936), 93-4, and 
calculations therefrom. 
Table 3-11 
though, -converselyi this has probably more to do with falling prices- 
than rising money wages. To summarise: although the evidence is not 
74. Douglas, Zero Hour, 
f 
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unambiguous, the signs are that Edinburgh's economic experience in 
the earlier 1920s was, in direction if not in degreee, that of the 
nation as a whole. The post-war boom lasted, at best, two years; 
the slump was at its worst through 1921 and 1922; thereafter, trade 




Standardsof Living and the Working Class 
4.1 Introductory 
The last chapter shewed that the environment of Edinburgh's labour 
politics during our period was shaped, in part, by long-term, historical 
factors: especially, the development of the city's social geography 
and industrial structure. But we also saw the economic turbulence of 
the wartime and post-war years. Tn this chapter we examine the impact 
of these short-term, economic, factors on the standard-of living of 
the-working class. We do so for. two reasons. Firstly, as we shall 
see, the various elements of the standard of living affect the various 
elements of the working class in different ways: changes in living 
standards can, therefore, have important implications for the social 
structure of the working class. (and hence for the latter's ability 
to act politically). Secondly, the physical, economic and social 
conditions of working class life, and changes in them, can be motives 
for political and trade union action. We-concentrate on two aspects of 
the standard of living: we look, firstly, at a number of issues related 
to the labour markets employment and incomes, and we then discuss 
housing donditions. 
4.2 The cost of living 
At its simplest, the standard of-living may be-regarded as a function 
of income and the cost of living. This formulation begs many questions 
(some of which we shall address in-the course-of our discussion), but 




The cost of living is our starting-point. This, of course, 
1, varies according to the purchasing and consumption patterns of each 
householdl; lattempts to seek an objective or neutral criterion are 
thus almost inevitably frustrated. After 1914, an official 'cost of 
living' index was issued: this was designed to 'measure the percentage 
increase in the cost of maintaining a minimum or subsistence standard 
of living among working class households. ' 
2 Nationally collated, it did 
not register the detail of local variations. Certainly it was mistrusted 
within the labour movement: the Trades and Labour Council described it 
as 'obsolete and unreliable' in 1923- Interestingly, however, they 
did not question the basic assumption that the index should be based on 
a minimum, expenditure level; they merely suggested that it should relate 
'to those commodities which form the cost of subsistence of the workers'; 
3 
and it was this dispute over detail, rather than principle, which under- 
lay their decision to print annually a detailed 'Household Budget' after 
1914. This was described as being the 'Minimum for-Man and Wife and Two 
Young Children' .4 See table 4.1). Broadly, it supports the official 
version of changes in the cost of living. -Unfortunately this-, unofficial', 
local research was not published after 1920, perhaps because it ceased 
to-be_helpful; 5 but, together with-the official index-, it confirms 
that the general wartime and immediate post-.; war experience-of inflation 
was shared in Edinburgh, and suggests that the picture of falling prices 





R. Hyman and B. Price, 'Labour Statistics', in J. Irvine, I. Miles 
and J. Evans (eds. ),. Demystifying Social Statistics (London ig7g),. 266. 
G. S. Bain, R. Bacon and. J. Piml I ott, 'The Labour torcel in A. H I Halsey 
(ed. ) Trends in British Society since 1900 (London 1972), 107- 
T&LCIminutes,. 31 July 1923- 
TC AR 1916,19. 
Cp the comment by an employers' chairman in negotiations in 1922: 
'There was no. grumbling on your. part about going on the. Board of 
Trade cost of living when wages were going up, bu *tn, 
ow , 
it is 
coming down, people. aiýq. taýipg exception to it although it is 
work'ed out in the same way'. ESAEU and AEG, Conference P3ýoceedingsj 


















Cost of living indices, 1914-1927 
Official Wrestricted' TC'full' 
100 100 100 
125 127 n. a. 
144 158 neae 
179 2o6 n. a. 
205.215* n. a. 
221 208 192 
269 258 234 







'Official': Cost of Living index issued by (successively) 
Board of Trade and Ministry of Labour; "TC restrictedl: 
household budget researched by Edin. TC, excluding rent, 
rates, lighting, boots and clothing, which are included 
in ITC full'. 
* In 1918, several items were not available. 
Source calculated from: A. H. Halsey (ed), Trends in British Society 
since 1900; Edin. TC and TUC Annual Reports 1916-20. 
If these figures - graphically illustrate some of the pressures behind 
the post-war militancy, they give us no real grasp of the actual standard 
of living which might be enjoyed by Edinburgh's working class families. 
In pursuit of this, we may next look in more detail at the TradesCouncil's 
minimum household budget, the elements of which are set out in table 4.2. 
Several points stand out. It is not a generous allowance. As the compilers 
pointed out, it 'does not include any expenditure for Tobacco, Beer, 
16 Papers, Amusements, 
, 
Holidays, Renewal of Furniture, etc. ; nor does it 
cover work-related expenditure, such as fares. But it represents a 
working class view of an adequate, if minim-all weekly 'shopping basket'. 
6. TUC AR 1920,6. 
I 
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Table 4.2 Edinburgh Trades Council's Household Budget, 
with prices applicable on 19 June 1920 
S. d. 
stone meal 16 
4 lbs. sugar 48 
lb. tea 1.4 
lb. margarine 71 
1b. butter' 16 
1 stone potatoes 28 
jar marmalade 2 1J 
lb. basrley & peas 6 
lb' lentils 34 
Rice: tapioca, etc. 10 
1ý'lb. self-raising flour 8 
1 lb. cheese 10 
lb. bacon 13 
-ý doz. eggs 19 Milk 24 
Butcher meat .70 
E3 .d. 
Vegetables 16 
Currants & Raisins 71 
ý lb. corned beef 5 
1 lb. fish 9 
Teabread 54 
6 21b. loaves 33 
1 cwt. coal 2 74 
4 bunches firewood 5 
Soap and Washing powders 17 
Sundries 2 10 
'Restricted' total 44s. 6d. 
Rent and rates 60 
Light 10 
Boots and clothing 2o 4 
'Full' total 71s. 8d. 
Definitions: 'Restricted' total was used in 1916-1918; 'Full' 
total in 1919 and 1920. 
Source: TUC Annual Report 1920, 
It is not-easy to estimate which categories of families found 
themselves ablej relatively easily, to match such a diet, or to exceed 
it, for there are a number of complicating factors. Where the budget 
assumes a family of two adults and two children to be typical, it is 
by no means clear that this was. so. The censuses suggest that the mean 
number of children per family in Scotland at this period was in the 
region of four; and that the number was significantly greater in 
7 
families where the husband was-a manual worker. Within the working 
class there was also variation, with the unskilled tending to have 
larger families than the skilled. 
8 
This 




is supported by a survey carried out in Edinburgh in 1931: 
examining households where the 'chief occupations included: - 
Asphalters, railwaymen, motor-drivers, 
Corporation employees, building trades 
operatives, labourers, shop assistants 
and porters, coopers, laundry workers, 
office-cleaners, carters, messengers, 
dockers, fishermen, miners, vanmen, 
apprentices of all descriptions, etc. etc., 9 
this found 5.8 members of each family on average, with this mean 
varying in different streets between 4.3 and 8.2.10 The reasoning 
behind the Trades Council budget is unfortunately not stated, so we 
can make no easy allowance for extra family members; but this does 
point to the narrowness of the line between adequacy and poverty - 
the same family income could lead to both. 
4.3 Employment incomes 
Income was, of course, a second major factor in determining the standard 
of'living, though again the evidence here is limited. Two main comments 
have beezi made on the-movement of wages during our period: firstly, 
that money wage rates, having been broadly-steady*in the pre-war decade, 
rose sharply during the War to a peak in 1920, before falling again 
almost as sharply-and steadying again from about 1922 at about twice 
the pre-war level. 
11 Secondly, that there was a general narrowing of 
the differentials within the working class over the period 1914-1926: 
9. I. T. Barclay and E. E. Perry,, Behind Princes Street: A Contrast. 
Report on Survey of Housing. Conditions of 443 Families Ai_tuated 
in St. Andrew's Ward, Edinburgh (Edin. 1931), 33- 
10. Ibid., 28-9. 
11. Bain et al., in Halsey (ed. ), 121. 
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more specifically, 'while the real wages of skilled workmen were little, 
if at all, greater in 1926 or in 1929 than before the War, those of 
unskilled men had increased greatly. 112 Such trends would have had a 
profound effect not only on working class standards of living, but on 
how they were perceived. To a working class unused to such rapid 
inflation, the price rises of wartime may have thrown the legitimacy 
of the. wage structure into question, for the effect of inflation on 
a relatively stable structure of money wages is to reduce real 
differentials. If it was not only differentials which were reduced, but 
also the real value oF skilled workers' wages, a desire to see the 
restoration of differentials may have been associated with a new 





at each Date' (ibid., 150): 
Bowley , 148. Cp Bowley's table of 
'Wages in less skilled 
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One indication of long-term change to this effect is the different 
attitude of the Trades Council to slum-dwellers. In the early 
1880's its'President, asked whether slum-dwellers resented their 
conditions, 'r6sponded : 'Properly speaking it is generally the 
Irish element, labourers and what not who live in that locality, 
and I must confess I do not'come into communication with them 
as a rule ... I 
(Quoted Gray, Labour Aristocracy, 98-9). Forty 
years later agitation on slum dwellers' conditions was a central 
aspect of the Council's activity: cp, e. g., EC of Edin. T&LC, 
Our Unseen City Revealed. A Tale of Housing Atrocities 
(Edin. n. d. Z 1922_/); T&LC minutes, passim . 
F 
many cultural differences between working class groups would 
persist, those based on consumption patterns must have been threatened: 
for example, if the identity of the labour aristocracy was associated 
with perceptions of 'respectability', as Gray maintains, 
14 it must have 
been both more difficult to preserve during wartime and, thereafter, more 
difficult to preserve as an exclusive and identifying attribute of the 
skilled worker. 
Broadly, the national trends seem to have applied in Edinburgh, 
though we shall notice some differences of emphasis. We can also look 
in more detail at certain individual occupations. Throughout our period 
the Tradez Council collected, and published annually, lists of wages and 
conditions applicable to 
, 
various trades in the City, and these are 
valuable data, although we must use them with caution. The information 
was collected through a questionnaire circulated annually to affiliated 
union branches and asking ý_nter alia for 'Wages, Including Bonuses. 115 
Apparently, many branches responded to this question only fitfully, if 
at all, and there are consequent gaps in the data. Nor are these gaps 
only random. Almost inevitably, it was easier for branch secretaries 
to complete the form where there was a single, uniform rate in the 
district, and this was a concept more applicable to skilled Otrades') 
unions, rather than to unions organising a multitude of grades and 
occupations. Perhaps the main exception to this was where the unskilled 
or semi-skilled formed an organisation with a recognised podtion in a 
union - either a chapel or a workplace branch; but this was rare. 
We therefore have quite full information on many-trades (electricians, 
engineers, bookbinders, compositors, bricklayers, bakers and so forth), 
but the-data relating to the semi-skilled and unskilled is patchy. 
This isq of course, especially true of the unorganided, or non-union, 
sectors of industry: a small indication of what may lie hidden is 
provided by the laundry workers for whom unionisation was recent (and 
weak). The 
14. Gray, Labour Aristocracy, esp. 136-43- 
15. A fragment of such a form survives in a T&LC minute book(its 
reverse having apparently ýeen used for. scrappaper). It requests 
'Information desired for the compiling of the Annual Report: - 
'in these matýers: l Union ., ý. Branch ... Membership* ... 
"Contracted- 
in Membership ... Secretary ... Address ... Wages. L including Boýuses ... Hours per week ... Overtime Rate... ý here the page is torn offl. 
p 
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m 
rise in money wages during the war years was a marked feature of 
the Edinburgh experience. 'In several trades ... wages have been 
doubled, ' the Trades Council recorded in 1919, but 'in the trades and 
occupations which are not so woll oreanised ... the workers have been 
unable to maintain a proper atandard of life. 
16 Rates were highly 
volatile during 1919-1922t but thereafter became otable, in Aeveral cases 
remaining unaltered until 1927- Some of these wage movements are 
represented in figure 4-3; yet while this can give us some feeling of 
the extent of the wartime changes, and their impact, other methods of 
comparison are necessary to explore them to the full. 
In table 4*4 we examine, as far as possible, the progress of pay 
differentials within industries: adequate data are available on only 
three. In Building, Bowley's designation of bricklayers and painters 
as skilled and semi-skilled respectively has been followed; 
17 in printing 
the category 'warehouse assistants and packers' is taken to be an 
unskilled grade. The rubber industry is more difficult, since the data 
provide a range of-payments. In some years these are distinguished as 
'time' and 'piece', but it is not clear to which groups or grades 
different payments systems applied. However, taking them as examples 
of semi-and unskilled "ates of pay, they are compared with two rates 
likely to have applied to craft maintenance workers in-the industry. 
In general, we have a picture of narrowing wage differentials as-between 
skills and, one broadly, consistent. with Bowley's national figures. The 
only exception to this pattern is in the relationship between electricians' 
and rubber workers' wages: and it is at least possible that this is 
specific to the electrical trades, In contrasti engineers lost ground 
in relation to process workers in this industry. We do, then, have 
evidence of an erosion of craft privilege, weakening the economic 
basis'of cultural distinctiveness. This 
16. TC AR 1919,5; emphasis added. 
17. Bowley, 149. 
I 
Table 4.4 Intra-industrial wage differentials in_Edinburgh, 
1914 - 1926 
Building 1914 1919 1921 j32, ý 1926 
Bricklayers 100 100 100 
Painters 93 130 98 
, Labourers 59-73 n. a. 74 
Printing 
Compositors 100 100 
Warehouse 





Engineer 100 100 100 
Rubber)(top: 84/95* 80 99 
workerXbottom: 63 70 75 
Electrician 100 100 100 
Rubber)(top: 78/87* 82 77 
worker)(bottom: 58 72 58 
Note: 'different values for 1914gLven in different TC Annual 
Reports. The higher figure is less probable. 
Source:, calculated from TCARs, various years. 
is still more marked when we compare skilled and unskilled workers' 
pay between industries (figure 4-5): whereas in 1914 there was a marked 
differential between the'-wages of skilled and semi-skilled workers as a 
group, and the unskilled, this was-no longer the case in the 1920s. 
Substantial differentials remained, but they. were almost as much between 
different categories of skilledworkers and different unskilled 
occupations, as between skilled and unskilled.. (The trades which suffered 
most were in engineering. ) 
18 By the mid-1920s, in short, wage rates 
seem to have been determined almost as much by the condition of the 
industry as by the worker's skill. 
We now turn away from the impact of wage changes on working class 
fragmentation, to the changing real value of wages. Any estimate of real 
wages will inevitably be only approximate; however, an interesting method 
18. Cp ss. 6.2 and 6-3 below. 
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Figure 4., 9 Wage ratesas aperceniagý om ositorý' ýage rates: 
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is to estimate the ýalue of wages in relation to the Trades Council's 
own 'Minimum Household Budget'. (Unfortunately, lacking detail on 
this after 1920, it has been necessary to estimate its cost in each 
year using the 'official' cost of living index: the assumption, 
however, is that the approximation is not so great as to invalidate the 
results, which are shown in figure 4.60 The trends are much as we 
might expect: falling real wage rates during wartime; significant 
increases in 1919-1921, somewhat eroded during 1922-1923, and then a 
small improvement. The strong suggestion is that almost all ocCupations 
had improved their real wages by 1927, as compared with 1914, and 
especially with 1918. Yet other -trends also stand out. The real wages 
of the unskilled tended to improve faster than those of-the skilled; 
the real. wages of engineers fell. 
19 But more than this, before and 
immediately after the War, the bulk of unskilled workers operated at 
below what the Trades Council considered a 'minimum' level; and 
immediately after the War, even skilled workers were perilously close to 
%ale it, By the mid-twenties, however, most unskillew workers seem to have 
20 
earned more than this minimum, *if only marginally so. 
Wage rates and incomes are not, of course, necessarily identical. 
Several-factors must therefore be added to our discussion thus far. 
Firstly, not all wage rates were time rates. We have already seen that 
some rubber workers were paid piece rates, and we can reasonably presume 
that many piece rates were omitted from the Trades Council's compilations 
(since they were more difficult to estimate). Piecework 
Cp comments by two AEU representatives in negotiations with the 
local engineering employers: 'Mr. STUART ... 
Z-with-7 
the starvation wages that you are offering I am quite 
serious in saying that some of our fellows are looking for 
anything bar engineering, ... What they are looking for are jobs 
either in pubs or at labouring work. 'Mr. WRIGHT :I might 
tell you for my own part that I'was getting more some time ago 
for labouring. ' ESAE&I and AEU, Local Conference Proceedings, 
in re outworking allowances', 22 January 1923,20-21. 
20. We canj of course, be less confident about absolute levels at 




Figure 4.6 'Real' wage rates In Edinburgh, 1914-1927 
Wage rates in certain Edinburgh trades, expressed as a percentage of the estimated 
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uig3. neera ý'ýýEýuildoing trade 
iI 
seems to have been especially prevalent in two categories 
of work: where the finished product was essentially quite standardized 
and the production process relatively simple and labour-intensive (such 
as brushmaking); and where the production process,, though highly 
capitalized, involved the production of large numbers of standardized 
items. In the latter case, it need not be the production of a single 
item: in rubber works, for examples the production of golf balls and 
hot-water bottles was seasonal; 
21 in gas-meter manufactures there 
were over 400 separately priced Jobs for brass finishers. 
22 And, of 
course, piecework was not necessatily, a strategy to reduce earnings 
(although sometimes it was): 
23 
rather, it was designed to reduce unit 
costs by encouraging productivity, It therefore offered the 'clever 
24 
craftsman' relatively high reWards, but rather less to the 'duffer'* 
Secondly, earnings over a period of time depend upon regularity 
of employment. During the war the Trades Council pointed out that as 
there had 'been no rise in wages locally to. equal half of the financial 
imposts on the necessaries of life, 
It is only the comparative regularity of 
employment now obtaining under the present 
abnormal conditions, and the overtime worked 
in some trades, that makes the increased 
cost bearable. 25 - 
21. Milnes, 251. 
22. ESAE&I and Brassfinishers' Society, Local Conference Proceedings, 
'piecework prices - application for advance of 20 per cent', 29 
October 1920,15. 
23- E. g., 'in one of the largest pits in East Lothian': 'The men 
thinking (foolishly 
, 
of course) that if they put their backs into 
it and were able to earn an extra shilling or two - well, the ton 
rate being so small, the manager would surely never think of 
reducing it. ' But alas ... One fine day recently. 
(or iýather, one 
very black day for them) they were told that'on and after''a certain 
date the ton rate would be reduced from 2s2. to Is. 6d. 1 
(Andrew Clarke, Labour Standard, 25 April 1925) 
24. ESAE&I and Brass finisher's Society, 29 October 1920,13,14: 
the terms were used by employers' representatives. 
25- TC AR 19161 6: the same point is made in TC AR 1917,8- 
f 
ill 
The wartime experience was one of full employment and overtime; 
in these circumstances standards of living could rise even though 
real wage rates declined. During 1919 and 1920 the common demand was 
for a shorter working week combined with the abolition of overtime 
and high basic wages. 
26 With the passing of the boom, however, overtime 
ceased to be a significant phenomenon: indeed, in contrast, short 
time working is more commonly the complaint. 
27 We cannot, therefore, 
make any easy or straightforward deductions from the wage rate data 
concerning actual incomes; whilst those in full-time employment may 
have somewhat improved their position, work was in the 'twenties becoming 
increasingly uncertain and unpredictable. 
In one sense, the extent of employment and under-employment was 
determined by what employers were wont to call 'the state of trade'. 
We examine overall trends in employment in the next section. But, 
in certain industries, this state of trade was highly dependent on 
seasonality. The effect of the season on certain outdoor trades is well 
known. In building, for instance 'In spite of all modern improvements ... 
the weather is still of paramount importance'. 
28 
Yet many other 
industries were influenced by seasonal changes in demand. The rubber 
industry experienced fluctuations which led to a 20 per cent variation 
in women's employment, always the most vulnerable. 
29 Confectionery was 
also seasonal, as of course were most holiday-related trades. Although 
seasonality declined in some industries, such as printing, 
30and 
although 
it may have appeared insignificant beside the more secular trends in 
employment, it remains an important qualification standing against any 
over-easy assumptions about the working-class standard of living. 
Short time working, and seasonal unemployment, were compounded 
in certain industries by casual labour.. The dockers in Leith were, of 
course, casually employed. So too were building workers. 'No builder 
26. See, E. g., NAUL No. 292 branch minutes, 12 January 1919; NUR No 1 
branch minutes, 2 February 1919, 
27- E. g'., ibid., 11 March 1923,27 July 1926; Labour Standard, 9 January 
1926, ESAE&I and AEUILocal Conference Proceedings 'in re Outworking 
Allowances', 19 December 1922,15 -16. 
28. Milnes, 158, see'also A-D-Webb, 'The Building Trade' in S. Webb and 
A. Freeman (eds. ), Seasonal Trades (London 1912), 312 - 93- 
f 29. Milnes, 
. 
251-2: women made up roughly one half of the labour force. 
30- J. Child. Industrial Relations in the B itish Printing Industry. 





of a lower grade than foreman can count on continuous employment from 
one day to another. Technically he cannot count on it from one hour 
to another...., 
31 But casual employment of this, relatively formaliced, 
type was only one variant: one point in a spectrum of managerial 
prerogative and tactics which includedothers such as the short-term 
employment of married women to overcome peaks in demand, and the use 
of apprentices as both cheap, and limited-term, labour. 
4.4 Unemployment. 
Unemployment, then, was important for the employed as well as the 
workless, for security of employment was central to security of income, 
and (especially during the 'twenties) unemployment was a widespread 
threat. For a variety of reasons the statistics must be treated with 
caution. 'It is still uncertain how far the volume and rate of inter- 
war, unemployment are adequately reflected in the available statistics. '32 
This is particularly true of just our period. Yet we can describe its 
broad dimensionse. During 1919 and early 1920 
unemployment was not perceived as a significant problem. It arose at 
only-four meeting .s of the Trades Council. The following year it was 
discussed on 10 occasions. By 1921 it had become a major problem, 
arising at least 35 times - rather more than twice, on average, for 
each Trades Council meetingP As the Council recorded in the middle 
of19221 
31- MilneS, 158. 
32. W-R-Gari3idej The Measurement of Unemployment'. Methods and Sources 
in Great Britain 1850 - 1979 (Oxford 19863,46; ibid. 29-61, 
for a discussion of the problems. 
33- TC and TUC minutes, 1919-1921* 
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On the average, during the year 
Z-1921-222 approximately 151000 
of our people have been on the live 
Registers of*the Labour Exchange alone. 
ýhose peoples with their dependants 
constituting about'a fifth of the 
population 34 
The progress of unemployment during the remainder of our period is 
shewn in table 4-7: 
Table 4.? Unemployment in Edinburgh 
Population of Insured Effectively Unemployed 
Working age Persons Employed No#. Percentage 
1ý23 2ý1,309 120; 9ý6 io?, 87ý 1ý1057 10.8 
1ý25 2ý4; 964 124 . 836 111,700 13,130 10-5 
1927- -- -298,618 126: 1.50 114,681.11,469 9.1 
Source: N. Milnes, Industrial Edinburgh, 93-4. 
Whilst the relationship-of insurance figures to the-'actual' rate of 
unemployment is unclear$ in terms of simple volume they-can only have 
understated the problem, for various groups were excluded, whi Ist a 
substantial-section of the gainfulýy employed was-not-insured. 
35 We 
can therefore speak of-the numbers unemployed in table 4.7 as 
conservative approximations. 
- There is reason to believe-, too, that these figures-substantially 
understate the incidence of unemployment-on the-workingclass, and 
particularly on working class areas of the city. -Some impression of 
this can be gained by comparing unemployment-in-Edinburgh -'proper' with 
that in the more working class district of Leith. The proportions of the 
insured population unemployed are-shown-in figure 4; 8, and are in each 
year nearly twice as great in Leith as in Edinburgh. It 
34. T&LC AR 1922, *7-* 'on*'the 'relationýh*i*p'betwe . en .. the*ltive'Register' 
and other unem -oyTent statistics,. pee 
Garside,. 40 Pý 
35- 'At I the 1931 Ce I nsus In. early.. 1ý ''Mil ,j 
lion. perspns within the insurance 
age limits were counted as gainfully employeal'of whom only 121 
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was Leith's industrial structure which led to this: 'the high 
unemployment percentage fin Leith, 7 is not alone due to a slump in 
shipping and transport, but rather to an all-round decline which has 
affected all industries., 
36 In reality, therefore, the incidence of 
unemployment among the working class in Edinburgh as a whole may have 
been rather higher than the statistics suggest; perhaps as high as the 
Leith rate. 
37 
Unfortunately the evidence available on the duration of 
unemployment, where it exists at all, is sparse and unre2lable. 
38 It 
is therefore impossible to do more than make very rough estimates about 
what-proportion of the city's workers experienced unemployment during 
our period. Extrapolating, perhaps too simplistically, from a national 
survey. to the local situation, Milnes estimated that between 1923 and 
1930,65.8 per cent of the City's insured population experienced 'inter- 
mittent unemployment', and of these over 60 per cent1would have known 
but short spells., 
39,, By the same token, of course, nearly 40 per cent 
would have known longer spells; and these calculations suggest that 
some experience of unemployment was the rule, rather than the exception, 
during these years - although th. e-incidence of unemployment in 1923-, 1927 
would clearly not have been so good. 
Unemployment, therefore, was sufficiently comm6n to be widely 
feared. It also tended. to create a structural fragmentation within the 
working class, for the financial gap between the. employed and the un- 
employed could be, considerable. (We leave aside, here, those whose 
unemployment was short term and relatively predictable. ) Especially 
was the gap large between the unemployed and'the employed trade unionist, 
36. Milnes, 84. - 
37- Cp Labour Standard, 13 February 1926 '(report on TC and unemployed 
Committees' deputation to Edin. Town Council): regarding 'an 
idle list of 20,000 people', 1, Mr. Hew Robertson ... contended that the position was worse than appeared, because the industrial 
section of the community, from whom this 20,000 was drawn was 
comparatively small. ' 
38. Garside, 39,183,4. 
39- Milnes, 64; on which her c. -ilculations are based, see Garsidel 
184, n. 7. 
I 
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for the compression of inequalities between trade unionists itself 
emphasised their distance from the-workless* Of course, this is to 
oversimplify: their remained a substantial sector of ill-paid labour, 
much of it female, of which the laundryuorkers are indicative. 
4o 
But 
this sector was very largely ununionised - or, perhaps more precisely 
in many instances, de-unionised; for, as the depression bit deeper, 
the frontiers of unionisation were rolled back from the positions 
they had secured in 1920-1921. 
Without question, the workless were poor; the long-term 
unemployed could be very poor indeed. The editor of the Labour 
Standard recalled meeting a man in the winter of 1923-1924, 
in the Waverley Station who had been 
unemployed for 18*months, had lost his 
wife, was then in his third week of the 
'gap', had had two meals in three days, had 
wrists that were mere skin and bone. 
Apparently, he also carried some poison 'for the simple purpose of 
killing himself and ending his torture. 141 Suicide was no doubt 
exceptional, but the income available to the unemployed was very 
limited. It came from two main sources: unemployment insurance 
benefit, and parish relief under the Poor Law. Both were highly 
circumscribed by regulations designed to protect the various funds 
against 'abuse' by. 'scroungers', and these regulations could be 
onerous. This is not the place to examine these in detail, but 
it is necessary to look briefly at the impact of both in Edinburgh. 
Unemployment insurance regulations were constantly changing 
Auring the early 'twenties. The benefit rates, shown in table 4.9, 
show one aspect of this. They became more generous, although even 
so their real value should not be exaggerated. In addition, two 
qualifications should be made. Firstly, government fears at the. end 
of the war led to the introduction of an 'Out-of-Work Donationlin 
November 1918: 
40. Milnes, esp. 257-9- 
41. Labour Standard, 20 June 1925; the 'gap' was a period of five 
weeks during which no uncovenanted benefit could be claimed (see W. Hannington, A Short History of the Unemployed (London 
1938), 28,35,39)- 
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Table 4.9 Unemployment Benefit Scales 1918-26 
Scale Adults 16 - 18 Dependents 
effective, Men Women Boys Girls Wife Each Child 
from:, 
1911 78 7s 3s6d 3s6d 
1919(Dec) 11s 11S 5s6d 5s6d 
1920(Nov) 15s 12s' 7s6d 6s 
192 1 (Mar) 20s 16s los 8s 
1921(July) 15s 12s 10S 8s 
1921(Nov) 15s 128 los 8S 5s ls 
1924(Aug) 18s 15s 7s6d 6s 5s 2s 
Sources: W. Hannington, A Short History of the Unemployed (1938), 
21,22,28,29,30,39; J. J. Astor et al., Unemployment 
Insurance in Great'Britain (1925), 12. 
29a for men, 24s. for women, 6s. for the first dependent child and 3s- 
for. each additional child. 
42 
This lasted until November 1919 for 
civilians, but until March 1921 for ex-service men and women. The 
early figures therefore understate the average income of the unemployed. 
Secondly, as the scales themselves became more generous, so conversely 
the administrative rules through which they were applied to individuals 
became more severe. 
43 
There were. several reasons for this, including 
the protection of the Insurance Fund itself. But most important seems 
to have been the creation of a climate of opinion in the press, 
national but also local, which assumed abuse of the system to be normal. 
As The Manchester Guardian noted, 
42. 'A. Deacon, In Searc 
,h of 
the Scrounger, 13. The Rates were raised 
from 20s. and 24s. four days before the General Election; 
Hannington, 20, uses the wrong figures. In his Unemployed 
Struggles 1919 - 1936 (London 1936), 28, Hannington attributes 
the origins of the NUWCM in large measure to the ending of the 
Out of Work Donation. 
43. Deacon is a detailed study-of these; see also J. Harris, 'In 
Search of the Scrounger', BSSLH 35,1977,64-7; Deacon, 'Labour 
and the unemployed: the administration of insurance in the 
twenties', BSSLH 31,1975,10-11- 
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Judging by the correspondence columns 
of some newspapers, two propositions 
are very firmly held by some middle- 
class tax payers - first, that the 
unemployed would rather draw the dole 
than go to work, and, second, that the 
one ideal of the poorer classes is to 
get something for nothing out of the 
pockets of the richer. 44 
This approach certainly underlies the questions asked by one well- 
known, independent', study: 
45 
and produced wry comments in the labour 
press. One Evening News leader, for instance, drew a tortuous moral 
from the fact that a 
poor householder must now spend 930 
a year in having his garden weeded 
by casual labour, whereas he could 
get the work done for r, 12 before the 
War. 'The broad lesson', says the 
News,. 'is that there is now the dole 
to fall back upon'. 
'Why do these people do it? ' asked the-Labour Standard. Was it 'in the 
British tradition to kick a-man when he is down? ' Did they 'ever 
inflict their sermons on the idle rich ...? ' Or was it 'merely that 
the existence of the dole raises the cost of the retainers which they 
require to keep them in a life of ease? 
46 
Yet such protests were vain:, the consequence was continual bouts 
of 'tightening up's especially in relation to whether the applicant 
for benefit was 'genuinely seeking work'. In part these proceeded from 
governmental directives, but local administration was also important. 
Let us recount one example. Legislation in 1925 decreed that benefit 
should be paid for periods for which contributions had not been paid 
44. Manchester Guardian 7 January 1926. 
45. J. J. Astor et al., Unemployment Insurance in Great Britain: a 
critical examination (London 1925). 
46. Labour Standard, 21 March 1925, referring to Evening News, 16 March 
1925, On the administration of the Poor Law in Scotland, see 
I. Levitt, 'The Scottish Poor Law and Unemployment, 1890 - 1929' 
in T. C. Smout (ed. ) The Search for Wealth and Stabilit (London. 
1979), 263 - 82. 
I' 
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'only if ... 
Cthe Minister of Labourý7 deems it is expedient 
in the public interest to pay such benefit to the particular applicant 
concerned' . 
47 
This was especially relevant to so-called 'extended 
benefit I., Decisions were to b. - made by Rota Panel Committees , con- 
sisting of three members, incýuding employersland workers, 
representatives. According to Unemployment Insurance in Great 
Britain: 
Since these conditions involve the 
determination of what is 'reasonable', 
as distinct from questions of technique, 
the democratic Rota Panel is a more 
appropriate adjudicating body than the 
employment exchange officials. 48 
This view was not shared in th 
,e 
Edinburgh Employment Exchange, for 
whereas 'Prior to the new regulations ... the applicant only appeared 
before the Rota Committee, and, if satisfactory, a grant was rec- 
ommended', 
With the tightening-up process now in 
force, many applicants have been called 
before the permanent officials of the 
Divisional Office. Following this inter- 
view they were again called before a Rota 
Committee, with those gentleman's written 
observations. 
'The results', according to the Labour Standard were 'best known to Tc 
many who are"now getting Parish Relief. 
-' 9 ; ýe District Secretary 
of the AEU claimed that officials had interviewed claimants for 
extended benefit even 'in certain cases where grants had been 
recommended by Rota Committees'; no Rota Representatives were 
present, and 'claimants were "tricked" into making statements likely 
to injure their claims'. It seems that this led to the reversal 
of decisions in 47 cases out of 75.50 Certainly the variation in 
the numbers of those receiving Parish Relief is suggestive of changes 
in policy, rather than simply in the number unemployed (see table 
4.10). In short, the Insurance benefit scales were not 
applicable to all the unemployed. Those 
47. Astor et al., 12; cp Hannington, Short History, 43- 
48. Astor et al., 13-14. 
'49. Labour Standard, 21 November 1925. 
50- Ibid 19 December 1925; the AEU District Secretary was also 
Secr; t'ary of the Advisory Committee of Workpeoples, Rep- 
resentatives, for Edinburgh and"Leith. 
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Table 4.10 Numbers in receipt of Public Assistance in Edinburgh, 
_1923-1928 
Number on roll at 15 May 
Able-bodied Disabled 
Poor Poor 
1923 4093 3064 
1924 3135 347o 
1925 2284 36o2 
1926 3626 3549 
1927 3446 3550 
1928 381o 3664 
Source: Milnes, 27- 
who hacýjbpen unemployed too long, or had paid too few contributions, 
or were unfit/or 'not genuinely'seeking' work (or, it seems, who*had been 
insufficiently quick-witted in interviews with Ministry officials) were 
thrown onto the Parish. Parish Relief was very largely determined locally 
by the Parish Council. The outlook of this body was summed up in a 
speech by its chairman, one Colonel Young, to its Annual Dinner in 1925: 
It was not the duty nor in the power 
of any community to find work for 
anybody.... The poor-they would always 
have with them, 'but that should not 
be taken as any encouragement for 
those who feared nothing so much as their 
success in getting a job. 51 
In consequence, the Parish Council operated both a means test and an 
attitude test: the fate of those who failed these is described by a 
Labour Parish councillor: 
Recently a number of unemployed workers 
drawing Parish Relief for themselves and 
their families, called on me stating that 
the Assistant Inspector had told them that 
as they were not genuinely seeking work 
their Parish Relief. had ceased. They would 
have to go into the Poorhouse and the'Parish 
would look after the wife and family 
while they were there. 52 
51. , 
Quoted in Evening News, 10 March 1925; Labour Standard, 21 March 1925. 
52. W-Waterston in Labour StanLardl_ 11 December 1926. 
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Table 4.11 Parish Relief scale in EdinburRh 
Adult Adult living Man and per child Maximum 
at home Wife 
15s- 7s. 6d. 22s. 6d 38.6d 40s. 
Source: Labour Standard 7 August 1926. 
For those who were successful, however, the Relief scale was that shown 
in table 4.11: 
_ 
this was less generous than the so-called 'Mond Scale' 
suggested by the then Minister of Health in 1922, but was in national 
terms not unfavourable. 
53 Importantly, for even an averagely-sized 
family, it was more generous than unemployment insurance. 
In view of these vagaries of unemployment insurance and parish 
relief, it is only possible to get the broadest impression of the effect 
of unemployment on real income, and on income relationships. The 
calculations in table 4.12 must, therefore, be treated with a certain 
scepticism: the sense in which they were 'available' is a limited one. 
Table 4.12 'Real' value of relief available in Edinburgh, 1918-27, 
as a percentage of estimated-cost of purchasing Trades 
Council's 'Minimum Household 
-Budget' 
in each year 
Unemployment Out-of-Work Parish 
1918 
iglg(Jan/Dec) 







19? -6 1927 
Notes: 
Insurance. Donation Relief 
12.8 
11.8 64.4 







(1) : changes in the rates during. 'these years, -together with 
, zhe., rapid change 
in prices in 1920, make estimation of the 
'real' value impossible. , 
(2) : Civilian Out-of-Work Donation 
ceased 24 November 1919; ex-servicemen's on 31 March 1920. 
All figures are for family-of manL_wifeand 2 children under 16. 
Sources: calculated from: tables 4.9,4.11, and A. Deacon, In Search of 
the Scrounger (1976), 13- 
F 
. 
53- Labour Standard, 7 August 1926; Astor et al., 34. 
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They do suggest, however, that for those able to obtain Unemployment 
Insurance benefits conditions were best in 1919, and then improved 
again from 1921 onward. Comparisons with the wage rates of those in 
employment are still more difficult. It was a common middle-class 
opinion that the dole discouraged the unemployed from taking casual 
54 
or lower-paid labour. For those with families there may be some 
truth in this, though the 'policing' of the various systems was a 
powerful disincentive. Table 4.13 compares wage and unemployment 
insurance rates on the same basis as figure 4-5 although unfortunately 
it is necessary to take different years. The implication is that whilst 
union-organised employment retained differentials in relation to the 
unemployed, there was indeed a sector of semi--ýorganisedj semi-casual, 
unskilled employment wherethere was little financial incentive to 
work - unless, of course, two or more members of a family could find 
employment. 




Laundry Workers (Top of scale) 
it (Foot of scale) 




- 11 - 
- II - 
-II- woman 
couple 
couple with two young 
children 
boy, 17 years 
girl, 17 years 
1920 1923 1926 
100 100 100 
98 74 73 
n. a. 73 72 
37 37 36 
13 13 '13 
12 20 23 
12 16 19 
12 26 30 
12 29 35 
6 13 10 
8 
*: Labourers: "Labourers" 1923; Building Trade Labourers 1926. 
Sources: calculated from 
each year. 
table 4.9 Trades Council Annual Reports 
But unemployment did make people poorer, a fact which the existence 
of ill-paid jobs cannot gainsay. - A 1930 study of St. Andrew's Ward, 
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Source: calculated from f. -T'. 'Barclay and E. E. Perry, 
Behind Princes Street. -' A Contrast (Edinburgh 1931), 32- 
0 
i3urvey of housing conditions - the area was selected for 
study because of its high infant mortality rate - it included a survey 
of the weekly earnings of 407 families in 22 streets. By comparing, for 
each street, the mean family income with the number of families un- 
employed, we have what is probably the most helpful overall indication 
of the impact of unemployment on the working class. Again, there are 
problems: we cannot treat the-area as 'representative': indeed, it was 
chosen because it was not, although in fact it was broadly comparable, 
in terms of infantile mortality, with four or five other wards. By 
1930, also, unemployment had been a fact of life for ten years. But, 
as figure 4.14 shows, there does seem to have been a clear relationship 
between unemployment and family income, and it is reasonable to suppose 
that a nobdissimilar relationship existed five years earlier, in type if 
not in intensity. 
4.5- Women's employment 
The war had; of course, resulted in a rise in the employment of women; 
this was largely eroded between 1919 and 1921 by a combination of men 
returning from the war, and family formation. 
56 But unemployment and 
short-time working thereafter meant that married women increasingly 
began to seek work in order to supplement family incomes; the recession 
also seems to have led to a decline in the marriage rate after 1920,57 
as the economic basis of family formation was eroded. Since working 
after marriageuns unusual (though becoming less infrequent) for women, 
a reduction in the marriage rate tended to increase the supply of female 
labour. It is therefore likely that the increase in the number of women 
in insured employment in the city (see table 4.15)v which was rather 
greater than the rise in male employment, nevertheless understates the 
increase in the number of women seeking work: certainly Milnes believed 
that 'more women obtain work largely because many more seek it. 
58 
56. Bowley, 57'61; see also table 4.18 below. 
57- Milnes, 70 - 71- 




Table 4.15 Male and Female Employment 1923-1927 
Year Insured men: 
No. as Percentage 
of pop'r of working age 
1923 8? -, 360 
63.2 
1925 84,880 64.3 
1927 85,470 63.9 
Insured women: 
No. as Percentage 




Note: population of working age is estimated by taking an arithmetic 
increase each year between 1921 and 1931 censuses. 
Source:. N. Milnes, Industrial Edinburgh, 94-5- 
So in one respect the rise in women's employment was a corollary of 
unemployment: a response to family poverty, it indicates a falling 
average standard of living. But as women became cheaper to employ 
59 (compared to men), employers seem to have exploited the opportunity. 
Straightforward displacement of men by women seems to have been unusual; 
more often, it occurred in conjunction with changes in technology or 
product. It was said, for instance, that the replacement of men by 
women in the rubber industry was . 
not due to any actual displacement of 
men by women, but rather to the 
development of certain branches of the 
work which are particularly suited to 
the women workers. 6o 
In many cases, women's relative advantage seems to have been associated 
with non-wage elements of costs. In the laundries, married women were 
not generally employed, for their enforced retiral on marriage 'gives 
those who remain a greater chance of promotion', whilst also providing, 
in married, former employees, a pool of trained, casual labour for use 
in 'holiday, or rush periods. ' 
61 
Elsewhere, women were less well organised 
by trades unions: on the railways, for instance, 'women carriage 
cleaners ... were not coming up to the "scratch"' in 1920, and meetings 
were. held by the NUR to induce 'better organisation' among them. 
62 
59- Ibid., 190-91,256-7. 
60. Ibid., 245; these branches apparently ircludedthe making of shoes, 
golf balls, and hot water bottles. 
61. Ibid., 257- 
62 NUR No. 1 branch minutest 1 February 1920; CP 15 February 1920. 
I 
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As such, their employment was both cheaper and less well protected. 
Before turning to the final section of this chapter, let us draw 
together the various threads of-our discussion. The inflation of 
1914-1920 was unprecedented in living memory. Real wages fell 
during the war, though with full employment and overtime, earnings 
did not suffer comparably. The effect of the inflation, and the post- 
war wage advances, was to compress wage differentials. When the post- 
war boom passed, therefore, two distinct developments had occurred: 
among employed trade unionists, skill differentials had been eroded, 
or even eliminated; but there was a substantial gap between the employed 
trade unionist and the unemployed*(especially the long-term un- 
employed). At the same times the existence of the unemployed enCouraged 
new people to seek work in order to sustain family incomes; this 
depressed wages, especially among non-unionised sectors of employment. 
We thus see an evolving structure of intnw., lass fragmentations in which 
the fact of a worker's having a job, and the sector in which that job 
was, were increasing-in importance compared with his or her skill. 
4.6 Working class housing 
This section is concerned with the relationship between the working class's 
standard of living and its housing, and with the relationsjUp between 
its housing and its class structure. We shall discover that, for various 
reasons, housing diminished in importance during our period as a 
mechanism for sustaining intra-class fragmentation. We begin by briefly 
surveying the development of housing patterns in Edinburgh; we then 
examine how the housing, market changed over our periodt and its 
relationship to incomes; and finally we discuss the distribution and 
social meaning of working class housing patterns. 
i 
Later nineteenth century Edinburgh saw two complementary 
processes of social segregation. Firstly, much of the middle class 
-migrated to new suburbs, leaving its former houses to the working 
class. Until the 1920s, however, the migration was short range, the 
new suburbs were not far from the, older areas, and much of the town 
centre (especially the 'New Town') remained prosporous. So Robert 
Louis Stevenson's observation that 
Social inequality is nowhere more 
ostentatious than at Edinburgh ffor2 
... to the stroller along Princes 
Street, the High Street callously 
exhibits its back garrets. 63 
remained true well into the inter-war period: the physical distance 
between the classes was very small. 
Second, within the working class a similar process took place. 
The 'more prosperous' workers were able to move to 'new and superior 
housing 064 In general, however, this did not lead'to the creation 
of geographically distinct areas of owner-occupied working class 
housing: on the contrary, 
most manual workers of all occupational 
groups continued to live in rented flats 
of the tenement style. 65 
Lacking the ability to emphasise the differentiation within the working 
class by geographical isolation, nineteenth century Edinburgh was 
marked by 'well-understood gradations in types of working-class 
housing'. 
66 
The standard and status of accommodation could vary 'from 
district to district, street to street, even block to block or stair to 
stair', so that I "improved" blocks might be found interspersed among 
dwellings of a distinctly poorer class. ' 
67 
So even within socially 
mixed working class streets, the'respectablel stood apart from the 
'rough'. 
This segregation seems to have diminished, at least in intensity, 
from the late nineteenth century onwards. In two working-class streets 
studied by Elliott and McCrone, built in the 1880s and originally occupied 
63. R. L. Stevenson, Picturesque_Notes on Edinburgh (London n. d. f18790 18 
64. Gray, Labour Aristocracy, 95. 




largely by skilled manual and white collar workers, the proportion of 
68 
these shrank and that of unskilled workers grew. But this form of 
intra-class fragmentation was most severely eroded during the wart 
Housing standards were intimately linked with rents, and therefore 
with incomes: we have seen something of the effect of the War an 
the latter. However, not only did the war (and its immediate aftermath) 
flatten inequalities in incomejand increase real income: it did so 
especially in relation to housing costs. 
In 1915, under pressure from the Clydeside rent strike, Asquith's 
government introduced a freeze on rents: the precise effect of this may 
be unclear, but overall it appears to have had the desired effect. The 
Trades Council in Edinburgh for instance's judged that average working 
69 
class rents had not changed in the City in 1920 compared with 1914, 
and certainly after the 1915 Act there were no major Complaints by the 
Trades Council about breaches of this law. Within the working class 
budget., therefore, the cost of housing plummeted relative to other 
expenditures: in terms of the Trades Council's 'Household Budget', its 
'Minimum Standard', this is shown in table 4.16: - 
Table 4.16 Rent as a proportion of Trades Council's Minimum 
Household Budget, 
-1914-1920 
29 July 1914 19-7 per cent 
28 June 1919 10.2 per cent 
19 June 1920 8.4 per cent 
Note: this was, of course, their view of a minimum rent. 
Source: calculated from Trades Council annual reports 1919,10, 
and 1920, , 
6. 
Although rents were increased during the 'twenties, they remained 
controlled, 
70 
and at the end of the decade, according to Bowley, lformý/_ed2 
a much smaller proportion of working-class incomes than did pre-war rents 
of the pre-war incomes. 171 In 
68. Elliott and McCrone, 29 30. 
69. TC ýR 1920,6. 
70- J. Melling, 'Clydeside housing and the evolution of state rent 
control' in. idem (ed. ), Housing, Social Policy and the State 
(London-1980), 139-67, discusses these controls. 
71. Bowley, 82. 
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short, it became far more difficult for exclusion practices to be 
based on housing standards, via rents and incomes; for even good 
quality working-class housing was within the grasp of a group larger 
than the former 'labour aristocracy 1. 
Although the housing market was less than free, supply and 
demand were still important factors. Housing supply was severely 
limited: there was very little working class housing built in the 
pre-war decade, and none at all during the war; after the war the 
Town Council was less than enthusiastic in taking up the opportunities 
offered under successive Housing Acts, so that its schemes made, little 
impact in volume terms until the mid-'twenties. (See table 4.17. ) 
Private enterprise building was also at a low level, so the process 
of 'filtration' (by which accommodation was meant to 'filter down' 
through the social scale as the richer built new houses and those they 
vacated, were sub-divided)72c-ould have little effect. 




By Private enterprise: 
'Without state assistance 
(b) (a) 
'With state. assistance 2 
By Local Authorities (with 
state assistance) 494 





(a) 301 245 309 
82 223 562 589 
89 8.51 789 1112 
44 442 324 44 
Totals 496(a) 171(a) 1375 1596 2010 
Notes: (a) No returns, so totals incomplete; (b) years to 31 August, 
except 'Private enterprise without state assistance': 30 
September. 
Source: Milnes, 176., 
It is more difficult to reach a clear view of housing demands 
especially working class demand. There was a substantial rise in 
72. Cp 'Filtration'-in The Red, Flag 1,1927,14; R-Tressellj The 
Ragged Trousered Philanthropists (London 195 ), esp. 79. 
I 
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family formation figures Othe only reasonable indicator as to the 
level of likely demand', according to John Butt)73 after the war, as 
table 4.18 shows, and birth figures ouggest a still greater pressure 
on space within each housing unit. 
Table 4.18' Marriageg and births in Edinburgh, 1914 - 1927 
Marriages Births 
No. Rate per 1000 popý 
iqi4 3165 9-7 6466 
1919.469o 13.8 5612 
1920 4483 13.4 7774 
1921 461o 11.0 9028 
1922 4057 9.6 8772 
1923 4164 9.8 8662 
1924 3963 9-3 84o4 
1925 W65 9.6 7843 
1926 3823 n. a. 7926 
1927 3861 n. a. 7621 
Note: 'figures for 1914-20 relate to Edinburgh proper; those for 
1921-27 include Leith, Liberton, Colinton, Corstorphine and 
Cramond. 
Source:.. Edin. Public Health Department Annual Reports, each year. 
Some idea of the class distribution of housing demand can be gained 
from the statistics, collected by the Public Health Departmentt of 
population density by weirds. Overall,. the City's population density 
increased during this period, in line with the population increase. 
, 
If, however, we compare the changes in density over these years in those 
yards normally descrihed as working class, with the changes for the 
City as a whole (see table 4.19), it is clear that in all cases 
except one the increase in population density during the war years was 
greater than the overall increase. 
74 (It needs to be stressed, of 
course, that these wards' population densities were in any year well 
above the City's mean-) 'Certain reservations must be expressed about 
these figures, *howevers and it is thus helpful to look also at the number 
73. J. Butt, 'Working class housing in Glasgow, 1851-19141 in S. Chapman 
(ed. ) The History of Working Class Eousing. A Sympos (Newton 
Abboý 1971. ), 73. 
According to the Royal Commission on the Housing of the Industrial 
Populatian of Scotland (Cd. 8731,1917). Oký, waz!. wor% caused 'a 
very considerable influx of workers. The housing accommodation 
is not only taxed to its utmost, it is. overtaxed and overcrowded. ' 
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Table 4.19 Changes in population density in Edinburgh 
1914 1919 1922 jý2.2 
Edinburgh: 96. o 100 97-0 97-0 
Wards: 
Calton 95.4 100 92.4 90.6 
Canongate 97-3 100 92-3 go. 8 
St. Stephon, 's 94.2 100 100.2 90.6 
St. Andrewla 93-3 100 92.0 92-5 
St. Giles'. 95-9 100 85-3 82.8 
Dalry 94-3 100 91.2 89-5 
George Square 96.0 100 88.9 87-1 
St. Leonard's 93.4 100 90-3 88-7 
Notes:, ý1919 ='100 throughout. Edinburgh figure is for the 1914 and 
1919 boundaries throughout. 
Sources: calculated from Edinburgh Public Health Department Annual 
Reports, each year. 
of households occupying just one and two rooms in the city. These rose 
significantly, by 4-3 per cent and 9-7 per cent respectively during the 
war years; and, though less rapidly, continued to rise during the years 







Households occupying one and two rooms, Edinburgh 1914-21 
One Room 






















Notes: (1) 'TOP 5 wards': per centage of one-and two-roomed households 
in. each year fouDd in five wards with largest number of such 
households; (2) Edinburgh and Leith according to 1914-1919 
boundaýries; (3) in each year, the top 5 wards were found to be 
the same, viz., for one-roomed houmholds: Canongate, St. Andrews, 
St. Giled, George Square, St. Leonarcrs; for two-roomed households: 
Calton, ) Canongate, Gorgie, Dalry, St. Leonardb. 
Sources: (calculated from) Edin. Public Health Department Annual 
ýeports, each year. 
three indicators, therefore, point to intensified working class 
demand for housing during the war, and at least two suggest that the 
demand continued to be high throughout our period. 
When combined with the shortage of supply and the imperfections 
of the housing market at this time, the level of demand suggests 
significant alteration in the social allocation of housing. In 
particular, it seems that the stratum of skilled manual workers, 
often identified as central to the late Victorian working class 
structurej lost some of its ability to isolate itself: and this, of 
course, is one way of describing the weakening of the stratum itself 
as a distinct entity. A parish minister, for instance, reported in 
1922, that 'several respectable families' were living in the tenement 
(mentioned in section 3.2) of 80 or 90 residents whose vermin were 
so active and resilient. 
75 
Yet the evidence suggests that, despite the pressure on these 
forms of working class stratification, they were not eliminated. The 
impression of the Presbytery investigators was of the respectable 
holding out in difficult circumstances. They rejected, for example, 
the notion that the inhabitants of. such stairs were 'unfitted to the 
responsibility of being tenants, '. as it was applied lindisc. riminatelyl: 
Characters of this kind are too common, 
but the local patriotism of the lobby 
and the stair in better instances 
repudiates them. 76 
The proportion of 'well-kept' rooms was 'highl, lconsidering the 
cramped conditions'; 
77and 
although the lack of privacy made 'any form 
of intelligent study or practice in the Arts or in Religion ... very 
difficult', there were 'occasional breaks in the claudd': 
Sometimes the people possess gramophones 
and a selection of overtures: they 
generally read the evening paper; and their 
taste, if it passes beyond china dogs and 
family, photographs, relieves the walls with 
surprising reproductions of good paintings. 78 
Leaving aside the sense in whiý. Ih this tells us as much about the attitudes 
75. Joint Committee, Housing of the Poor, 10. 
76. Ibid., 11. 
77- Ibid. 
78- Ibid., 13. 
of the investigators as about the people investigated, the suggestion 
is that 
, 
the attitudes and lifestyles of the pre-war 'respectable' work- 
ing class did not die as quickly as a purely economic analysis might 
lead us to expect. Within a housing market which allowed less 
differentiation, and within an economic climate which severely 
pressurised the economic basis of such values, the values and attitudes 
themselves seem to have preserved important elements of pre-war 
stratification, at least to the extent that many cultural manifestations 
of group exclusiveness were preserved. 
I 
Moreover, the erosiop of the structural basis of stratification 
within the working class housing market should not be exaggerated: 
whilst stratification was undermined during the war, and during the 
post-war years until the mid-1920s, it was not eliminated. Indeed, it 
is the persistence, and even intensification, of working class segregation 
that has won the'most attention from social historians, who have tended 
to focus on longer-term trends. 
79-In Edinburgh, such segregation did 
intensify in the later 'twenties and during the 'thirties, as the new 
corporation housing schemes were completed; for, among other factors, 
the higher rents charged for these gave renewed significance within the 
housing market to family income. A comment by the Medical Officer of 
Health in 1924 is evidence both of this, and of the official incomp- 
rehension of the realities of working class incomes: 
It is apparently a waste of time and energy 
ýo attempt to uonvince many people who live 
in slums that a Z15 house provided with such 
conveniences as electricTlight, gas boiler, hot 
water system, wash-house, tub and sink, drying 
green, and open-air all round, is in every 
possible direction worth L5 more -than the 
dungeon-like slum devoid of almost every comfort 
that a human habitation should possess. 80 
79- 
8o. 
E. g., Cronin, esp. 121. 
W. Robertsori, M0111 in Edin. Public Health Department, AR 1924, v; 
the Chief Sanitary Inspector reported his officials' 'Repeated 
visits' to tenants in the Canongate-Grassmarket area: 'although 
a number of tenants were induced to go to Lochend, the majority 
were very apathetic and a variety of excuses were made. Many 
averred that the rents were too lfgh, and others that they did not 
want to leave the district. ' (Ibid-, 73-4). Cp Barclay and Perry, 
31: -'The rents charged for new houses (including rates) average 
13s. for three-roomed houses, and 15s- for four-roomed houses. 
These rents are obviously outside the range of the low-paid 
worker..,,. ' 
135 
Certainly there were also non-economic disincentives to moving, 
81 
but the strong suggestion from the evidence is that those who moved 
to the new schemes consisted chiefly of the 'respectable' working 
class (though it is not clear that we can treat these simply as the 
skilled workers and their families). In 1928, for instance, sanitary 
inspectors found that only thirty, 
, 
out of 600, tenanto who moved to 
new Corporation houses 'continued to show careless inclinations' in 
their domestic habits. 
82 
But, in an important sense, the re-assertion 
of important segregation based on income from the later 'twenties 
only serves the stre3s its relative absence during our period: the 
post-war years were special, and they stand out in large measure 
because of the pressures to which existing patterns and imnds of 
intra-class fragmentation were exposed. 
We can, then, draw two kinds of conclusion from this chapter's 
discussion. Firstly, we can say that the structure of the working class 
was changing: pre-war patterns of fragmentation were placed under 
various, but continuous, pressures. Yet no new, single, dominant 
pattern emerged to replace them. Rather, relics of the old patterns, 
combined with newly-emerging (and 
* sometimes 
transient) sources of 
fragmentation, produced a complex network of intersecting divisions: 
thus the ability of any of these fragmentations to produce culturally 
exclusive groupings was limited. A recent author captures the essence 
of this process: the 'working class ... was, if not more internally 
homogeneous, at least less sharply divided within itself ... than its 
Victorian analogue had been' . 
83 86condly, during the war, many aspects 
of the economic and social conditions of working class life had det- 
eriorated. Afterwards, come advances were made; but after 1920 or 1921, 
81. E. g., 'systematic visitation' and 'constant supervision' of council 
tenants by 'Women Sanitary InspectQrs', using 'encouragements 
persuasions. practical advice, and failing these, ... sterner methods, 
' 
had 'wonderfully good results in improving the habits of the 
people'. Chief Sanitary Inspector's reports in Public Health 
Dept. ARs 1927,81-21,1928,94. 
82. Ibid., 1928,94. The Chief Sanitary Inspectors as, -umptions about 
workers 'careless inclinations' are illustrated in ibid., 19249 
73-4; 1926,73; 1927,81-2; 1928,94. 
83. Cronin, 121. 
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any improvements were smalll and must be set against substantial 
areas of deterioration. 
So Edinburgh's working class had many grounds for grievance 
during our period. - We may also suppose that it was more likely to 
. respond, 
in a concerted manner, to arguments which legitimised action 
against those grievances, for the degree of internal division was 
reduced. We cannot, however, say what form that action could takes 
it might, as some have argued, involve a growth in electoral support 
for the Labour Party; 
84 
or it might be more militant, even 
revolutionary, collective action. The evolution of different forms 
of class action is the subject of the remainder of our study. 
84. E. g., Chamberlain; see also-H. C. G. Matthew, R. I. McKibbin, 
J. A. Kay, 'The franchise factor in the rise of the Labour 
ýarty, ' Eng. Hist. Rev,. 91,1976,723-52- 
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Part Three Industry, Management and Iobour 
'the human complex (the collective worker) 
of. an enterprise is also a machine which 
cannot, without considerable loss, be 
taken to pieces too often and renewed with 
single new parts. ' 
Gramsci, Prison Notebooksi 303- 
'This "rationalisation. of industry"'is ... only 
"rational" in the lona run if it is not based 
-ill less on ýh-e-nervous on the physical,, and, st 
exhaustion of the workers. 
'But at the present moment attention is 
chiefly concentrated only on the rationalisatign 
of industrial processes, and little or none is 
given to the more rational use of the worker 




Economic Development and the Organisation of Work 
5.1 Introductory 
'There is one strange image that, ' in the words of Raymond Williams$ 
'we all grew up with: that of the Z-1abour movomentls2 industrial 
and political wings. ' 
I 
Although just what each of these 'wings' consists 
of, and how they are*related, have usually been unclear, our division 
of parts III and IV follows this imagery, In part III we are con- 
cerned with-labour's industrial 'wing': with how and why its support 
grew between 1917 and 1920, but then declined; with the character and 
development of trade unions (the organisational expression of this 
'wing'). Bui we are also concerned to understand the industrial 
sources of labour's strength since they are variables in our later 
discussion (Ln part IV) of the movement's'political wing'. 
2 
We pursue these concerns in three chapters. Chapters 6 and 7 
explore various aspects of the development of industry, and of union 
organisation and methods, in Edinburgh. The present chapter is a 
preface to their explorations. We argue that existing accounts of 
British economic development in t4e late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries are inadequate for the purpose of explaining the development 
of work organisation, industrial relations, and trade unions; and we 
suggest three respects in which they require elaboration. 
1. In M. Jacques arid F. Malhern (eds), The-Forward March of Labour 
I 
Halted? (London 1981), 143. 
2. The use of the terms 'industrial' and 'political' involves an 
element of imprecision, as each can have (at least) two distinct 
meanings: one referring to a mode, of activity, the other to a 
context. 
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5.2 The-standard account 
There are three main aspects to the 'standard account' of capitalist 
development in later nineteenth and earlier twentieth century 
3 Britain. According to some, they together constitute 'a "second 
industrial revolution" 1.4 The first aspect is the increasingly deep 
involvement of science in industrial technology. Whereas in the early 
stqges of industrialisation the important inventions rested on a 
traditional body of scientific andtechnical knowledge, much of it 
embodied in the skills of workers-, the major technical advances of the 
later nineteenth century were increasingly dependent on a high level 
of scientific sophistication. T%4o of the major growth industries 
of this period, for instance, - electricity and chemicals - were 
entirely contingent upon scientific advances. In consequence, 
industry began-to harness scientific expertise: 
At first science costs the capitalist 
nothing since he merely exploits the 
accumulaied knowledge of the physical 
sciences, but later the capitalist 
systematically organises'and harnesses 
science, paying for scientific education, 
research, laboratories, etc., out of the 
huge surplus social product which either 
belongs directly to him or which the 
capitalist class as'a whole controls in 
the form of tax revenues. 
3- This interpretation'can be found in a variety of works, some 
of which expound it, whilst others merely assume it. A very 
clear version is 'in E. J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire 
. 
(Harmondsworth 1969) 172-8; much the same position is taken 
by D. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus (Cambridge 1969), ch-5- 
It is assumed by H. Braverman, Labor and Monop2y Capital. Th 
degradation of work in the twentieth century 0ew Xork 197 
cp. esp. chs- 3,4,7. 




Harry Braverman refers to this as a Isciettific-technical revolution. 
The second aspect of-this standard account can itself be divided 
into two. On the one hand, the scale-of economic enterprise grew: 
capital ownership became-concentrated, the size of productive units 
increased. On the other, there was a 'systematic extension of the 
factory systeml: 
7 in particular, the manufacturing process was divided 
into a series of relatively simple tasks, each of which could be 
executed by a- power-driven - machine, requiring relatively little 
skill from its operator. Whilst factory production, and even mass 
production, were not in themselves new, it is argued that not until late 
in the nineteenth century did they become widespread. 
The final aspect is, for our purposes, the most important. As* 
production became increasingly concentrated, as the division of labour 
in the factory intensified, as the scientific and research aspects of 
the enterprise became more significant, so the co-ordination and control 
6. An illustration of this process, with added localcolour, is to 
be seen in the life of Sir Alred Ewing (1855 - 1935). After 
studying at Edinburgh University under its first Professor of 
Engineering (the chair was, established in 1868), he held 
engineering or mechanics chairs successively at the Imperial 
University of Tokyo (1878-83), and the University of Dundee (1883-90) and Cambridge (1890-1902). Under his direction the 
Cambridge school grew 'almost at an 6mbarrasing rate' (DNB, 2625) 
until it became"the foremost engineering school in Great 
Britain' (Beare, 'Engineering', 108). At both Dundee and 
Cambridge he acted as an advisor to industry, particularly in 
two areas: the strength of materials, and engine design. Yet 
it may be said that his life encapsulates not only the 
increasingly close relationship between science and industry, but 
also its relatively limited impact in Britain. Apart from con- 
tributing his expertise in essentially traditional areas of 
industry (heavy engineering and shipbuilding), his later career 
illustrates a highly conservative world view. Having declined 







toryl, 4e accepted, in 1902, the post of Director of 
Npyal Education. He remained at the Admiralty iintil 1917 when he u 
was appointed Principal of Edinburgh University, a position he held 
until 1929 (and where he was, iýter alia, responsible for instituting 
the Ph. D. degree). Cp. 
-A. 
W. Ewihgl The Man of Rooý 40. The Life of 
Sir Alfred Ewing (n. d. fc. 1939ýý; 1E_,. I. Carlyle, 'Sir Wames) 
Alfred Ewing', DNB, 2625; T. H. Beare, 'Engineering' in British 
Association, Edinburgh's Place in Scientific Progress (Edin. and 
London 
, 
1921)-100-112. For another examples cp M. Sanderson, 
'The Professor as Industrial Consultant: Oliver Arnold and the 
British Steel Industry 1900-141, Econ. HistRev-31,1978,585-600 
1 7. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, 174. 
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of the-productive-process became itself a problem. The solution 
to this was found, it is argued, in 'scientific management', which 
became both a programme and a reality 
in the 1880s, 'chiefly under the impact 
of F. W. Taylor, of the U. S. A. By 1900, 
therefore, the foundations of modern 
large-scale industry had been laid. 8 
ZScientific management' assumed that efficiency lay in the minute sub- 
division of the production process. But Taylorist 'scientific manage- 
ment' also asserted that management should haye absolute control over 
the labour process, should be able to dictate to each worker the precise 
manner in which his or her task was to be executed. This had two 
important consequences. Firstly, the discretion removed from each 
worker had to be invested in an elite group: management therefore 
became a more specialised task, an aspect of the division of labourl 
with the function, inter alia , of measuring, calculating, and sub- 
sequently prescribing, all 'scientifically', how each job should be 
carried out. Secondly, since one of Taylor's prime objectives was the 
elimination of 'systematic soldiering'19 and since the motivation of 
workers was essentially 'economically rational', management's role also 
lay in the prescription of economic incentives to hard work, chiefly 
through systems of 'payment by results', and in the close supervision 
of (and disciplining of errant or lazY)workers. 
10 
This account of trends in the structure of industry between the 
1880s and the 1920s is, however, -insufficiently specific to explain the 
development of work organisation and labour behaviour. For instance$ 
it would be accepted at the same time by some who would argue that these 
trends led to the passive subordination of the working classs 
11 
and by 
8. Ibid., 176; a similar view of the impact of scientific management 
is put forward by Braverman, esp. 86 -91. 
9. Cp, e. g., F-W. Taylor, Shop Management in his Scientific 
Management, (New York and London 1940,32-33, raverman, 98. 
10. There are many accounts of Taylorism and 'Scientific Management'. 
This account rests especiallu on Braverman, ch. 4 and A. Foxt 
Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations (London 1974) 
191-5. 
ii. Cp T. Elger, 'Valorisat'ion'and-'*Ideskilling": a critique of 
Braverman', C. and C- 7,7,1979, esp. 60. 
0 
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others who would contend that large-scale working class resistance and 
rebellion were provoked. 
12 Probably the chief reason is that most 
historians' object of explanation has been different: either they have 
been interested in more general issues, such as economic growth; or, 
as Braverman, their methodology has excluded worker behaviour as a 
significant variable in the development of work organisation *13 
Consequently, their focus has been on long-term trends, 
14 
which 
inevitably downgrades the importance of contradictory, but temporary, 
short term developments. One of-the assumptions of our study of a 
relatively brief period, however, is just 'the importance of the short 
run in union behaviour., 
15 
We must, then, amend this account in various ways: we must make 
it more specific by introducing certain elaborations and qualifications. 
The. first concerns the specificity of the Scottish economy; the second 
concerns the relationship of management organisation to industrial 
structure; while the third concerns management strategy. 
5.3 The Scottish economy_and industrial innovation 
The development of capitalist economies-is uneven. During the later 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Scottish economy was marked 
by a number of distinctive features: these were associated with 
conservative and individualistic attitudes to industrial and economic 
decision making. The 
12. E. g., for the USA, D. Montgomery, 'The "New Unionism" and the 
transformation of workers' Consciousness in America, 1909-22; 
Journal'of Social*HistorY 7s 1974,509-29; for Great Britain, 
G. Brown, Sabotake, A Study . in Industrial Conflict (Nottingham 
1977), esp. 133-61, Hinton, -esp. 98. Sociological explanations 
are surveyed by Fox, Beyond Contract. 
'13- A-Friedman, 'Responsible autonomy versus direct control over the 
labour process, ' C. and C. 11 1977,44. 
14? Eýg. j Braverman: Hobsbawmj Industry and Empire. 
15. J. Lovell in conference report, LSSLH 41,1980,17- 
I 
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economy -was dominated by heavy industry heavy engineering, 
shipbuilding, iron-ffa: nufacture, coalmining of what is termed the 
'traditional-' type. 
16 
. Eight staple industries produced 
60 per cent of 
Scottish-output in 1913.17 Much of this production was'exported, and 
much of this went to the empire. Many of-the major enterprises before 
the war were family concerns (in practice, if not always in theory): 
'Only in the case of the railways an&some newer firms in oil and 
electricity was the family principle not to be found', yet even these 
tended to be closely associated with banking and financial companies 
18 - in which families were still represented. Scottish financial 
interests, centred in Edinburgh, were internationally-oriented: more 
interested in overseas investment than with domestic profitability. 
19 
So there was little restructuring of industry or rationalisation 
in the pre-war years. Numerous company amalgamations between 1890 and 
1914 
involved the fusion of independent family 
concerns into a holding company structure 
in which there was little reorganisation 
at the technical or financial level. The' 
device fa holding company was mainly a 
way_of 
ýegulating 
sale. s or output or of 
enabling a number of small firms to raise 
capital through the stock exchange flot- 
ation of a more marketable holding company. 20 
16. See 
, 
N. K. Buxton, 'Economic Growth in Scotland between the Wars: 
the Role of Production Structure and Rati6nalisation' Econ. Hist. 
Ee-v,, ' 33,1980, esp- 547-9 for a useful analysis of this 
17 
frequently-made point. 
C. Harviej No Gods and Precious Few Heroes, Scotland 1914-1980 
(London 19717t -1. 
18. J. Scott and M. Hughes, The Anatomy of Scottish Capital. Scottish 
Companies and'Scottish Capital, 1900 - 197 5 9- (London 970) 
4; 
cp. also 49-53- 
191 lbidýj 22-37,64. 
20. Ibid., 54. 
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Levels-of investment in manufacturing industry were relatively low 
(in 1908, for instance, 'railways accounted for almost three-quarters 
21 
of the money invested in Scottish joint-stock companies,! ); thus 
domestic-profitability declined, encouraging overseas and imperial 
ventures. As Bruce Lenman observes, 'such links could be self- 
reinforcing-' 
22 
Scottish industry's conservative approach was confirmed by the 
impact of war. Lenman captures the cruel reality: 
The nature of the First World War -a 
bloody struggle fought in the end by 
armies of millions in trenches in 
France, where the main business for 
most of the War consisted of the 
relentless slaughter of infantry by 
massed artillery - could scarcely 
have 
, 
been better designed to enhance 
demand for Scotland's traditional 
products. 23 
Rationalisation and restructuring during the %r were largely imposed 
on industry from without, and were not reflected at the level of company 
structure:. such company amalgamations as did occur during the war and 
thereafter, continued to take the 'holding company' form. 
24 The post- 
war boom - lasting at best into the* first half of 1921 - again offered 
the prospect of continuing heavy demand in the industries of Scotland's 
traditional strength. There was thus little apparent need for a thorough- 
going re-ýassessment of investment and market strategies. Yet the post- 
war boom obscured the wartime loss. of markets, and (it is argued) further 
erosion of competitiveness through quality deterioration. 
25 
21. Harvie, 
22. B-Lenman, An Economic History of Modern Scotland 1660 - 1976 (Lond'on**1977), 192, See also Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, 
esp! 306-9;. T. Dickson-(ed. ), Scottish-Capitalism. Class State 
and Nation from before the Union to the Present (London-1-91-9-OT 
esp. 245-54. 
23- 1 Lenman, 208. 
24. Scott and'Hughes, 67- 
25- Lenman, 211. 
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The recession, which bit deep in Scotland with its narrow industrial 
base, did bring industrial restructuring in its wake: 'Concentration 
and monopolisation proceeded apace and consolidated the position of 
the large firms', in every sector. 
26 But the assumptions behind the 
strategic, choices. remained in the defensive mould set before the war. 
Daring the boom, for instance, confident of demand, the majority of 
British shipbuilders attempted to secure their steel supplies, often 
by. purchasing steel producers; their expectations disappointed, they 
turned to price fixing a reements, negotiations (often fruitless) with 
continental competitorsj 
97 
only 'when all else failed to seek'a 
solution in various forms of rationalisation. 128 Yet these were 
rational responses to low, if unpredictable, demand. Uncertainty, 
induced by recession, encouraged defensiveness, but discouraged radical 
restructuring. To pursue the example of shipbuilding (whose problems 
were but those of recession writ large) market unpredictability led to 
the maintenance of excess capacity in both labour and plants as intense 
competition encouraged rapid delivery timcs and the ability to fulfil 
a variety of orders, and thus to a shortage of finance for technological 
29 
innovati6n. 
Save, perhaps, during the war, then, the Scottish economy in our 
period generally discouraged both innovative investment and organisat- 
ional restructuring. Yet both are fundamental elements of all three 
aspects of the 'standard account' of economic development: utilising 
scientific advances in industrial technology; extending factory production 
and increasing the size of enterprises; and introducing lscientifýc 
management'. If both these elements were absent, any explanation,. of the 
growth of trade unionism or work organisation which rests on the 'standard 
account', must be revised. i 
26, Scott and Hughes, 66. 
27- P. L. Payne, 'Rationality and'Personality: *a study of mergers in 
the Scottish irodand steel industry, 1916 - 19361, Business History, 19,1977,166-8. 
.ý 
28. Ibid., 168. 
29. A. Slaven, 'A Shipyard in Depression: John Brown's of Clydebank 




and the organisation of management 
The second deficiency of the 'standard account' lies in its assumptions 
that the organisational form of advancing industrial capitalism was 
'scientific management', and that this was the embodiment of organisational 
rationality and efficiency. In this section we suggest that while 
'scientific management' in a general (rather than a specifically 
Taylorist) sense was widely assumed to be the best method of organisation 
in the years around the turn of the century, its effectiveness was 
limited, and that it was sorely tested dilizing and after the Great War. 
By 1914 few doubted that hierarchical bureaucracy was fundamental 
to efficient management; whilst the 'scientific management' movement 
added strength to this belief, it was not confined to Taylor's devotees 
alone. 
' Even the most routine management texts assumed it: 
30 Its 
ascendancy, is most graphically shown in the stark simplicity of the 
organisation chart. 
31 Its importance was explained by two main metaphors, 
illustrating (if generally implicitly) the co-ordinating and controlling 
functions of management. On the one hand, 'factory organisation is very 
similar ... to a machine': just as 'Efficiency in a machine is a result 
of good material, proper*design, and careful operation', so in a factory 
'there must be definite objectives toward which the separate and combined 
efforts of all members of the organisation are directed'. 
32 On the other 
hand, with regard to labour control, a works manager's Irequirembnts of 
character, initiative, decision, leadership, practical psychology or 
understanding of men, technical knowledge, etc., are very similar' to 
those of 'an officer in the British Navyl; 
33 
whilst foremenwere seen as 
our 'non-commissioned officersl34 in organisations of essentially military 
structure. 
30- See, e. g., F. N. Casmith_; /, 'Factory Management', in An Encyclopaedia 
of Indu*strialism (Nelson's. Encyclopaedic Libraryl London I n. d. Z 0-1913-/), 207-23- 
31- For contemporary examples of the organisation chart, cp J. F. Whiteford, 
Factory Management Wastes: and how to prevent them (London 1919)221-2. 
32. Ibid., 10-11. 
33- W. J. Deeley, Labour Difficulties and Suggested Solut 
- 
ions. A Manual 
for Technical Students, Cashiers, Foremen, lDepartmental or Works 
Managers and-Employers-, (Manchester 1918), 129. 
34. , John Brown and Co. Ltd., UCS 23/31 'Memorandum on the Shortage of 
Ironworkers at Clydebank', quoted in J-Melling, I "Non-Commissioned 
Officers": British employers and their supervisory workers, 1880- 
1920' Social History, 5,1980,209-10. 
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Now the problem with a managerial structure of this kind - 
approximating to what Tom Burns'and G. M. Stalker have termed a 
'mechanistic' management system35 - is that its effectiveness is 
limited to relatively stable conditions. Rapid changes in market 
conditions, or technological innovation, or rapid changes in workers' 
behaviour, can render it highly ineffectual. The achievement of the* 
later Victorian period was in large part the extension of large-scale 
production, and of a mass market in Britain and overseas, which could 
sustain unprecedented levels of demand through a wide spectrum of inter- 
related industries and markets; on this basis a relative stability was 
attained, which permitted the growth of 'mechanistic' management 
systems. 
The war brought frequent and rapid changes to the managerial 
environment. The labour market changed; the government increasingly 
intervened in matters of supply and demand; the Factory and Workshop 
Acts were suspended. Apart from becoming deeply involved in the 
direction of industry, government actually managed substantial Sections 
of it. By 1918 over 3,400,000 people were employed in munitions workl 
and about 2,250,000 in controlled establishments - in which the 
Ministry of Munitions exercised many of the central functions of 
management, determining hours, work rules, and wages. 
36 The post-war 
period was also highly unstable. During the boom years, not only was 
labour in a position of almost unprecedented peacetime strength, but the 
structure of markets had rapidly to readjust to peacetime conditions, 
overseas contacts had to be reconstructed, in many cases the end of war 
production involved a move to substantially different products and 
markets. And within two years, of course, the boom was passing, leaving 
managers to confront the problems caused by constantly inadequate 
demand. 
Such constant Irevolutionising' of the managerial environment 
placed-great strains-on existing organisational structures - and, 
35- T-Burns and G. M. Stalker, The Management of Innovation (London 
19ý6)1 119-20. 
36. G. R. Rubin, 'The Origins of Industrial Tribunals: Munitions 
Tribunals dUring the First World Warts. Industrial Law Journal 6, 
1977,162. 
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though implicitly, on existing images of management organisation. 
Instability of this kind requires non-programmed decision-making, for 
'which mechanistic management systems are ill-designed. There appear 
to be two ways in which organisations can adjust to such circumstances. 
They can move toward adopting, explicitly, a form of. organisation which 
is 
appropriate to changing conditions, which 
give rise constantly to fresh problems and 
unforeseen requirements for action which cannot 
be broken down or distributed automatically . arising from the functional roles defined within 
a hierarchic structure. 37 
This form, which Burns characterises as' organic', lays stress on the 
exercise by all members of an organisation of functions and responsibilities 
which are not predefined, but which must 'be constantly redefined through 
interaction with others participating in the discharge of common tasks 
or the solution of common problems., 
38 This requires widespread knowledge 
of - and commitment to - the objectives and situation of the concern as 
a whole; and it implies an emphasis on lateral, rather than merely 
vertical, interaction within the organisation. This response, however, 
demands a correct identification of the problem by those in authority 
within the organisation, and the ability to generate knowledge, 
commitment, and abilities amongst its members. 
The second possible response to constantly changing circumstance 
is more common when notions of hierarchy and bureaucracy-are deeply 
ingrained: it is 
to redefine, in more precise and 
rigorous terms,. the roles and working 
relationships obtaining within manage- 
ment along orthodox lines of lorganisation 
charts' and lorganisation manuals', and'to 
reinforce the formal structure. 39 
37- Burns'and Stalker, 121. 
. 38. T-. Burns, 'On the Plurality of Social Systems's in T. Burns (ed. 
) 
Industrial Man (Harmondsworth 1969), 242. For Burn's 
gomparison of mechanistic and organic systems, see Burns and 
Stalker, 119-22, and Burns, 242-3. 
39- Burns, 'Preface to the Second Edition', Burns and Stalker, ix. 
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This, in short, involves efforts to 'make the system work' - with the 
strong assumption that interaction whose existence is not*prescribed 
must be improper: and, conversely but perversely, that if it exists 
but is not prescribed, the formal structures must be respecified 
accordingly. The problem, of course, is that while such responses 
can be adequate where there is a single moment of changes where the 
change is constant, and unfamiliar circumstances are the norm, the 
formal structures tend to mushroom as institutions of various kinds 
are defined. Moreover, some of the (formal or informal) institutions 
generated may be dysfunctional to the mechanistic system. 
4o 
So the wartime and post-war period demanded organisational responses 
for which existing management structures and theory were ill-adapted; 
to assume the rationality and efficiency, regardless of their context, 
of 'mechanistic' managerial organisations is to obscure an important 
area of potential'instability. 
5.5 Managerial strategies and the organisation of work 
We now turn from the organisation of manggement to a closely related 
issue: the strategies adopted by management, and its control over the 
work process.. Broadly, historians have not distinguished these from 
management structures and they have implicitly assumed-the view most 
clearly articulated by Braverman. This notices a resonance between 
the increasingly'detailed division of labour, 'inherent in the growth 
of factory production, and Taylorist 'scientific management', with its 
detailed breakdown of tasks; and proceeds to the conclusý, on that-the 
latter is the logical consequence of the former (or, perhaps, thbLt both 
41 
are necessary consequences of the advanced capitalist mode of production). 
Unable to control the worker's subjective state, the capitalist broke 
the production process into a multitude of discrete segments, in each 
40. Ibid., ix- xi. 
41. Braverman, esp. 70-123; see also, e. 
Empire, 174-7- 
. Hobsbawm, Industry and 
i 
iso 
of which the importance of the worker's mental attitude was minimised 
becausethe task was simple and precis6ly defined. 
But this view that there was - so to say -a shared rationality, 
or essential structure, between the advanced capitalist mode of 
production and 'scientific management' is over-simple. Whilst there 
may have been a'secular trend toward larger scale production and the 
division of labours these were not inevitable choices: they brought 
many costs, not least a rise in the ratio of 'unproductive' to 
'productive' 1, abour, and a need for greater fixed capital investment. 
In uncertain economic conditions (or with conservative decision-makers)t 
the changes necessary to implement 'scientific management' might appear 
unduly risky. Moreover, the tight control of production processes 
involved in 'scientific management' strategies required managements 
to be able to centralise all useful knowledge about production: this 
had then to be redistributed to the workforce on a 'need to know' 
basis. 
42 
Yet this greatly exaggerates most managements' ability'to 
gathers storel'evaluate and process information; and, conversely, 
greatly understates the positive' role of labour. in readjusting methods 
of production and overcoming problems. 
43 
There was, in short, not merely a single possible, rational, 
and efficient strategy for management. Rather, a wide spectrum existed, 
from'direct control' of the pure Taylorist variety (which controls 
labour by 'coercive-threats, close supervision and minimising individual 
worker responsibility'), to 'responsible autonomy' which 
attempts-to harness the adaptability-of 
labour power by giving workers leeway and 
encouraging them to adEpt to changing 
conditions in a manner beneficial to the 
firm. To do this top managers give workers 
status,, authority and responsibility. Top 
managers try to win their loyalty and co-opt 
their organisations to the firms ideals 
(that is, the competitive struggle)ideologicallY 44 
42. Braverman, esp., 109-18. 
43- ý. L-Friedman, Industry and1abour. Class Struggle at work and 
monopoly capitalism (London.. 19? 97,95,., 
44. Ibid., ? 8; tresponsibie autonomy' and 'direct control' strategies 
ipay be seen. as instances (in relation to the management of workers) 
of 'organic' and 'Mechanistic' management systems. 
151 
Strategies of the 'responsible autonomy' type are particularly 
appropriate to rapidly changing conditions, or to situations where 
labour is strong. 
Now in the three orSour decades before 1914, as production 
increasingly relied upon 'semi-skilled' labour (among whom trade 
unionism grew apace), the-costs of imposing direct control strategies 
were considerable. Although direct control methods were 'the most visible 
aspect of managerialism during this period', 
45 
their impact has probably 
been exaggerated. The main reasons for this are the dominance of 
#scientific management' in management literature (Taylorism and 
46 
management could often-appear synonymous); and the fact that the 
spread of bonus systems and methods of payment by results has often been 
treated as sufficient evidence of the spread of scientific management* 
47 
With the war dame a restructuring of output, the conscription of 
labour into the armed forces, and dilution involving 'the subdivision 
of processes, the installation of specialised machinery, the upgrading 
148 of 'existing labour, and the introduction of new labour. All this 
required the goodwill and expertise of existing workers, whose bargain- 
ing strength consequently increased; and although the Idilutees' were 
often required to perform tightly specified tasks (reminiscent of Taylor's 
written instruction card scheme), 
49 
many were required to attain 
relatively high levels of sophistication. 
50 
In short, both before and during the war, many employers had good 
reason-to adopt significant measuresof 'responsible autonomy. 
45. Ibid., 91. 
46. Cp. -, e. g., IF. N. ', 'Factory Management. 
47- Brown, 160. * 
48. History of the Ministry of Munition, IV, part iv, 74, quoted 
Melling, 213- 
49. See, e. g., J. Maclean, 'The War after the War'(1917), In the Rapids 
of Revolution, Essays, articles and letters, 1902-23 (Eondon 1976) 
124-36; A. S. Milward, The Economic Effect of the World Wars on 
Britainj (London 19 0), 33-7 and 41. 
50. This can be seen from some of the literature produced to help 
dilutees: cp., e. g., E. Pull, The Munition Workers' Handbook. A duide for Persons taking up Munition Work (London. 19167-which aimed 
'to provide in a small a space as possible*'all the practical inform- 
ation a person taking up munition work would be requiredto know, in 
order-to start work in an engineering ship'. 
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After the armistice, these reasons did not necessarily disappears as 
we shall see, although the depression shifted the balance of power 
against labour. The major feature of post-war management strategies 
was a movement akin to what Bryan Palmer has termed 'a "thrust for 
efficiency" 1: that is, 'an eclectic collection of managerial ref- 
orms and inhovationst, '5'motivated in Britain by notions of efficiency 
and reconstruction, but implying no particular strategy9 Efficiency 
could)of course, be improved by strategies of 'responsible autonomy', 
as well as by 'direct control'. We shall see, *. in chapter 6, that 
the former were often used. But the language, of the efficiency 
movement was overwhelmin ly the language of 'direct control': 
machinery was efficient., 
Plheuman 
factor introduces uncertainty in 
quantity and qualityl, 
52 
and unless Icentralisation of production 
control' could be achieved, there would be 1waste'. 
53 Increasingly, 
efficient management and scientific management (if not-in the 
strictest, Taylorian, sense) wer6 widely assumed to be identical: 
the welfare movement, for instance, which in wartime appeared to 
offer an alternative to scientific management, 
54 
was by the mid- 
'twenties justifying its policies in identical language: 
Our object is ... to eliminate all useless 
or ineffective expenditure of energy and 
all other kinds of waste. 55 
This has intensified an historical confusion. Having failed, 
very often, to appreciate the possibility of rational strategies 
other than those of direct control, many historians have tended 
to conflate new management techniques (bonus schemes and so forth) 
with scientific management. But. the reality in our period, was - 
neither 'direct control, ' nor -'responsible autonomy', but generally 
an admixture of the two: we thall see in the next-chapter how 
51. B-Palmer, 'Class, Conception and Conflict: The Thrust for 
Efficiency, Managerial views of Labour and the Working Class 
Rebellion, 1903-ý21 Rev. Rad. *Pol'. Econ. 7(2), 105, -31-49. 
52. J. F. Whiteford, Factory Management Wastes: -and how to prevent 
them (London 1919), 39. 
53- Ibid. i 44-5- 
54. See E. D. Proua, Welfare Work. Employers'-experiments for 
improving working conditions in factories wýtlj. a foreword 
by David. Lloyd George (London j-qjýT. 
. 
55- B. S. Rowntree in The Cocoa Works ! jýazinej 1923, quoted by 
Prown, 219; cp'Rowntree, The Human Factor in Busýnesr (London 
1920),. 
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there strategies related to the strength of labour. 
We have, then, questioned the value of the 'standard account' of 
economic development in explaining the development of labour - 
especially in a local and short-term study. We now turn to the 
development of work organisation and trade unionism in Edinburgh: 
in this we shall give due weight to the importance of short-run 
factors; we shall also ensure that our discussion of industrial 
, development is sufficiently detailed*: to permit explanation at 
the level of specificity suggested in this chapter. 
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Chapter 
Employers' Strategies and the Control of Work in Edinburgh 
6.1 Introductory 
This chapter examines the industrial context in which Edinburgh's 
trade unionism developed during and after the Great War. We have, 
of course, already seen (in chapters 3 and 4) that the city's 
industrial structure was relatively heterogeneous; we have sketched 
the ebb and flow of her economic prosperity; and we have surveyed 
certain trends in the structure of her working class. Here we 
analyse the development of four of Edinburgh's industries in the 
light of the categories suggested in chapter 5. 
The industries chosen are engineering, printing, rubber 
manufacture, and railway transport. These were selected for several 
reasons. Engineering and printing illustrate the profoundly varying 
developments of job control structures in two long-established 
industries;, rubber was an industry with a very different economic 
situations and one where unions were established only during the 
Great War; and on the railways union recognition was a very recent 
development in a highly complex industry. In addition, in 1921 
engineering and printing were Edinburgh's two largest manufacturing 
industries in terms of employment; the railway was the largest 
employer in transport; while the rubber industry in Edinburgh was 
centred on the largest factory of any kind in the East of Scotland. 
I 
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6.2 Engineering: structure and technology 
The engineering industry was central to the processes of technological$ 
organisational and managerial change in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Relative to the economy of Scotland as awhole, 
the industry was of course under-represented in Edinburgh. Neverthe- 
less, ýt remained the largest single (manufacturing) industrial 
group in the 1921 Census, and by a considerable margin; while engineers 
made a substantial contribution to the labour movement in the city. 
A study of Edinburgh's engineering industry demonstrates the 
dangers of generalising overhastily (as Braverman, among others, perhaps 
does) from the experience of the more advanced sections of the industry. 
The bulk of the city's engineering firms developed areas of special- 
isation during the 1850s and 1860s: in many cases'these specialisms 
were associated with the manufacture of capital equipment for other 
Edinburgh industries. Thus Bertrams, founded in 1821, was by the 
1850s specialising in papermaking machinery; 
Ia 
separate firm, 
James Bertram and Sons, ' was founded in 1845 for the same purpose; 
2 
Miller and Co., founded in 1867, specialised in the production of 
large chilled iron goods, notably rollers used in papermaking; 
3 
MacKenzie and Moncur, founded in 1900, specialised in large casting, 
4 
particularly for papermaking machinery. Similar 'servicing' origins 
are apparent in relation to other local industries: printing, ink and 
colour manufacturing, brewing, shipbuilding, rubber-manufacture, mining 
and so on (by the 1920s, of course, products were sold more widely 
than Edinburgh). 'With the diversity of requirements represented by 
these trades, a Professor Oliver wrote in the early 'thirties, 
Edinburgh's engineering industry has 
developed-along highly specialised lines 
iihere craft, skill, ingenuity and invent- 
iveness rather than mass production prevail. 5 
1. Gray, Labour Aristocracy, 38-9. 
2. C. Pa)kley, Scottish-Industry Today. A Survey of Recent -DevelO mentsl(]Edin-burgh 1937), 144; Keir, City of Edinburgh 61 
3- Ibid. - 
4. Ibid.; Oakley, Scottish Industry, 144-5. 
Prof. W-Oliver, 'The Engineering Industries of Edinburgh's in 
Scottish Chamber. 9f Commerce, Trade and Commerce, 47- 
I" 
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This was a division of labour, to be sure, but one significantly 
different from the classic model. For rather than integrating the 
entire production process within one factory, and then dividing it 
internally according to a centrally-determined pattern between 
different sub-processes and work-groups, here the division was not 
merely between workers but between units of capital. The production 
process was divided between various firms, as elements of it were 
sub-contracted from one to another. 
This pattern persisted into the 1920s. The reasons are not 
to be found only in notions of 'backwardness' or 'conservatism' but 
in the-nature of product and market. The manufacture of capital 
equipment was largely carried on in response to individual contracts, 
on each of which the specifications were likely to vary., The holding 
of-stocks ues-thus both risky and expensive. One paper-making machine, 
for instance, might take a, year-to construct; a r*elatively large firm 
like Bertrams might, on average, make two a year. 
6 
In these cir- 
cumstances, sub-contracting for components was an important method 
of spreading risks, since it reduced the fixed costs of production in 
any one firm. It also allowed firms to specialise, since sub- 
contracting firms-might constructý components not only for one firm, 
but for several (and not always for the 4me industry). In short, 
the costs, of production and theýuncertainty of demand put a premium 
on low fixed costs. To be sure, this doubtless appealed-to a capital 
market which preferred short-run to long-run investment, and to firms 
which were-small and often family-owned. But it was also itself a form 
of organising industrial capital*, a method of structuring, produ6tion 
so as to-achieve economies of scale without surrendering flexibility. 
For these capital-goods ýndustries, market uncertainty, and changes 
in product, were normal; and the entire industry could be organised 
accordingly. Similar considerations apply in relation to constructicn 
engineers, shipbuilders, and those firms ancillary to shipbuilding 
(such as Brown BrOs-, who made steering gear and similar components for 
ships). 
6. Keir, City of Edinburgh, 616'. 
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There were, of course, exceptions to this industrial structure: 
but they tend to be the sort which prove the rule. For instance, 
many shipbuilders at the end of the war, confident of full order-books 
for the foreseeable future, and aware of the strong demand for steel, 
attempted to secure their supplies by 'vertical integration' - 
purchasing steel makers.? The parlous state of inter-war shipbuilding 
is probably itself adequate comment on the success of this strategy, 
but we should stress the mood in which such steps were taken: 
confidence (albeit misýlaced) of strong demand. One example of 
integrated production will demonstrate the importance of market 
factors. Between 1899 and 1914, nine types of motor car were manufactur- 
ed in Edinburgh .8 Few firms were commercially successful, but not 
because they adhered to outdated production methods. On the contrary, 
in at least one case a motor works was purpose-built: on a seven-acre 
site by the Granton branch of the Caledonian railway. Yet this site 
was occupied by three different manufacturers within six years, all 
of whom closed down (and one of whom went bankrupt): by the outbreak 
9 
og war it had become a printing works. The reasons were twofold: 
firstly, Scotland's heavy engineering had not led to the development 
of a network of component or sub-assembly producers appropriate to the 
motor industry (in contrast, say, - to developments in the midlands of 
England). Most components for Scottish-built care were imported from 
England or France, with consequently high transport costs. Secondly, 
the pre-war market for motor vehicles was not a Scottish one: there 
were roughly three times as many new vehicle registxtions per head in 
London as in Scotland. 
10 Economies of scale were thus achieved only 
7- Payne,. 'Rationality and personality', 166-7. This strategy, 
according to Payne, was adopted by"the majority of British 
shipbuilders'. The Leith. shipyard, Henry Robb, was probably 
too small to follow this strategy; but its formation in 1918 
(incorporating three older Leith shipbuilders) is indicative of 
another response to confidence of continuing strong demand. On 
this amalgamation, cp Keir, City of Edinburgh, 617- 
8. G. T. Bloomfield, 'New integrated motor works iii Scotland 1899- 
19141, Industrial Archaeology Review, 5,1981,127- 
9. Ibid., 130. 
10. Ibid., 126 - 8. 
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at the price of 
' 
an inflexibility which, with a shortfall in demand, 
left these companies dangerously exposed. 
The fact that the manufacture of heavy capital goods 
placed a premium on flexibility of labour as well au of capital 
implied a relatively heavy dependence on the skills of the craftsman, 
and the more so as few of the firms were large enough to justify 
substantial managerial and research costs. Perhaps the extreme case 
of employers' explicit reliance of workers' responsibility is 
outworking, which was common in the city: 
There is barely a chop in Edinburgh 
but which sends men out working, 
while extremely few in Glasgow do 
declared an ASE negotiator; 
11 
and it was common ground that, in the 
words of the local engineering employers' chairman, 
In most cases, with any normal firms, 
the outworker is a man who is known 
and there is trust given on both sides. 12 
13 Outworkers. were governed by local agreements on conditions and 
allowances, but might be required to travel anywhere in Great Britain 
and Ireland-to execute their tasks, and would do so unsupervised* But 
this is only the extreme case: within the workshops engineering crafts- 
men continued to ex I ercise a consiaerable degree of what James Hinton 
calls 'craft control' . 
14 H. N. Blyth's account on his apprenticeship at 
Brown Bros. during the war is evocative of this: the men whose role 
11. George Gray, ASEý in ESAE&I and ASE, Local Conference Proceedings 
in re Engineers, Working Rules', 19 September 1919,29; cp also 
ibid., 6. 
12. Mr. W. Wallace, Chairman, ESAE&I, in ESAE&I and ASE, Local Conference 
Proceedings 'in re Outworking allowances, ' 22 January 1923,11-- 
13- 'Workers normally. employed in the shops who are sent outworking, 
normally to , customer's works, 
to 
, 
install, m aintain or repair 
plant manufactured by their employer'. A. Marsh, Industrial 
Relations in_Engineerin (Oxford 1965), 177. 
14. Hinton, First Shop Stewards' Movement, 93-6. This is not to 
claim that 'craft control' is in any strong sense 'workers' 
control': cp J. Monds, 'Workers' Control and the Historians: 
a new'Economism, l NLR 97,1976,81-100, and Hinton's 'Rejoinder', 
ibid., 100-104. 
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is pre-eminent are not, despite their formal authority, the foremen, 
but ratherIthe journeymen., 
15 The majority of Edinburgh's engineering 
employers were thus bound to adopt strategies which emphasised the 
'responsible autonomy' of their workers: 'direct controllion any 
scale was neither economic norin many cases, even possible. Thus 
it was that payment by results was relatively rare in the industry 
in Edinburgh: the only clear example lies in the gas meter nector 
which, of course, was quite uncharacteristic, 
16 
6.3 Engineering in-War zind peace 
The common image of wartime rationalisation as involving the production 
of 'relatively standardised but often extremely comIlex goods in huge 
numbers'17 is a great over-simplification: 'in Edinburgh, whilst there 
was rationalisation and war production, it was not necessarily mass 
production in this sense. And whilst there was a greater standard- 
isation of product thantpreviously, in many cases this was the 
production of standardised batches, rather than continuous production 
over years of identical products. Brown Bros., for instance, moved 
in a two year period from starting and reversing engines, to triple 
expansion engines, to searchlight gears, to tanks. 
18 Productivity 
needed to be. achieved qu: U,: ly in each case, and could not rely on the 
. construction of elaborate assembly lines for each new product. 
Thus 
employers (and government) rested heavily on the ability of skilled 
15. H. N. Blytfi, 'An*apprentice fitter, 1915', Industrial Archaeology 
16,1982,223-32. Blyth recounts one particularly revealing 
downgrading of his foreman. An Admiralty inspector visited to 
test a new engine. He passed it. 'The Managing Director was on 
the inspector's right and our foreman on his left. The inspector 
shook hands with the boss and our foreman hastily wiped a hand on 
the slack of his trousers in case it should bedlaken too'- It 
was not: foreman and workers got merely 'a nod of approval'. 
Ibid., 227. 
- 
16. ESE&IA and AELT, Conference Proceedings, 'Proposed Reduction of 
124 per cent on piecework prices of brass finishers and brass 
moulders, - -in Gas Meter ýia king works 1,20 July 1922. 
17i Milward-, 33- * 
18. Blyth, passim. 
S 
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workers to adapt production processes: clearly this meant a devolution 
of responsibility and decision-making, which tended to strengthen the 
pre-existing tendency to organic management structures. And, most 
importantly, after 1919 firms in general returned to their pre-war 
product structure. Whilst general lessons, about management, ration- 
alisation, and so on might be carried over, the contexts of peace 
and war were very different. 
Nevertheless, there was a drive to Greater, productivity, 
greater 'efficiency', less Iwaste'l Partly, as we have seen, this 
was associated with the demands of war, although of course it was 
able to draw on d'eeper roots also.. 
19 There seems to have beon a 
conscious effort on the part of certain elements of the state, among 
others., to demonstrate that the 'Iesson of the war' - the importance 
of 'all working together for a common purpose' from which any diversion 
of energy was a waste - was equally valid in peacetime. 
20 But after 
the War, and particularly after the boom of 1919 - 1921, the drive was 
bolstered by the increasing crisis in engineering. Edinburgh did not 
escape this unscathed. 'No skilled tradesman ha3 had a worse time 
during the last. five years-than the engineer, '-The Labour Standard 
recorded in 1926.21 Engineers' pay, of course, declined steeply 
relative to other trades; and whilst the only major closure during 
our period was of the Norýth British Railway's St. Margaret's 
19. Especially the notion of 'national efficiency' which had been 
central to 'Liberal Imperialism': see H. C. G. Matthew, The 
Liberal ImRerialists. The ideas and-policies of a post- 
Gladstonian elite (Oxford 1973)- 
20. A-Clutton Brock, Our Common Purpose. The Economics of Peace 
(London, n. d. Z 1919j, . This pamphlet was issued by the National War Savings Committees a statutory body set up to 
oversee and encourage public saving following 'the first 
issue of national Savings Certificates in 1916. By 1920 it 
had dropped 'War' from its title. 
21. Labour Standard, 6 March 19? -6. 
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Locomotive Erecting shop at Meadowbanký 
22 
the poor state of trade was 
a constant employers' complaint. 
23 
The drive for efficiency was thus not limited to a single form, 
even within a single industry (of course, in many respects it is mis- 
leading to consider engineering a single industry). Daring. the war 
employers became conscious of the strength of the workforce, and 
anxious to integrate it within a common definition of purpose for 
their enterprises. In wartime, too, such a definition was more readily 
available, more self-evident, and perhaps less questioned: recalling 
his wartime workmates, Blyth averred 
I never saw any slackness in that works 
CBrown Bros. 7. A few men held that the 
war was unnecessary because German employers 
could not possibly be worse than British ones 
and anyway the capitalist system was so rotten 
that it did not matter who held the power. 
These malcontents had next to no influence 




On this, op Labour Standard, 17 October 1925,2'January 1926; 
NUR Edin. No. 1 branch minutes, 10,24 August, 7,21 September, 
1924. The workshop was 'run down' over a period of years, and 
there are therefore various figures on the number of people 
affected, 'from 469 (NUR 7 September 1924) to 100(Labour 
Standard, 17 October 1925). The closure was an immediate 
consequence of the reorganisation and rationalisation of the 
railway companies by the Railways Act 1921. But it was also 
associated with the depression, and especially the collapse of 
overseas markets: the North British Locomotive Co., of Glasgow, 
the major Scottish engine-builder, had built 400 locomotives a 
year on average between 1904 and 1914, mainly for export; 
between 1921 and 1931 the average was 150- Harvie , No Gods, 
40. 
Cp ESAE&I and ASE and SBUI Conference Proceedings, 'Brass- 
m6iilders' rates Levelling up to Iron moulders, 4 April 1921, 
4,6,8, '12; ESAEU and'AEU Conference Proceedingý, 'in re 
Outworking Allowances', 22 january 1922, esp. 21,23; I&AE 
(Eof S)A and AEU, Conference Proceedings, 'in re Allowances 
for repair work on Diesel, Semi-Diesel and Oil Internal 
Combustion Engines', 23 October 1925, esp. 2,4,29,31; 
EC of *, E&Al; (EofS)A and AEU. Conference Proceedings, 'in re 
Local Application for 20/- per week increase in wages, ' 22 
April 1926, esp- 3,7-8,12-14,16,19-21,231 31-2- 
Blyth, 225. 
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(Though Blyth is not a sympathetic source on this. ) But the 
attempt to integrate at the ideological or at'vitudinal level was 
bolstered by a willingness to make material concessions. Wages 
are the clearest example, rising 100 per cent for engineers between 
1914 and 1919.25 But employers were also prepared to make - 
perhaps had to make - concessions with potentially more lasting 
implications: especially. in relation to workplace union'organisation. 
In a remarkable local conference held in January 1918, for instance, 
district officials of the ASE raised the question of shop steward 
organisation: they did so, however, in order to ensure the develop- 
ment went along the right lines:. I 
The whole thing, as far as we are 
concerned, resolves itself into this: 
we don't want any unofficial shop 
stewards started in the district. 
You quite understand our position. 
The official shop steward is under 
the direction of the district 
committee. That is the official 
body, and to have any unofficial 
body started would not be very 
desirable in this district at any 
rate, whatever may be said at 
Coventry. 26 
But, in-practice, the local employers were recognising chop stewards 
already, and seemed reluctant to jeopardise their in-plant working 
relationships for the sake of union structures. 'Of course, ' the 
employer's chairman remarked, 'at the present time the greater part 
25. TC AR 1919. 
26. ESAE&I and ASE, Conference Proceedings, 'recognition of shop 
stewar4s as officials of the union', 18 January 1918, 'g. The 
vehemence with which the speaker, Wilson Coates (ASE), made 
this point may have been influenced by several years-as full- 
time national Organising Secretary of the National Union of 
Paper Mill Workers. There seems to have been at least one 
occasion when he was upset by his, members, and where his 
approach to trade unionism involvqd strong ties with employers 
to ensure recognition, rather than organising workers directly. 
Ile was also upset by his union in 1916, when forced to resign 
in unclear (but evidently unpleasant) circumstances. See 
C. J. Bundock, The Story of the National Union of Printing, 
Bookbinding and Paper Workers (Oxford 1958), 374,186-7. 
On the situation in Coventry, see Hinton, First Shop Stewards' 
Movement, 223-5- 
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of the firms fin Edinburgh2 recognise a man as a shop steward;, 
27 
the . question which concerned them suggests they were finding 
resistance difficult: 
how far will it go? That is really 
the point we should like to know. 28 
To this, there was no reply. 
It is widely held that the increasing complexity of payments 
systems during the war was a major factor in , 
the development of shop- 
steward organisation in engineering. 
29 Edinburgh appears to have been 
no exception to this rule: the employers' account of their recog- 
nation of shop-stewards focuses on piece-work as providing the issue 
around which stewards came to their attention; 
30 
whilst there was one 
example quoted, from a firm which manufactured heavy capital equipment$ 
which lends support to this view from the opposite direction. 'We 
never knew until a few weeks ago that we had such a thing asa shop- 
steward about the place, ' the firm's representative said. 'You have 
had shop stewards there for the last 16 years, ' retorted the union 
negotiator. 
31 This exchange indicates, first, that shop-stewards were 
27- ESAEU and ASE, Conference, Proceedings, 18 January 1918,3- 
28. Ibid., A. The context of this Conference should be explained. 
In December 1917s. 13 unions reached agreementýwith the EEF on 
'Regulations regarding the Appointment and Functions of Shop 
Stewards'. These 13 did. not include the ASE, who appear (from 
this local negotiation) to have felt that the national 
agreement gave too much autonomy to shop stewards. The Edinburgh 
District Committee was therefore attempting to negotiate a local 
agreement which would cover this point, but the employers were 
unwilling to depart from the national guidelines. Clearly 
there was little chance of the ASE mobilising around an attempt 
to reduce shop stewards' autonomy, and the meeting broke up 
without agreement. For. the national agreement see Marsh, 262-4. 
29. Cpj e. g., G. D. H. Cole, Workshop Ouanisation (Oxford 1923) esp. 
48-65; C. L. Goodrich, The Frontier- of Control. A, Study in 
british 
- Workshop Politics (New York 1921), esp. 163-75; Hinton , First Sho]2 Stewards' Movement, esp. 86-92; Brown, Sabotage 
_ 
A-Study 
in Industrial Conflict (Nottingham 1977), esp. 175-83- - 
30. ESAE&I and ASE, Conference Poceedings, 18 January 1918,2 -4. 
31- Ibid., 4. 
I 
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a well-established part of the engineering union world; 
32second, that 
where a firm relied on 'craft control', the role of the shop steward 
could be a quiescent one; and third, that the war posed all kinds of 
new questions for shop stewards. 
ý3 
While the post-war boom lasted, there was little incentive 
for employers to press for greater efficiency. With unions rolatively 
strong, with derand high, and with old markets to be reconquered, the 
opportunity, cost of losinS production through industrial disputes was 
high. There were also just many other things to do; not least 
organising the changeover from war production, in which workers' 
goodwill-was, an important asset. The achievement of 'efficiency' 
remained, in theory, an important managerial objective, and there was 
no slackening in the efforts to swing public opinion to the view that 
the common objective of workers and management should be the eliminat- 
ion of waste. 
34 But in practice, the maxiMisation of output seems to 
have been the primary objective: profit margins might be smaller, but 
total profits would remain, and the future could be assured through 
recapturing market sharcs. 
There wasl'therefore, little incentive for employers to attempt 
to assert some new form of direct control in the immediate post-war 
years. But a shift from a 'direct control' to a 'responsible autonomy' 
32. Shop stewardshad of course first been appointed by the ASE, 
officially, in 1892, and the ASE's defeat in 1897-8 (following 
which its executive adopted a strategy of co-operating with the 
EEF within the 1898 Terms of Settlement) left resistance de 
facto to them. But 1917 was the first national agreement7- 
relating to shop stewards. Cp. Hinton, . First Shop St_ewards' 
Movement, 80-82; J. Zeitlin, 'Craft control and the division. 
of labour: engineers and compositors in Britain i8go - 19301, 
Cambridge J. of Economics 3,1979, esp. 270-72. 
33- For instance, in the case quoted it was the arrival of a 
recruiting officer at the factory which brought the existence 
of the shop steward to management's attention. 
34. On management theory, cp, e. g., Whiteford, Factory M4n2Z_eMLe_nt 
Wastes. On public opinion, anti-waste, and. restriction Of 
output, cp Goodrich, 176-85; M-Cowling, The Impactof Labour 
1920 - 1924, The Beginning of Modern British Politics 
(Cambridge 1971), esp. 45-59- 
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strategy may be an, effective control strategy for management: 
If top managers decide to reduce their 
direct control over the direction of 
worker activity and the co-ordination of 
materials flows in order to increase their 
authority over workers, success in 
implementing this strategy will result in 
greater managerial control over productive 
activity as a whole, greater managerial 
control, given the reality of worker 
resistance. 35 
The risk here is that we may confuse an erosion of managerial 
control with an attempt to assert control through indirect - 
'responsible autonomy' - means; the danger is the more real since 
a 'responsible autonomy' strategy is precisely the more appropriate 
where worker resistance-is a reality. In fact, the immediate post- 
war years are best interpreted in terms of overall erosion of 
managenial control; although simultaneously we do see attempts by 
employers to regain control by other means. 
36 
With the onset of the recession in 1920-21, the ground shifted. 
Engineering was hit early and hard. 
37 The principle of 'efficiency' 
again found material support. Workers found themselves increasingly 
on the 'long side' of the labour market. This eased management's 
problems in one respect at least: the need to motivate workers' 
diminished. 38 To the ext'ent that employees had tended to 'responsible 
autonomy' strategies and structures for this reason, they were now 
able to shift to tighter control over the workforce. But of course 
there were otherreasons for employers! adoption of the 'responsible 
autonomy' approach, which were strengthened by the depression. 
Declining demand did not encourage the investment necessary to make 
direct control fully effective. Uncertainty of demand for central 
products put a premium on the ability to compete for orders over a 
35. Friedman, Industry and Labour 84. 
36. Cp Goodrich, Frontier of Control., 
37- Harvie, 39-40; Dickson, Scottish Capitalism, 247; cp Hannington 
Unemployed Struggles, 1-11. 
38. The distinction between motivation and other aspects of manager- 
ial control is made by K. Stone, 'The Origins of Job Structures 
in the Steel Industry 1, Rev. Rad. Pol. Econ. 6(2), 1974, esp-70- 
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relatively wide product range: this discouraged inflexible fixed 
investment, and positively encouraged reliance on workers' ability 
to adapt. Mýintaifiing unwieldy management structures was increas- 
ingly risky, and its cost higher in relation to income. 
In practice, Edinburgh's engineering employers seem to have 
steered a middle course. There was tightening-up, as employers 
attempted to reduce costs. According to a correspondent in The 
Labour Standard, 
the conditions in many shops ýfin 1925_7 
are as bad as possible. Speeding up and 
time-checking even for the lavatory has 
been brought to a fine art. 39 
Although conditions clearly varied, there is no reason to treat this 
as mere hyperbole. But overall, Edinburgh's engineering employers 
seem to have sought less provocative methods of cutting costs. 
Working conditions were allowed to deteriorate, or installed at an 
inadequate standard. 
40 
Perhaps as a consequence, the AEU noticed 
'a steady increase in our sick members! during the years after 1921. 
41 
The conditions of apprentices (a minority group for which, in practice 
if not in rhetoric, few journeymen seem to have been prepared to 
fight) were undermined in two ways. Firstly, they were taken on 
where-adult labour was being laid off so that their proportion within 
the total engineering labour force grew, leading to comments that the 
industry was 'overrun' by apprentices in the mid-'twenties. 
42 They 
39- Labour Standaid, 9 May 1925: 'Engineering Employers' Insult to 
Engineers'. 
40. Cp P. Collins, 'Work for Electrician6-in Edinburgh', Labour 
Standard, 1 August 1925. 
41. E&AFA(EofS) and AEU, Adjourned Local Conference Proceed- 
ings in re Local Application for 20/- per week increase in 
wagesi 1 22 April 1926,6, (T. Dewar, AEU). On the relation 
betweQn working conditions and health there is now, of coursel 
a large literature, but see esp. P. Kinnersly, The Hazards of 
Work, (London 1973); N. McDonald and M. Doyle, The Stresses 01 Tork (Walton-on-Thames 1981).; A. LeServe, C. Vose, C. Wigleyj 
D. Bennett, Chemicals, Work and Cancer (Walton-on-Thames 1980). 
42. Labour Standard 25 April 1925: Anon, 'How Capitalism has 
Ruined the Engineers. ' 
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seem to have been employed, in many cases, as semi-skilled labour: 
-hefi2r time spent in the workshop has 
been very frequently upon repetition work 
of no educational value. Instead of 
apprentices they have developed into cheap 
labour for the bosses .... 43 
(Given the traditional attitude of journeyman to apprentice, 
44 
this 
may have had the additional effect of inducing the former to under- 
take informally, unpaid, and even unconsciously, certain supervisory 
functions in relation to semi-skilled labour. ) Second, apprentices 
seem to have been easily manipulated. 'During the last six years 
of trade depression, ' wrote an 'engineer' in 1927, 
many*apprentices have been stood off for 
weeks on end, and few boys have finished 
their four yearS' apprenticeship with 
more than three years actually in the 
workshop. The rest of the period they 
have been serving their time on the so- 
called dole. 45 
Often, they were dismissed when their indentures expired, and full 
wages Decame due; in other cases, they werelthreatened with the sack 
unless they continue to work at apprentice wages'. 
46 
In short, they 
were often treated as cheap latour which could be ehpilý manipulated, 
because their ability to resist (or induce others to resist on their 
behalf) was small. 
Edinburgh's engineering employers then, generally continued 
their established managerial approach, (which involved more 
43. Labour Standard 8 January 1927: 'Engineer', 'The New, Heriot- 
Watt Trust and Apprentices'; the, same poict is made in the 
article in Labour Standard. 25 April 1925. Cp the argument 
in ESýMI and AEU Local. Conference Proceedings, , Question 
referred: - Young journeymen's rates (Edinburgh District)', 
4 April 1921: here employers 'wished to pay young journey- 
men according to their-ability', whilst the AEU was pressing 
for regularisation. 
44. Cp Blyth, passim. 
45. Labour Standard 8 January 1927. 
46. Labour Standard 25-April 1925. A letter from 'Engineer' in 
response to this article alleged that 'One firm had the. 
audacity to apply for more apprentices. at. the Labour 
exchange to start their time when over twenty of their 
apprentices were drawing Unemployment Benefit': Labour 
Standard 2 May 1925- 
V 
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than normal reliance on the craft responsibility of their skilled 
employees), but tempered it with cost-cutting measures of various 
I kinds. Two qualifications should, however, be made. Firstly, we 
must except those firms in which strides had been made toward 
standardisation, and where piecework was normal. This meant, above 
all, the gas-meter making industry. Although, taking the inter-war 
period as a whole, this wap to be one of Edinburgh's successes - link- 
ed as 




early 'twenties it suffered. The employers responded by cutting 
piecework rates. 
49 
In addition, foremen had a more important role in 
this sector, not merely supervising and coping with grievances, but 
directing jobs in detail, even undertaking initial negotiations with 
shop stewards on adjustments to piece rates. 
50 It is likely that, 
after 1921, their role was enhanced. 
51 
Secondly, the bulk of the Edinburgh firms were federated within 
the East of Scotland Association of Engineers and Ironfounders52 (and, 
through it, with the Engineering Employers' Federation). They showed 
47. Oakley, 145-6. 
48. Cp, e. g., ES%IA . and AEU, Conference Proceedings. 'Proposed 
reduction of 12J per cent on piecework prices of brass finishers 
and brass moulders, in Gas Meter making works', 20 July 1922, 
esp. 9. 
49. Ibid., passim. 
50. ESAE&I afid the Brassfinishers' Society, Conference Proceedings, 
'Bras§finishers' piecework prices - application for advance of 2P per cent' 29. October 1920, esp- 5-6,81 91 18-19,23- 
51. Cp Labour Standard, 9 May 1925. 
52. From 1925, the Engineering and Allied Employers' Association 
(East of Scotland). On the development of the UF, see Marsh, 41-52: between 1919 and 1924 the EEF was known as the Engineer- 
ing and National Employer's Federation; 1924-1961 as the 
Engineering and Allied Employers' National Federation. The 
Meter Making Employers' Federation merged with the EEF in 1919 
or 1920: a fact which sýrves to emphasise the distinctiveness 
of this sector: ESAE&I and the Brassfinishers Society, 
Conference Proceedings,. 'Brassfini. shers piecework prices', 
29 October 1920,3-4. 
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no signs of reluctance in executing the policy of the Federation, 
notably in locking-out their employees in 1922, although there were 
signs that they were grateful for the opportunity it gave for them 
to evade direct responsibility for policies. And, clearly, it was 
the 1922 lock-out which comprehensively set the tone for industrial 
relations in engineering during the remainder of our period. 
6.4 Printing: technological change and industrial structure 
The printing industry during and after the war was emerging from, and 
coming to terms with, a profound, technological revolution. The 
introduction into Britain of theLinotype and Monotype composing 
machines (in 1889 and 1899 respectively) rapidly undermined the 
skills of the hand compositor:. 
53., 
after four centuries of hand 
composing, in two brief decades the change, in larger offices, was 
54 
complete. ' The Linotype came to dominate in newspaper printing, 
the Monotype in bookwork, which was central to Edinburgh's printing 
industry. They were both faster and more accurate than hand compos- 
ing: a monotype machine sets 7,000 letters per hour as compared 
with'1; 000 when they were set by hand, and 'sets them better. 155 
Making use of punched paper tape, which could be easily stored, the 
monotype enabled the setting of type for reprints to be done without 
a compositor: a considerable advantage in book-printing. In the 
wake of this fundamental technological breakthrough, other advances 
were made, which either offered increases in productivity in areas 
53. Child, Printing Industry, 155-8. 
54. 'Ibid., 165. 
55. ý. Gibson, 'Printing' in N*Milnes, Industrial Edinburgh, 204-5- 
A contemporary text7book estimated. that where an 'expert in 
fast Z_hand2 type-setting' might reach 4,000'letters per 
hour, and the norm was nearer 1000, a monotype operator 
would vary between 51000 and. 15 000: J. Southward, Modern 





where craft labour had not been used in any case 
(self-feeding 
printing machines, folding machines, and so on), 
56 
or represented 
advances in specialised sectors of the industry, as offset 
printing revolutionisedlithography. 
57 , 
Edinburgh, of course, had long been a centre for printing. 
58 
Although it had its quota of small, jobbing, firms, the core of the 
industry lay in a number of medium and large-scale companies, 
contracting and selling not only locally but nationally and even 
internationally. Of the latter some specialised - as John 
Bartholomew, for instance, did in maps; whilst others preferred to 
retain the ability to respond to demand across a wider spectrum. 
Whereas most firms produced to contracts from publishers, a few 
(notably Bartholomew, T. & A. Constable, and Thomas Nelson & Sons) 
were themselves publishers, thus achieving an important degree of 
vertical integration. The latter could specialise's rationalise, in 
pursu it of economies of scale internally. Thomas Nelson iA the 
extreme case: employing nearly a thousand workers, their Parkside 
works routinely produced 30,000 volumes daily, and could double this 
in an emergency. 
59 All were published by the firm. Much of the plant 
was designed by a specialist engineering staff, retained by the 
company; some of it was apparently 
. unique and secret. 
6o 
Of course, 
all the firms specialised to some extent, and some of those which 
worked largely to contract had relatively stable relationships with 
publishers. 
61 
But on the whole. Edinburgh's printers Irationalised' 
and installed new, machinery more slowly than some of their rivals, 
notably in South East England; after the turn of the century 
Edinburgh's competitive advantage, largely gained through the 
employment of women compositors, was eroded for this reason. 
62 
56. Gibson, 'Printing', 205-6. 
57- Child, 158-9., 
58. On the development of printing in Edinburgh, see Gibson, 178-84; 
Keir, 686-9. 
59- Child, 160. 
60. Oakley, 138. 
61. J. S. Waterston, 'The Printing and Allied Trades of Edinburgh' 
in Scottish Chamber of Commerce, Trade and Commerce, 52- 
62. Child, 160 ; -Gibson, 201. 
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Edinburgh's importance in publishing was diminishing, in London's 
-favour, of course; and this did not help the city's printing industry: 
at least one firm, the Ballantyre Press, moved from Edinburgh to 
London. 
63 
Nevertheless, by 1914 the now technology was quite widespread 
in the city: in comparison to engineering, it was easily introduced 
into printing. The reasons for this are important. The division of 
labour, particularly between compositors and machinemen (who operated 
the printing machines), and between them and bookbinders, warehousemen, 
and so on, was long-established. It was built into the lay-out of 
virtually every printing shop (even those for which 'design' is too 
64 
strong a word). The monotype and linotype did not'dismember the 
compositor's task: rather, each could carry it out entirely. 
65 Thus 
gains in ptoductivity could be achieved without the wholesale re- 
organisation of the division of labour - new workshop layoutst incent- 
ive payment systems, tighter supervision - which was necessary in 
engineering. 
66 
In addition, the pre-war printing market was a 
growing one, not least because the new machinery allowed for the 
production of cheap books for a new mass market. 
67 
6.5 Printing: craft control in war and peace 
The war did not have the profound effect on printing that it had on 
much of engineering: the trade was in part a. 1luxury' one, and paper 
supplies were uncertain. Nevertheless, with recruitment into the 
armed forces and transfer of labour to munitions industries proceeding 
63- In 1915: ibid, 183- 
64. Southward, Is 1-42. 
65. In contrast to previous typesetting machines, which had been 
unable to overcome important elements of the jobj e. g., 
'distribution': cp Child, 155-7. 
66. Zeitlin, 268. - 
67. Child, 159- 
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apace (often with employers' encouragement)t 
68 
from 1916 there was 
a labour shortage, and dilution threatened. 
69 
The print unions did 
not resist the latter, although they attempted to regulate it: 
mobility between jobs within firms, and mobility between firms, were 
increased, and overtime restrictions and machine-manning quotas 
relaxed. 
70 The effective condition for this was substantial wage 
increases. By the end of the war thellstabl (or piece) rate in 
Edinburgh had risen to 66s (31s in 1914), and the rate for mechanical 
composition to 68s6d (38s6d in 1914). 
71 Perhaps because women were 
already common in Edinburgh's printing offices, dilution does not seem 
to have had a major disruptive effect. Few women compositors, for 
instance, were taken on during the war: all were paid the full male 
rate, and all were rapidly replaced after the war. 
72 
Daring the post-war boom employers were willing to concede in 
the confidence that demand and prices would continue to strengthen. 
-In 1919 and 1920 four increases were obtained, taking compositors' 
wages to the-apex of the 'wage league'. Other wages in the industry 
followed them. 73 Althoughthese were; since 1917, negotiated nation- 
ally, successes were also gained in Edinburgh. Most importantly, the 
68. Child, 220. 
69. S. C. GillesPie, A Hundred Years of Progress. The Record of the 





141-2; Child, 220-26. 
Child, 221-2; Gillespie, 157- 
Ibid.; cp also ch. 4 above 
Ibid., 206-7. Women had been introduced into skilled parts of 
the industry to break the 1872-73 Edinburgh printer's strike. 
At the 1911 census, 1796 out of 5259 'printers' were women. In 
1910, however, apparently with the women's support, the STA 
negotiated, after a strike, an agreement. with the employers, that 
no women would be apprenticed as compositors after 1916. - This 
agreement seems to have held: 'dilution' wds only a temporary 
reversal of it. See Gillespies. 105,203t-7; Zeitlin, 270- 
Child, 223-4; Gillespie, 158; ch. 4 above. 
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long-standing local grievance of the so-called 'mixed system' (by 
which earnings consisted of both piece-and time-work elements) was 
abolished by eliminating piece-work. 
74 At the same time the major 
post-war problem began to emerge: a contraction in the staple book 
trade, which created some problems in the reabsorption of demobilised 
union workers. 
75 And union attempts to organise the Edinburgh daily 
76 
press - non-union since 1872 - were rebuffed. 
As the economy moved into recession, so too did printing. The 
years from 1920 to 1923 were 'ones of heavy unemployment and consider- 
able short-time working, ' although conditions began to improve from 
1924 onward. 
77 The decline of the book sector - particularly quality 
books - meant that Edinburgh continued to suffer more than the national 
average for the industry. Where employment in Scottish printing as a 
wholu rose by 19 per cent between 1921 and 1931, the bulk of this was 
in newspapers and periodicals: in Edinburgh the total workforce fell 
by 5 per cent, although the number employed in newspapers and period- 
icals actually rose by some 50 per cent. 
78 Yet the industry, even in 
Edinburgh, was less ýard-hit than many. Throughout the inter-war 
period unemployment in printing, publishing and bookbinding, was 
about a half the average for all industries nationally; and this seems 
also to'have been true of Edinburgh. 
79 
The peculiarities of Edinburgh printing were not great enough 
to make its industrial politics significantly different from those of 
the industry elsewhere. Jonathan Zeitlin sums the position up thus: 
74. Gillespie, 72-61 1531 163: although simple, this achievement 
had eluded the unions for over 50 years. 
75- Gillespie, 142. 
76. One tactic employed successfully by The Scotsman's management 
was to introduce a superannuation scheme for non-unionists only. 
It had the desired effect: TC EC minutes, 4 Bebruary 1919. Cp 
also Gillespie, 222. 
Ibid., 142. 
78. Gibson,. 184-5; Census 1921; Gillespie, 143- 'Printing' here 
includes publishing and bookbinding. Oakley, scottish Industry 
Today, 137, misquotes the 19 per cent figure joým-ak_eit apply to 
Edinburgh: he thus concludes the position in the city to be 
'satisfactory', despite other indicators to the contrary. 
79. Child, 234-5; Gibson, 188. 
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by the 1920s, 
printers had become clearly the best- 
paid manual workers of the period. 
The typographical unions throughout 
the country had secured complete 
control over the new composing machines - 
linotypes and monotypes - at substantial 
advances over hand rates. At the same 
time, they obtained official recog- 
nition from employers for restrictions 
on the number of apýrentices, paving the 
way for the monopolyof labour auRly that 
underlies their power on Fleet Street 
today. - 80 
In Edinburgh, the basis of this position had been achieved by the 
strike of 1909-10 on the question of female labour (and, more centrally 
perhaps, control of'entry into apprenticeships), and by the lock-out 
of 1913, as a result of which employers accepted the principle of 
mutuality: that no working rules would be instituted without the 
agreement of the union. 
81 
Compositors secured control of composing 
machines, and although some ancillary workers were recruited, these were 
brought into the union - as, for example, monotype casters were 
admitted into the STA in 1918.82 The role of the unions in the post- 
war period was largely the policing of these agreements:, there was 
no major attempt by the employers to alter their terms. 
This strong element of craft control, now but rarely based on 
skills was associated with a peculiar management of work within the 
printing officesl Thus Carter Goodrich: 
The compositors do not choose their own 
foremen, but the 'father of the chapel, ' 
their shop steward, performs enough super- 
visory functions for the firm so that he 
is in effect an elected sub-foreman; and 
the 'clicker' chosen by a 'companionship' 
or team of cQmpositors to do their bargain- 
ing with the firm and to allot piecework 
might also be thought of as an elected 
supervisor 83 
80. Zeitlin, 264. 
81. Gillespie, 217-8. 
82. Ibid, 202. 
83- Goodrich, 118-9. 
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In the 1936 edition of Southward's Modern Printing, a standard hand- 
book the duties'of the clicker are enumerated, and the supervisory Ir 
element is clear: 
1. To receive copy from the overseer, and 
with it full instructions as to the style 
of -the work to be done ... : 2. To give out copy in portion6 to the 
compositors workirig under him, and to 
provide thein with directions as to style. 
3. To keep an account of the copy given 
to each man. 
4. To superintend the making up of the 
work. 
5. To book each man's work, wages, etc., 
-in a ledger. 6. To produce a general bill, showing to 
the firm the exact total cost at which the 
work is produced. 84 
Southward points OUt-that this system saves the employer 'much time', 
... Z- and_7 also tends to securing uniformity in the style of the work'. 
85 
Yet more than this, ' as Goodrich recognised, it amounted 'in effect to a 
democratic form of sub-contract; ' mistakenly, however, he saw it as 
an historical relic, not to be found in Imodernised industry'. 
86 For 
it clearly wasarational form of managing, workers given the reality of 
the strength of certain groups; and the impossibility in practice of 
achieving sufficient unity among employers to break union regulation. 
It-was also - albeit accidentally -a method of harnessing workers to 
the objectives of the enterprise through delegating substantial autonomy 
to officially-sanctioned work group3 with strongly-imbued craft stand- 
ards. In this way management might hope to minimise the development 
of dysfunctional group institutions, which tend to develop when 
management attempts highly individualised control methods. 
87 It was, 
in short, a strategy of Ireqponsible autonomy', but one which in 
content rested heavily on the traditional structures of work organis- 
ation in the industry. 
84. Southward, II, '302. 
85- Ibid. 
86. Goodrich, 120. The origins of companionships and clickers are 
discussed by Chiýd, 42-3- 
87- Pp D. Roy, 'Efficiency and "the fýxll: informal intergroup 
relations in a piecework machine shrip's in Burns, Industrial 
Man, 359-79; Roy, 'Quota restriction and goldbricking in a 
machine shop', Amer. J. Sociol 57,1952-1 427-42-- 
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Certainly (save in the newspaper sector) employers do not 
seem to have been unhappy with the unions' role in the industry. 
Edinburgh's employers' dissatisfaction about wages seems-to havb 
concerned'relativities between towns within the industry, rather 
than their overall high level. But 
they seemed on the whole to consider that 
a high degree of union organisation made 
their task easier in some ways than if 
they had to deal with unorganised workers: 
the unions, for example, were co-operating 
to secure a good type of apprentice and to 
supervise his trainingi and, again, employers 
who needed men could get the kind of worker 
they wanted through the union, which knew its 
members and their suitability for particular 
jobs to a degree which an employment exchange 
could'never do. 88 
The unions, then, gained substantial control over work organisation 
in the industry; but with this went the clear understanding that they 
would operate within bounds acceptable to employers. To this extent, 
Goodrich is clearly correct in categorising it as 'craft', rather than 
'contagious', control. 
89 
6.6 -The rubber industry: technology and control 
Edinburgh's rubber industry was quite different from engineering and 
printing. It was of. much more recent origin, having been established 
only since the 1850s, and thus lacked their long traditions. It 
was far more concent4ated: one firm, the North British Rubber 
Company - the largest - in any industry in the east of Scotland - 
employed three-quarters of the city's rubber workers at its Castle 
Mills. go This was by far the largest single factory in the city, and 
had, from its inception, operated a relatively complex internal division 
88ý Gibsoý, 197. 
89. Goodrich, 26o-65. 
go. So called because originally built'as a' silk-mill. , 
The . story 
of tlie*company's esiablishment is to be'found in Oakley, 135; 
Milnes, 242-4; Keir, 637-8; G. A. Findlay, 'Rubber Manufacture:..; 
in Edinburth, l in Scottish Chamber of Commerce 'Trade and 
Commerce, 60. On concentration in the industry, cp Milnes, 1171 
242. 
177 
of labour; although clearly there had been changes, the essential 
methods established at the company's inception were still in use in 
the 1930s- 
91 
In contrast to both engineering and printing, the rubber 
industry was highly vertically integrated. The North British 
carried out the manufacturing process from processing the raw material 
to wholesaling an array of finished articles: roughly equivalent to 
a single firm notcnly making a variety of papers, but also making 
books, stationery, and so forth, with them. Consequently, it was 
necessary to co-ordinate a great variety of different production 
processes. On the one hand, the raw rubber had to be purified, and 
then mixed with silphur and pigments to form a plastic 'dough': 
The dough is then passed through vitrious ' 
machines for running it into sheet, tubing, 
or cord, from which are built up the articles 
it is desired to manufacture. A large portion 
of these articles have to be subsequently 
moulded. The manufactured article is then 
subjected to heat for a length of time, which 
causes the sulphur to combine chemically with 
the rubber, producing a state of vulcanisation. 92 
During this period, however, limitations in rubber and moulding 
technology required many rubber products to be strengthened with 
textile-fabrics: 93 this was achieved by softening the dough with a 
solvent, generally naphthaland then forcing it onto the fabric by 
passing it through rollers. 
94 Much of-the machinery used in these 
processes was 'of an elaborate, heavy, and frequently dangerous 
type ..., and although some of the work consists mainly in machine- 
minding, much of it calls for a high degree of skill., 
95 
Whilst some materials, such as floor coverings, might be complete 
at this stage, many required assembly and finishing in separate 
91. Oakley, 1,35- 
92. 'British Empire Industries: Rubber' in Whitaker's. Almanack 1920 
84o;. - 
93. E. g., the moulded hot-water bottle was only beginning to be 
introduced in theltwenties, and the fabric bottle was still 
held to be superior-in giving 'a much longer life': Findlay, 60. 
94. Whitaker's-Almanack, 1920,840. 
95. Milnes, 249. 
f 
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departments. Here a variety of other skills was called for, some 
involving the operation of light machinery (as sewing the cloth 
uppers onto plimsolls, or piercing eyelets), but probably the majority 
being entirely hand-work. Of course, the skills required were rarely 
of a high level; no apprenticeship was involved,, and although some 
workers completed, for instance, entire garments, many of the tasks 
were intensely sub-divided and simplified. 
96 Thin meant that 
management required substantial control over the production processý 
listi4g just some of the products gives an impression of the extent 
of the co-ordination and organisation necessary. Not only were 
various types of boots and shoes made, but so also were waterproof 
coats, hot water bottles, golf balls, bicycle and motor-car tyres, 
floats for-fishing nets, and a whole variety of components for the car 
industry ... 
?? 
Far more than in engineering or printing, management in the 
rubber industry retained control of the production process. There 
were a number of reasons for this. Firstly,. the process was-very much 
the employers' creation: it was not constructed in dialogue with a 
body of craft knowledge. Secondly, the Company ensured that its 
superiority of knowledge about the'design of the production processes was 
retained. Its size enabled it to sustain substantial managerial and 
technological staffs - nearly a hundred of the company's clerks 
joined the union in 1919 - who were responsible for a number of advances 
in product design. 
96 Thirdly, the company went to remarkable lengths 
to ensure control-over recruitment. It maintained its own employment 
exchange: mainly, recruitment was of boys and girls aged 14. All 
applicants were interviewed, and all those successful were subject to 
medical examination. Those with records of-union activity might be 
refused employment. 
99 Among women, at least, preference was given to- 
those from areas of high unemployment around Edinburgh: New Craighall, 
Musselburgh, Leith and Broxburn. Indeed, special lbpses were operated 
96. Iýid, 250; Findlay, 60. 
97- Milnes, 249-50; Oakley, 136-7- 
98. NUC Edin. branch minutes, 21 April, 5 May 1919; Oakley 136-7. 




for them. Women were expected to leave on marriage, but would then 
form part of a reserve labour force, to be taken on as seasonal workers 
(much of the work was seasonal: most obviously, golf balls and hot 
water bottles). 
100 Finally, there seems to have been a careful 
planning of the internal labour-market. There were clear distinct- 
ions between male and female jobs, with the men employed largely in 
the earlier stages of the process, and the women in assembly and 
fini shing: 
101 there is some evidence that management exploited 
potential and actual conflict between men and women in order to weaken 
(or, at least, control) union organisation. It was certainly the 
view of a Labour Standard writer in 1925 that 
The women did not object to being 
sweated and used as a lever to keep 
down the wages of the men. 102 
Time rates and piecework were both used; despite a widespread dislike 
for the latter, union efforts to remove them were unsuccessful, per- 
haps because they offered the chance to earn up to 25 per cent more 
than time rates. 
103 Of course, this does not imply that managerial 
control was in no way challenged; nor that the 'frontier of control' 
remained stationary throughout our period. On the contrary. 
6.7 The Castle Mills in war and peace 
The rubber industry was at the centre of the war effort; Whitaker's 
Almanack for 1920 recorded: 
The war absorbed an enormous quantity 
of rubber in the manufacture of aero- 
planes (Palmer tyres of 1500 m1m x 300 
m1m, were fitted to Handl ey-Page Bombing 
100. Milnes, 250-2; NAUL No. 292 branch minutes 29 January, 5 February 
1918; -cp also 25 February, 17 June 1920. 
101. Milnes, 249-50- 
102. 
'Labour 
Standard 13 June 1925: 'Rubber and politics: North 
British Rubber Company Thrives on Sweated Workers'. It should 
be said that the article had some harsh comments about the male 
workers' allegedly docile attitude. Cp also Milnes, 252-3- 
103. TC ARs esp. 1923 and 1924; a Rubber Workers' union branch 
quarterly meeting, at which the majority of those present were 
pieceworkers, carried unanimously a demand for a 44 hour week, 
the abolition of piecework and overtime. They achieved only a 
47 hour week: NAUL No. 292 branch minutes, 12Jan, 
23Feb . 1919. 
18 0 
Machines), 'submarines, surgical 
appliances, anti-gas apparatus, 
field telephone cables, rubber 
boots, *waterproof coats and 
sheets, and tyres for motor 
ambulances, motor cars, motor 
vans, and lorries of every 
discription., 104 
As one of the largest rubber works in the country, the Castle Mills 
fell under the aegis of the Munitions of War Acts, which brought the 
apparatus of state intervention,: ý compulsory arbitration; regulations 
on hours of work, work discipline, attendance standards; liability to 
inspection by Ministry personnel, including the welfare inspectorate. 
105 
Strikes were outlawed; dilution encouraged, new products demanded 
(and-the production of others intensified or discontinued). Neverthe- 
less, it is likely that the major impact was in the pressure of work 
and the involvement of statutory institutions, rather than in 
production methods and work organisation: here the essential 
systems had been long set. 
-, Rubber-making had always been a dangerous business. Apart from 
dangerous machinery, many of the chemicals were dangerous: some were 
also addictive. 
1o6 The industr" robably became more, dangerous during yp 
the war; certainly many complaints arose from workers at the Castle 
Mills. Over one month, for instance, in the winter of 1917-18, three 
issues of health and safety were reported to consecutive union 
committee meetings. Firstly, there was concern about 'replacing 
dressing for burns in solvent' 
107(not, interestingly, about the burns 
or the solvent themselves). Second, 'The case of men suffering from 
lead poinoning was again raised; ' the strategy selected was to ask 
'the NB Co to insure these men specially'. 
108 Finally, the problems 
104. Whitaker's Almanack, 1920,840. 
105- Cp N. Whiieside, 'Industrial welfare and labour regulation in 
Britain at*tfie time*of . the First World War', Int. Rev-of Social 
History 251,1980,307-31; G. R. Rubin, 'The Origins of Industrial 
Tribunals', 149-64. 
106. T-Oliver, 'Indiarubber: Dangers Incidental to the"Use of Bi- 
sulphide of Cýrbon and Naphthain T. Oliver (ed), Dangerous Trades 
(London 1902), 470-74: 'Oliýver was a member. of several Home Office 
committees and closely associate4 with the Factory Inspectorate. 
For a more modern assessment, including several hazards of which 
Oliver was-unaware, cp Kinnersly, esp. 129-30,347,367. 
107i NAUL No. 292 branch minutes 13 December 1917- 
108. Ibid., 27 December 1917: my emphasis. 
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of solvents recurred: two deaths were reported, 'and a discussion 
as to the cause of death and Z-what was seen as2 the epidemic of 
disease in the solvent followed. 1109 
The involvement of statutory bodies and regulations in the 
organisation of production was a clear departure fron pre-war 
practice. It is generally held that one intention of the Munitions 
of War Acts was to weaken union organisation; and they clearly were 
used to attack'strong union organisation, as on Clydeside. 
110 However, 
it is likely that, where union organisation was weak or non-existent, 
the effect of the Acts was to lend recognition and legitimation, de 
facto, to trade unions; or to hinder the development of a sharp 
employers' response to the early stages of union development. (The 
object, after all, was to maximis e production: provoking a dispute 
on issues such as recognition or union existence can hardly have 
seemed justifiable to the Ministry's officials. ) Such a contention 
is consistent with the formation of union organisation at Castle 
Mills. ill The management had successfully prevented the formation of 
an active or lasting union presence for the previous sixty years; 
nor did it suddenly become an advocate-of union membership. In 
April and May 191? a campaign by the organiser of the NAUL led to 
the establishment of a committee and a series of mass meetings! 
some indication of the rapidity with which success was achieved is 
109. Ibid., 10 January 1918. 
110. Cp Rubin, Esp. 152-31 A-Marwick, The Deluae, British Society 
and the First World War (Harmondsworth 1967), 56-6.5; J-11inton 
'The Clyde Workers' Committee and the diluti6n struggle' in 
Briggs and Saville, Essays in Labour History, 152-84, esp. 161. 
111. And also, of course, vith the massive increase in union member- 
ship occurring during the war: this, and its distribution by 
industry, is examined in B. C. Roberts, Trade Union Government 
and Administration in Great Britain (London-1956), 471-84. For 
a modern discussion of theimportance of recognition to union 
organisation, see E-Batstone, I. Boraston and S. Frenkel, Lho 
Stewards in Action (London 1977), esp. ch-7,259- There are 
other examples of the Ministry of Munitions pressing employers 
to recognise union institutions against their wishes, e. g., at 
Coventry, to recognise shop stewards' committeco so as to 
facilitate dilution: Hinton, First Shop St-wards' Movement 
224-5; Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Soci2jXi. b- 
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to be seen in the fact that on 21 May four branch officers were kept 
busy for 2j hours entering members and receiving cash. 
112 Membership 
did not reach 100 per cent, although it may have done so'in certain 
departments, but the cases of membors refusing -to work alongside non- 
members. suggest that the latter were in a minority. 
113 
The significance of the Ministry of Munitions was that it 
provided a mechanism for raising issues, a substitute in this sense 
for agreed procedures. Where previously the distance between 
organisingin a union and achieving anything by this was considerable 
(in terms of dismissals, disputes, lost time, and so on) - now, 
suddenly, it was reduced. An achievable end was in view; axylthe 
role of theMinistry could, in part, be seen as a neutral one. 
Within weeks of its establishment, the union took up the ca3e of 
three men who had been 'forced to sign an agreement accepting a 
lower rate than the niinimum'rate. 1 
114 The Ministry's representative 
confirmed that the company's action was wrong. 
115 Later in the same 
year a strike occurred, w'hich seems to have led to proceedings at a 
Munitions Tribunal, thus 'compelling Coy to negotiate'. 
116 
The existence cf a union at the Castle Mills meant that after 
the war, and more particularly after 1920, management could no longer 
rule in the same old way. In early 1919 the union went on the 
offensive, demanding a 44 hour week, and the abolition of piecework 
and overtime. They won a 47 hour week, in place of the previous 55 
112. The formation of the NAUL No. 292 branch is described in the 
minutes for April and May 1917; the first figures on member- 
ship are to be found in the minutes of 14 August 1917 when 
a ballot for secretary was held: 2118. votes were cast (although 
by then members from two small rubber works were also included). 
113. Cp NAUL No-292 branch minutes 3,5,19 February, 8 August 1918, 
16 January 1919. 
114. NAUL No. 292 branch minutes, 28 June 1917. 
115. But headded 'that the amount at issue being so wall, the 
matter was not worth proceeding with'. Ibid., 2 August 1917. 
116. Ibid., 23 August 1917; Cp also 14 August 1917- 
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(no mean achievement)'619d, substantial advances in pay, though piece- 
work and overtime were not abolished. 
118 By mid-1920 the union branch 
numbered about 3900, and cannot have been far from 100 per cent 
membership in the industry in Edinburgh. 
119 A Whitley Council was 
set up, with joint works committees in the various plants, a district 
structure to which disputes would be referred failing internal agree- 
ment, and a national industrial council: the union saw this as a 
major advance. 
120 But, ultimately, employers' control was not in 
question. 
Although the detail is obscure, after 1920 union strength was 
eroded, -until by the 1930s, it was largely dependent upon managerial 
support. 
121. During the War the Company conceded the union presence- 
reluctantly, -defended - even aggressively - its right to employ non- 
union labour, used the latter against the union, -and in no way 
discouraged inter-union-competition for recruits. 
122 After the war, 
tedundancies boon began, with little union resistance. 
123 Management's 
control of the internal labour market led to the transfer of nearly a 
117! lbid. 1.12 January, 23 February 1919. 
118. See Ch. 4; TC AR 1920,42; by May 1919, pieceworkers were 
complaining at how their earnings had been cut with the shorter 
week: NAUL No. 292 branch minutes, 8 May 1919. 
119. This estimate is derived from the assertion, ibid. 15 July 1920, 
that affiliation to the TC on full'membership 'would mean an 
affiliation fee of approximately L65'; TC fees in 1920 were 
4d per member p. a.: TC AR 1920,55; for 1923 Milnes estimates 
the number employed In the industry at 4233: Milnes 244; the 
1921 Census rdcords*3903 'workers in Rubber, Vulcanite, Ebonitell 
excluding employers, managers, foremen and-overlookers. 
120. NAUL No. 292-. branch minutes, 8 August 1918,10 January 1919. 
121* Milnes, 252-3- 
122. Cp, e. g., NAUL No. 292 branch minutes, 3,5 February 1918; 12 June 
--1? August 1918; 21 August 1919. 
123. Ibid. s 3 July 1919- 
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hundred clerks from the NAUL to the National Union of Clerks; 
124 
and 
attempts to establish a joint union committee including craft unions 
125 
proved abortive.. Given an apparent tension between men and women, 
and a number of structural disincentives to union membership among 
the latter (high turnover, retirement on marriage, distinct socio- 
geographical origins), the increasing proportion of females in the 
industry's labour force must have been, at least incidentally, a 
strategy, to weaken the union. 
126 The decision to maintain a Welfare 
Department, particularly to deal with women, may also be seen in this 
light. 127 Certainly, the union began to suffer some setbacks. During 
1922 or 1923 time and piece rates were reduced by between 21 and 32 
per cent, and an hour was added to the working week. 
128 Work was 
speeded-up, and a number of disputes occurred: by 1925 union member- 
ship had fallen to 25 per cent, and no doubt suffered more after the 
General Strike. 129 
In short, the scale and technology of the rubber industry, 
especially in-the Castle Mills, made direct control both possible and 
and desirable. During the war, however, as union organisation developed, 
124. Ibid., ý1 August, 4 September 1919; cp . NUC Edinburgh, branch 
minutes, 6 January, 17 March, 21 April, 5 May 1919. 
125. NAUL No. 292 branch minutes, 27 November 1919. 
126. Cp ibid., 15 May 1917; Milnes 252-3. The numbers effectively 





1924 4584 49-3 
1925 4682 50.6 
1926 4827 50-7 
1927 4356 50-0 
1928 448o 52.9 
Source: Milnes, 244- 
127- Milnes, 251. 
1289 TC AR 1922,1923- 
129. Labour Standard 13 June 1925: 'North'British Rubber Company 




management appears to have edged toward an element of 'responsible 
autonomy': but in a form very different from that found in print- 
ing. For whilst close supervision persisted in the work process 
itself, some recognition was given to trade union organisation. 
Probably, however, this openness to a union role was induced by 
government-involvement, for after the war. the Company made a 
determined, and largely successful, attempt to weaken union 
organisation. Interestingly, however, this itself seems to have 
brought costs: a number of sectional strikes occurred, which were 
difficult to settle, and so the Company took steps to strengthen 
130 
union membership. For, as Milnes recorded after discussion with 
the Company, 
In the absence of a'recognised union 
when disputes arise, the firm is, 
compelled to carry on negotiations 
with a specially elected workers' 
committee and discussions with such 
a committee are frequently futile, 
since agreements made with them are 
generally impossible to enforce. 131 
6.8 The railways: structure and service 
Although Edinburgh was far more than a railway town, the railways 
were more important to her econoiny than to the economies of most 
towns, even in the 1920s. Over four per cent of the city's work- 
force132 was employed in the service of the North British and- 
Caledonian Railway companies. 
133 Leith's trado was highly dependent- 
on the ability of the railways to transport its imports and exports; 
not least coal. The proximity of the railway was an important factor 
in the location of industry in the town. 
134 
130. Hilnes, 252 
131- Ibid. - 
132'. Census, 1921. 
133. As a i9sult of the Railways. Act 1921, these became part respect- 
ively, of the London North Eastern and London, Midland and Scott- 
ish railways (LNER and LMS). 
134. Cp, e. g., Oakley, 132- 
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The railway companies were massive. The two which ran into and 
out of Edinburgh were, by a large margin, the largest industrial 
companies in Scotland. Each had well over twice the share capital of 
the third largest company: together, they had a share capital 
larger than the total share capital of the next eighteen largest 
companies. 
135 They were vast employers of labour, not merely in 
operating trains - which had to be as nearly around-the-clock as 
possible - but in loading and unloading freight, building and re- 
pairing rolling-stock, and maintaining track, stations, and other 
fixed capital. In Edinburgh alone, in 1921, they employed over 8,000 
men and. women136 in a variety of roles: as drivers, firemen, guards, 
porters, clearly; but also as clerks, signalmen, permanent way men 
(maintaining track), and in -the railway workshops in the entire 
spectrum of the engineering trades. 
Some of these tasks were relatively capital-intensive: for 
instance, each engine crew operated in a machine of great complexity, 
as did-signalmen. Their movements were prescribed in detail by time- 
tables, although, of course, keeping safely to these timetables was a 
matter of Great skill and responsibility. On the other hand, track 
maintenance was highly labour-intenzive, requiring gangs of men to work, 
often with little more than hand-tools, and often many miles from their 
home towns. Railway engineering workshops had many of the character- 
istics of heavy engineering. EaccNaaRydeveloped a large central 
administrative organisation, which planned the operational aspects 
of railway work: timetabling in particular, but of repairs, 
maintenance, as well as of trains themselves. And each was marked by 
an internal division of labour of bewildering complexity. 
A military model was fundamental to the organisation of work in 
the railway industry before-and after the Great War. Partly this was 
because it was one of the few known methods-of large-scale organisation 
when the railways were established. 
137 But, in addition, the railways 
135. Scott and Hughes, The Anatomy of Scottish Capital, 67-81 109: the 
... figures relate to 1920-21. 
136.1921* Census. 
137. On this, nee Burns and Stalker, 104-5. 
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had to co-ordinate a network of employees (often, initially, from 
. rural 
backgrounds) in widely varying-jobs over vast areas. Basic 
work-disciplines had to be instilled, basic standdrds set: a process 
very similar to mobilising an army. It was necessary to instil not 
merely a sense of organisational goals, but also a common appreciat- 
ion of their paramount importance. Not just tlie structural, but 
also the moral, elements of the military model were taken over. 
When men joined the railway they entored 
the 'Service'. They worked for a company 
and wore the uniform and livery of that 
company. The officials of the company 
were termed 'officers' and'superior 
ýofficersl. Trains carrying such 
Personnel were termed 'officers specials'. 
A man did not go to work; he went 6n 
'duty'. His position was a 'Post's and 
when he left that 'post' he was''relieved'. 
If he failed to report for duty, or left 
his post without permission, he was 'Absent 
without Leave'. If he offended against 
company rules (for instance by smoking on 
týe footplate) he was'put on a 'charge' 
and subject to a fine, to suspension from 
duty, or to loss of rank. No appeal was 
allowed. A railway man worked to a roster 
or a roia. Ile was obliged to obey without 
dissent, those persons, appointed 'above'. 
him. 'Service', punctilio, and absolute 
obedience to rule were drilled into him. 138 
The success of this strategy during the nineteenth century was remark- 
able: the'attitudes of the-'Service! were very largely internalised 
by the-railway servants and, in time, those joining knew what to 
expect. And there was another side to the military approach: if 
hours were long and . pay was 
low, loyalty was rewarded by a 
139 
security of employment almost unmatched in nineteenth century industry. 
Nevertheless, in time railway servants robelled against 'all the 
petty tyranny'. 
14o In doing so, however, they were hindered by another 
138. F. McKennal 'Victorian Railway Workers', Histoz? j Workshop Journal 
1) 1976), 27-8. 
139. Ibid., 26-37. 
140. The phrase in J. H. Thomas's, quoted in P'-S-Bagwell, The Rail 
. waYmen. 
The History oftbe National Union of Railwaymen (London 1963), 299. 
I 
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aspect of the military model: for in the railway service the 
division of labour became a fetish. There were (literally) 
hundreds of distinct job classifications and grades, and, in the 
army model workers were commonly addressed and referred to by job 
title as well as name. This was reinforced in everyday social 
interaction: drivers and firemen, for instance, working together 
in the same cab, would very likely drink in different bare and stay 
at different hostels. 
141 The sense of 'the service', the intensity and 
social meaning of the division of labour, theýstrictness of company 
discipline, made the development of uni ted union organisation between 
grades difficult. Also, the companies were inclined to perceive 
union organisation (and, even moret strikes) as incipiently mutinous. 
It was, therefore, not until the decisive national strike-of 1911 
that the unions even achieved recognition from management; 
142 
and 
only in the wake of this was the National-Unlon of Railwaymen formed, 
by amalgamation of several smaller unions. 
143 
6.9 The service in war and peace 
When war broke-out, the railway companies were--placed-under-State 
control. A Ra ilway Executive Committee-wao appointed, consisting of 
leading railway general managers, to operate the-railwayr, in-the -- 
-interest of the-war-effort. Railway company revenues were. guaranteed 
at (record) 1913 lev -(There was-no mention of workers' wages or Wls a 
living standards. ) At the same time, many railway-workers-left to 
join the forces, and the service became understaffed; new sources of 
labour were found, particularly Among women, but the main solution 
141. McKenna, -42-8; Bagwell, 417. 
142. On the 19'11 strike, see McKenna, 54-65; Býgwell, ' 289-368'; '*. 
N. McKillop, The Lightod Flame. A History of the Associated 
Society-of Locomotive Engineers & Firemen (London 19505ýý98. 
143; Bagwell., 325-43. 
144. Ibid., 346-7. 
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was-to lengthen working hours and increase the workload of railway- 
men. - 
145 For, the-railways bore the brunt of internal transport demands; 
these, were particularly gr eat in Scotland with the Grand Fleet based 
at-Scapa Flow, and important elements of it using other anchorages at 
Invergordon, in the Forth, and on the west coast. 
146 So the war had 
a positive effect on the bargaining strength of the NUR. As the 
Edinburgh No. l'branch recalled, 
with the international war, the wage war 
' The cost of living rose did not stop, 
tremendously, and demands had to be made 
for increased wages. 147 
These were conceded in part (though only in fhe form of flat rate 
'war bonuses'); but the important change from 1915, was that they 
were agreed, nationallY: company negotiations on wages were never 
revived. 
148 
1. ., The 'truce' which the railway union3eaders and the railway 
managers-agreed in October 1914 lasted-through the war. The central- 
isation of negotiations was, of course, related to this, for the , 
Railway-Executive could be more confident of agreement with national 
leaders, who were strongly associated with the national war effort: 
the General Secretary of the NUR, J. H. Thomas, for instance, was 
invited to join the Cabinet in 1917, an offer he declined at least in 
part because he was hoping for an invitation to join the WarCabinet; 
in 1918 he became a Privy Councillor. 
149 But this 'truce' did not 
bring an end to industrial conflict. The experience of the NUR, in 
particular, for several years before 1914 had led to the development 
of a militant element within its membership which drew inspiration and 
theory from syAdica , 
lists and socialists. 
150 In Edinburgh during 1911 
and 1912 the No. I branch of tho NUR became increasingly militant, and 
145i Ibid., -345. 
146. Lenman, Economic-History, 209. 
147- NUR Edinburgh No. 1 branch, Jubilee Souvenir 1876:: _ý269 
(E-din. 
1926)1 26. 
148; Ibid. ;. Bagwell, 348-9. 
149i Bagwell, 351-2. 
150. Holton, British Syndicalism, esp. 97-9,164-7. 
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critical of its national leadership. 
151 Whilst some aspects of the 
wartime experience weakened this movement (nob least the blandish- 
ments of patriotism), the rising cost of living, especially when 
compared with the comfortable situation of shareholders, lent strength 
to demands for higher wages. A tension therefore developed between 
the leading officials of the union, and many of its active members: 
this was reflected in the increasing influenc, e of District Councils 
and Vigilance Committee3, and in the problems which Thomas encountered 
in resisting a strike in November 1917.152 
Given the nature of their highly mechanistic organisational 
structures, dilution brought problems on the railways. The grade and 
classification-structure was the foundation of an intricate system 
of status differencesi and in peacetime an individual's progression 
through them was slow. During the war it was accelerated: -thus the 
social meanings attached to the various jobs, or work-roles, were 
severely dislocated. Very often the short-term response was a 
vigorous defence of existing standards. A revealing instance arose in 
Edinburgh in May 1918, when the North British proposed to introduce 
women passenger guards. A special meeting of passenger guards 
appointed a deputation to 'state thefir2. objectionl to the 
district superintend-ant: the union branch, covering all grades, 
shared the guards' view, rejectinp,, an addendum to the effect 
That this meeting impresses upon the 
deputation of passenger guards the - 
advisability of placing no obstacle in 
the way of women becoming passenger 
151. Ibid., 108-9; cp NUR Edin. No 1 branch, Souveniri 23: 'About 
this time the socialist activity of certain members is worthy 
of notice as giving point to the discussion and interest to the 
meetings which had a good effect on the members'. In Dec-1913i 
James Larkin addressed 71000 supporters in Ed , 
inburgh; 'The 
platform was stormed by sympathisers eager. to shake Mr. Larkin 
by the hand': Liverpool Daily-Post and Mercury, 12 Dec. 1913, 
quoted Holton, 196. 
152. Bagwell, esp- 352-5- 
I" 
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guards, but will press for the best 
conditions being obtained for those 
who may be introduced. 153 
In the long. run, however, the mearling-system was inevitably under- 
mined. This did not imply the imminent collapse of the industry's 
division of labour (although there were several steps just after the 
war to simplify and standardise the classification and grading 
systems)., 
154 It did, however, still further weaken the effectiveness 
of 'railway values' in sustaining work disciplines; and this was to 
create further problems for railway management after the war. 
Three factors are crucial to understanding the post-war 
development of the railways: the enormous achievements of the unions 
in 1919 (and to a lesser extent, 1920); the deteriorating market 
environment; and the changing relationship between the industry and 
the state. Of 1919 much has been written. The eight-hour day was 
implemented in February, a landmark in the history of the industry 
(and particularly in the history of the ASLE&F. 
155 The national 
rail strike in September was marked by great-unity in action between 
trade unions ('The Associated Z_SLE&-w7' though having got a 
settlement, struck with usto a man); 
156 by great membership support 
- although Edinburgh's claim 'All men and women out' should be 
qualified by the NUR No 1 branch's interest in 'the question of 
Blacklegsl; 157by the use of the press on both-sides; 
158 by the 
government's capitulation. It was, above all, a massive achievement 
153- NUR Edin. No 1 branch minutes 26 May 1918: 
* 
the addendum was 
rejected by 11 votes to 2. There is a more optimistic view 
of dilution in G. D. H. Cole and R. Page Arnot, Trade Unionism on 
the Railways. Its History and problems (London 1917), 62-4. 
154. See Bagwell, 417-8; McKillop, 136-8: the immediate cause of 
these was the need to harmonise various companies' grading, 
structures on grouping. . 
155. CpI esp., McKillop, ch. 10, esp. 119-20. 
156. NUR Edin. No 1, Souvenir, 28. The 1919 strike is most fully 
covered by Bagwell, ch. 15, 
157- The claim was made in a telegram to Unity House, London, 
quoted Bagwell, 387. The question of blacklegs was discussed 
by the Edin. No. 1 branch, NUR, on three occasions at leastj it 
seems they were summoned to a special meeting, and the branch 
wisýed to see thein expelled: Minutes, 12,26 October, 9 November 
1919. 
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of organisation and morale: at the No. 1 branch's meeting on 
9 November, a song written as a 'souvenir of the Railway Strike' 
. Iqo 
by a branch member was sung; printed, it sold well: " Although 
160 doubts were subsequently voiced at the detailed national agreement, 
1919 seemed to have shifted the balance of power in the industry 
away from the employers. 
Under the shadow of this defeat, the employers had to contend 
with a deteriorating market situation, They were subject to intense 
coppetition. After the war, especially after the onset of depression, 
the shipping surplus brought down coasting rates: Lcith's coastal 
161 trade remained relatively stable after the war, and rose after 1923- 
Except where speed was essential, or the destination inland, shipping 
was highly competitive with the railways. 
162 In local trading, road 
transport was an increasing problem (as chapter 3 suggested). In 
the 1919 rail strike, the lorry proved itself a potentially dangerous 
competitor, especially over short distances* 
163 At the same time, the 
159. NUR Edin. No 1 branch minutes 9 November, 7 December 1919. 
160. The No I branch, NUR, expressed 'its dissatisfaction with the 
Agreement and its inadequacyý to meet our demands, while being 
forced to accept it': ibid, 18 January 1920, cp 28 M=rch 1920; 
Bagwell, 416-7. - 
161; Milnes, 148,155. 
162. There were, of course, extra hazards in coastal transport. 
Keynes' Economic Consequences of the Peace, for instance, 
printed in 1919 by R. & R. Cl. ark of Edinburgh for Macmillan, 
first came to the public's attention on the shores of Jutland. 
The ship carrying it was driven eastward by storms, and finally 
wrecked: 2000 copies were thrown overboard to lighten the load. 
See R'Harrod, The Life of John Maynard Keynes (Harmondsworth 
1972): 339- 
163- Interestingly, however, even in the mid-'twenties the Gperal 
Secretary of the Scottish Horse and Motormen's Association 
(the carters' union) 'was not convinced that the motor vehicle 
would dominate the future' (A. Tuckett, The Scottish Carter 
(London 1967), 158): the horse was still of vital importance. 
On the lorry in 1919, cp Bagwell, 396, 
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recession rcduced the total quantity of goods requiring transport, 
particularly on certain Scottish routes which had been heavily used 
in wartime. 
The railway employers' responses to the new market situation, 
and the unprecedented self-confidence of the railway workers, were 
influenced by their relationship with the state. Government control 
lasted longer on the railways than in other industries. Not until 
August 1921 was state control surrendered, although as this date 
approached the personnel who exercised contro2 on its behalf began 
to act in the interest of their companies, rather than of the state 
as such. 
164 During the first two post-war years the government not 
only conceded on railway working conditions; it also prevaricated and 
vacillated on the question of control, first sugeesting nationalisation 
but - having defused the issue until union strength had waned - finally 
returning the railways to the companies. under the ineffectual aegis 
of a Ministry of Transport. 
165 The Railways Act 1921 was an example 
of state intervention to restructure the private sector, since it did 
'regroup' the railways into seven large companies (with effect from 
1924). But 
Parliament had ... rejected the idea 
of a co-ordinated transport system 
run primarily as a service .... In 
particular, the railways were to be 
run as commercial undertakings, whose, 
first consideration was the production 
of a profit for those who had invested 
their money in the companies. 166 
The railway companies thus returned in 1.0,21 to full control 
of an industry which, for the previous seven years, had been operated 
with other (military and political) objectives to the fore. Union 
organisation now posed problems: -there could be no return to the 
pre-1911 strategy of tight direct control of labourignoring unions. 
This had been accepted by the creation of various 'Joint' institutions 
164. Bagwell, 411,419-21. 
165. Ibid., esp. 404-14, for a full coverage of this subject also 
Middlemas, Politics in Industrial society, esp. 1.3-4,14931, 155-7- 
166. Býag-aeql I Wt. 
during 1919-21, and by the 1921 Act. Yet the companies needed to 
increase their rate of return on capital and labour employed. They 
attempted to do so in two ways during the early 'twenties: by 
increasing the volume of traffic, and by reducing their expenditure 
on labour-and capital. 'The first is easily dealt with: advertising 
campaigns, cheap day return and weekly season tickets, and similar 
promotional devices were inevitably inadequate in the competitive 
environment after 1921 (which, of course, is when companies began to 
attempt them in earnest). 
167 so their major efforts went into the 
direct cutting of costs. In the Edinburgh area, a number of smaller 
stations and branch lines were closed in the early 'twenties; 
168 the 
workshop at St. Margaret's was run down; 
169 
employment was reduced 
and greater efficiency demanded. 
170 
Such moves required a reassertion of managerial control. But 
the effectiveness of the pre-war work structures, eroded during war- 
time, had been further weakened by the disputes over 'standardisation' 
which arose in the wake of the terms of settlement of the 1919 strike. 
The elaborate system of grades and classifications was vastly simplified! 
but all kinds of inconsistencies arose, and dissatisfaction was rife. 
167. Hunter, Edinburghl_s Transport, 162-3: all were tried in 
-. Edinburgh. 
168. Ibid., 163-6. 
169. NUR Edin. No 1 branch minutes 10,24 Aug., 7,21 Sept. 19 Oct., 1924; 
Laboiir Standard , 17 October 1925,2 January 1926. This Prationalisation' was of course made possible by the grouping 
of railways: work was concentrated at Cowlairs (Glasgow) and 
Inverurie. 
170- Between 1921 and 1931 the number of railway employees in 
Edinburgh fell by 18-3 per cent, according to the censuses, 
from 8 o64 to 6586. The number of insurcA railway employees 
declined thus: - 
j22 1928 j 1924 1225 1926 12ýz 
Nunber: 2376 2500 2082 1845 2093 1932 
Index: . 100 105 88 ?8 
88 81 
Source: Milnes, 154, and calculation therefrom. 
I 
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Speaker after speaker at an NUR branch meeting in March 1920 gave 
examples of the injustice of the new system. One will suffice: 
before the agreement, the grade 'Examiners' had been divided into 
four classes, 'Special', 'first', 'second'., and 'third': 
now they were only one clas3, and all paid 
alike - 66/- falling 56/-- Under him as 
examiner in Waverley Z-the speaker reported, _7 he had tradesmen working - there were joiners, 
plumbers, who were simply refusing to accept 
the grading. 171 
This elision of grades stirred emotions which tho grade system had 
so effectively fostered; but it also demonstrated that the structure 
was not immutable. What remdined, therefoce, was an hierarchic 
structure based upon a system of rules backed up by disciplinary 
sanctions; but less effective in mobilieing opinion, in sustaining 
a common moral culture within the workforce. 
- Moreover other aspects of the old notion of railway service 
ware weakened by the financial policies of the railway companies after 
1920. Cost-cutting policies brought an end to the 'Job for life'. 
172 
Dismissals began in 1920: some were only temporary$ but this only 
serves to emphasise the employers' new approach to labour-173 At the 
same time, employment cuts were seen by the workers as an attack on 
the standard of the service. Threats to permanent way staff numbers, 
for instance, lconstituteCg a grave menace to the travelling 
publicl;!? 
It 
whilst tightening up of working practices was held to have 
led to defective rolling stock$ and thus accidents. 
175 
The approach adopted by the railway companies in reasserting 
their control can be seen as a sbift in the direction of alresponsible 
171. NUR Edin. -No 1 branch minutes 28 March 1920. 
172- McKenna, 31-5. 
173- For examples, see NUR Edin. No I branch minutes, 4 July, 4) 
15 August, 1920,27 February, 8 Kay, 31 July, 4,18 December 1921, 
11 flar6h 1923,29 June, 21 September 1924. Cp also Bagwell, 
419-20, and the assertion of the National Wagev Board that 'in 
practice security of employment for the ordinary railway employee 
extends beyond the guaranteed week and, provided he is able to 
perform his work, he it. practically immune from the vicissitudes 
of short time and unemployment'. (3 Julie 1920, quoted Bagwell, 
419. ) 
174. NUR No. I branch minutes, 29 June 1924. 
17.5- Labour Standard 22 January 1927: a letter from IRjilway Worker. ' 
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autonomy' strategy: though a very qualified shift. There is 
little question that discipline tightened after 1919. Signalmen 
were suffering Isevore punishments for technical offences'; 
176 
a 
yard foreman e)hibited 'Prussianism in its worst and Z-sic2 
malignant form,. 
177 At the same time, piecework was introduced in 
certain jobs, particularly in the workshops. 
178 The essence of the 
employers' strategy was to tighten control, intensify labour, in 
the everyday working of the. railways; but to involve unions in the 
newly-instituted joint procedures and committees, thus reducing 
their ability to mobilise effectively. This had an effect both 
nationally and locally. At a national level, the leaders of the 
INUR regarded recognition accorded to the unions by the 1921 Act as 
their major achievement, even opposing a 1924 ASLE& F strike 
because it was in breach of procedure, and instructing NUR members 
to work normally. 
179 Locally, the attitude was similar: 
the National Wages Board and the Wages 
Board, with the Railway Boards, Section- 
al Councils, and Local Departmental 
Committees, Z-are2 all ý bodie2s ... 
which when our railwaymen are wise 
enough to organise sufficiently may 
provide them with the machinery that 
would give them complete control of 
their industry. 18o 
Union branches became involved in these bodies; representatives argued 
their memberd cases, both individual and collective; some gained 
enviable repiltations as advocates. 
181 
In short, the railway employers' approach during the early 
1920s attempted to integrate union organisation in a common con- 
ception, not so much of the aims of the railways, as of the values 
176. NUR Edin. No I branch minutes 23 April 1922: report of aletter 
from Edin. and District Signalmen's Committee. 
177- Ibid., 22-October 1922; other exainples are to be found in ibid, 1 February, 14 March, 9 May 1920,2 July 1922,15 July 1923, 
18_April 1926. Cp also Bagwell, 440-1. 
178. Ibid., 13 July 1924. 
179. Bagwell, 434-7- 
180. NUR Edin. No 1 branch, Souvenir, 28. 
181. An example is Nixon of the-NUR No 1 Branch. He was requested 
by men from otherdepartments (e. g. Minutes, 8 May 1921), 
objected to by management (ibid. ), and O-ffered promotion by the 
North'British RC (ibid., 23 May 1920). 
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1 
of recognition and procedure. 
182 The companies were fortunate 
(in this respect) that unemployment lessened many of their problems 
of motivation, for this integration of the unions could reduce the 
effectiveness of workers' resistance, but it could not motivate as 
effectively as the old notions CC the railway service. The employers 
were successful to the extent that the unions perceived the joint 
institutions gained in 1921 as their fundamental achievements, the 
basis of their ability to represent their membera effectively. The 
railway unions had tunied, perhaps perforce, from defending their 
members to defending the joint machiney they had won. 
Edinburgh's employers, then, adopted a variety of strategies in 
attempting to achieve the control over labour necessary to enable 
them to attain their objectives. These strategies varied according 
to a number of factors: the structure of the firm and the industry, 
their market environment, the strength of labour. But some general 
conclusions can be reached; certain trends are discernable. Firstly, 
'scientific management' in a strong sense was rarely adopted. 
During the years of greatest labour strength, change was too frequent 
to encourage investment in the control systems necessary to make such 
techniques effective; and, moreover, it required the goodwill and 
abilities of various groups of workers. With the depression, 
employers did 'tighten-up' in a number of ways, but this did not 
amount to 'scientific management'; and in many cases this 'tightening- 
up' was allied with attempts to win workers' commitment to enterprise 
objectives (either directlyýEhrough enlisting unions' interest in 
co=on aims, such as stability). Secondly, the onset of depression 
did not encourage attempts to achieve economies of scale: on the 
contrary, 'tightening-up' was an attempt to achieve greater efficiencies 
with existing plant. Thirdly, although employers' control was never 
fundamentally in doubt, it was occasionally under severe pressure 
until 1920. Thereafter, the balance of industrial power shifted 
decisively against the unions: nevertheless, there are grounds for 
182. On procedure as an element of 'responsible autonomy' strategies, 
cp Friedman, Industry-and Labour, 96-8. 
198 
supposing that, in the late 'twenties, their position in Edinburgh 
was in general stronger than'it had been before the war. 
Union development thus occurred on shifting and differing 
terrains. Although influenced by factors such as industrial 
structure and management strategy, these were so variegated as to 
suggest that other factors were also necessary to produce the major 
shifts in union strength which marked our period. It is to those 
factors which grounded the general. union advance of 1917-1920, 




Trade Union Development: Motivation and Organisation 
7.1 Union mobilisation 
Although they are subject to many other influences, the essential 
framework within which unions develop is the conflict around the 
'frontier of control'. On the terrain discussed in the last 
chapter, workers and-managers recognise their interests, identify 
grievances, mobilise arguments. As we have seen, this terrain is 
not unchanging: economic, social or political events, even a 
substantial victory by one side in manoeuvre on a given landscape, 
may move future conflict onto entirely new (and more favourable) 
ground. The 1922 lock-out in engineering shifted future conflict 
onto terrain even more favourable to the employers; the 1919 rail- 
way strike did so to the unions' benefit (although probably it 
might have been more fully exploited): within a single workplace, 
the establishment of a union at the Castle Mills had a similar 
effect.. And ground thus won may be eroded slowly, without any 
apparent defeat. 
But although the terrain of industrial conflict normally 
gives an advantage, or initiative, to one side or another, it does 
not in any simple sense determine the outcome. It is, of course, 
possible for one side (management, say) 
Oto blunder, causing its 
defeat, even though the overall balance of power is in its favour. 
More importantly, however, industrial conflict involves the 
mobilisation of power resources by-employers and workers: the 
success of either side therefore depends not only on the-resources 
available tQ it (in relation to its opponent's resources)t but 
also on its success in using them. 
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We suggested in chapter 2 that it can be helpful to examine 
the working class's ability to take collective political action 
in relation to the principles which motivate the action. In this 
section we attempt to specify the theory there presented in 
relation to trade unions. 7 
There is now a substantial literature attesting to the 
generation by groups of workers of values and behavioural patterns 
which, if not oppositional, are at least dysfunctional from the 
viewpoint of the industrial concern for which they work. Much of this 
literature originated in criticism of, or in atte mpts to improve, 
management theories. Its implications are clear: there exists even 
within those work situations which are'very largely employer-defined, 
social institutions - often informal - which support values different 
from those which the employer would encourage. These institutions 
may develop an outlook on the economic objectives of work which 
involves a rationality at variance with the employers'. This may 
lead to various attempts to establish some collective control over 
payments systems. 
1 On the other hand they may assert some entitle- 
ment to controlling the workers' imme&te working environment: this 
may involve attempts to control'the pace of work, or its distribution 
between members of'the group, or the rights of management or other 
groups of workers. 
2 These two dimensions may be consciously linked, 
as they appear to be in notions of an 'effort bargain' -a 'fair 
day's work for a fair day's pay .3 Such are principles deriving 
1. Cp, e. g., Roy, 'Efficiency and "the fix", 255-66; Roy, 
'Quota restriction and goldbricking in a machine shopl, 427-42. 
2. Co, e. g.,. ibid.; Roy, 'Bana na time: job satisfaction and 
informal interaction's_Human Organisation 18,196o, 158-68; 
H. Beynon, Working for Forq (Hardmonsworth 1973), esp. ch 6; 
Armstrong et al., Ideology and Sh22: floor Industrial Relations, 
116-9. 
3- Ibid., 113-6; cp H. Behrend, 'The effort bargain', Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review 10,. 1957,503-15; J. Saville, 'The 
ideology of labourism; in R. Benewick, R. N. Berki and B-Parekh 
(eds),, Knowledge and Belief in politics. The problem of ideolo 
(London- -19-7-3)ýý -, esp. 215-17- 
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from workers' practical consciousness: they negotiate fundamental 
economic values, but always in relation to a specific and limited 
context; they spring not from an alternative rationality of general 
W11 
applications but from an interpretation of workerO positions and 
interests in the language of 'theoretical consciousness'. 
Secondly, however, dominant societal values are brought 
into the workplace in at least two ways. They are reflected in the 
ordinary discourse of workers, albeit in a 'fragmentary, incoherent 
and inconsequential' form. 
4 
But, in a far more articulate and 
purposive way, they underlie the activity of management. Management's 
authority is buttressed by assumptions about the prerogatives of 
property; its relations with its employees exist within a legal frame- 
work - during our period, there was no equivocation about its being 
the law-of 'Master and Servantl; 
5 its actions can generally be 
justified by reference to fundamental. economic values. 
6 
Generally, 
too, the law constitutes a power-resource for management, rather than 
for workers. 7 
These various values and principles have an important role in 
mobilisation, of course. We should bear in mind that they are 
generated and sustained by institutions. Thus, for example, the 
legitimacy afforded to 'restrictive practices' may be rather greater 
where they are supported by long-established craft institutions and 
attitudes, than where their sole support is a group of semi-skilled 8 
workers on an assembly-line, many of whom have no union background. 
4. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, 419. 
5. K, W-Wedderburn, The Worker and The Law (Harmondsworth 1971), 
esp. 52-3: it was, e. g. 1still the position that the servant 'contracted on the terms that as between himself and his master 
. 
he would run this risk Cof liability if he injured a 
fellow-worker2'(Baron Alderson, 1850, quoted Wedderburn, 264). 
6. Armstrong, et al., 64-82, esp. 68-70. 
7- Ibid., 64-5; Wedderburn, esp. 23-9. 
8. Cps e. g-, Beynon, 177-8: this does not, of course, imply 
that semi-skilled assembly-line workers are unable to create 
institutions which legitimise restrictive practices. 
zuz 
For our purposes, it is useful to distinguish two types of 
institutions, There are, first, those which generate or sustain 
legitimising principles quite unconsciously, as perhaps the work- 
group which reallocates work among*its members generates justific- 
ations for its actions. Second, other institutions are formed 
precisely to further certain objectives, and by implication the 
principles which legitimise these. Thus a trade union may be formed 
to press/interests of a group of workers; in attempting to do so, 
however, it may deploy arguments which draw on a far wider set of 
legitimising principles - including several from the managerial 
repertoire. 
Bearing in mind that those types are not in reality discrete, 
we have two preliminary criteria by which to assess the political 
development of a workplace trade union organisation: these are 
whether and how the organisation deploys principles of legitimation; 
and the extent to which it develops institutions which aid it in the 
mobilisation of various kinds of resource. To take an example from 
industrial relations literature: shop stewards acting in isolation 
appear to be generally less effective than those who operate among 
a network of, colleagues. This network i. E3 able to carry out many 
tasks more effectively (intelligence-gathering, processing and 
evaluating information, -and so on); but it also allows an elite group 
to asse6s its relationship with its members in terms of a relatively 
distinct vocabulary of motives, and hence to consider methods of 
legitimising action for them which appears necessary to it*9 
, 
In this chapter we examine the development and activity of 
trade union institutions, or organisation, in Edinburgh. We examine- 
the factors which influenced this development and activity, especially 
the important legitimising principles; and we discuss some of the main 
characteristics of the organisations which were created. 
Cp E. Batstone, I. Boraston, and S. Frenkel, Shop Stewards in 
Action. (London 1M), esp. chs. 2,3- 
20 "a 
7.2 Mobilisation and advance, _1917 - 
1918 
The scale of union advance in Britain during and just after the 
Great War is a commonplace. The general view is expressed by 
Bain: 
The First World War enormously enhanced 
the power and prestige of the trade 
union movement. Between 1913 and 1920 
the number of trade unionists more than 
doubled giving the movement a total 
membership of over 8 million. 10 
And while most obvious in the membership statistics, the advance is 
also reflected in other factors: increased state recognition, more 
widespread workplace organisation, the organisation of previously 
non-union groups of workers, the amalgamation and restructuring of a 
number of unions. But for our purposes it is necessary to move 
beyond these generalisations. 
In fact, the growth in trade union membership during 1914 and 
1915 was, if anything, slower than it had been during the preceding 
four years. As table 7.1 shows, it was not until 1916 that we can 
begin to speak of increases which were clearly war-related. Of course, 
Table 7-1: Trade Union Membership 1910 - 1920 
Year Total Union Membership of TUC-affiliated unions: 
Membershi Total Growth over previous year's figure 
(thous (thousands) Tthousands) (per cent) 
1910 2565 1662 14 M 
1911 3139 2002 34o 20.4 
1912 3416 2232 230 11-5 
1913 4135 - 4.50 20.2 1914 4145 2682 
1 
1915 4359 2851 169 6-3 
1916 4644 3o82 231 8.1 
1917 4599 4532 1450 47.0 
1918 6533 5284 752 16.6 
1919 7926 6505 1221 23-1 
1920 8348 6418 -87 -1-3 
Notes: (a) No TUC was held in 1914: there are thus no membership 
figures., fpr 1913,,, The growth calculations are therefore for two years 
taken together. According to Bain et al., the TUC membership figures 
refer to the preVious year in each case. If so, then in 1917 TUC 
membership exceeded total trade union membership: a proposttion both 
implausible and contradictory. These columnsphould not, therefore be 
too closely compared. 
Source: Bain, ' Bacon, Pimlottj 'The Labour Force' in Halsey, Trends in 
British Society since 1900,123-6; and calculations thence. 
10. G. S. Bain , The Growth of 
White-Collar Unionism , 
(Oxford 1970)) 142. 
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these figures mask the loss of members to the armed forces, but the 
distinction between the two periods is clear nevertheless. A similar 
discontinuity appears in other labour statistics: for instance, the 
number of stoppages due to industrial disputes rose markedly in 1917 
and 1918, as did the numbers of workers involved. 
11 In short, even 
the national, aggregate, statistical data point to an important hiatus, 
corresponding with 1916. We now examine the revival which occurred 
from. that year, largely from local evidence. As late as the spring 
of 1916, the Trades Council recorded that 
At present the difficulties in organising 
the large non-union element in the District 
are greatly increased by the War. 12 
In contrast, 1917 was 'a record year so far as interest in and 
development of Trade Unionism is concernedg, 
13 
whilst 
The marked features of the year 1918-7 
from the Trade Union point of view, apart 
from the general industrial unrest, are - 
(1) the strengthening and extension of the 
Trade Union movement; 14 
It is perhaps wise briefly to review some of these developments, for 
their impact on the consciousness of trade union activists was strong. 
11. Stoppages of work arising from industrial disputes in the UK were 
as follows: 
Year No. of Stoppages No. of workers Working 
beginning in year involved. days lost 
1913 1459 664 98o4 
1914 972 447 9878 
191.5 672 448 2953 
1916 532 276 2446 
1917 730 872 5647 
1918 1165 1116 5875 
1919 1352 2591 34969 
Source: Bain, Bacon and Pimlott, 127- 
12. TC AR 1916,2. 
13- Ibid., 1918,4. 
14. Ibid., 1919,2. 
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We have already mentioned the NAUL's 'great success in organising 
the numerous rubber workers in Edinburgh, ' which won the Trades 
Council's 'Congratulations'. 15 Organisation began among chemical 
and hosiery workers, 
16 
among asylum and precious metal workers, 
17 
among dressmakers, milliners, 




This extension of the boundaries of trade unionism inspired the 
normally sober secretary of the Trades Council to a rare literary 
licence: 
Even in occupations which were usually 
regarded as outwith the influence of 
Trade Unionism has the gospel spread. 
The policemen have been arrested. The 
Insurance Clerks are thinking of a new 
policy; the Bank Clerks are combining 
to check economic pressure; the Teachers 
are growing class conscious; and the 
Domestic Servants are endeavouring to 
make a clean sweep of old and hard 
traditions. 21 
At the same time, where organisation existed, the density of union 
membership increased. In some cases this was Aue to the recruitment 
of women who had previously been excluded from union membership, as 
when the Bookbinders decided to admit women in 1918, and found their 
membership swelled by some 1200.22 In other cases, it was due merely 
23 
to a general strengthening of organisation, as among the laundry 
and road transport workers. 
24 
15. Ibid., 1918,4. 
16. Ibid. 
17. Ibid., 1919,2. 
18_. 1 bid., 1918,7-8. 
19. TC minutes, 10 September 1918. 
20. NUC Edin. branch minutes, 4 March 1918. 
21. TC AR 1919,2: my emphasis (the past tense seeins to indicate 
a sense of a new era's having arrived). 
22. Ibid., 1918, 
23- Ibid., 4-7- 
24. Ibid., 1919,5; Tuckett, The Scottish Carter, 134-5,144-5- 
0 
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An attempt to explain this development solely by reference 
to the internal organisation of the trade union movement would not 
succeed. There were, it is true, attempts to improve the structure 
of the movement, and these had some effect. 
25 But such an explanation 
would ignore the substantial evidence that the movement was bedevilled 
by organisational failings - rather than bupyed up by achievements. 
The constant theme of the Trades Council, for example, was just the 
'lack of co-ordination, and consequent waste of effort'; 
26 intractable 
problems which could not, apparently, by overcome. 
The central failing was competition between unions, associated 
with intense multi-unionism: laundry workers, for instance, were 
enrolled in 'five or six separate unions' even before J-H-Moore 
initiated the Laundry Workers' Union in 1917.27 A conference called 
to 'arrange spheres of action for the unions which enro1jeg women 
workers' achieved little. The Paper Workers contested with the 
Bookbinders over the latter's new women members; 
28 
whilst the Bakers, 
the Shop Assistants, and the General Workers Unions, together with 
the NAUL competed for biscuit workers. 
29 For, essentially, the problems 
were rooted too deeply to be solved on a local basis. 
We must, therefore, seek other explanations for the union 
ability to mobilise late in the war; 
30 
several factors were important. 
25. E. g., TC AR 1916,2; ESAE&I and ASE, Conference Proceedings, 18 
January 1918, passim; see also s. 6-3- 
26. TC AR 1918,7; cp TC AR 1917,16. 
27- TC AR 1918,4-ý. On J-H-Moore, see Labour Standard, 9 Oct. 1926. 
28. TC AR 1918,7- 
29. TC Minutes (EC) 17 September 1918; see also 30 JulYs 131 (EC) 
20,27 August, 10 September 19.18 for dispute between Wiredrawers 
and Workers Unions. 
30- It might be argued that multi-unionism and competition 
reflected a decentralised union structure, and that this was 
an important factor in unions' ability to cope with the rapid 
changes of wartime. (This would be to think of unions at this 
time as an organic structure. ) This argument has some force, 
but it is hard to believe that the degree of inter-union 
competition was in fact helpful. In any case, decentralisation 
could be achieved within many unions. 
29 07 
First, certain important principles giving legitimacy to the 
capitalist enterprise were eroded. Secondly, at the same time a 
number of - relatively general - legitimising principles, to which 
wartime developments lent support, began to be extended increasingly 
to trade unions. Third, the roýe of trade unions was tecognised by 
the states and while this did mean abandoning some union standards, 
it had positive effects too. Fourth, there was an undoubted, though 
intangible, strengthening of-what we may term the self-image of the 
working class, generated by the sense of wartime sacrifice. Fifth, 
a number of issues were generated, within the workplace, which were 
clearly important in terms of both legitimising principles available 
at a societal level, and of those applicable to union organisation. 
Consequently, mobilisation became relatively easy. Let us look at 
these factors in turn. 
The principal objective of the capitalist business enterprise 
is, inevitably, the making of profit. In general, this is lent 
support by the operation of a market economy; it is also-lent supports 
as a principle legitimising action; by its association with a number 
of other expressions. 'Efficiency', good lorganisation', opposition to 
'waste', were all, however, during*the war far more associated with 
the prosecution of the war effort: 
31 to oversimplify somewhat, their 
central meaning was derived from the military, rather than from the 
business, context, and associated with national, rather than 
commercial interest. 
32 State controls on prof'it, however 
ineffectual, 
further eroded the legitimacy of Ilaissez fairel. Thus, certainly 
within the working class, 'profit' largely lost*the-support it had 
gained from these principles; conversely, it became associated with 
'profiteering', a concept previously of little significance, but 'one 
of the emotional corrosives of the war period. 
33 EspeciallY from* 
34 1916, 'profiteers' came under sustained attack from the popular press. 
31. We might also argue that, even before the war, the notion of 
'efficiency' had achieved wider currency, deriving especially 
from its use by the'Liberal imperialists' and during the Boer 
War. C, p Matthew, The Liberal Imperialists esp. 225-64,291-5. 
32- Cp Marwick, Delugej esp. 162-78. 
33- Ibid., 131. - 
34. Ibid., 132-3. 
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This was reflected within the working class movement. In the 
advertisements appearing in the Edinburgh Trades Council's Annual 
Reports in f6vour of the Co-operative movement, 
35for 
example, by 
1918 assumptions about 'profiteering' were uncontroversial enough 






must be scrapped and modern methods 
substituted. Other economies will, 
no doubt, suggest themselves, but 
the great break away from 
P-R_O_F_I_T_E_E_R_I_N_G 
will undoubtedlylL-lp to solve your 
difficulties. In your own interests, 
therefore, you should wakb. arrange- 
ments to join. 36 
and so forth. As the Commission of Enquiry into the Industrial Unrest 
in Scotland reported, in a sentence of inordinate complexity, 
There is no doubt that the chief and 
fundamental cause of the existing 
unrest is the increased cost of living, 
which, in the mind of the workers, is 
the result of the Government having 
failed timeously, and effectively, to 
control the production, supply, and 
distribution, of food, and thus 
opening the door to what the worker 
terms 'profiteering's by which he means 
the amassing by a few people, of abnormal 
wealth, out of the necessities of the 
country. The actual increase in the 
cost of living does not appear to be so 
important a factor in the worker's mind 
as the belief that 'profiteering' exists .... 37 
Our second factor is an associated one. As the legitimacy Of 
'profit' was eroded, in part by state action, in part by the assault 
on 'profiteering', but in part. by its becoming distanced from related, 
normally supportive, legitimising principles; so some of the latter 
35. Placed, apparently, by the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale 
Society; St. Cuthbert's, the main Edinburgh store, placed 
advertisements separately. The latter's advertisements lacked 
'the former's idealism, concentrating on their moderate terms, 
etc. Cp TC. AR 1916,12; TC AR 1919,7. 
36. TC AR 19i8l 6. 
37- Cd. 8669,3. 
0-1 , I. 
became increasingly open to employment in furthering trade union 
activities and objectives. It was not that unions necessarily started 
to use principles which they had previously shunned; rather that the 
latter now worked. For instance, the organising secretary of the 
NAUL had, very likely, been pointing out the importance of 
organisation for years before his 'stirring address' to the rutber 
workers: 
the employers having long since been 
organised it was up to the workers 
without delay to do the same. 38 
On this occasion, however, the notion - and benefits - of lorgan- 
isatinn' may have been more obvious to his audience, for, As we have 
39 
seen, they joined in large numbers, and elected shop stewards. 
Again, much could be made of the 'discoveries' of the Welfare movement: 
The. test of experience has proved to 
Government officials and to many others 
who, at the beginning of the War, desired 
to scrap every Trade Union regulation and 
restriction, that long hours are uneconomic 
and wasteful; that behind the rules put in 
force by trade unionists was a world of 
experience and industrial knowledge. 
Scientific study and enlightened and 
unprejudiced management are now reaching 
. 
conclusions arrived at fifty years ago 
by thinking Trade Unionists. 40 
'Efficiency' then, was no-longer the indisputable domain of the 
employer. Another example, though at one remove: the ideas of co- 
ordination, efficiency, elimination of wasteful competition, were 
important in giving legitimacy to plans to restructure the trade 
union movement. Amalgamation of unions would save 'expense and 
labourt, and 'the petty, personal ambitions that spring out of the 
present competition would end' . 
41 
38. NAUL No-292 branch minutes, I May 1917. 
39- Ibid. 
40. TC AR 1918,8; On the welfare movement, cp N. Whiteside, 
'Industrial welfare and labour regulation in Britain at the 
time of the First World War,, Int. Rev. Soc. Hjst. 25,1980 esp. 
310-18; ýroudj Welfare Work. 
41. ' TC AR 1918i 7; cp TC AR 1916,2. 
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The third factor which coincided to ease unions' problems 
of mobilisation was their recognition by the sLate. We have referred 
to this in previous chapters, and touched on it earlier in this. It 
had many aspects. Clearly union leaders were consulted at a national 
level on many matters: to this extent they could no longer be 
entirely 'beyond the. palel. (We shall not pursue this aspect, which is 
well-covered in the historical literature. )42 At the same time, the 
legal status of trade unions was enhanced, 
43and 
this had very 
immediate practical effects. In 1915 the NAUL started to organise 
workers at Musselburgh wire mills, 
who, although engaged on Government 
work, were being paid very low wages. 
Meetings ... were held to explain to 
the workers their position under the 
Munitions Act, and the advantages that 
would accrue from joining a trade 
union. 44 
Locally, the trade union movement was called to be represented on a 
variety of statutory, official, semi-official and voluntary bodies: 
exemption tribunals under the Derby Scheme, Relief of Distress Fund 
committees, Local Pensions Committees, Food Control Committees, and 
so on. 
Of course, the other side of trade union recognition was an 
attempt by the Government to control labour by winning itslea ders, 
together with a legal structure which - while recognising unions' right 
to exist - severely circumscribed workers' freedoms. Naturally, 'this 
created problems for unions, such as the tendency for disputes to arise 
42. Cp, e. g., Marwick, Deluge, esp- 58-65; Middlemas, Politics in 
Industrial Society, esp. 71-81,88-go, 123-33; Harrison, 'The 
War Emergency Workers' National Committee 1914-1920'; 
J-M-Winter, Socialism and the Challenge of War. Ideas and 
Politics in Britain 1912-1918 (London 1974), esp. ch-7- 
43- Notably by the Munitions of War Acts: the 1917 Act, for instance, 
read in part: 'No worker employed on or in connection with 
munitions work. shall be discharged on the ground that he has 
Joined or is a member of a trade union, or that he has taken part 
in any trade dispute and if any employer discharges a workman on 
any such ground he shall be guilty of an offence ..... 
(7 &8 Geo. 
5, c. 45, s-9). 
44.1' TC AR 1916,2i A branch was formed, and wage rises gained. 
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between union members and their own leaders, rather than with 
employers. But, certainly locally, the trade unions seem to have 
taken a very sanguine approach: while broadly supportive of the 
war effort, and of the 'national interest', they retained a strong 
sense of class (as well'as national) identity. As Bernard Waites 
has ybinted outt. 'certain features of the War's impact could be both 
socially cohesive'and at the same time footer'class and sectional 
consciousness. ' 
45 
Thus the workers needed defence against 'the 
clutching hand-of capitalism', 
46 
even (perhaps especially) during wartime; 
the Government shewed, ýor instance, 'no capacity or desire to deal 
with the problem' of food price rises* 
47 
There were, therefore, at 
least by the end-of the War, few illusions about the character of 
trade unionists' involvement in many of these committees: 'no 
effective power'was ever given' to the Food Control Committees, and 
What Pol%ers were given have been 
gradually diminished. The Food 
Control Committeez are in reality 
mere rags to clothe the nakedness 
of bureaucrac. y. ... They have 
unlimited power to pass resolutions, 
but no power to put them into 
oýeration. 48 
Such an evaluation was complemented-by a willingness to organise 
demonstrations and deputations on the issue in question, whilst being 
represented on the relevant committee. 
49 
Our fourth coincident factor, the strengthening self-image of 
the working-class, is more elusive. On the one hand it is an 
historiographical co=onplace; 
50 
on the other, we are suggesting here 
perhaps a surge in confidence, rather than a legitimising principle 
4.5. B. A. Waites, 'The effect of the First World War on class and 
status in England, 1910 -19201, Journal of Contemporar 
11j 1976', 42. 
46. TC AR 1916,5. 
47- Ibid., 6. 
48. TC AR 1919,13- 
49. See, e. g., TC AR 19181 12. 
50- Cp, e. g., Waites, 'Effect of-war on class and status'; Marwick, 
Deluge, esp. 218-26,316-17- 
C) 
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as such: it is thus less easy to identify instances where this 
factor was important. The sense of war service having some kind of 
collective exchange value - homes 'fit for heroes', and the like - 
seems not to have been used publicly by Edinburgh's trade union 
movement until after the war (and, incidentally or significantly, 
until after it had entered the language of national politics). 
It i. ýn our. final element that the others turn. As we saw in 
chapters 5 and 6, the exigencies of war generated a host of problems 
within the various workplaces. Industrial relations problems, how- 
ever, are often beyond the ability of trade unions to influence, 
simply because they are unable to induce among their members (or 
potential members) a sense that the problem is a problem. 
Alternatively, the union organisation itself may not recognise the 
situation confronting it as problematical. What is important, -then, 
is that the problems which arose as the war progressed were perceived 
as relevant problems both by the unions and their members; and that in 
some cases they were seen as problems which could be influenced by 
union action. Our suggestion is that many of the problems could be 
understood in, terms of the legitimising-principles which the war was 
making available. Thus, for the Clerks, whose union was small and 
lacked control over recruitment, dilution, for instance - the 
-'serious danger Cto_7 which the. Clerk is subjected by the influx of 
partially qualified people into offices' - could be understood in 
terms of the 'danger of inefficiency'. 
51 
More important, perhaps, one major-problem was present with 
ever-greater-intensity during the later years of the war: --the problem 
of rising p#ces. This provided a central focus for working class - 
mobilisation., -and-for two main reasons. On the-one hand, it-provided 
a critical link between social distress and workplace organisation. 
As the Trades Council pointed out, it was 'in the trades and occupations 
51. NUC Edin. branch minutes, 5 August 1918. 
f 
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which are not so well organised that the workers have been unable 
to maintain a proper standard of life, 
52 In well-organised 
establishments, achievement was frequent: 
Long period agreements have been 
suspended. The rapidity with which 
food prices have changed has necess- 
itated the review of rates of wages 
at stated intervals. Wages in 
munition and some other trades are 
now open for reconsideration every 
four months. 53 
Of course, by no means all these rises were achieved by 'dispute': 
indeed, most were 'granted as the result of negotiation or arbitra- 
tion'. 54 But the link between union organisation and adequate pay 
seems to have been clear. 
On the other hand, however, price rises - especially food price 
rises - was an issue which could draw on a Aole range of legitimising 
principles, sustained not only within the working class, but actively 
propagated by nati6nal institutions. A major cause of the inflation 
was Ithe . rampant and rapacious prbfiteetl, 
55the 
workers and their 
families were prepared to suffer hardship if the sacrifice was equal, 
but not 'to use glorified soup kitchens so as, to keep the well-to-do 
immune from hardship and inconvenience'; 
56 they were particularly 
unwilling to do so when the Government had only 'to completely control 
and regulate' food supplies 
57to 
overcome the problem: 
If all foodstuffs had been commandeered, 
and distribution regulated from the out- 
break of war, and home production 
. 
stimulated and encouraged, the present 
crisis could have been avoided . 58 
52. TC AR 1919,5. 
53; TC AR 1918,8. 
54. Ibid. 1 
55; TC AR 19191 5. 
56i TC AR 1918,12. 
57i Ibid. -- 
58. TC AR 1917,8. 
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The achievement of the trade union movement - in-recruitment 
and membership - during the later years of the war was, therefore, 
based primarily on the conjunction of favourable circumstances. 
There is little sign that, in tdinbuýgh, any major advances were 
made in the creation of institutions capable of generating legitim- 
ising principles or shaping issues - if we leave aside the one major 
achievement of large-scale recruitment and organisation at the work- 
place. In contrast to the engineering centres of the west of 
Scotland, Coventry and Sheffield, no strong shop stewards' movement 
emerged. In the rubber mills, and in many other sectors, --the' 
achievement was the simple formation of a union. Rather , the 
institutional structure of trade unionism remained relatively stable 
inform, even though far stronger-in membership: -it seems to have 
been capable of deploying, often q4ite effectively, legitimising 
principles which were already available, and of translating them 
into the working environment. It could 'negotiate' the meanings of 
principles originating elsewhere. But in essence, its victories - 
were achieved using weapons forged by others. 
By way of concluding this section, we may look briefly at two 
disputes which occurred late in-the' war. The first, in the spring of 
1917, concerned the dressmakers, -'whose-low wages and miserable. - 
earnings were proverbiall. 
59 Whilst previous-efforts had failed, the' 
Shop Assistants Union attempted to recruit, and 'Once a-start was-made, 
the women flocked into, the unions and a spirit of'revolt was boýnl. 
60 
The tactics of the union seem to have-been canny. A 'modest-and 
fair' wage claim was put to the employers, and had-the-effect of 
splitting them. Some firms conceded, but-the--larger ones did not. 
A strik6 ensued. 
, 
The sp , 
irit,. the 
loyaltyi. and the courage of the girls 
won the fight after a six weeks' 
struggle. 61 
Council held that 
-The fine fight by the Dressmakers against 
a strong combination of, employpr. -ý was , one of the factors that led to the successful'' 






62. Ibid., 8'. 
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Another important factor was that 'a section of the press - The 
Evening News - several prominent citizens, and the generalpublic, were 
all on the side of the women' . 
63 
This was almost unprecedented in a 
strike in wartime (indeed, in any strike); although to be sure a strike 
in dressmaking could not beýpresented as unpatriotic so easily as a 
strike ir; say, munitions. Of course, the unions mobilised labour and 
working class opinion effectively too: demonstrations were helds 37 
union organisations of various kinds contributed C84 138 11d to a 
strike appeal. 
64 
Labour councillors were brought into action. 
65 
Probably this played a part in swinging 'public opinion', but such 
methods had previously failed too often for us to believe they can 
alone account for the breadth of support. They were able to employ a 
vocabulary of motives ý4hich was, temporarily, biased in favour of the 
workers. 
.-- The second dispute occurred at Middlemas & Son's ', biscuit factory 
in the city, in September and October 1918. The workers, again largely 
women, sought union membership in order to 'level up their rates of 
pay' in line with other factories in the industry. 
66 Management raised 
no objection to union membership in principle. 
67 But then, according 
to one account, some of the women joined the union, and were 'straight- 
way dismissed': 'Some of their fellow-workers struck in sympathy. ' 
68 
In another version, management refused negotiations, and the women there- 
upon struck. 
69 
In either event the firmness of management's approach 
is clear. -With some-workers out (apparently about 60), but many 
others still working, the employer reduced the hours and raised the 
wages of those still at work, while refusing to reinstate those on 
strike 'in a body'. 
70 Conversely, the unions seem to have been in 
63; Ibid. 
64i TC AR-1918,20. 
65. Ibid., 7-8. - 
66; TC AR 1919.6. 
67i Ibid. 
68; Ibid. 
69i TC-minutes, 10 September 1918i 
70. Ibid., (EC) 17 September 1918. 
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disarray. It seems that the workers joined the Shop Assistants Union, 
(or perhaps only approached it for financial assistance and advice) 
only after they had struck (or been dismissed). 
71 The Shop Assistants 
were at this precise time in the midst of a demarcation dispute over 
recruitment of biscuit factory workers. 
72 The women were under 
pressure from their families to return to work: 
73 
we should not forget 
that the cost of living in 1918 was-extremely high, and compensated 
for only-by rising pay levels. 'In the end, ' the Trades Council 
recorded, I ... the contest had to-be temporarily given up. The 
arbitrary power of the management, and the fear of dismissal, held 
in check the natural instincts of the bulk of the employees of the 
firm. ' 74 
So although both disputes occurred in previously non-union work- 
places, one was succesfull while in the other the employer prevailed. 
These cases illustrate several points. Even during this period, unions 
were not guaranteed success: organisational failings, combined with 
astute tactics on the employers' part, could make matters at least very 
difficult for the unions. Particularly in those sectors only recently 
organised, success depended largely on the ability to mobilise people 
into forms of lindustrial action'. but this in itself was highly 
dependent not so much on trade union organisation, as on the ability 
to mobilise opinion more widely: union organisation did not seem ablb 
of 
to sustain/itself legitimising princ#les strong enough to 'justify, 
large-scale or long-term industrial action. Finally, even in wartime, 
the fear of dismissal was not negligible. 
71- Both TC AR 1919,6, and TC minutes 10 September 1918, give this 
impression. 
72- TC minutes (EC) 17 September 1918. Cp also 12 February 1918. 
This was, of course, long befote the Bridlington Agreement, and 
such arbitration was a normal part of trades councils'activities, 
cp A. Clinton, 'Trades Councils'from the beginning of the Twentieth 
Century to the Second World Warlt (Univ. of London PhjD- 1973), 
esp. 45-6. The dispute was eventually settled in*the Shop 
Assistants' favour: TC Minutes (EC) 5 October 1918. 
73- TC minutes. (EC) 17 September-1918; cp TC minutes (EC) 15 Oct. 1918. 
74. - TC AR 1919,6; see also ibid., 22. 
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7.3 - 'A state of flux, 
751919 
- 1920 
The armistice was a momentous event; yet few trade unionists seem to 
have regarded it as fundamentally altering their purpose. Alexander 
Caldwell, the Trades Council's vice-president, an eloquent painter, 
opening the first post-war meeting, referred from the chair to 
the fact that the week just closed had 
seen the cessation of hostilities in the 
devasting war of the last four years; and 
while expressing hope that the resulting 
peace would be a just and lasting one, he 
trusted that no political or other changes 
would distract our attention from the task 
of overcoming the enemy on the home front. 76 
The attitude elsewhere was equally matter-of-fact: the Rubber Workers 
dispatched a congratulatory telegram to Sir Douglas Haig 'on the 
Great Victory achieved by Greater Britain and her Allies in the War, 
now hap over', and then got down to business; 
77the Railwaymen P. ): ̀Y 
considered a motion 'that the EC be called together on the cessation 
of hostilities for the purpose of declaring a General Strike to 
establish-a dictatorship of the proletariat in this country', rejected 
it, and did likewise. 
78 Looking back six months later, the advent of 
peace did not seem to the Trades Council one of the 'marked f8atures of 
79 the year from the trade union point of view'. 
In the world of 1919 and early 19209 mobilisation of trade 
union members remained quite straightforward. Again, in seeking to 
explain this, the coincidence-of a number of factors is important. 
First, there was a significant, though temporary and partial, loss of 
self-confidence by important elements of capital and the state. This 
was associated with increased problems of co-ordination between 
employers, and between employers and government. Middlemas has written 
W-Wallaýe, employers' chairman, in ESAE &I and ASE, Local 
COnf6rence Proceedings 'in re Engineers working rules', 19 Sept. 
1919,7. 
76. TC minutes 19 November 1918: for personal information on 
Alexander Caldwell, I am grateful to Mr. F. Lawson. 
77i NAUL No 292 branch minutes-14 November 1918. 
78; NUR No 1 branch minutes 10,24 November 1918. 
79. TC, AR 1919,2. 
f 
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of 'the goyernment's near-panic early in 19191 as it confronted 
a national coal strike with the loyalty of army and police in 
doubt. 
80 
At the'same time state control of industry could no 
longer be justified, yet the employers lacked representative 
organisations which could engage in negotiations with the govern- 
ment on their collective behalf. 
81 Mistrust,. already sown by the 
state's wartime "interference' in management, was intensified when 
bodies 
- in the absence of representative/ - government appeared to be 
conceding demands to unions without consulting employers. 
82 The 
lack of co-ordination between employers and government seems to have 
been particularly intense during the first half of 1919.83 In 
addition, there was an important section of opinion within govern- 
ment - especially, it seems, within the Ministry of Labour - and 
increasingly too among employers, which accepted that there could 
be no return to pre--war labour relations. The problem was not how 
to re-establish the old forms of. labour control, but how to re- 
establish control, given the increased power of the shop floor, such 
that business could be successfully prosecuted: thus Whitley 84 
councils, thus the National Industrial Conference of 1919-1921. 
80; Middlemas, 145. 
81. The FBI had been set up in 1916,. but was thought 'soft' by 
the most important (Engineering) , employers 
federation. The 
NCEO was thus , established 
in competition in 1919, but the 
strength and ambition of the*EEF ýrevented either gaining a 
dominant role. - Cp Middlemas, 128,146-7,160-1. 
. 
82. P. Maguire, 'Employers attitudes to industrial relations and 
Government policies 1915-201,. paper given to Conference of 
the Society for the Study of Labour History, 27 November 1982 
(abstract); cp Middlemas, 127. 
83i Maguire, own notes. 
84. Cp Lowe; 'The failure of consensus in Britain, 649-75; 
V. A116n,. 'The National Industrial Conference 1919 - 1921' in 
Allen, The Sociology of Industrial Relations (London 1971), 
83-90; H. Ramsay, 'Cycles of , control: w-orker participation 
in 
sociological and histor . ical-perspectivell Sociology 11,1977 
esp. 485-8; Middlemas 137-41. 
Indeed, Middlemas has gone so far as to assert that 
The stability of the political 
system in the 'revolutionary yW sl 
1919-20 owes something to the 
majority ý of employers2 who ... 
had come to accept the Ministry of 
Labour view that*formal sanctions 
against strikers, and non-recognition, 
had been proved unworkable as well as 
unacceptable. 85 
I We now turn to our second factor. After the war issues remained 
which were legitimate in terms of principles generally available, and 
which were also relevant to union action at workplace level. Two are 
outstanding: inflation, and the shorter working week. According to 
the various indices, the working class cost of living rose by between 
22 and 24 per cent over the year 1.919-20.86 'Daring the past year, ' 
recorded the Trades Council in 1920, 'the mad race between wages and 
87 
prices has continued. ' There seems to have been little initial need. 
for industrial action. As we saw in chapter 4 there were few, if any, 
organised trades which did not obtain some increase during these 
years. However, although the process of organisation was-no doubt 
aided by the inflation, and the need to pursue wage rises, union 
success was at-best mixed. 
88 
As chapter 4 also shows, despite the 
wage increases, the city's trade unions found it most difficult to 
maintain their standard of living in these years. 
89 
The problems the 
unions encountered in fully-regaining ground lost to inflation, and 
the frustrations engendered, are perhaps reflected by the Trades 
Council's decision to hold a demonstration on the High Cost of Living 
in July 1920, and in the terms of the motion proposed: 
That this meeting - holding that high prices 
- are due to causes under human control, calls 
upon the Government to take the necessary 
steps to reduce prices or to give place to 
those who will. go 
85; Middlemas 127; cp Lowe, 'Ministryof Labour', 24. 
86i See table 4.1 
87i TC AR 1920,2. 
88i TC AR 1920,2. 
89. See figure 4. ý cp TC AR 1920,2; TC minutes 21 September 1919. 
90. TC minutes (EC) 18 July 1920. 
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The other linking issue was the shorter working week. This 
was, of course, the occasion for a celebrated strike on the Clyde 
in January and February 1919: a strike which was defeated, at least 
in part, because the government determined that it was unofficial, 
quasi-revolutionary, action which could not be allowed to succeed. 
The 40 hours movement gained some support in Edinburgh; but, perhaps 
more important, hours were reduced in virtually every organised 
trade, as table 7-2 shows. Again the bulk of these reductions were 
Table 7.2 Basic working week in certain, . 
-Edinburgh 
trades 
1214 - 1927 
1914 1918 1919 1920 '1921 j3.2 1 12? 1
&& to 
1922 1224 1927 
Brewery. workers 56 50 50 50 
Bricklayers 51 50 44 44 44 44 44 
Engineers 54 -54 47 47 47 47 47 
'Labourers' 50 50 44 44 44 44 
Masons 51 50 44 44 44 48 48 
Painters 50 50 44 44 44 44 44 
-Bookbinders 50 50 48 48 
48,. - 48 
48 
Compositors 50 50 48.48 48 48 48 
. 
Railway . drivers 60 48 48 48 48 48 
11 firemen 60 48.48 48 48 48 
Rubber workers 55 55 47 47 47 48 48 
Sheet metal 51 51 47 47 47 48 48 
Slaters 50 50 44 44 44 44 44 
Bakers 48 45 -55 48-521 48-51 48'51 44 45-47 








EL work 54 48-52 48 48 48 48 
Electicians 50-54 to 47 47 47 47 47 
Source: TC Alls, 1918-27- Note: not available. 
achieved by negotiation. The Rubber Workers, for instance, demanded 
a 44 hour week in January 1919; six weeks later they settled for a 
nationally-agreed 47 hours. 
91 In sum, then, issues were available 
which were both amenable to action within the workplace and trade 
union context, and clearly achievable by such means. 
91. NAUL No 292 branch minutes 12 January, 23 February 1919- 
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The third coincident factor was the redefining of national 
(and community) interest. The threat to the nation was no longer 
so conspicious; the national interest therefore became more controv- 
ersial, and class and sectional interests were strengthened. We 
have seen that, during the war, the trade union movement was quite 
capable of proposing, at least, a somewhat negotiated version of 
the national interest: 
support was given to the war in the hope 
that the country would win and be able to 
formulate such conditions of settlement 
as should make for permanent peace. 92 
This position specifically included 
, 
criticism not only of the manage- 
ment of the war effort, but of war aims. Still more, after the war, 
were questions asked ab6ut the objectives of the national struggle. 
The fact that 'brutal' employers still received 'public and civic 
honours' showed 'that the old regime has not passed, '*that sweaters 
and'hypocrites need not yet fear social ostracism., 
93 There was a 
decided sense that the government could not be trusted: that it had 
. 
made use of the workers in a national emergency, but was not there- 
after prepared properly to acknowledge their aspirations. This 
sense grew as 1915 became 1920: 
if one tithe of the energy and 
Statesmanship displayed in the 
production of munitions had been 
transferre'd to work of real national 
importance, unemployment would have 
been wiped out of existence. But the 
path of * 
the present Government has 
been one long trail strewn with broken 
pledges. 94 
Nonetheless, the sense of renewal, of national reconstruction and a 
common purpose, was one to which the establishment paid at least lip- 
service; and it was a sense which trade unionists were prepared to use 
even if they had doubts about its honesty. Thus, in negotation with 
92. TC AR 1919, . 17- 
93ý TC AR 1919,6. 
94. TC AR 1920,5. 
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the employer's federation, an ASE negotiator accepted 
that during the war that was not a 
suitable time to discuss alterations, 
of byelaws, but now that we are come 
to the period of reconstruction when 
we are trying to make the land fit 
for heroes to live in, we propose to 
put these fdraft working rules2 as 
our part in trying to reconstruct things 
in this district, and in this particular 
industry 9.5 
In short, the nation now included the working class, whose aspirations 
were valid. Interestingly, the employers in September 1919 could make 
no response to this argument (although defending their position on 
other grounds). 
We are, then, arguing that the trade unions' advance was due 
to their being offered a set of legitimising principles, supported by 
the dominant institutional order, which was relatively open to action 
in their interests - rather than to their having themselves generated 
quite independent principles. But the unions were not unaware that 
they were engaged in an ideological struggle. This was particularly 
true in relation to the national interest, and to-the war. The 
Trades Council, in the months after the armistice, put much effort 
into strengthening its links with ex-servicemen. The government, 
fearing a threat to public order feom disaffected former soldiers - 
'in the event of rioting, ' a Home Office agent pointed out, 'for the 
first tihie in history, the -ioters will be better trained than the 
troops, 
96_ 
attempted several strategems to frustrate relations between 
trade unions and ex-servicemen. 
97 Trade unions, too, had reasons to fenr 
95- ESAE&I and ASE, Local Conference ProceedýUs, 'In re Engineers 




me Office, Directorate of Intelligence, 'Report on Revolution- 
arY Organisations in the Unite*d Kingdom", Cabinet PaPer-qj'C*P*. 
1830. of 2 September 1920 (Cab. 24/111), quoted in S. R. Wards 'of British Ex-Servicemen 1918-1920's 'Intelligence Surve llance 
Hist. Journal-16,19739 179- 
97- Ward, 179-88; the background to the government's fear was the 
unrest in the armed forces during 1917-1919; see D. Gill and 
G Dallas, 'Mutiny at Etaples base in 1917', *Past and Preaent 
699 1975 j-* 88-112; D. Englander & J-Osborne, 'Ta-cý. 
--, ToTn-lmý and 
Henry Dubb-i the . axmed'f orces and the ýforking class I, flist - 
Journal 21,1978,593-621; A-Rothstein, The Soldiers, Strikes 
of 1919 (London, 1980. 
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demobilisation: 'once the demobilisatioa rio. ts beganlaccording to 
one study, the 'spectre of red and white armies haunted capital 
98 
and Labour respectively' . Yet more prosaic fears were also 
important in Edinburgh. Former soldiers and sailors sought their 
old jobs back, often vainly. A large pool of unemployed quickly 
formed, and the authorities clearly attempted to divert responsibility 
onto trade union practices. 
The return of the ex-Servicemen has been 
made the occasion for fresh attacks on the 
Unions. Time and again on public platforms 
the slander is reiterated by responsible 
ministers of the Government that organised 
Labour is placing obstacles in the way of the 
ex-Serviceman breturn to industrial life. 99 
The local unions, through the Trades Council, considered the problems 
of demobilisation and resettlement in 'two special conferences as early 
as February 1919: in May and June a joint committee was established 
between the Trades Council and the Discharged and Demobilised Sailors' 
and Soldiers' Federation. 
100 (which seems first to have been referred 
to in the Trades Council minutes as a 'Workers' and Soldiers' 
101 Council'). But such initiatives were to be frustrated. Although 
some 'useful work' was done, and an 'interesting campaign against 
certain "ultra-patriotic" employers' planned, 
102 
the joint ccmmittee 
seems to have broken up 'owing to the influence of interested 
politicians and a party Press'103- although the immediate cause was 
the Trades Council's amalgamation with the Labour Party. 
io4 Thereafter 
a continuous crusade of slander has 
been conducted in the Press and on many 
platforms for the purpose of alienating 
the ex-Service man from the Trade Unions. 105 
98i Englander and-Osborne, 620. 
99. TC AR 19201-5- 
'April 100. Formed in 1917 with the aid of a Scottish Llberal, M. P. 
J. M. Hogge, who opposed conscription: cp Ward, 181,185-7- 
101. TC minutes 20 May 1919: it. is possible that this refers to 
another organisation, but the coincidence of date makes this 
unlikely. -- 
102i T CAR 1920,10. 
103; Ibid. 
104. TC minutes 11 Nov. 1919; it is. significant that the Trados 
Council was divided on - at leAst - how it shoulA*approach the 
problem ofex-servicemen. An attempt to'try to maintain the 
conne'xion with the ex-servicemen's Federation'wdý agreed by 
just 34'votes to 27: TC minutes 18 November 1919. 
105. TC AR 1920,10. 
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- The fourth factor requires less discussion. We have already 
discussed the role during the war of those legitimising principles 
associated with the language of organisation, planning and efficiency; 
they remained influential thereafter. The reorgahisation of the 
TUC after the war dr. -w on both parallels with the bureaucratic- 
organisation of the Civil Service and 'the terminology of war'. 
106 
We shall see in chapter 9 that the reorganisation of the Edinburgh 
. 
Trades-Council sprang in part from similar motives. 
1070f 
courae, 
such-language was often not associated directly with wartime 
experiences: we have seen, for instance, how organisation, efficiency, 
planning were given meaning by their use in industry. During 1919, 
too, the notion of 'profiteeringl. was still a powerful source of 
legitimation; we shall look at this in more detail in a later section. 
Our-fifth factor is this: the status and prestige achieved by 
- or granted to - the-trade unions during the war could not be 
immediately withdrawn. In particular, the government's anxiety to 
isolate the 'revolutionary' or 'political' element by strengthening 
national leaderships could be perceived as an acceptance of an 
important-role for the trade union movement. 
1o8_ The-factor is not 
easy to-tackle from local data. But the trade unions, were 
deeply involved by 1919 in aspects-of what we may term the state 
apparatus; and to this extent their status was enhanced. -Inevitably 
they were-involved in the administration of pensions and-unemployment 
insurance. 
109 Virtually every trade had representation on the 
Education Authotity'sAdvisory Council. 
110 Several of the city's 
leading trade unionists were JPs: it-seems, for instance, to 
have been almost automatic for those who-held senior office in the 
Trades Council, at least for more -than one year, to have been honoured 
106. V. L. *Allen, 'The re-o.;, ganisation of'the Trade . Z-Eicl. Union 
Congress, '1918-1927ý, Brit. J. Sociol. 11,1960v esp., 25,29; cp 
A. Bullock, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin,, Vol. 11 1881- 
1940 (London 1960)i. 107-111,147-9- 
107; TC AR 1920,10 -13- 
108i Middlemas, 146-51;. Foster, 'British Imperialism' 31-6. 
109. E. g., TO AR 1919,37; Whiteside, 'Welfare legislation and the 
unions', 857-74.. -- 
110. E. g., TO AR 1919,35- 
I 
ý ý, b 
in this way. 
"' 
Certainly the Trades Council imagined that 
Our influence is distinctly felt in 
our local governing bodies, and 
Government departments consult us 
more freely than in the past. 112 
No doubt there was an element of 'incorporation' here, but this should 
not be exaggerated. For instance, in rhetoric at least, some of the 
trade union justices were militantl'anti-government, and conscious of 
class interest. Nor should we imagine that this enhanced 'status' 
had no implications for the business of union workplace organisation. 
Two instances may be given here. -Firstly,. the Whitley Councils, 
whatever their real, or long-term, effects, were undoubtedly 
113 
perceived by some unions as likely to strengthen their organisation. 
In addition, union. JPs were - ai least during the heady days of 1919-1920 
,i -iLL 
- acceptable arbitrat-ors in industrial disFates. ''-T 
We now turn to our final coincident factor: the rising level 
of union morale. This rests on the proposition that the ability to 
mobilise can itself constitute a legitimising principle. can do 
so in two senses. - It can constitute a most effective argument for 
union negotiators. Thus in September 1919 the ASE took a grievance 
to the employers' association. After prolonged argument, the patience 
of the union men broke: 
We both talk from the strength of the case 
which we have, and this , 
is probably the strongest 
position which we are. #, namely, that. the men 
have absolutely got their backs up in the matter, 
and it will n9t'be very difficult for us to stop 
them fro-n going, and that is the biggest arTament 
in the matter. 115 
ill. The following TC officials ýere JPs '(with date they. became 
justices): A16xander Smith, Se 
, 
cretary 1911-25 (ýy 1,915); 
Andrew Eunson,, President lqjý-19*'(1917); 41exander Caldwell, ' 
Vice-President. 1918-19, Prepident 1919-20. (1919)..; George Hogg, 
Secretary, Leith TC & LP 1920-21 (by 1521)., Other trade union 
JPs (1916-20) included: J. R. Bell (NUR), J-Ca, ýpbell (Bookbinders 
by 1919-local-organiser of the Shop Assistants). 
112i TC A. R 1920,2. 
113; Cp, e; g; $ NAUL No-292 branch minutes, 
8-August 1918, -16 Jan-. --1919. 
114. Cp*, e. g I,, 'Awar "d 
by the Referee'. 'Z-Andrew.. '. 'Eun'sonJg7iý'iýý Dispute 
betw 
, 
een the Amalgamated Eiigiheering Union. and the Scottish Motor 
Traction Company ýimited 1,23 August 1920. In this case the 
union JP concerned found in favour of the union: no doubt it 
was not always so. -- 
115. AS9 Local Conieren66 Proceedings "in re Engineers 
I. .^ 
r--J. . 4^. In 17A. mi-- --- i---- !- -T IV 1.1-11-nizi woriting Mles-, -iýi -aujiL. - iviv, ? i; Lne tsjjuai-ýer Lo 
ASE 
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But, in addition, confidence that others will join in common action 
is an important justification for taking action. Thus the Edinburgh 
Railwaymen's telegram claim, 'All men and women out', during the 
1919 strike, though technically incorrect as we have seen, 
116 
none- 
theless played a role in legitimising the action. 
7.4 Union organisation -1917 - 
jJ40 
Whilst union mobilisation remained quite easy cbizing 1919 and 1920 - 
and union victory was the rule - the achievements were based on factors 
which were not the conscious creation of the movement itself. The 
legitimation of action was easier chiefly because substantial con- 
cessions had been made to the trade union movement and the working 
class during the war,. and action against them was consequently more 
difficult to co-ordinate and justify. Broadly, and with partial 
exceptions which we shall discuss, the trade union movement in 
Edinburgh did not generate mobilising institutions of any real strength 
during-the period from 1917 to 1920; it failed to consolidate organ- 
isationally on its ephemeral achievements. It was not that there 
was no awareness that the gains might be transient: 
If our gains in 1919 are not to be 
ephemeral, there must b more unity 
of purpose and more co-operative 
action than the past has shown. 117 
Yet, for several reasons, lessons were not - or could not be - learnt. 
The first reason also reflects the nature of the gains of 1917- 
1920. -In almost all unions, existing organisational structures were 
placed under severe strain. Perhaps the clearest cases are in those 
unions, largely of unskilled, semi-skilled, and white-collar workers, 
which grew beyond recognition. InaDme cases entirely new structures 
had tobe created, as the NAUL in the rubber works. Here the union 
had to assimilate over 2,100 new members within three months of its 
', 118 119 formation: even simply to administer such numbers was'amajor task. 
116. S-6.9 above. 
117- TC AR 1919,9 - 13- 
118.. NAUL No 292 branch minutes, 14 August 1917- 
119. Ibid., April, 11,15,21 May 1917. 
Thus within two months of its formation, the branch committee had to be 
enlarged as'80 many sections of the works' were unrepresented. 
120 
Inevitably, all this had to be achieved by men and women who were in- 
expert at managing a union's affairs, and in their spare time. 
121 The 
growth of the National Union of Clerks was less spectacular, but still 
created major problems. In Spetember 1917 the Edinburgh branch had 25 
members: by the end of the year this figure had doubled to 57; by 
September 1919 it stood at 378.122 Here, an existing structure was 
, 123 altered markedlY: from being a somewhat exclusive group, composed 
largely of trade union and political activists, 
124 the branch became 
120. Ibid., 28 June 1917- 
121. Although an 'all-day man' was appointed as secretary in Aug. 1917 
(Ibid., 15 July, 14 Aug. 1917), and the works does seem to have been 
a major object of the local (full time) NAUL organiser's attention. 
122. NUC Edin. branch minutes, 7 Jan 1918,13 Oct 1919- 
123- Ibid., 12,19 May 1919. 
124. For 
, 
its size, the Edin. NUC contained a remarkably high proportion 
of men and women active in the local labour movement. The follow- 
ing can be identified as NUC members between 1911 and 1916 (when 
its membership'was in the region of 25) and as active in the 
labour movement during the following decade: 
Name First reference Positions held in lRbour 
in NUC minutes movement, 1916 - 1927 
T. A. Cairns 3 June 1912 TUC Treasurer 1922-25 
TUC President 1925-26 
TUC EC 1926-30 
SDF EC 1921-22 
SDF del. to TUC 1922-23 
W-Elger 1 July 1912 TUC EC 1920-21 
TUC President 1921-22 
SDF EC 1921-22 
NUC Edin. President 1913-15' 
STUC Gen. Sec. 1922-46 
NUC Nat. President 
Grace Mewhort 1 July 1912 TUC EC 1916-20 
TUC Vice-Pres. 1920-21 
STUC Gen. Council 1921-22 
Labour Party Town Council 
Candidate 1919 
Frank Smithies 7 October 1912 TUC Librarian 1922-23 
TUC Political 
Officer 1923-36 
SDF EC 1921-22 
George Williamson 1 September 1913 T&LC Treasurer 1920-23 
ILP (West branch) 
del. to TUC 
J. P. M. Millar 6 September 1915 ILP (Central) member 
NCLC Organising Tutor for 




one with a mass membership, and with large sections of its members 
in various firms. 
125 
In short, efficient administration was by far the most immed- 
iate concern of union organisation during this period: its absence 
could easily appear to be the movement's major organisational failing. 
Deeper questions, such as those relating to the purpose and role of 
union organisations, could - understandably - be pressed into the 
background: and the more so as union activity was, given the 
favourable situation, apparently having positive results. There is 
an interesting illustration of this in a dispute we have previously 
touched upon. In Janaury 1919 the Clerks were approached by a dis- 
affected member of the NAUL at the Castle Rubber Mills: 'he thought 
there was a possibility of the clerical staff, of 100 members, ... 
transferring to the NUC ý26 He and his colleagues 'had been rather 
badly treated by their present union. ' 
127 After some effort by the 
: 
128 NUCI they 'transferred' such was the Clerk's euphemism. To the 
NAUL this was 'encroachment', even 'poaching': and indeed, prima 
facie, 
, 
such it'was. But in protesting to the Trades Council, 
129they 
encountered problems. They had been affiliated to the Trades Council 
only for a short period, had appointed only four delegates, of whom 
only one attended regularly, and he was hardly a prominent member. 
130 
They had, in short, made little effort to consolidate their relation- 
ships with the trade union movement outside their own place of work. 
The Clerks had done so assiduouslyý: one of theirdelegatesia. member 
of the Executive Committee of the Trades Council since at least 1916, 
was larticulate' and able enough io be elected to the General 
Council of the STUC - just the third woman to be so. 
131 For the Rubber 
12.5. E. g., abc-ut 100 at N. B. Rubber Co., about 60 at the Ministry of 
Labour; NUC Edin. branch minutes 17 March, 5 May 1919- 
126. NUC Edin. branch minutes, 16 January 1919. 
127. Ibid., 17 March 1919. 
128. Ibid., 21 April, 5 May 1919. 
129. TC minutes (EC), 13 May 1919. 
130- TC AR 1918l 26; TC AR 1919,26; TC minutes 1918-19, Passim- 
131- TC ARs 19ý6-21; S. Lewenhak, 'Women in the leadership Of the 
Scottish Trades Union Congress 1897 - 1970', SLHS 7,1973,14. 
f 
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Workers, this was a matter of principle. They demanded the Clerks 
be reprimanded. The Trades Council would-clearly do this only 
after much persuasion, if at all; it therefore invited both parties' 
executives to a conference. This was a final insult to the Rubber 
Workers: 
after considerable discussion at their 
branch meeting_7 it was ... unanimously 
agreed. to decline to meet the Natfional 
, Union of2 Clerks Executive, as we were the injured party and we as a Union cease 
to be affiliated to the Trades Council 
owing to their failure to protect our 
, 
interests. -132 
The greater ability of the Clerks to create institutional links 
allowed them to emerge unscathed from a situation in which they had 
acted without scruple. Yet the ability to create and use institutions 
in this way may be seen as but a low level in a ranking of institutional 
mobilisation. The Rubber Workers, internally, had created one import- 
ant institution in the appointment of shop stewards and accident 
stewards: it is likely, however, that thes e were largely confined 
in their activity to the collection of dues and dispensing benefit. 
133 
So the organisational development of the trade union movement 
was hindered, in part, by the sheer scale of the administrative tasks 
imposed by its very success in recruitment. But there was a second 
reason: the concept. of lorganisation' available, atInast within the 
mainstream of the trade -anion movement. We argued in chapter 5 that 
the metaphors of work organisation used by management were, in the 
maixi, '. mechanical and military; and that this limited the extent to 
which managerial strategies relying on some workers' responsibility 
could be developed. For the unions' activists, the-position was not 
dissimilar. Their illustrations of'organisation also drew on mech- 
anical and military analogies: the union should be anleffective 
weapon', 
134 
the great claim of those who created the Trades and Labour 
132. NAUL No 292 branch minutes, 4 September 1'919; cp TC minutest 
9. September 1919. 
133- NAUL No 292 branch minutes, 15 May 1917,14 May 1918, 
29 Janua'ry 1920. 
134. TC AR 1919,5. 
F 
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Council was to 
have succeeded in producing a machine 
. 99 capable of giving adequate expression to the aims, tho hopes and the 
aspirations of the working class of thia 
city. 135 
The problem with this 'nuts and bolts' understanding was that it 
I. 136 treated organisation as an instrument, rather than as a relationship. 
In reality, of course, organisation itself required conatant legit- 
imisation, and yet was a vital element in chaping an issue, and thus 
in mobilising union members. In short, the concept of organ1sation 
as a machine left activistp as 'mechanics', in come sense external to 
the machine - its operators: the generals in an army whose will to 
fight could be taken for granted. 
This mechanistic image of organisation was also constrained 
by the tendency to see administration as the fundamental aspect of 
organisation. Within a year of its formation, for example, the Trades 
and Labour Council felt in need 'of fully equipping our machinery with 
cash and staffl; 
137 
a year later it believed that it 
would never be able to give the maximum 
assistance to the Working-Class Move- 
ment locally until the present systera 
of spare-time officials is superseded by 
a more progressive method. 138 
This 'more progressive method' was nothing more grand than the appoint- 
ment of a full-time Secretary: 
139 We have seen above how important 
quite basic administrative tasks were to a union organisation based 
on voluntary, spare-time labour; such efficiency, of course, had a 
bearing on the legitimacy of union organisation itself. When a shop 
steward at the Victoria rubber works-lost 52s. of union money (nearly 
a week's wage for one of his members) it was important to raise a 
sub3cription not merely to recover the money, but because fit would 
strengthen the bona fide nature of the case. 
140 (Not infrequunt 
135. TC AR 1920,13. 
136. This-view of organisation. has much in common with the social 
ýemocratic (what Macintyre terms the Labour Socialist) con- 
ceptibn of the State: cp S-Macintyre., A Proletarian Science* 
Marxism in Britain 1917-1933 (Cambridge 1980), 707ý---80- 
137. TC AR 1921, -g. 
138. The TUC sent it6 affiliates a circular to this effect on 7 Dec. 
1921: 
.. 
TC AR 1922,8. 
139- Ibid., 11. 
140. NAUL No. 292 branch minutes, 29 January 1920. 
4 4) 1 
complaints at the ineffectiveness of full-time union officers 
should be seen in this light also. ) But to see union organisation 
primarily in 'terms of administrative (or mechanical) analogies 
hindered the development of thought about the role of organisation 
in, and its relation to, the mobillsation of union members and 
institutions. 
In the years before 1921 the effect of these weaknesses could 
pass unnoticed. Solidarity could be assumed. Failings could be 
explained in terms of failing in organisation organisation as it 
was then understood - or in terms of betrayal. Or both. 
7.5_ 
_'Fighting on 
the defensive',. 1921-1927 
The good times did not last long after the war: as early as the 
spring of 1920 the Trades Council-was sounding a note of warning. 
During the war period the average 
worker has become lulled to a sense 
of security by the comparative ease 
with which increases. of wages and 
improvement of conditions have been 
obtained, but signs are not wanting 
that the employing classes have been 
strengthening their position, and are 
marshalling their forces for the great 
struggle which is undoubtedly imminent. 141 
A year later, this 'prophecy Z-had, 2 ... indeed, come true': 'A 142 
struggle has begunl'the rules of which are the laws of the jungle', 
During subsequent years the struggle ebbed and flowed, but real trade 
union achievement was rare. So successive Trades Council annual reports 
moved from recognising the 'extraordinary difficulty' 
143 the movement 
was facing (and the defeats^suffered) in 1921-1922; to-stressingýhfleroism 
of the struggles, the loyalty and example in defeat. 
141. TC AR 1920,5. 
142. TC AR 1921,5-6. 
143. TC AR 1922,4. 
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Our explanation for this deterioration in the trade union 
position concentrates on, firstly, the changes which occurred in the 
principles by which actions could be legitimated (in this section) 
and, secondly, the effect of developments within the trade union 
movement at the level of organisation (section 7.6). Of course, we 
should bear in mind that the terrain on which these struggles were 
fought out had changed to the disadvantage of workers in relation 
to their employers. 
Let us turn, first, to the legitimising principles by which 
trade union action in the working class interest could be justified. 
We have-argued, of course, that these were unusually wide during 1917- 
1920, notably because of the impetus given to notions associated 
wiýh planning during wartime, because they were in many cases supported 
by important central institutions of the wider society, such as the 
press an d the military, - or, if not supported, at least given space 
by these. More important, perhaps, these principles found some 
resonance within the workplace. Clearly, our assumption is that the 
balance of legitimation shifted significantly away from the working 
class (or, at least, away from trade unions) after 1920. But this 
requires further elaboration: several aspects will be examined. 
First, the institutional support for certain aspects of trade 
union activities or objectives, especially in important sections of 
the press, rapidly evaporated during the early post-war years. The 
press had never, of course, been supportive of trade unions; but, as 
we have seen, for, just a few years they shared certain assumptions. 
Whilst in 1919 and early 1920 trade unions had been able to enlist 
newspapers' support, and to ýIrousel public opinion, in some disputes, 
this seems, rapidly to have dissipated. 
144 
144. It should be stressed that trade union activists never imagined 
the press to . ba- favourable. As early as March 1919 the TC protest- 
ed at the 'present active anti Trades Union campaign being 
conducted by a certain section of the Scottish Press.... ' 
(Minutes, 11 March 1919). What is significant is the constant 
assertion that the situation was unfair, and deteriorating. 
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The Press that pled with such sweet 
reason for Whitley Councils and 
Conciliation when the sword was in 
the hand of the Trade Unions, today 
urges the mine-owners to be relentless ... 
complained the Trades Council in 1921; 
145 
while a year later rather 
than supporting the just demands of labour, 
The millionaire-owned press has now 
changed its headlines and leaders to 
read that Britain is'a poor country 
with limited economic resources .... 146 
This refrain continued through the remainder of our period; 
, 
Secondy, the relationship between trade unions and the 
governmett altered. The recognition of trade unionism implicit in 
joint consultation, 'Whitleyism', and the National Industrial 
Conference disappeared, with 
the Government's rapid loss of interest 
when participation ceased to hold out 
any promise of aiding employers both 
through its own failure and with the 
tightening grip of recession which 
obviated that rquirement. 147 
This did not, of course, utean an end to governmental recognition of 
trade unions; but the character of the recognition changed. We have 
seen that in 1919 and 1920 the government's intent was to divide 
responsible leaders from various - apparently revolutionary -elements: 
shop stewards, industrial unionists, and the like, represented an 
illegitimate and unacceptable form of trade unionism. From 1920 the 
definition of illegitimacy expanded as the strength of all forms of 
union action waned. All strikes - indeed, any form of union action 
likely to prove effective - were no longer to be countenanced: 
the employers have been, either openly 
or secretly, assisted by a Government 
which. while proclaiming its impartiality 
145. TC AR 1921,6. 
146. TC AR 1922,4. On the general attitudes of the popular press 
in this period, cp. M. Cowling, The Impact of Labouj 1 20-ýý24. 
The beginning_of modern British politics (Cambridge 1971), esp. 
ý5-59; on Governmental relations w-ith (and use of) the press, 
see Middlemas, esp. 153-ý; Foster, British ImperLal 1 39-4,36-7. 
147. H. Ramsay, 'Cycles of control', 488. 
2t-1 
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and its 'inability to take sides', has 
placed the full w6ight of the machinery 
of the State against the comparatively 
mild demands of organised Labour. 148 
At another level, whilst trade union justices of the peace were not 
stripped of their offices, their role was narrowed. With the 
employers' offensive, arbitration was no longer so desirable (or 
necessary) from their point of view: arbitrators who were trade 
unionists must have seemed particularly inappropriate. Trade union 
JPs were, therefore, confined to the bench. At the same time, it 
149 
seems no longer -to have been so important to appoint trade unionists. 
In short, Irecognition' was conferred not so much on trade unions 
as such,. but rather on'certain (narrower) definitions of trade union 
actii, ity. 
At the same time, thirdly, the memory of certain legitirdsing 
principles (particularly those deriving from the war) became ever more 
148. TC AR 1922,4; cp Middlemas, 158-61. 
149. Between 1920 and 1927, only one Trades and Labour Council 
official became a JP : Peter Herd (AEU, East branch), its 
Assistant Secretary (and later Secretary) in 1922 or 1923- 
The names of. lUorking-Class Justices of'the Peace' were 
recorded in TQ ARs froca 1922: 
Working C16ss Justices of the Peace 
Year 140.0fJps No. of JPs who were: 
current or former identifiably 
councillors or trade union 
parish councillore officials 
1922 12 55 
1923 18 6? 
1924 18 67 
1925 20 68 
1926 20 68 
1927 20 68 
Other avenues to the justices' bench seem to have been through 
the Co-operative, movement and. bodies such as the Education 
Authority. 
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distant. Many were re-interpreted in the light of new conditions 
and events, particularly those terms which were associated with the 
economy. We examined in section 7.2 the strength of the language of 
organisation and planning, and tho erosion of the profit motives 
during the war. A result was that certain legitimising principles 
(such as efficiency), which had previously been closely associated 
in meaning with notions of profit, now became more closely associated 
with notions of organisation and planning. This was particularly 
true in industrial contexts. Now, after the war, state control over 
the economy was rapidly abandoned, and companies, broadly speaking, 
returned ID traditional objectives in a market context. 
150 This put 
the meanings of efficiency and its associated principles under press- 
151 
ure. This was increased as press campaigns against 'waste' developed. ' 
Employers and managers had in any case been less wholehearted about the 
organisational benefits of war, often interpreting it more in terms of 
interference and inefficiency. 
There are several indications that the meaning of these terms 
shifted. The notion of 'profiteering', for instance, which had been 
common currency in wartime, became more rare, and played but a small 
part in explanations of industrial and other developments. To return 
to an example used earlier, in 191 9 the Co-operative movement remind- 
ed Trade unionists that it was still 
the sworn enemy of profiteering in any 
shape or form, and for'that reason alone-, 
deserves their warmest support. 152 
By 1920 awareness of separate class-interest remained in the claim 
that 
The financial and other benefits which 
are inseparable from CO-OPERATIVE 
TRADING make an irresistible appeal to 
all who-find it necessary to economise. 6nly'people who have plenty of the world"s 
goods can afford to be, outside this helpT 
ful movement 153 
150- Cp R. H. Tawney, 'The abol-*Jtion of economic controls, 1918-21', 
Econ. Hist. Rev. 13,1943, s 1-30; P. Abrams, 'The failure of social 
reform, 1916-20', Past & Present 24,1963,. ý2-64; Lowe 'The 
erosion of state intervention in Britain', 270-86. 
151- On the press, 'waste', 'efficiency and economy', cp Cowling, esp. 
51-2,55-8. 
152. TC AR 1919,4. Emphasis in original. 
153- TC AR 1920,12.. Capitalisation in original. 
236 
but the force of 'profiteering' no longer seemed important. And 
indeed, the word hardly appears in trade union minute3, reports or 
publications after 1919.154 This ineant that a commonsense explan- 
ation of economic development, which had strong emotive content and 
was supported by powerful established institutions, was no longer 
commonly available. 
The effect of the loss of these legitimising principles can be 
illustrated by examining the changing language used by negotiators 
in the engineering industry. Where in 1919 and early 1920 the unions' 
negotiators could argue in terms of their members' feelings (and win 
their case, very often), from 1920 this became more difficult. The 
employers now held the trump card: the state of the economy. The 
argument was not, of course, new: it was the stock-in-trade of 
employers in negotiations, well-known - and understood - by their 
union counterparts. It was used, to be sure, in 1919 and 1920: but 
in those months it was both weakened by the war, and outweighed by the 
unions' confidence. 
155 Thus we find a reversal in methods of negotiation. 
In 1919 the union negotiators tend tocbploy a simple case, based 
essentially on their ability to mobilise their members (though often 
154. Perhaps the sole exception is in a somewhat theoretical dis- 
cussion of employment in TC AR 1921,5: 'Capital interest is 
being paid from a camel's hump, begot of. artificial prosperity 
and profiteering, while. unemployment stands sombre and fore- 
boding over every worker's home-' Even here, however, profit- 
eering clearly refers back to an earlier period. 
155- Cp ESAE&I and ASE, Local Conference Proceedings 'Marine 
Repairs (Shore and marine engineers)', 30 April 1920, in which 
the union accepted_that 'if-we were to take up a stiff-necked 
attitude ... the Z ship2 owner will naturally say, "we are 
-not going to Leith, we will send them Z their ships_7 to where 
we will get them repaired without trouble. " I But other 
principles outweighed this: argument drew on the quality Of 
work done (the question was whether repairs to ships' engines 
should be carried out by ships' or shore engineers),. precedent, 
the categories of work involved in relation to the, expertise of 
the parties, the need to share work equitably. Above all, how- 
ever, the union won because of its claim, evidently believed, that, 
its members were incensed, and that its threat to suspend work 
was not an idle one. 
interwoven with other assertions); the employers generally introduce 
other principles in an attempt to confuse -the issue - or, at least, to 
provide the trappings of relevant and reasoned judement. Rules should 
not be altered in 1919 because it would be 'panic legislation' in 
'abnormal conditions'; apprentices' pay should not be too high 
because 'there are evil influences'at work' on such boys; some issues 
are too lbigl to be deait with locally; 'political argument' should 
be kept out of industrial negotiation; 'order and ruling' are desirablej 
1constant confusion and trouble' (allegedly the result of workplace 
negotiations) are tobe shunned. 
156 
t' 
From 1920 the employers could deploy a simple case: that they 
. 
were all, employers and employees, subject to the exigencies of a 
market over which there was no control. Work was not 'plentiful', 
trade was 'slack': the consequences, though regrettable, were ' 
inescapablC-. Th(ý argument came in several forms: from mild rerh- 
inders Othe trade ... has falled upon bad times'), 
157 
through strong 
reminders Owe do not think we are pressing hard'at all, but only 
fighting to'get back to a level Z-of PaY2 where we can make our jobs 
158 
attractive to the bqyýrs )) to outright threats: 
I think most men who have a job, and a 
steady job, are very happy just now, and 
any of them who have contracts are very 
pleased and there is no change ... that is 
going to better the conditions 159 
- thus one employer ift 1923; while another, in 1925, averred: 
It is that time and quarter that is just 
driving work across the other side of the 
water. It makes things impossible. 16o 
The union representatives, in contrast, drew on a wider range of 
legitmising principles. Parity Oin all districts where brass moulders 
156. These examples are drawn from ESAM and ASE, Local Conference 
ProceedinF, 'In re Engineers working Rules' 19 Sept-1919,9,11, 
151 31s37- 
157- ESAM and AEU and SBU Local Confbrence Proceed ' 
jpf,, 5, lBrass 
1 Moulderal rates - leyelling up to iron moulders'. April 1921,8. 
158. ESAE&I abd AEU, Local Conference Proceedings lift re Outworking 
Allowances', 22 ýanuary 1923,3. 
159. Ibid., 23-* 
160. E&AE(EofS) and AEU, Local Conference Proceedings 'in re Allow- 
ances , 
for repair work on Diesels Semi-Diesel and Oil Internal 
Combustion Engines', 23 October 192,5,29. 
and iron moulders are working the principle is generally admitted - 
that the rates should be paid practically the same'); 
161 
precedent 
Othe principle was recognised in July of last year' )1162 the 
'effort bargain' Oit is far more, unhealthy work than that of an 
163 
iron moulder, and the brass moulders' work is just ; is exhaustive'): 
These could be effective in securing'marginal or sectional improve- 
mentst but rarely when an employer resisted resolutely, for they were 
of relatively narrow application* 
The unions continued to use, on occasion, the broader principles 
on which they had earlier mobilised so effectively (such as wartime 
promises), but to'little effect: the principles themselves had never 
been accepted by the employers - and now they no longer mobilised 
union members. In a revealing exchange in January 1923, the employers 
show a quiet confidence in the workers' quiescence: 
The CHAIRMAN: You will . ý. perhaps 
CýLdjourn. and ... discuss what are your 
real proposalsin connection with Clause 6 on the country allowance, because we 
certainly cannot go to the length of 
Z7raising it from 4/- to, 7 51- per day. 
Mr. STUART Z-AEU2: Then, I do not think 
there is much use in our coming back. 
That is the last word we 4ad on it with 
the mn. 
The CHAIRMAN: But the last word is that 
ýhe men. are worýcing at 11/- 164 
To Stuart's assertion that 'We are not here to bluff you on this 
matter', the Chairman responded, 'Well, I do not know what word you 
put upon it, but He would not move beyond 4/-; he knew he 
did not have to. 
161. ESAMI and AEU and SBU, Local Conference Proceedings, 'Brass- 
mouldgrol rates -levp1ling up to iron moulderal, 4 April 1921,3. 
162. Ibid. 
163- Ibid. 
164. ESAE&I and AEU Local Conference Proceedings 'in re Outworking 




For the employers, moreover$ 'the market' could undercut 
almost any argument the unions could produce, and justify almost 
any move by management. It could even explain why unions could not 
be informed about the state of trade: 'we never see these cuts 
Z- in the price of gas-meters sold2 and never get any proof of themt' 
complained an AEU man in 1922.. ' The employers' chairman retorted 
I assure you it is done, but we cannot 
go on revealing all our business to Tom, 
Dick and Harry because it gets abroad and 
spoils trade. 166 
The union could not longer win the argument. Toward the end of our 
period, it even attempted to argue for increased wages by using the 
employers' own argument in reverse: because there had been a 'definite 
improvement in trade' . 
167 This was forlorn, for having accepted the 
premise of the employers' case, the union could not escape; the logic 
of their', riposte: 'we should be perfectly justified ... to ask you to 
help us to get work-by reducing further the Z- wage_7 costs. ' 
168 
The fourth aspect of the shift in the balance of legitimation 
is*crucial. The economic downturn changed the nature of the issues 
confronting trade union organisations. Where the problems of 1917- 
1920, notably inflation, had been very amenable to solution by union 
activity at the workplace, the problems of depression were not. Whilst 
employers were operating in a profitable environment, whilst their 
major aim was to win back lost markets, whilst the post-war boom lasted, 
union acticn could win concessions with relative ease. When the mark- 
ets began to disappear, when the relative cost of employing workers 
rose, when profit margino contracted, workplace organisation could 
achieve less. The distance between hope and realistic expectation 
thus grew; and, -in due time, hopes were either dashed or adjusted 
downward. Whilst unions were conscious of unemployment (either because 
166. ESAEU and AEU) Conference Proceedin s, I roposed reduction 
of 12j per cent on pl9cework prices os finishers and brass 
moulders in Gas Meter making works', 20 JulY 19231 9- 
167- E&AE(. EofS)A' and AEU, Adjourned Local Conference Proceedings, 'in 
re Lqqal pLpplication for 20/- per week increase in wages 
22 April'1926,12. 
168. Ibid., 14. 
I 
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their members were-out of work, or because their memberships were 
declining)) 169 they could do little about it. Their memb'ers were 
increasingly hard to mobilise, and it was still harder to mobilise 
them successfully, since success now generally required action at an 
industrial - rather than sectional or workplace - level. The scale of 
action required had escalated greatly; the possible benefits from 
action had become smaller, or at least moro distant. 
Many employers, of course, attempted. to use the depression to 
tighten their control over labour - to require closer supervision, 
faster work, and so on. This generated issues which were relevant 
to union organisation and illustrates two important points. Firstly, 
the existence of the issues did not mean tha, t union action could 
achieve the'improvements desired. The gas meter making firmsl for 
instance, in 1922 determined to reduce their piecework rates. This 
was an issue, as an AEU representative pointed out, on which the men's 
expressed view was unambiguous: 
we had a very representative meeting 
of the whole of the gas meter making 
shops-in the city ..., and the men instructed me to point out that the 
12J per cent reduction that you 
propose is-totally unwarranted. 170 
But the unions had recently been defeated in the national lock-out, and 
the negotiatbns were almost ritualistic: the employers had an answer 
to every argument - 'to get prices down to increase business and 
induce managers to order more meters. ' 
171 Secondly, 1917-1920 had 
169. Cp, e. g., NUR Edin No. I branch minutes 29 January 922, when a 
continuing fall in membership1which was accounted 
Zfor 
7 by the 
number of dismissals8lc' was reported; within the AEU, -9 er 
cent were unemýployed in. April 1926 (Thomas Dewar, in F, &AjEeofS) 
and AEU 
, 
Adjourned Local Conference Proceedings 'in re local 
application for 20/- per eek increase in wagesi, 22 April 192616. 
170. ESAE&I and AEU, Local Conference Proceedings, 'Proposed reduction 
of 121 per cent on piecework prices of brass finishers and brass 
moulders, in Gas Meter malting works', 20 July 1922,3- 
171. -Ibid., 11. 
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been marked not only by the existence of issues amenable to improve- 
ment though workplace action: it had also been a period when widely 
available legitimising principles were seen to be relevant to these 
issues and methods. During the 'twenties this was no longer so: 
indeed, Icommonsense' seemed to support the employers' interpretat- 
ions of economic necessity. On no occasion, before 1926, did an 
engineers 'negotiator attempt to criticise the economic assumptions 
of the eraployers case for limiting or reducing wage costs. 
7.6_ Trade unionism andorganisation, 1921 - 1927 
Broadly, then, the political 'space' which had been created in the 
brief period around the armistice closed quite rapidly as the post-war 
boom passed. Of course, it might have been possible for labour 
organisations themselves to create or support legitimising principles, 
to sustain this 'space' of themselves: this did not happen. During 
1919 and 1920 the scale of the task of creating union organisation, 
together with the understanding of'organisation which existed among 
union activists and members, had meant that union workplace organ- 
isation developed with an administrative, rather than a 'political' 
- in the sense of mobilising - orientation. This played a part in 
determining the natuie of the. union activity in subsequent years. 
In this section we explore the development of union organisation 
(and organisational thinking) after 1920, and we discuss some of its 
implications. 
We have seen that union organisational thought in the immediate 
post-war years was marked by mechanistic and military images, and by 
the immediate imperatives'of efficient internal administration. One 
consequence was that the movement failed to address the relationship 
of union institutions to their members. For, on the one hand, union 
organisation was apparently working, as increasing membership made plain; 
242 
whilst, on the other, the : hflux of new members and the existence 
of mobilising issues-at the workplace was creating, informally, a 
highly decentralised, quasi-organic, structure. The latter, however, 
developed largely unplanned; a corollary of multi-unionism, and 
growth from the grass roots. 
As the depression set in, the context in which union organ- 
isational structures functioned changed. , The intensity of the 
depression, and the rapidity of its onset, were reflected in union 
Table 7-3 Trade Union Membership 1918 - 1927 













Membership of TUC-affiliated unions: 
Total Change from previous year Ft-housands) Tthousands) (per-cent) 
5284 +752 +16.6 
'6505 +1221 +23.1 
6 418 -8ý - 1-3 
5129 - 1289 -20.1 4ý69 - 760 -14.8 4ý28 - 41 - 0.1 435*1 + 23 + 0.0 
4366 + 15 + 0.0 
4164 202 - 4.6 
3875 - 289 - 6.9 
Source: Bain, BacOn and Pimlott, in Halsey (ed. ), 123-6. 
membership, The national figures are shown in table 7-3: as a gauge of 
the decline, membership of TUC-affiliated unions fell by 32.6 per 
cent over the three year period beginning in December 1919. We only 
have membership figures for one Edinburgh union organisation over 
this period. The decline in its membership over the same period was 
almost identical, at 32-3 per cent. (Sýe figure 7.4. ) The number of 
union branches affiliated to the Trades Council fell from 95 to 70 in 
just one year, 1920-1921 me figure 7-5); financial pressure caused 
by loss of membership and unemployment was an important reason. The 
Painters reported between 180 and 200 of its 1200 members idle in 
November 1920; 
172 
the following year the orchestras cut back, causing 
172. TC minutes, 16 November 1920. 
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'large unemployment' among the Musicians' members; 
173 
the Penicuik 
branch of the Printing and Paper Workers withdrew from the Council 
because trade depression was affecting branch income 0174 
But the depressiods impact on union organisation was uneven. 
There were problems in integrating newly unionised workers into 
union institutions, and new union institutions into the existi: ig 
organisational structures of the trade union movement. Three aspects 
deserve discussion. Firstly, involvement in union activity by union 
members did not change significantly during the year after the war. 
Among the Railwaymen. the mean number voting at meetings (the only 
available indicator) only rose as a proportion of membership as the 
latter began to fall in 1920 (see figure 7.4). So the (quantitative) 
increase in union membership was not accompanied by a (qualitive) 
change in the meaning of union membership. Participation in union 
meetings declined by 47 per cent as a proportion of membership beWeen 
the winter of 1920-21 and the summer of 1923, despite the fact that 
the falls in the number of new members, and in total branch member- 
ship, had been stemmed between six and eighteen months earlier. 
Although participation rose ag&in, it never, rivalled the proportions 
of 1918- 1920- 
Turning, secondly, to the Trades Council, we, can see in figure 
7-5 that when the number of organisations affiliated to the Council, 
and their size, were greatest, each delegate attended the fewest 
meetings, and the average-attendance at each meeting was lowest. In 
-short, theýinfusion of new members into the movement in 1919 and 1920 
could not be consolidated in organisation, attitudes or behaviour. 
After 1921, the number. of Trades Council affiliates began-to rise, 
but the membership of affiliated organisations (reflected, if 
approximately, in the number of delegates) never reached the 1920 
level. The level of activity of the average delegate, as represented 
by the number of meetings attended, never again approached its levels 
0 1915- 1918. 
i 
Thirdly, -union branches new to the movement formed the bulk of 
those which ceased affiliation to the Trades and Labour Council in 1921. 
173. TC minutes, 28 June 1921. 
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(See table 7.6; it was in this year that the number of Council 
affiliates fell the most. ) Of the sixteen unions which had 
affiliated since 1915, a majority was made up of unions in the 
Trade union branches which ceased to be affiliated to 
Edinburgh Trades Council 1920-21 
Branches not affiliated to Edinburgh Trades Council in 1215: 
Asylum workers (Morningside) 
National Union of Clerks (Engineering) 
Electrical Trades Union (North) 
, 
Electrical Trades Union (Cinema Operators) 
General Workers (Meter) 
General Workers (Tobacco) 
General Workers (Drug) 
Gold, Silver and Allied Trades 
Pottery Workers (Portobello) 
Prudential Staff Fed'eration 
Railwaymen (Edin No-3) 
Scale, Beam and Weighing Machine Makers. 
Woodworkers (Amalgamated NoM 
Woollen Workers 
Workers'Union (No-2) 
16 Workers' Union (Musselburgh) 
Table 7.6 
Branches not affiliated to Edinburgh Trades Council in 1915; 
possibly then affiliated to Leith Trades Council: 
7 
National Amalgamated Union of Labour. (Leith) 




Tailors and Tailoresses (Leith) 
Woodworkers (Leith No-2) 
Branches affiliated to Edinburgh Trade's Council in 1915: 
. 
Electrical Trades Union (West) 
Farm Servants (Dairyworkers) 
Furnishing Trades 
Tramway and Vehicle Workers 
Sources: Edin. TC & TUC ARs, 1916,1921,1922. 
-'growth sectors': semi- and unskilled workers, white-collar workers, 
and so on. Overall, therefore, it was among the more recentlY 
organised. workers, and unions, that organisation was weakest, and most 
g* 
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liable to erosion; but the trade union movement as a whole found it 
difficult to sustain the level of membership participation in its 
affairs that had characterised the war years. 
After 1920, then, the unions' inability to consolidate their 
gains of, 1917-20 began to be exposed; at the same time, the context 
in which they operated altered. There consequently developed, 
(alongside a debate about 
* 
strategy), intense discussion of certain 
organisational questions* The major problem was identified as the 
inability of unions ýo hold their own against an alliance of employers 
and governmentt 
When it has come to meeting the attacks 
of those whose interests lie in the 
maintenance of the status quo, or in 
reactions the Trade Union Movement, 
fighting on the defensive, has been 
out-generalled and out manoeuvred, 
-and the. combined weight of the 
employers' attack has. been felt by 
separate sections at different times. 175- 
This analysis seems to have been shared widely: locally, but also 
nationally. The proposed solution was reflected in the title of a 
17 
.6 
special conference on 'Hours, Wages, Unemployment, and Co-ordination's 
If the-problein had been disunity in action, the solution, clearly, was 
to co-ordinate. 
, Yet whilst the perceived problem had changed from the earlier 
period, the solution was found in the same essential conception of 
organisation. With diminishing memberships, efficient branch ad- 
ministration was no longer a key issue, but the image of organisation 
remained mechanistic*. - hierarchical and militaristic. We see this in 
the language of the Special Conference resolution. 'Complete co- - 
ordination of policy is necessary within the trade union movement, ' 
175. TUC AR 1922,4. 
176. TUC minutes, 4 March 1923: the Conference was attended by 
about 150 delegates. 
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it declared, setting out steps to be taken locally 'to acsist 
National Unions and the Tradefs2 Union Congress to this end * 
177 
Indeed in the debate on union organisation, all drew on conceptual 
assumptions which saw organisation in mechanistic images. There are 
two main problems with this approach. One we know: its tendency 
to divorce organisational questions from those of legitimising . 
mobilisation. The assumption was that sectionalism, for instance, 
was an organisational problem which co-ordination could solve. The 
second problem is related: such a model of organisation can be 
effective in some circumstances only. To employ the military 
metaphor, it may be appropriate to using a well-motivated army in 
a 'war of manoeuvrel, when the objectives are clearly specified and 
attainable. (Thus it-provided the basis for local strike committee 
organisation-in 1926, which has so impressed many historians. )178 
But-t4e 'army' after 1920 was not well-motivated: its morale-was 
low; its willingness to take action could not be. assumed. In short, 
tfie concept of organisation available tended to conceal the relatihn- 
ship between organisation'and the legitimation of action. Instead, it 
laid stress on the direction of action; it emphasised tactics at the 
expense of strategy. 
Of course, as the depression - with its accompanying problems 
in-mobilisation - became more entrenched, an awareness of other problems 
developed. A 'Trade Union Organising Committee' established by the 
Trades and Labour Council at the-end of 1922, for instanceg 
acted on the principlej not cnly that 
'it was necessary to get Non-Unignists 
into Unions, but that a working class 
consciousness should be created. 1? 9 
This'was no small task, and similar statements echoed plaintively 
through the succeeding years: 'If Trade Unionism is expected to kill 
177- TUC minutes 18 March 1923: the Conference had been adjourned 
from a fortnight earlier to debate this, its last, motion. 
178. The post well-known example is. the organisation chart of the 
Methil Council of Action, first cited in E. Burns, General Strike' 
1_926. Trades Council's in Action (London 1926), whi-ch--aý1SO 
includes other examplesl On similar developments in Edinburgh 
cp T. MacDougall, 'Edinburgh with some notes on the'Lothians and 
Fife' in J. Skelley (ed. ))The General Strike, 1926 (London 1976), 
esp. 148-9. - 
179. TUC minutes, 16 December 1922. 
4%0 
. Y118 poverty and assist in uplifting mankind, there must be solidarit 
Cýet 
the-tendency was to distinguish organisation from propaganda, but 
to view the latter simply as one tqsk to be executed by the former. 
An example of this is the 'Back to the Unions' campaign of 1923: 
initiated by the TUC with a self-explanatory purpose, it was pursued 
in Edinburgh by a series of public and works-gate meetings, 
demonstrations and marches, with handbills, posters, and rejoining 
forms. Yet the campaign made no recommendations about union 
behaviour, let alone union structure, although it was-necessary to 
set up ad hoc committees (of district union officials, and on 
organising women) to run it - perhaps implicit. recognition of the 
ihadequacy of existing institutions for the tasks now necessary* 
181 
There was some debate which confronted the possibility of a 
link between organisational structure and the attitudes and actions 
of-union members. It did not'arise until late in our period. It was, 
inýaddition, -a debate which occurred-within the bounds established 
by the available notions of organisation. Whilst there began to be 
an awareness that 
For the successful w ork of the Trade 
Unions, understanding and performing 
their work is not enough; special 
knowledge, tact, and ability are the 
essentials, 
thi's was to be 'combined with a disciplined sense of confidence in 
the authoritative decisi6ns of a local or national General Council. 
The tendency-towards amalgamation in the Trade Union woTld is-in the 
right direction'. 
182 In short,, notions of hierarchy and discipline 
continued to rule supreme. The two main sources of criticism 
illustrate this. The first drew on the tradition of industrial 
unionism, and was well-put in an article in The Labour Standard: 
180. TUC AR 1925,. 15. 
181i T& LC minutes, 8 May 1923,15 May 1923- 
182. TUC AR 1924,13- 
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A policy of scientific amalgamation is 
needed.. Not the haphazard amalgamation 
which consists in knocking two or three 
unions into one, regardless of whether 
the financial product is a homogeneous 
whole, but amalgamation on industrial 
lines, so that there may be one union 
for each industry, in which will be 
organised all the workers of that industry 
- manual, clericals technical and 
administrative. When we see the necessity 
for sinking sectional differences and interests; 
and organising on these lines I we will have 
taken a tremendous step in the'dir'ection of 
workers' control of industry. 183 
Thus even the industrial unionists, so closely allied in basic 
thinking to syndicalism, attempted to change union organisation only 
to another version of mechanistic structure. The second source of 
criticism likewise came from the left. It did stress the importance 
of decentralising decision-making to local trades councils and the 
like. Yet there was no ailtempt to explore the relationship 
between organisation and the legitimation of action, and - if' 
anything -'the authority of the localised committee was to be even 
more absolute. The view is perhaps most clearly put in a conference 
motion: I 
That this conference agrees to endeavour 
to co-ordinate all sections of the working 
classes locally. No one section of wcrkers 
to act inde'endently of any others, but p 
submit all questions to a Central Committee 
appointed by this Conference, which shall act 
in coAjunctiozý with the Trades Council for 
the purpose of defending all the interests of the 
Working Class. 184 
How was it that such images of organisation, continued to be 
important-in the, ltwenties? Two inter-related factors should be 
discussed. The first is the development of organisational thinking 
183- Labour Standard lo 6ctober 1925: 'A Hundred Per Cent Trade 
Union Organisation'. 
184. TUC minutes, 18 March 1922: t'radep c'ouncils' roles may have 
been stressed as a likely source of alternatime (leftist) 
policies, rather than from a principlod attempt to 
decentralise. 
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outside the trade unions: the second is the development of certain 
aspects of industrial relations. 
We shall mention two aspects of the development of organis- 
ational thinking outside the trade unions: management thought, and 
political thought especially within the labour movement. Managerial 
images of organisation were strongly influenced by analogies with 
machines, weapons and armies; but whilst there was a 'thrust for 
efficiency' during and after the uar, this did not necessarily mean 
a move-simplistically in the direction of 'scientific management'. 
Rather, 'efficiency' could be achieved in a variety of ways, the 
success of each of which was determined largely by its context. 
Nevertheless, the managerial mood of the 'twenties shifted toward 
tighter control of work, closer discipline, and more centralised, 
hierarchical, decision-making. These were the years when Taylorism 
began to acquire institutional backing in Britain as consultants 
applying versions of Taylor's methods were set-up: the best-known, 
185 Charles E. Bedaux Ltd., in 1926. There was, in short, little in 
management thinking which would provide a basis for the type of 
critique of trade union organisati. on and methods we have discussed. 
Within the labour movement, contributions to thinking about 
organisation came largely from the political side. The formation 
of the Communist Party during-1920, and 1921 highlights the process 
by which--the syndicalist tradition, whichhad been an important 
element in wartime shop stewards movements, was integrated into a 
'political' organisation, losing much of its contribution to trade 
union debate in the process. The Communist Party also rapidly adopted 
a view of the Russian Revolution which-stressed the importance of 
Bolshevik organisation in 1917: almost--inevitably, -this led-to a 
concentration on the-importance of hierarchical-centralist organisation 
in-trade unions-al-so. The-Labour Party-was-in the-process of re- 
organisation into a national, membership organisation in which formal 
185.1 B: ýown, Sabotage, 231; on the Bedaux system, see Brown, 231-511 
P. Livingstone, 'Stop ýhe Stop Watch', New Society .. jo July 1969, 
M$Jenk'ins 'Time'and Motion Strike'. Manchester 1934-1937', 
Our History, 60,1974. 
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control was centralised. 
186 After 1918 (indeed, also before) there 
was no critique of organisation which could have threatened the 
direciion being taken within the trade unicn movement. In facts 
perhaps the only source of thought about organisation which mig 
have questioned the approach being taken was guild socialism: but, 
for. a variety of reasons its impact was very limited. 
The major factor in sustaining mechanistic union structurest 
however, is to be found in the development of industrial relations 
in certain, key, industries. During the. twenties, there was of 
course a movement toward national'bargaining both in engineering and 
on the, railways. These industries set the pace and tone of industrial 
187 ' 
relations in the 'twenties-, they were also strongly represented 
in the general institutions of the labour movement, in Edinburgh, such 
as the Trades and Labour Council. Of course, national bargaining 
meant something slightly different-in each case. But, above all, it 
regulated: it reduced uncertainty, introducing anelement of stability 
into the framework of decision-making and planning. It did so in 
several ways., It reduced differences in labour relations practice 
between firms, areas, or divisions to a minimum (though it could not 
eliminate them). It meant that, 'even where disputes occurred, they 
would do so only after the eTployer had advance warning, and thus 
time to prepare. -. It reduced the danger of disputes that occurred 
in 
one firm disrupting the work of others which bought from or sold to 
it. Agreed national bargaining structures also enabled employers 
to enlist union leaders' support in certain tasks: most immediately, 
they became committed to elements of the agreed procedures, to the 
method and-timings for settling disputes; subsequently,. they might 
become committed to the terms of substantive agreements. In short, 
national bargaining brought order. 
186i Cp McKibbin, Evolution of the Labour Party, esp. 91-106. 
187- No doubt other'industries could be added to a list of 'pace- 
setters'. (e. g., mining): the point here is that these are 
industries already covered in some depth which were 'pace- 
setters'. 
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Employers, of. course, had other motives for adopting a 
national bargaining structure. On the railways, when negotiated 
in, 1921, it may-have seemed an unexceptionable guid pro quo for 
union acceptance of the companies' returning to private ownership. 
In engineering, inertia was important: ' a- national structure of 
negotiation - 'procedure' - existed anyway. But-it also represented 
a way of reducing the investment which a firm needed to make in 
industrial relations expertise, cost, and time. 
. -What were the advantages of national bargaining structures 
and procedures to trade unions? Clearly-national bargaining had- 
certain advantages for unions-in common with employers: it reduced 
the-unit costs, particularly in terms-of time, of-negotiation; it 
allowed for the development of-expertise-(though whether this- 
opportunity was exploited is less-clear); above all-, -again, it 
increased the-stability, and reduced the-uncertainty, of the bargain- 
ing situation. But, in addition, - there were apparent advantages to 
the union rather than the employer. ýChe-NUR--leadersi-for-instanceI 
seem to have seen their negotiating machinery agreed, in-1921 as a 





-In an-industry like engineering, 
it-could be a means of ensuring a basic standard--in-nearly all firms: 
-'if that-is-so then so much the-better-' was-the-response of. -an ASE 
negotiator when assured-that his belief-that 'the worse Z-sic2 
offenders' in the disputed matter 'do not come under the Federation 
at all' was incorrect. 
189 
--One- of- -the -advantages of a national negotiating machinery- to 
unions'--leaders was the prospect ofýstabilising external conditions 
(which had been changing apace for several-years) so thkt-the-internal 
affairs-of their organisations could be sorted out. ý Administrative 
effectiveness was-an urgent priority-for local union organisations in 
the years of rapid membership growth; this was so for national unions 
18&; Bagwell-, - -498-11. - 
189. ESAE&I and ASE Local Conference Proceedings, 'Qu'esition referred: 
marine repairs - (Shore and marine engineers)', 30 April 1920,5. 
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also. According to one NUR member, for instance, where 38 clerks 
had been employed at Unity House in 1914, there were 51 in 1920; 
190 
visiting the Headquarters, 
he had f ound the clerks on the point 
of revolt, because their claim of a 
50 per cent Z-sic_7 had been thrown 
back on them by the EC: who had been 
told they had refused to work over- 
time when the truth was they were 
working excessive hours. 191 
There were clearly administrative problems. And, as memberships 
began to fall after 1920, union leaders faced the problems of 
managing decline: the need to cut costs, arid thus probably to 
reduce their establishment of officials and staff, whilst having 
at, the same time to cope with the problems generated by the onset 
of depression. 
We now turn to the implications of national negotiations and 
procedures for union organisation, and images of organisation. The 
first we have already touched on: if agreements were reached (either 
substantive-or procedural) above plant level, then the leaders who 
had negotiated them had in some way to ensure their members' compliance 
with ihe agreements (or to-find some acceptable reason for not doing 
so )ý92 One method, clearly, was only to make agreements which were 
190. NUR Edin No. J'Branch minutes, 28 March 1920: according to 
another member, who was on the Union's National EC, there were 
100 clerks at Head Office in 1920. Between 1914 and 1919 NUR 
membership grew from . 273,362 to 481, o8l; in 1920 it fell back 
to 457,836: Bagwell, 699-700- 
191. NUR Edin. No. 1 branch minutes, 14 March 1920. 
192. The legitimacy of procedure and agreement might be outweighed 
by other legitimising principles - e. g., members' attitudest 
or absurdity - as when an 4EU negotiator pointed out that 'our 
members are very discontent on this question .... 
Zl2t would 
be very absurd for our men to say, "Oh, wait till a national 
agreement comes along and we will start the job when it is 
completed". 
* 
Yet, that is an analogous position Z-to the. 
question at issue2l E&AE (EofS) and AEU Local Conference 
Proceddings, 'in re Allowances for repair work on Diesel, Semi- 
'Diesel and Oil Internal Combustion Engines, ' 23 October 1925,43- 
f, 
2c 55 
assured of members' enthusiastic acceptance: whilst this was 
difficult even during 1917-20, it became far more so thereafter. 
Another would have been to persuade the members that an agreement 
reached was the best possible in the circumstances: it may be that 
this was easier in depression than in the period of optimism. A 
third option, ' however, Was to ensure compliance rather than endorse- 
ment. This might mean the persuasion of members not by reference 
to the substantive merits of the agreementbut rather by reference 
to other-principles: unity, -loyalty to the union, discipline, and 
the like. -It might, however, mean the coercion of members into 
compliance, through sanctions of various kinds. 
- This implied an important shift in the functional focus of 
union structure: not so much in the purpose. for which it was 
designed, but rather in the activities which seemed most important 
to union leaders, Whereas in 1917-20 the main function of-union 
structures-Un-this respect) was to assimilate new members, during 
the 'twenties their main function became-the control of their members; 
for Whereas befote 1920 union achievements were likely to commend- 
them''to their members, during the later period successes were, few. 
Military commanders-are-wont-to equate morale with discipline. 
Where motivation failed, discipline could-replace it. A straight- 
forward example is to be found in the NUR, where, in the aftermath 




in no uncertain manner. condemned pur. 
Leaders for. their signing such-a 
settlement and then fining our members 
for taking part-in the strikei---- 194 ...... 
In general, though, this shift in function was reflected in-measures 
to strengthen leadership control at-an-earlier stage: ---again, the 
NUR provides-an example-in its-introduction of extra tests for 
prospective organisers in 1924.195 
193 Cp Bagwell, 489-go. 
194i NUR Edin. No.. 1 Branch minutes, 11 july 1927. 
195. Ibid., 23 March 1924. 
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Unions are, of course, inherently difficult to discipline. They 
contain important - and formal - elements of legitimate authority 
at both 'top' and 'bottom', and institutions at lower levels which 
(to varying degrees) are able to articulate opposition to centralised 
leaderships. This was very noticeable among the Railwaymen, where 
branches could be large and strong, and where there was a strong 
tradition of 'unofficial' organisation. Thus the NUR No. I 
branch conducted a war of words with their National Executive 
Committee throughout the early-'120s (some examples of which we have 
seen). (Even so, however, the principle of loyalty to the Union 
could be a strong one, especially where its own members were not 
involved: so the branch could approve even of the Executive Committee 
and J. H. Thomas in their action against an 'unconstitutional' strike - 
it was necessary 'to take every step to safeguard the constitution of 
196 
our Society'. ) It, was, therefore, impossible for this process totally 
to transform union structures. 
This was,. of course, the more so as the influence of nationally 
agreed procedures was felt not only nationally: Jndeed their essence 
was just the involvement of union officials (permanent and lay) at 
all levels. So the Engineers participated in district conferences, 
the Railwaymen in departmental committees, even though they might 
doubt their power and effectiverfes I s. 
197in 
so doing, local activists 
too came to rely - in part - on the disciplining functions of union 
structure. Although they might object to the authority of national 
officers, local activists themselves came partially to rely on 
union organisation to ensure their agreements were adhered to: there 
was, in short, no constituency with power to mobilise resources 
within-the unions which did not also have some stake in the way they 
were organised. 
196. Ibid., 29 June 1924. 
197- Cp, e. g., the comment of an NUR member 'on the power of these 
Z Departmental_7 comittees fsic2 which he bad doubts about': 
ibid., 22 October 1922. 
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7.7 Industry, mli2ap . ement and labour 
The burden of our argument about the development-of trade unionism 
may be summarised thus. Standard accounts of the development of 
industry and work organisation direct our attention away from the 
important short-term changes which occurred durincr and after the 
areat War; in their search for fundamental economic trends, they 
obscure also the extent of diversity and uneven developments both 
between and within various industrial sectors. Examining the develop- 
ment of four sectors of Edinburgh's economy, we identified a spectrum 
of responses to the same overall economic conditions. There was no 
ineluctable trend toward larger scale production and the direct 
control of labour: indeed, during and just after the war, strat- 
egies were adopted which (in various ways) reflected both an 
accommodation to labourstrength, and, at least in relation to 
certain workers, a reliance upon their technical ability. When the 
depression came, industrial management did not immediately and 
inevitably resort to strong forms'of direct control. This seems to 
have been technically feasible only in the larger enterprises (such 
as the Castle Mills, and the railway companies); even there, the 
strength of well-established unions could temper it (as on the 
railways), while the North British*Rubber Company learnt that elimin- 
ating union strength could also involve costs. The structure of 
Edinburgh's engineering industry generally hindered the development 
of large-scale enterprises, and its products. placed a heavy reliance 
on workers'-skills. So although the economics of the industry made 
labour weak, employers could not ignore the unions. In printing, 
union strength was well-established, and was eroded very little. 
, In these structural conditions, unions were able to make sub- 
stantial advances until 1920 or 1921. These were based on a number 
of factors. In particular, the war generated problems wh. ich were 
amenable to union action, and shifted the language of industrial 
motiviation in directions which furthered union interests. At the 
same time, the institutional development of trade unionism was directed 
along lines which discouraged it from taking a vigorous, mobilising, 
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role. This meant that, after 1920 (when circumstances moved against 
the union interest) the trade union movement was unable to resist 
effectively. - It also meant that, as the motivation of union 
members became mare difficult, unions tended to attempt -to achieve 
action through notions of institutional loyalty (to the union) or, 
in the last resort, through disciplinary action. Union organisation- 
al structures became more centralised (at every level). 
We now turn from the 'industrial wing' of labour to its 
'political wing'. 
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Part Four ' Labour Politics 
'a class which has to work fixed hours every 
day cannot have permanent and specialised 
assault organisations - as can a class which 
has ample financial resourecs and all of whoae 
members are not tied down by fixed work. ' 
Gramsci, Prisorl Notebooks, 232. 
'Co-ordination is one of the greatest needs of 
thd Working Class Movement, and if Labour is 
to function efficiently, it is imperative that 
all Trade Union and Labour bodies should be' 
affiliated to the Trades and 
, 
Labour Council, 
and thus increase the strength and influence of 
the central responsible body. 
Edinburgh Trades and Labour 
Council, Annual Report 1923,4. 
I ... the time has arrived, if not already past, 
for a general stocktWting in the Socialist 
movement. Our weapons and armour have bec9me 
obsolete. '... The high hopes of 1919 are already 
shattered, and pessimism is gaining ground. The 
tactics of Socialism must be altered to meet an 
entirely new situation. ' 
John Gibson, 




Labour ýolitics and the Impact of War 
8.1 Introductory 
Our next three chapters explain the development of labour's political 
organisation in Edinburgh. In chapter 4 we suggested that there were 
certain structural reasons for believing that, after the Great War, 
the working class may have been more receptive'to proposals involving 
it in taking United political action-*-than it had been in (say) the 
late Victorian period. Chapters 6 and 7 examined the development of 
trade union action: we-saw, on the one hand, that work experiences 
continued to be diverse (strengthening our view that the-notion-of 
an 'occupational community' is-inapplicable to Edinburgh); while, on 
the other, we saw that the-depression-after 1920 discouraged militant 
forms of industrial action. This chapter examine sthe impact of war 
on labour politics (although this involves some-discussion of pre-war 
patterns); it is preceded by some-remarks on the nature of political 
action and the role of political institutions. -Chapter 9 concentrates 
on the post-war reorganisation of-labour politics; while in chapter 10 
we turn our attention to the years-after-1920i-and the struggle-to 
control the restructured labour movement, a struggle essentially (if 
not simply) between 'left' and 1right'. -These-will lead us to 
conclusions about the character of the political action of Edinburgh's 
working class in the 'twenties. 
Within the terms of the theory we developed-in-chapter-2, trade 
union action is a form, a sub-set, Of political action: yet it is 
261 
valuable to point to threo divergences between the mobilisation of 
union members by union organisations, and the mobilisation of the 
working class by political parties and similar bodies. Firstly, 
there are divergences in the social groups to be mobilised: the 
trade union's 'target' group is relatively narrow I as the workers 
in a particular factory, or industry; the political party tends to 
be concerned to mobilise entire classes, nations, races. Second, 
there are divergences in the nature of the principles used to 
motivate action in each context: whilst the, union tends to use those 
which are more or less directly, relevant to the workplace, the political 
party, characteristically deploys more general principles. Thus a 
union might argue for an increase in its members' pay on grounds of 
comparability ('in all districts where brass moulders and iron moulders 
are working the principle is generally admitted -that the rates 
should be paid practically the same'), 
1 
and mobi-lise its members to 
2 
strike on such a basis; on the other hand, whilst a political party 
might-support (or oppose) such a dispute, it would tend to do so on 
other, more general grounds - brass moulders would be too small a 
constituency. 
Finally, there are divergencias in context. The context of 
trade union action is generally the workplace, or at least industrial: 
the institutions which are actively involved in-the processes of 
resource mobilisation and deployment are unions, workgroups, manage- 
ment Other, external, institutions and legitimising principles are 
of course involved, but generally passively - as when wartime unions 
drew on popular notions of 'profiteering'. Political activity is 
normally seen as occurring in a national or'local-context: it is not 
delimited by any particular institutional context, although its 
characteristic institutions are parties, local councils, parliament - 
1. ESAMI and AEU'and SBUI Conference Proceedings, 'Brass moulders 
rates. - levelling up to iron moulders', 4 April 1921,3- 
2. Ibid., 2. 
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and strenuous efforts may be made todefine 'political in terms of 
some specific relationship to such institutions, in order to 
render other forms of political activity illegitimate. This 
divergence is important, for our entire period can be seen as one 
of conflict between advocates of divergent concepts of political 
action for dominance of lhbour politics. 
The concept of the 'party' is central to our study: it has 
been commonly assumed, by students of Labour politics, to be 
relatively unproblematical, an unambiguous term in a common 
language, of political discourse whose meaning has, moreover, re- 
3, mained essentially constant throughout Labour's history. If there 
have been important debates which relate to the meaning of 'party', 
these have essentially been between Labour and (say) Conservatives 
or Communists-, -not within the Labour Party itself. Thus Robert 
McKenzie contrasts the self-images of Conservative and Labour parties, 
but does not suggest the latter changed over time, certainly after 
1918.1ý Similarly, Ross McKibbin's invaluable study of the Labour 
Party's organisation in the years after 1918 shows how important 
Trades Councils continued to be; yet the possibility that this 
reflected, even in part, a different conception of the party's 
role (rather than simple administrative convenience on the path to 
5 
a 'true' party structure) is not examined. But during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there were varying con- 
ceptions of the institutions which would be the vehicle of a socialist 
transformation, just as there were varying images of socialism - 
indeed, of all aspects of socialist politics - within the labour 
movement. 
3- ILP (Central branch) minutes (January - May 1918). The main 
exception to this rule'is Winter, Socialism and the'Challenge of 
War, esp. 52-9,215-23,259-63: W1 er's disucssion, however, 
concentrates on the view of a few leading socialists. M-Rustin) 
'Different conceptions of party: Labour's constitutional de- 
bates', NLR 126,1981, '17, -: 42, touches on some of the issues in a 
discussion of recent debates within the-Labour Party. 
4i R; T. XcKenzie, British Political Parties, esp. 9-15. 
5- R. McKibbin, The Evolution of the Labour Party 191Q-19. Z4- (Oxford 
1974), esp. 137-44. 
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We turn, shortly, to a discussion of the development of 
notions of the-socialist 'party' in Edinburgh's labour movement. 
First, however, we should briefly consider the relevance of the 
'party' to the theory we have developed. As the distinction bet- 
ween 'political' and ! trade union' activity is far more ambiguous 
than commonly assumed, so there are many similarities bdween the 
activities of trade unions and of socialist political parties. 
Those intent on motivating a group of peoplo to some end must 
decide, consciously or by default, how far, -and in what manner, 
they will make use of mediating institutions in the process. 
Thus trade unions, political parties, elements of these - in short, 
any mobilising institution - may attempt to mobilise people 
directly - that is, by attempting themselves to generate the legit- 
imising principles required, and by attempting themselves to be the 
institutions through which contact with the people is made. But they 
may also attempt to do so indirectly - by using principles generated 
by others, by mobilising other institutions in order to achieve a 
mobilisation in their 'target group', or by creating other such 
institutions. Thus a trade union may attempt direct contact with its 
members, through shop stewards, branches and the like; or it may 
choose instead (more likelyas well) to mobilise through building 
links with workgroups, management, and so on. Similarly a political 
party may atbempt direct contacts with the people, through propaganda, 
perhaps; or it may attempt to mobilise or influence them indirectly, 
by winning publicity in-the press, or by activity on local authorities, 
or through trade unions. 
Although this is a difficult distinction, it is an important 
one, and for two main reasons. First, indirect mobilisation involves, 
in effect, constructing alliances with mediating institutions: these 
will rarely-be on precisely the basis which motivates the initiating 
institution, and thus the meaning of the action will be (as it were) 
negotiated. -Since almost all political action involves indirect 
mobilisation, institutions are (consciously or otherwise) engaged in 
continual processes of negotiation - with other political bodiesq with 
zb4 
trade unions, with social groupings of all kinds - so that the 
meaning of political actions is constantly under review. The 
coalescence and disintegration of alliances is a central aspect 
of our discussion. 
Second, attempts to enlist support from other institutions 
may involve costs for the initiating institution. For each 
attempt is an engagement between the values and social patterns of 
the two . institutions, and may mean that either or both will change 
in character in the process. This may cause tensions within, say, 
a party, between those who value pure adherence to principle, and 
those who appreciate the potential gains of alliances with important 
other groups or institutions: tensions which might render it in- 
effectual, or even lead to its disintegration as a sinele body. 
8.2 Labour and socialist politics before 1914. 
When socialist organisation began to emerge in Edinburgh in'the 1880r. 
6 
there was already 'a relatively autonomous working-class industrial 
and political movement$ conditiondd by the position and outlook of 
the labour aristocracy, and effectively contained within the-forms 
7 
of social hegemony characteristic of the period': in effects this 
meant containment within a Liberal coalition, 
8 
and an orient, tion 
toward achieving representation on those bodies where political 
power apparently resided. By the later 'eighties the socialists had 
formed some measure of support, at least on certain issueS19 although 
their support was unstable. 
6. On this, see Gray2 Labour Aristocracy, 177; E. P. Thompson, 
70 
William Morris. Romantic to Revolutionary (London 1977)9350-li 414- 
Gray, Labour Aristocracy, 163- 
This period is discussed in ibid., esp. 144-64; see also 
Macdougall (ed. ) The Minutes of Edinburgh Trades Council 1859-- 
1873 (Edinburgh 1968), xxx, 303 (minutes. of 30 Sept. 1670)- 
9. Ibid., 437. 
Socialism in the 1880s was marked by great faith in the 
powers of propaganda, of direct, almost missionary, methods to 
win men and women to the Icausel; 
loother 
questions of strategy 
were secondary. With the*surge'of unionisation from the late 
188Cs, other strategies became possible. By 1892 a branch of the 
Independent Labour Party had been formed, and in that year fielded 
* parliamentary candidate in the'Central division. 
11 This points to 
* vital characteristic of the socialist movement in the 1890s: one 
which remained important at least until the end of the war. The 
responses, at an organisational level, to these strategic issues 
were. not, very often, to alter the nature of an existing body, but 
rather to create another with a somewhat distinct purpose. Thus 
there was a considerable overlap in membership of all socialist 
organisationsduring this period. The socialists' electoral impact 
during the early'nineties, together with their offering a programme 
relevant't'o industrial issues, led to a 'definite shift' by the 
Trades Council 'towards co-opefation with the socialists, on an 
"independent labour" basis. 112 Again, a new organisation was created 
to'further this end; the Workers Municipal Committee (from 1899) 
provided for the affiliation of union brancheog co-operative 
societies and political bodies, parallelling - indeed, anticipating 
the formation of the national Labour Representation Committee. Within 
a year a 'substantial number of trade union branches, as well as the 
ILP and the SDFI, had affiliated; mid at the election of 1900 the 
election of the first 'Labour' councillor was secured. 
13 
10. A term preferred by Edinburgh members of the Socialist League to 
'religion' in referring to Socialism-in the 1885 Socialist 
League manifesto: see S. Yco, 'A Hew Life: the religion of 
socialism in Britain, 1883-18961, History Workshop Journal 4, 
1977', 49. The Manifesto is to be found in Thompson, Morris 
732-40. - 
11. Gray, Labour Arist ocracy, 177. The ILP branch was, strictly, 
a branch of the Scottish Labour Party: in the election, it 
polled 434 votes (against the Liberal's 3733 and Liberal- 
Unionists 1758). 
12. Gray, Labour Aristocracy_, 181. 
13- Ibid., 182. We should perhaps note that such developments were 
occurring throughout the country at this time: cp, e. g., D. Cox, 
'The Rise of the Labour Party in Leicester, ' (University of 
Leicester M. A. 11959), esp. 19-25; W. H. Marwick, A Short History 
of Labour in Scotland (Edinburgh 19 67), esp. -711ý-2; 
-Cole, 
Working Class Politics, 153-74. 
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There were, then, two parallel and related developments. 
Firstly, until perhaps the mid-'nineties, the socialist movement 
was marked by a zeal and common, purpose which saw strategy in 
terms of William Morris's injuction to 'make socialists' . 
14 But, 
secondly, the creation of institutions for different purposes 
tended to emphasise the range of objectives and methods within the 
movement, and to differentiate them one from anotherl so, by the 
later-'nineties, ideological differences were more important. Thus, 
for example, the SDF was riven during 1901- 1903 by a dispute over 
how far socialist principles should be compromised in the pursuit of 
political power. 
15 
In as much as politics can be reduced to political institutions, 
the politics of labour in Edinburgh after 1900 can be sketched thus* 
For electoral activity, there was the Workers Municipal Committee: or$ 
from 1905, a branch of the Scottish Workers' Representation Committee, 
which in April 1907 changed its name to 'The Labour Party, Scottish 
Section, Edinburgh Branch. 16 T4e unions' orgýnisational and 
political break with Liberalism-was not y6t rdlected in co-operation 
with socialists on an--explicitly socialist basis. Even the Labour 
Party's object after 1907 was just 'The Independent Representation 
of Labour on all Governing and Administrative Bodies., 
17 To the 
Labour Party the Trades Council was affiliated, and through the 
Labour Party it pursued its electoral ambitions: many of its other 
14. It may be significant that, on one estimate, the membership of 
the SDF rose from 483 in 1891 to a peak of 3250 in 1897, but 
had fallen to 1715 by 1902: see P. A. Watmough, IThe membership 
of the Social Dem=ýatic Federation, 1885-1go2l, BSSLH 34, 
1977,35-40. 
15- This was particularly vehement in Scotland, where in March 1901. 
the SDF withdrew from the Scottish Workers' Representation 
Committee; and in Edinburgh and Leith where the majority of 
the SDF members led the breakaway to form the Socialist Labour 
Party. On these disputes see Kendall, The Revolutionary Move- 
ment in Britain, 8-22; R-Challinor, The OriRins of British 
Bolshevism (London 1977), 9-26. 
16. Edin. 12 AR-1920,, in TC-AR 1920,21. 
17. Official letterhead: see, e. g., letter from R. T. Parker to 
A-Henderson, 25 July 1914, in Labour Party Library LP/PA/14/1/155- 
267 
activities were, however, political in other senses and were 
pursued independently - as its support for a 'Right to Work 
Committee' ('We believe the claim ... to be one of simple 
justiceQ; 
18 
or its attempts to improve technical education 
facilities in the city. 
19 Trade union branches could pursue 
? non-industrial' issues by-affiliation to the Trades Council 
(as 51 branches*did in 1908); 20a few also affiliated to the 
Labour Party, but most were 'involved in this electoral activity 
only at one remove, through the Trades Council. 
These trade union bodies were joined, in the local branch of 
the Labour Pdrty, by the ILP. Although explicitly a socialist 
organisation, the ILP's strength 'was not the possession of a 
coherent political philosophy, but the religious fervour with 
which it atýacked the-immediate tasks it saw before it. ' 
21 Central 
control was weak, and it was an organisational home for-many who 
wished to associate themselves with socialism, but with no particular 
version of it. The ILP became, ' in the pre-war years, the Labour 
Party's public face. - ILP members carried out the propaganda and 
fought the elections; trade unionists who actively supported Labour 
joined it. Its importance was well-recognised. Let us looks for 
instance, at the only Parliamentary division fought by Labour before 
the war (Leith, which was contested in January 1910 and at a by- 
22 
electionýin February 1914) . An. experienced Labour campaigner, who 
had already fought North Belfast twice, wrote to Ramsay MacDonald on 
receiving a 'unanimous invitation to ... address a meeting with the 
view of selection as Candidate. ' MacDonald, then Secretary of the 
national Labour Party, had previously voiced 'a very favourable opinion, 
of the constituency; now, asked his 'present view of a candidate's 
18. TC AR 1908. The Committee was led by Robert Allen, subsequently 
General Secretary of the STUC. 
190 H. Mackinven, Edinburgh and District Trades Council Centenary 
- 1859-1959, in TC AR 1959,53- 
20. TC AR 1908. 
21. A-Marwick, 'The Indpendent Labour Party (1918-32)'(B. Litt. thesis, 
(University. of Oxford 196o), 16-17. 






23he thought it 'a good constituency', but would not 
c. ommit himself to 'very strong advice's just because of his assess- 
ment, of the local ILP: 
I was neve 
,r 
altogether satisfied with the 
character of the men, taken as a whole, who 
composed the ILP-there. If I have any 
hesitation about it, it is owing to this 
latter fact. 24 
In shorts' other affiliates to a Labour Party could not compensate 
for weaknesses in the ILP. 
On this basis, the Labour Party had made substantial advances by 
1914: a councillor was returned-in 19'09, joined by two others in 
1911, and threa more in 1913- 
25 Three Labour members were returned to 
the School Board in 1911; a Labour Parish Councillor was elected in 
1908. But for the ILP propaganda was not inevitably associated only 
with elections; and-the SDF was, perhaps primarily, concerned with 
propaganda and education. Where the SDF rejected (after 1901, and until 
1914)26virtually any institutional mediation of its message, the ILP 
accepted the constraints (and the opportunities) implicit in part- 
icipation in elections, whilst maintaining a subýtantial amount of 
direct propaganda. Apart from týe. ILPI the most vital socialist 
party in Edinburgh during the early-years of the century was the 
Socialist Labour Party. This broke with the SDF in 1903, led by a 
number of th 
,e 
Scottish branches and heavily influenced by the American 
Marxist, Daniel De Leon: Edinburgh and Leith were at the head of this 
movement, -and indeed the Party's national headquarters, and its 
publishing house, were in-Edinburgh until the war. 
In Edinburgh, the SLP was the main representative of Marxist 
socialism. Whereas the ILP was an essentially open organisation, with 
little dogma-(but, by the-same token, little theory), and tolerant of 
a wide range of views within its membership, the SLP was based on a 
23. William Walker: letter to J. R. MacDonald, 20 February 1909: LP/ 
CAN . /06/2/244. 
24. J. R. MacDonald, letter to W. Walker, 22 February 1909: 
ýP/CAN/(D6/? 
_/? _45. 
25. - R. A. Fox, -'Members of the Labour Party elected to Edinburgh 
Town Council' (1971: typepcript ill possession of Edin. Trades 
Council), 1-2. 
- 
'26. Kendall, --171, Strictly, the OF became the Social Democratic 
Party in 1909 and the British Socialist Party in 1911. 
269 
highly specific theory of social change. Even more than the SDF 
(which, taking the country as a whole, was the major Marxist party), 
the SIP would have no truck with parliament and trade union 
leaders; 271ndeed, the 'way to socialism Cwas2 blocked by "Pure 
and simple" trade unions' as a whole. The answer lay in the 
construction of socialist trade unions. With such a strict 
position the Party came to assume 
the characteristics of a narrow dogmatic 
sect, convinced that it alone held the key 
to salvation, believing that all beyond its 
boundaries were finally damned, certain that 
salvation could not be achieved without a 
constant search for heresy and its prompt 
elimination wherever it appeared. 28 
Thus Neil Macle4n, the Party's most prominent member, was expelled 
when he joined the Edinburgh''Right to Work' Committee, and took 
part in its delegation to, the'Town Council in 1908 . 
29 
From about 1908 the SLP began to suffer a number of problems. 
Firstly, its theoretical clarity was eroded, as De Leon gave his 
support to the Industrial Workers of the World's amalgam of 
socialism, syndicalism, and industrial unionism: the way ahead now 
called for industriall rather than'socialist, unions. 
30 Secondly, 
the labour unrest provided contemporary examples of trade unionism 
which, - if not soc 
. ialist, were neither pure nor simple. 
31 Thus 
internal debates on strategy developed, which led to disputes about 
Party organisation. 'Members were no longer forbidden to address 
outside bodies or to hold trade union office., 
32 This led to 
criticism in Edinburgh, where the branch claimed that the Party 
had allowed itself to be dominated by an 
official gang. A large numbejý of members 
27. In its attitude to theory, the SLP can be seen as even more 
dogmatic than the SDF; it was also a rather different theory. 
On the SDF, see H. Collins, 'The Marxism of the Social Demo- 
cratic Federation' in Briggs. and Saville (eds. ), Essays in 
Labour History 18 6 1923,47-69; and Kendall, passi 
28. Kendall, 68. 
29. Challinor, Originst 109. 
30- Kendall, 66-7- 
31- Challinor, Origins, 56-106; Holton, British Syndicalism- 
32- Challinor, Origins, 118. 
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had only a dim conception of what the 
Party stood for. Suffice it to say 
that fully three-fourths of the 
Party consisted of members who ware 
connected with shop stewardism. 33 
In 1911 the Edinýurgh branch was expelled from the SLP. (Its 
members in June 1912 established the British Section of the Inter- 
national Socialist Labour Party, 
34 
an organisation whose subsequent 
record lends credence to the view that the nominal grandeur of 
socialist organisations is inversely related to their political 
significance. ) 
Nonetheless, the mainstream of the SLP gained in influence as 
its members began to involve themselves in*the trade union movement. 
Its influence was particularly strong in the NUR at the height of the 
union's flirtation with syndicalism and industrial unionism; and in 
the infant Labour College movement. Thus John S. Clarke, one of the 
SIP's most accomplished propagandists, gave a series of lectures to 
the"Edinburgh No. 1 branch of the NURI under Central Labour College 
35 
auspices, from 1912 or 1913; and, from the branch's post-war 
attitudes, there is every reason to believe he made some impadt - no 
doubt on fertile ground. Yet the major activities of the SLP during 
the pre-war period were public propaganda: its methods were similar 
to those of ILP, SDF, and others. Meetings were held, on street 
corners, in large part, but in Edinburgh predominantly in two places: 
33. R Mc Caigo Report on the Decline and Fall of the SLP (Airdrie, 
n: d. ), 5, quoted in Challinor, Origins, Jig. 
34. Challinor, Origins, 119. 
35- J. P. M. Millar, The Labour College Movement (London n. d. Z-19792 
40, records these as 'a series of winter course lectures ... to 
a class run by the Edinburgh No. 1 branch of the ASRSI in 1912; 
according to J. Atkins, Neither Crumbs nor Condescension. The' 
Central Labour College 1909_ -1915 , 
(Aberdeen 1981), 70, CLC 
extension classes were held for the Edin. NUR in 1913/14 and 
1914/15 (when the bookos period ends); R. Challinor, John S- 
Clarke. ' Parliamentarian, Poet, Lion-Tamer (Tendon 1977) 25, 
gives no precise date, but records that the class he was asked 
to teach was on 'A marxist interpretation of prehistoric 
archaeology', that 35 railwaymen attended, and that it was still 
running after two years (though it had moved on to other histor- 
ical periods, and opened to others besides railwaymen). 
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on the Mound, just off Princes Street, close to railway stations 
'bus terminus, and the centres of working-class residence in the 
Old Tovm; and in the East Meadows, Here John S. Clarke (and other 
36 
good speakers) could gather 'as many as 2,000 people at a time'; 
Hyman Levy, who grew up in the city, described its impact on him 
thus: 
On Sunday nights the Mound ... became 
a hotbed of political disucssion and 
social analysis. Here a vast crowd, 
sober, washed and clean-collared, fore- 
gathered to listen to speakers, of all 
political complexions. ... How was one 
to disentahgý-e the respective 
differences, if any, of the British 
Socialist Party, the Socialist 
Labour Party, or the Social 
Democratic Federation? Time and again 
with a copper I could ill afford, I 
bought a penny pamphlet with a picture 
on the outer cover of a heavily-bearded 
gentleman called Karl Marx. 37 
So when war came, labour politics in Edinburgh was not set upon 
an unchangeable course. Trade union politics was closely allied with 
the ILP for electoral purposes, and was beginning to mark up some 
successes; but the allegiance was not on a socialist basis. The 
Labour Party was little more than the name of this electoral coalition. 
The main activity of the ILP and of other socialist parties was 
propaganda; a relatively unmediated presentatýon of socialist theories 
and analyses to the public. The major exceptions to this were, 
firstly, the ILP's involvement in electoral politics, and, second, 
the SLP's, attention (from about 1909) to trade unions. Thus the 
ILP recognised the importance of working through the Labour Party, 
and with trade unions, if socialists were to achieve practical 
power; the SLP began to develop an analysis which allowed it to 
apply its Marxism to problems of trade union strategy and organisation. 
36. Ibid., 33. 
37- H. Levy, Social Thinking (London 1945), 8. The pamphlets were 
no doubt published by the SLP: cp Challinor, pSigins, 40-41. 
The BSP and the SDF would not have been debating with one 
another, being the. same organisation at different times. 
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Involvement with bodies ofdifferent political outlook could have 
caused problems for both organisations. The ILP escaped serious 
harm by virtue of its ideological flexibility: little was demanded 
of members1save a general belief in socialism; hard labour in the 
cause was welcomed, but enforced only by moral sanctions. In the 
SLP theory was all; changes in strategy led to dispute. The 
organisational solution was in a discipline which showed no 
favour even to its most noted members. 
8.3 War: new issues and institutions 
We may distinguish four levels on which the war altered the 
character of labour and socialist politics. Firstly, the range of 
issues confronting the movement, and around which it might need to 
mobilise, shifted. Second, there was a widening of the movement's 
institutional horizon, as labour representation was admitted in an 
increasing number of areas. Thirdly, there was the development of 
the institutional resources available within the labour movement, 
as the trade union movement, in particular, expanded. Finally, 
there was the tendency for legitimising principles to be more open 
to interpretation in the interest of the working class. We now 
examine these four levels in more detail; much of the material has 
already been dealt with, especially in chapter 5: we shall not, 
repeat this, but seek only to show-its relevance to labour politics, 
and to supplement it where necessary. 
The war, we have argued2 generated a host of problems which 
were (to a greater or lesser extent) amenable to solution through 
union-'mAilisation on a sectional or workplace basis: it also 
generated a number of other problems which workplace mobilisation 
was less likely to solve. It is instructive to list the main issues, 
as mentioned in wartime Trades Council and Labour Party annual reports: 
prices and the cost of living, conscription and recruitment, housing2 
food control, pensions, the plight of disabled ex-servicemen. 
We 
have seen that prices and the cost of living were issues which work- 
I 
place mobilisation could tackle, through winning pay rises in 
various-forms (or working longer hours); it seems too that some of 
the questions of military recruitment were effectively dealt with 
at this level. The remaining issues, however, demanded other forms 
of action, which were developed as appropriate to the various 
problems. This is nott however, to claim that they were adequate 
to tackle the problems effectively: broadlyt they were not. But 
as the problems were perceived within the labour movement as issues 
on which it was legitimate to take action, so mobilisation of various 
kinds was attempted. 
We turn, secondlyto the widening of labour's institutidnal 
horizon. Fundamental to this was the importance of the working class 
to the war effort; the consequence was that the Government needed 
channels through which to maintain the commitment of the working class, 
and one such channel (perhaps the most important) lay through the 
established organisations and leaders of labour. This has been 
widely acknowledged: but the common interpretation has been to 
stress the success of this as a Government stratgy. Thus although, 
for Miliband, 'many Labour leaders' had begun, in the pre-war decades, 
to learn a 'dual rolet (representatives of workers: but also 
Governments' representatives in relation to the working class), yet 
it was the war which gave that role new 
institutional forms. In the course of 
those four years of brokerage, a host of 
Labour representatives became deeply 
involved in the business of the State 
and, with their service in the new 
bureaucracy. that was born of the war, 
acquired a stake, if not in the country, 
at least in the'country's official 
business. 38 
Yet whilst involvement in these institutions carried such risks, there 
were also possibilities; it was an awareness of these which underlay a 
discussion of 'The War and the Future' in the 1916 Annual Report of 
38. Miliband, Parliamenta"--Socialism, 47; cp Middlemas, esp- 71-81, 88-90,98- 
, for a fuller elaboration of an ess&ntially - similar thesis. 
I 
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the Trades Council: 
Since hostilities began, the Trade 
Unions and the Labour Party have been 
specially consulted, and their advice 
sought on matters directly affecting 
their interest. The Prime Minister 
and Secretaries of State have met with 
them in secret, and private information 
has beengiven them. ' Special Congresses 
have been called to be addressed by the 
Government and their military chiefs. 
Recruiting schemes have been hatched 
with their aid. Labour, too, now sits 
in the Cabinet. On the many Committees 
set up to deal with the industrial and 
other problems arising out of the war, Labour has been provided with statutory 
representation. 39 
overnTey)tal, and, ýujsi- In short, there was a plausible view that a9cess o/governme: a, 
institutions, from which it had previously been excluded, gave labour 
a greater ability to defend its interests. - And it was not only the 
-national leaders of labour who became involved in such bodies: the 
institutions open to labour representation also multiplied locally. 
There were some, of course, even before the war; by early, 1916 the 
Trades Council had assisted with t, he Derby Scheme, and was rep- 
40 
resented on exemption tribunals under the Military Service Acts; 
as the war continued, it is clear that not only was there increasing 
labour representation on war-related committees (such as War Pensions 
and Food Control), 
41 
there was also a new tendency for labour 
representation to be invited onto other bodies (such as the Royal 
Infirmary's Board of Management)4,42 
There were some good reasons for imagining that these processes 
were concessions, to be exploited to the full while the opport'4nity 
lasted; rather than cunning strategies perpetrated by those bent on 
subduing the working class anew. Certainly a decision was taken by 
39. TC AR 1916,6-9. 
4o. Ibid., 5. Before the war, the main labour non-elective rep- 
resentation * was 
in Education Advisory Committees, and Pension Committees administering the Old Age Pension Acts. 
41. TC AR 1918,12-15. 
42. TC AR 1917,8. 
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the Trades Council: 
The Council had either to face this 
responsibility and the expense it 
entailed and take that part in 
public administration which 
opportunity gave, or recede to a 
podtion of critical aloofness. It 
wisely chose the first alternative 
... practically unanimously .... 
43 
We should remembertool that this form of involvement of labour 
representatives followed immediately the rapid expansion of Labour 
representation on Town and Parish councils during 1910- 1913; and 
coincided with the'period when the new councillors were beginning 
to participate in Council committees. Perhapst with just six 
councillors, winning representation on the various council committees 
was itself an achievement. Thus in 1911-1912 the Edinburgh Labour 
Party Annual Report contains a Town Council report which is 
perfunctory and general, and a plea from the first Labour councillor 
that there was 
a good deal tobe learned about City 
affairs , and the effectiveness of 
a representative isnot greatest 
until he has mastered a lot. 44 
Just six years later the Labour councillors were reporting in detail 
on a wide range of social-issues: housing transport, pensions, child 45 
welfare, education, food control, and so forth. This must. have been 
a learning process, and we need not be surprised if the terms of the 
representation, and their implications, were not always clearly 
appreciated. For leaving aside those areas where-it was achieved 
through election, labour representation was granted on restrictive 
terms. On the Local Food Committee there were only six labour 
members out of, fifteen (and this after 'agitation', and including 
representatives of the Co-operative movement); 
46 
when the Royal 
Infirmary Board agreed to workers' representation, it did so by adding 
43. Ibid. 1 4. 
44. Labou. - Party, Edin. branch, AR 1911-12. 
45- Labour Party, Edin. branch, AR 1917-18,4-7. 
46. TC AR 1918,12. 
F, 
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five such representatives to its existing twenty-one. 
4711hen 
the 
Town uouncil appointed a Tribunal under the Military Service Aut, 
it elected two Trades Council nominees (in a Tribunal of 25); it 
also elected two Labour councillors 'to sit as Labour representatives' 
in an apparent attempt to impose not'only the quantity, but also the 
character, of Labour representation: 
The Trades Council, while having every 
confidence in the judgement of these two 
councillors, objected to their being 
regarded as Labour representatives in the 
sense of the provisions of the regulations. 
The Trades Council held, as they were app- 
ointed by the Town Council to complete the 
number of Town Councillors who were entitled 
to sit on the Tribunal, to call them Labour 
representatives was to give them a dual 
qualification, and to allow more rep- 
resentatives of other interests to take 
office. 48 
It seems that the point was conceded; but the attempt is clear. 
So whilst the involvement of labour repreoentatives in the machinery 
of government increased substantially, and thus increased the 
institutional compass of labour politics, the representation, was 
limited both in number and in the terms of its involvement. 
8.4 War: ýthe political institutions of-labour 
We turn now, and thirdly, to the development of the institutional 
resources available within the labour movement. Much of this has 
been covered in chapter 7: the growth of trade union membership 
and organisation in particular. The former brought organisational 
problems which were not overcome. - Mobilisation was largely de- 
centralised; successes were achieved on a seutional basis, initiated 
locally and supported less by the strength of labour's institutional 
Etructure than by economic and ideological circumstance. But'the 
47. TCAR 1917,8-11. 
48. TC AR 1916,5. 
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essence of political achievement for labour lay in the co-ordination 
of action: we must therefote examine the relationships between the 
various institutiuns of the movement. 
Aýs we have seen, even before the war the role of the Labour 
Party in Edinburgh's labour politics was a restricted obe: the 
evidence suggests that this continued during wartime (and probably 
its'role became even more limited); that the role of the Trades 
Council was enhanced; and that the Trades Council became somewhat 
distanced from the Labour Party. It was probably inevitable that 
the vitality of an organisation which was, in essence, a coalition 
for electoral purposes, would decline during a period of electoral 
truce: 
49 
for its rationale had evaporated. The surviving wartime 
minutes of the Edinburgh branch indicate that-it mat, on average, 
every two or three months during 1917 and 1918. Its discussions 
50 
appear to have been desultory: the occasional-protest, sporadic 
attempts to form ward committecs; 
51 
a letter from Arthur Henderson 
suggesting a General Election was imminent: perhaps an attempt to 
invigorate the organisation. 
52 Labour representatives on public 
bodies do not seem to have reported to the meetings; indeed, seem not 
53 
even to have attended. So the Edinburgh Labour Party was neither 
49. It was agreed that seats would not, be contested during the war 
period,. although in November 1914 'three retiring Labour members 
were opposed ... but were returned. with large majorities' 
(TC 
AR 1915, quoted R. Fox, 2). There were no further contests until 
after'the war. 
50. E. g., on the disenfranchisement of conscientious objectors, see 
Labour Party, Edin. branch minutes, 13 December 1917. 
51. lbid.,, 22 November 1917,14 February, 13 June 1918. 
52. Ibid., 22 November 1917: he expected an election during the first 
six months of 1918. 
53. At one branch meeting, a delegation of two members had to be 
appointed to meet Labour councillors anent housing policy: ibidjun- 
dated fragment (but probably c. 11 October 1917 from intcrnal 
evidence; incorrectly marked 119181i presumably by National 
Library of Scotland gi;, aff). Town 4tnd Parish councillors did, 
of course, oubmit %vTitten_repgrts for the branch Annual Reports 
and probably attended the Annual General Meeting. School 
Board representatives did report more often. 
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electorally effective (perforce), nor did it effectively supervise 
its councillors. It had, in short, litt3e to do. 
This contrasts with the position of the Trades Council. As 
we have seen, this was involved in attempts to develop and co- 
ordinate union action, and in various ways in the apparatus of war- 
time civil administration. With certain qualifications (such as the 
Town Council's attempt toninimiso its representation on Military 
Service Tribunals), it was perceived as the representative body of 
labour in the City by those outside the movement: and the inevitable 
consequence was to enhance its role within the movement. Clearly 
the character of the Trades Council was changed somew1hat by this 
engagement with government. In 1917 the Annual Report recorded 
that 
the extra work thrown on the /- Tr; ideE; _7 Council in connection with new admin- 
istrative bodies formed to deal with 
matters arising out of the war, and the 
lost time of representatives that had 
to be paid, have added materially to 
the expense of the Council's work. 54 
But although the Trades Council was extremely busy, and although its 
status was enhanced, it did not make any real attempt to strengthen 
or extend the political institutions of the labour movement (as 
opposed to those in which it participated jointly with non-labour 
bodies). We shall look at two aspects of this. 
On the one hand, the Trades Council still found issues on which 
the joint administrative machinery was manifestly inadequate. This 
might mean dispatching a deputation to the aiithority which could mend 
the wrong: ar6paing 'reasonably', and within thevocabulary of motives 
acceptable to the authority. Or it might mean attempting to shift 
this vocabulary, by generating additicnal or alternative legitimising 
principles: this might imply creating institutions %4hcb could sustain 
such principles* It is instructive to look at the main issue on which 
labour was excluded from the processes of government and administration: 
housing. Especially in Scotland, this was the major non-industrial 
54. TC AR 1917,4. 
f' 
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issue of the war period (we have seen, in chapter 4, some of tho 
background to this). Here the Trades Council's approach was not 
unsophisticated; and at various times popular'discontent ran deep. 
4 
Yet the Trades Council found it difficult to capitalise on this in 
the form of deep-rooted or lasting organisation. 
In 1915 discontent over housing conditiono on Clydeside had 
led to-the famous rent strike, and to Government concession in the 
form of the Rent Restriction Act of 1915: the latter, though perhaps 
wrongly, ýas widely seen as an affirmation of the potential effect- 
iveness of working class action, and led directly to the formation of 
the Scottish Labour 1ýousing Association. 
55 But there was a considerable 
ambiguity in its activity. The SLHA drew not only on the tradition 
of ldireýt action' exemplified by the rent strike; as the 'urgent 
6 
qonnection between industrial and housing issues waned after the, 
strike, more mainstream traditions of protest came to the fore. Where 
the organisation of the rent strike on Clydeside had relied on the 
development of community-based mobilising institutions, the activity 
of the SLHA concentrated on co-ordinating the existing institutions 
of the labour movement in relation to the housing issue: over 
several years, this had some effect on the terms of the housing debate, 
and doubtless played some part in eliciting the post-war hoaning 
concessions from government. But this approach represented an implicit 
acceptance that the structure of the. labour movement was adequate to 
55. On the Clyde rent strike, see J. McHugh, 'The Clyde rent strike, 
1915', SLHSJ 12,1978,56-61; q. Melling,. 'The Glasgow rent 
strilo and Clydeside labour - some problems of interpretation's 
SLHSJ 13,19799 39-44; B. Moorhouse, M. Wilson, C. Chamberlainj 
'Rent strikes - direct action and the working class', Socialist 
1972, esp. 135 6,150-53; on the link'between the rent 
strike and the formation of the SLHA see J-Melling, 'Clydeside 
housing and the evolution of state rent control, 190Q - 1939' 
and the St&te, esp. in Melling (ed. ) Housing, Social Policy * 
147-51- Meýling #correctly refers to the SLHA as the Scottish 
Labour Party Housing Association. 
56. Ibid., 151. 
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deal with housing issues: in its pattern, at least, if not in its 
extent. And yet there is little sign that ýhis was so. 
In Edinburgh, the Trades Council's involvement with the SIM 
(it was involved in its formation, and'was one of its main 
supporters in the capital) reftected this approach. We can'see this 
if we look at the Council's activity on housing during just one year 
- 1916, for instance. Having participated in the founding confer- 
ence of the SLHA in January, 
57the 
chief grievance (housing conditions 
for workers at-Rosyth Naval Base: many, of course, -were living in 
Edinbure; h) was taken up thus. A deputation was sent 'to gain 
particulars concerning the type of houces provided for workers at 
the Naval base; the deputation reported to a Conference of 'Trado 
Union Branches, 'Labour and Socialist Bodies, and Women's Guilds'. 
58 
This led to a protest resolution and a deputatibn to the Tovin 
Cotific il: 
The deputation protested strongly against 
ýhe suggested renovation'of closed slum 
property and stated that if new houses 
could not be provided,, that large houses 
now standing empty, should be commandeered 
for the workers' use. ' 59 
The deputation met with no success: such proposals can hardly have 
commended themselves to a'Town Council replete with property-owners. 
A subsequent deputations dispatched to the Admiralty in London, 
60 
61 
fared little better. We have here both an approach which inevitably 
casts labour in a suppliant role, and, in their proposals, a trace of 
a more assertive attitude: the latter, however, could not be success- 
ful in the context of the former, whilst the former was almost 
inevitable given the unwillingness (or inability) to restructure the 
labour movements and given the fundamental commitment to a 'national 






TC AR 1916, lo. 
TC AR 1917,11. 
Ibid., 11-12. 
CP S-3-3 above. 
TC AR 1917,12. 
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The second aspect of the Trades Council's tendency to pay 
little attention to strengthening the institutional base of labour 
politics is shown in its wartime attitude to the Labour Party. 
Previously, it had maintained a relatively firm control: the Party's 
1 62 
secretary had also been secretary of the Council; as late as 
30 July 1914 the Trades Council had endeavoured to send 
its own delegates to the Conference whicliwas to appoint a Scottish 
Advisory Committee of the Labour Party. 
63 
During the war, tho Trades 
Council's interest was reduced: the Labour Party served no electoral 
purpose; and there was no need to dcal with Labour councillors through 



















25 E1919; P1920 
E: - on executive committee in year beginning Marcli. 
P: president in year beginning March. 
whilst not on the executive committee, Hogg was the T. C. 's auditor 
duringthe years 1917-18,1918-19 and 1919-20. 
Source: TC ARs, 1916-1919. 
Party, Edinburgh branch, 1916-20 
Attendance at TC 
-(precedi=eza-rT Actual Possible TC status 
Nat. League of Blind 24 26 
Typefounders 22 26 
Corporation Employees 24 26 E1916 
Shale Miners 88 E1916&191? 
NU Railwaymen No 1 15 27 
Shop Assistants 
(hAirdressers) 13 27 
Coachmakers 9 13 
Rail Clerks 18 27 











Postal & Telegraphic 
Clerks 
A. Bain Furnishing Trades 17 
J. Rutherford, Shop Assistants 
(hairdressers) 22 
j. F. Wallace ýhgineera (West branch) 22 
62. Fred Hamilton: cp TC AR 1908. 
63- Letter, Alexander Smith to Arthur Henderson, 30 JulY 1914 (IP/ 
SAC/14/13): representation was refused, despite Smith's assertion 
that Glasgow constituted a precedent: see letter, J. S. Middleton 
to A. Smith, 1 August 1914 (LPISACIJLV14). 
* 
23 26 E1918 
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an intermediary. The delegates to the local Labour Party appointed 
by the Trades Council between 1916 and '1920 (four were elected in 
each year) are shewn in table 8.1: they were trusted and probably 
conscientious delegates, well-known to the Trades Council in moot 
(but not all) cases, but not active at its highest levels. (The 
Council's Executive Committee was fifteen strong during these years. ) 
This is-not the policy of an organisation interested in detailed 
interVention in the Party. Even the records of those who were EC 
members tell the same story: two were EC members for just one year 
each; a third who was a member for two years apparently elected 
against being a delegate to the Party in the second. Only one, 
Wallace, was a man of obvious substance in the Council, becoming 
President in 1920. Yet by 1919 the amalgamation of the two 
organisations was on the immediate agenda; it is surprising that, even 
then, the Council was content to have only one EC member as a 
delegate. 
Nor*was this collective disinterest counteracted by any deep 
involvement by the individual delegates. No Trades Council deleEate 
served on the Labour Party branch executive for 1917-18.64 In 1918 the 
Conncil agreed-that the attendance ofits delegates 'could not be 
considered satisfactory's 
65though 
it made no move to remedy the 
position: indeed, three'of the delegates whose performance was thus 
criticised were returned again the following year. Neither was 
there any substantial overlap between leading Trades Council and 
Labour Party members. No-ono who was a member of tile Labour Party's 
executive committee in 1917-1918 was also a member of tile Trades 
Council's EC in that or the previous year: there was one commcn 
member Ath the Council's executive of 1918-1919 (but this was the 66 
Labour Party's charinan in the period i=ediately before amalgamation). 
64. Labour Party, Edin. branch Annual Report 1917/18. 
65. TC minutes, 7 May 1913. 
66. Cp Labour Party, Edin. branch minutes, 3 December 1917- 
I 
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-The Trades Council, then, whilat busy, did not intervene 
actively to change the institutional structure of labour politics 
markedly during the war: it responded to stimuli which originated 
outside the movement, and it intervened actively (if without great 
success) to restructure the local trade union, movement; but in 
politics it was largely passive. Yet its involvement in so much 
quasi-governmental politics inevitably shifted the orientation of 
labour politics. We might reasonably suppose that the alteration 
in the relative roles of Labour Party and Trades Council also affected 
socialist politics in the city: unfortunately, the surviving evidence 
is insufficient to allow precise statements about this. We can, 
however, sketch socialist politics at the end of the war. 
Probably the ILP suffered a loss of momentum with the 
suspension of elections; its value to the trade-unions - as an 
electoral ally - was reduced. At the same time, it was riven by 
the dispute about-commitment to the war. Yet what is most striking 
about the ILP is the extent to which it absorbed these problems: its 
fervour 'was related to a general, not a tightly-defined, end; and to 
no particular method. There is no record of a discussion about the 
67 
war in the surviving wartime minutes of Edinburgh Central branch, 
and the common attitude seems to have been to avoid formal debate on 
the subject of the war, but to concentrate on areas where agreement 
within the Party could be found: issues such as 'Land Socialisation' 
and opposition to wartime encroachments on civil liberties. 
68 
Thus it 
escaped the organisational splits which affected the BSP over the war 
question; and although we cannot be certain that the ILP-had grown 
during the war, it seems to have been growing at least in 1917 and 
1918, an&it was almost certainly the largest socialist organisation 
in the City. In 1917-it8 three branches had a combined membership 
probably exceeding 300', and the (key) Central branch alone was able 
to pay its affiliation fee to the Labour Party in February 1919 'on 
67- ILP(C) minutes survive from 11 January 1918 to the Armistice. 
68. ILP (C) minutes, 21 Jiinej 27 September 1918; letter Ernest A. 





The'meetings of the Central branch were held 
fortnightly, and the average attendance seems to have been about 
thirty: in May 1918 forty members attended a meeting, and thisvas 
considered "good' by the minutes; 
70 
a few'weeks previously about 




Although the ILP's role in electoral politics was of little 
importance while the latter were suspended, by the later years of the 
war the ILP had close informal connections with the trade unions. 
Of the twelve officials and executive committee members of the Central 
branch in 1917/18, for instance, certainly, four probably five* and 
quite possibly more were active trades unionists; so too were many 
others of the branch's leading members. 
72 At the same time, however, 
there is no sign of any attempt to intervene politically in union 
affairs, or to mobilise unions in pursuit of some Party objective. 
The priorities of the ILP are well-defined by the committees which 
the Central branch appointed: two onlpropagandal (one for the 
summer's-outdoor w ork, one for the winter); one each on 'Halls 
'Social', 'Labour Party (Edinburgh branch)" (presumably the ILP's 
delegates), and 'Parliamentary campaign'. 
73 In short, 'politics' 
for the ILP continued to mean, primarily, propaganda in which there 
was direct contact between the Party and the people; trade unionists 
who were also socialists might join the ILPI and their socialism 
would be reflected in their union work. But it was an individual 
rather than a collective intervention in union affairs. 
Of the other socialist bodies we can-be still less certain. 
The schism in the BSP leA to the formation, by the pro-war group in 
69. Edin.. 'branch, LP-Annual Report 1917-18,8; ILP(C) minutes 
28 February 1919. 
70. Ibidis 3 May 1918- 
71. Ibid., 29 March 1918., 
72. Edin. Central branch ILP, ! List of Officials and Standing 
Committees for the year to 28 February 19181. 
73- Ibid., the list also includes individuals responsible for 'Dues', 
'Literature', 'District Federation ILP19 'Workers Educational 
Association'. I have listed the committees in the order (of 
importance? ) in which they were set down in the original. 
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Edinburgh, -of an organisation called the Scottish Socialist 
Federation. Though small, this contained-several who were 
influential in the city's labour movement. 
74 We, know that branches 
of the BSP, SLP andBSISLP continued to function . 
75 We may assume 
that all continued their propagandistic work; and-it seems that 
the last-mentioned was largely restricted to this. -Certainly its 
theo 
, 
retical position excluded most other activities, and its contact 
with the-remainder of the labour movement may have been restricted 
to the occasional debate-76 In contrast to its national policy, the 
BSP branch in Edinburgh was not affiliated to the Labour Party: 
which may signify either its dissent from the policy, or its 
insignificant size. 
77 Otherwise, we can only surmise that the 
general development of these organisations followed the pattern 
found elsewhere. This suggests that wartime militancy, and partic- 
ularly the unofficial shop stewards movement, provided the mechanism 
through which BSP and - above all - SLP militants began to turn from 
politlc6 qua propaganda and-education to a consciousness of the 
the political dimension of industrial organisation and mobilisation: 
The wartime shop stewards' m, ovemen 
,t carried Industrial ýnionism and 
revolutionary syndicalism from prop- 
aganda to action, from the branch to 
the workshop. 78 - 
74. This 'Scottish Socialist Federation' should not be confused 
with either that which linked SDF and Socialist League in the 
late 
, 
18ýOs or that formed by Edinburgh ILP branches which 
prefeýrred t7o secede from the ILP rather than the Labour Party 
- in 1931- 
754 Cp ILP(c)-minutes, 16 May 1919. -- 
76. Cp letter, 20 January 1918, 'T. Tait, Organiser, Edin. branch, 
BSISLP to Secretary', ILP(C), challenging ILP to debate 'The 
ILP is unworthy of working class support-'. 
77- The BSPI_havirig voted to affiliate t6 the*L'Aour Party in'1914, 
did so in 1916, according to Kendall, 171; ' no BSP branch was 
affiliated to Edinburgh Labour Party in 1917/18. - 
78. Hinton, Fir'st Shop Stewards' Mo, ýement,, . 283'. is 
probably the best study of this, but cp Kendall, esp. 103-69; 
Challinor, Origins, esp. 150-70. 
S) 
r. 86 
Whilst the shop stewardsimovement, as we have seen, had a shallower 
basis in Edinburgh than in the West of Scotland, Edinburgh was a 
stronghold of the SIP. It would therefore be unwise to ignore these 
trends within Marxist socialism; in addition% there is evidence - 
as we shall presently see - that the influence of these ideas ran 
deep in certain sectors of industry. 
8.5 War: Political motivation 
We look now at the-fourth level at which the war affected labour and 
socialist politics. We have argued, in chapter 7, that the war 
changed the motivational context of industrial politics. The 
legitimacy of 'profit' was eroded; notions of 'efficiency', lorgan- 
isatýonl, and so on, long closely-associated with profit, became 
distanced from it, and - more important - open to interpretation in 
the working class or trade union interest; union activity, and 
workers' rights, were legally recognised (if not always effectively 
enforced); the sense of ordinary people's sacrifice in France ý 
strengthened working class self-confidence. All these elements, 
however, turned on the generation within the workplace of a host of 
problems which, in the light of these new motives, could be perceived 
as important and soluble; or on the generation of problems outside 
the workplace which could be tackled w1hin it. Now, broadly, these 
or similar changes also-occurred in the motivational context of 
politics more-generally. 'Profiteering' was a social, not merely 
an industrial, vice; 'efficiency' and lorganisation' were not seen 
as entirely, or even primarily, industrial principles - but as 
relevant to society as a whole; sacrifice in France was in no way 
closely, associated with industry as such. What was significant was 
that, in the workplacet these found an institutional context which 
made them relevant as principles legitimising action: in discussing 
the impact of these and similar sources of motivel we must consider 
how far labour and socialist politics offered a context which made 
principles legitimising a sense of injustice or grievance into 
principles legitimising a course of action. We must also consider that 
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legitimising principles can be relevant to different groups, and 
have different impacts in each. 
In part, the wartime period can be seen as one in which the 
labour movement was in internal dispute over the definition of 
political action. There were two poles in this dispute, and each 
may be regarded as providing a framework which enabled general 
principles to become principles legitimising specific courses of 
action. Each pole developed during the war (though each, of course, 
drew on more than just wartime experience). We should add, too, 
that the labour movement did not split clearly between these two 
definitions: there was tension between them not least because 
many individuals subscribed to some elements of both. The first pole 
can be characterised as an enhanced view of the powers of the state, 
coupled sometimes with an optimistic view of the possibility of 
labour. 's gaining control of'it, or at least influencing it. As early 
as 1916 an awareness was growing that 
there are great latent possibilities 
in the powers now in force whereby 
the State can commandeer supplies, 
take over businesses, assume control 
of factories, and run the transport 
services. 79 
As the intricacy of state control increased with the length of the 
war, so this awareness grew deeper roots. To be conscious of the 
state's power for good did not imply a belief that it could never be 
misused: 
The powers contained under the Defence 
of the Realm Act, and under the 
Munitions Act, may be a starting-point 
. 
for a reactionary and repressive 
policy. . 80 
Nor was it necessary-to believe that state control always operated 
effectively: it was, indeed, often an article of faith that it did 
not, either because the state wished it so, or because of the influence 
79. TC AR 1916,9. On the impact 6f wartime planning on British 
Labour thought, cp A-Oldfield, 'The Growth of the. Concept of 
Economic Planning in the Doctrine of the British Lab . our Party, 
1914-1935' (PhD thesis, University of Sheffield, 1973), esp. 
99-121. 
80. TC AR 19169 
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of entrenched vested interests. The Trades Council accused the 
Town Council, for instance, of attempting 'to frustrate or delay 
direct municipal action fon housing. _. 
7, and to provide a new field of 
operations for the discredited speculator', rather than accept the 
full recommendations of the Royal Commission on housing. 
81 
But the 
belief seems commonly to have been that the possibilities of state 
control, planning and organisation had been amply demonstrated: 
inadequacies could be blamed on failures of will. Thus in 1917 
food scarcities led the Government to urge local authorities 
to start Communal Kitchens, but the 
suspicion was raised that there was an 
attempt to get the workers and their 
families to use glorified soup kitchens 
so as to keep the well-to-do immune 
-from hardship and inconverýence. - 82 
The response, however, does not suggest that, even after three years 
of war, there were serious questions about where the solution lay. 
A demonstration in the Meadows demanded. 
that profiteering be ended, that steps 
be taken to completely control and 
regulate the food supplies, and that 
the Government disclose their plans 
for rationing. 83 
We have already seen how 'the status Labour has secured, and its 
call to the counsels of* the nation, 184 provide 
.d 
an institutional frame- 
work through which labour could hope to gain control - or at least 
some influence - over the apparatus of the state. The experience of- 
state power during the war offered a ready example of its importance. 
The second pole in the debate about the meaning of political 
action drew not so much on the power of existing government structures 
as on that of the existing trade union movement. This-approach 
located political strength in the trade union movement. Such a view 
81. TC AR 1918,17; cp Report f the Royal Commission on the Housing 
of the Industrial Po'Pulation of Scotland, Cd. 8731- 
82. TC AR 1918,12. 
83; Ibid.. For-the context to this, see Marwick, Deluge, 206-208. 
84. TC AR 1916,9-1o. 
was, of course, not unreasonable (if perhaps over-optimistic). It 
rested, apart-from the growth of union strength, during the war, on 
views of the potential-of trade union action which owed much to 
pre-war syndicalism and industrial unionism. Pre-war British 
syndicalism was a movement encompassing a variety of understandings 
about politics-and trades unionisriii, rather than a coherent, unified, 
body of theory; but it was an important-element-in the political 
reasoning of a-large number of labour militants. When Ja. mes Larkin 
spoke in-Edinburgh-in December 1913-, 7000-supporters turned out to 
hear him. 'The platform was stormed by-sympathisers eager to shilke 
Mr-. Larkin by the-hand. 185 Men and women such as these would have 
experienced the war with dispositions which comprehended-'direct 
action'; which believed labour unionism (of some kind)-could-form 
the basis of a new-sbciety; which saw in the state more dangers 
than possibilities. 
86 
This Eeneral--political outlook, stressing 
solution through--industrial-organisation end action, was strength- 
ened by the-importance-of the SLP in Edinburgh, and-by the-success 
of shop stewards and other trade union movements during the war. 
Such-understandings underlay widespread labour fears about the 
trend of government policy: - 
there is another view of War prece. dents........, 
The munition trades ýre dirirmed;. ýhe strike 








t.. penal. servitude is, 
_bp 
explained. on their portion. All this may 
tho ground of military necessity, but it seems 
an ominous invasion of industrial liberty. 87 
85. Liverp6ol Daily Post and Mercur*X*,, 12 December 1913, quoted by 
Holton, British Syndicalism, 196. 
86. The most comprehensive study'*Js Holton, *ýritish SynýLcalism, 
but see also Holton, ISyndicalist Theories of the State';. 
G. Brown (ed. ) The Industrial Synaicalist (Nottingham 1974,:. * 
reprint of a periodical, 1910-11, edited by Tom Mann), esp. 
5-29; Brown,. Sabotage, esp. 27-40. 
87- TC AR 1916,9. 
f' 
Such was the view of the Trades Council itself, so heavily involved 
in the apparatus of government, not simply of a few extremists. 
Within the mainstream of the movement there was an ambivalence, 
very often: political and economic developments and possibilities 
were perceived-in terms of both understandings of 'politics', 
simultaneously. 
Safety from the dangers that lie ahead 
will only be found in stronger industrial 
and political organisation, by the workers 
assuming the power to control their own 
destinies, and not remaining content with a 
share as a polite and gracious concession. 88 
Thus the Trades Council again. It was, therefore, by no means 
inevitable (if we were to abstract Edinburgh alone) that wartime 
developments would lead to the dominance of the post-1918 Labour 
Party. 
- -One final, but important, consideration should be mentioned. 
Although-there was a significant anti-war minority within the labour 
movement, the dominant attitude was an acceptance of the necessity 
of the war. This reflected a patriotism common to all classes. 
Returning to Edinburgh from Portobello, the pacifist, Clifford Allen, 
found on 'Top of tram fa. 2 state of-slight drunkenness and great 
hilarity and much hatred of Germans'; 
89 
this was the time, --too, when 
vigorous opposition to the establishment-of a professorship of 
German in the University could deny the validity of the German language 
and literature. 
go In the Trades-Council 
many discussions have taken place-... 
on issues arising out of the European 
88. Ibid., 10. 
89. Clifford Allenýs diary, 14 August 1918, quoted in A. Marwick, 
Clifford Allen. The Open-Conspirator (Edinburgh 1964), 51. 
90. Sir 
* 
Jame's brichton-Browne, F.. R. S. spokesman.. for those hostile 
to the proposal, wrote: 'The German language forsooth, is not 
alanguage; but a hideous guttural throaýage. As for German 
li 
* 
terature, that part of it which is not Poisonous , 
is of the 
most , stodgy and 
indigestible description. We have Schiller, 
Goethe, LesSing and Kant , of 
the ante-depravitý period in 
Germany adequately represented in tran&tions, and we don't 
want any more German Literature. ' - quoted in Ewing, Sir Alfred 
Ewing, 211; on Crichton-Browne, who was apparently an otherwise 
enlightened man, see DNB, 2536. 
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conflict. In the main a general 
support has been given to the war 
and the-policy of the Government. 91 
With rare exceptions, the limits of acceptable action during wartime 
were defined by an understanding of the h; -n%&%fu interest - albeit 
often an understanding which would have been rejected by government 
or employers: 'No military necessity, no national peril can justify 
punishment without trial-the annuling Z-sic_7 of the elementary 
rights of citizenship'. 
92 
IN 
91. TC AR 1916,12. 
92. Ibid., 9. 
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Chapter 
The-Reorganisation of Labour 1917 - 1921 
9.1 The post-war Political context. 
With the end of-the war-came important changes in the context of 
labour politics. Some, covered in earlier chapters, we must here 
take as read: a loss of self-confidence among employers and within 
the states a rise in union morale, a persistence of many of the 
I factors which generated union strength. Two, however, demand 
further discussion. The institutional framework within which 
political mobilisation and action occurred was substantially altered. 
At the same time, the stock of principles by which political action 
could be legitimised underwent a major change. Together, these 
induced-an uncertainty about the movement's political-aims and 
methods. Let us look at these two changes of context. 
First, the institutional framework: here there were a 
number of changes, some apparently contradictory. For the first 
time, from 1918, the parliamentary franchise was extended to include 
all working-class men, and although this did not bring a commensurate 
Labour vote, the Party in Edinburgh was encouraged by the election of 
its first M. P., William Graham, for the Central division. 
' The local 
Graham received 7159 votes; with a majority of 364 over his 
Coalition Liberal opponent, in a 45.2 per cent poll. It should 
be said, however, that results at the December 1918 election were 
not so encouraging elsewhere in the City: in Leith and in 
Edinburgh West, Labour candidates finished at'the bottom of the 
poll, behind Liberals and Coalition Unionists, taking 14.6 per 
cent of a 53.0 per cent poll in Edinburgh West; 19.1 per cent 
of a 52.2 per cent poll in Leith. 
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government franchise remained a restricted one, and may account 
in part for the poor Labour showing wh; n Town Council elections 
2 
were resumed in 1919: although the existing Labour-councillors 
did not face re-election, they may have felt some weakening of 
their electoral sources of strength. After the Armistice, do- 
mobilisation proceeded apace, under the pressure of large-scale milit- 
ary and naval unrest and mutiny: towns-and cities throughout the 
country were swamped with ex-servicemen, largely unemployed. They 
became, for a brief period, an important political constituency, 
wooed and feared by both Labour and government, -and generating a- 
number of aspirant representative organisations. 
3 In particular, 
they were a target for the press, which was itself increasingly a 
target of government news management: certainly the Trades Council 
claimed that an 'active anti Trades Union campaign Z-was_7 being 
conducted by a certain section of the Scottish Press' in early 1919, 
and a year later was referring to 
a continuous crusade of slander In the Press and on many platforms 
for the purpose of alienating the ex- 
Service man from the, Trade Unions. 5... 
At the same time the government was sponsoring the-creation of 'a 
series of "non-political" and "independent" bodies, whose expressed 
object was to "combat Bolshevism", genepally by-means of-extensive 
advertising, lecturing and agitation among the working class.. 
2. All six candidates were unsuccessful at the November elections, 
although eachpolled between 850 and 1509 votes. 
3- See above, chapter 7; the variotis organisations and their 
evolution are described in Ward, 'Intelligence surveillance'. 
4. TC minutes, ll'March 1919; on government news maiiagement, see 
Middlemasi-131,145-6; Cowling, Impact of Labour, 
__ 
esp. 45-59- 
5. TC AR 1920,10. 
6. S. White, 'Idearlogical hegemony and political control: the 
sociology oi anti-Bolshevism in Britain, 19187201, SLSHj,. 9,3; 
White, 3-20, examines the format#nj composition and support 
of many of these bodies; Middlemas, 141-51, discusses govern- 
ment strategy during this period. It is intriguing to note 
Lloyd George's 1920 comment: 'The real dangers to England do 
not emanate from Bolshevism. Bolshevism is almost a safeguard 
to society, for it infects all clapses with a horror of what 
might happen if the present organisation of society is over- 
thrown. ' Quoted in Middlemas, 152. 
I 
2c 94 
came At the same time, secondlyV a number of important changes in 
the stock of legitimising principles by which political action could 
be justified. Apart from those mentioned in chapter 7, two stand 
out: the end of the war, and the Russian revolutions of 1917. 
The ending of war weakened, and reoriented, the impact of the 
-language of 'nation' and patriotism. During the war, and in 
general, the needs of the war effort had been accepted by the 
labour movement in Edinburgh. Thus in-1915, the Trades Council's 
executive had opposed the Derby Scheme, urging the Government 
to compulsorily organise the nntion for 
the purpose of more effectually prosecuting 
the War, 7 
and-there was no question but that support should be given to the 
war. (This did not, of course, exclude opposition to measures 
deemed by-the government to W in the national interest: in*most 
instances, labour support for the war was a negotiated support. ) 
As the-war continued, the Trades, Council continued to be critical 
of--its prosecution, but always critically supportive. Outright 
opposition seems to have been confined to the socialist political 
organisations. Even there, however, such views were not held by all; 
and, certainly none*in leading positionslin EdinburghTs Labour Party 
seems to have been strongly anti-war. Of the three wartime 
councillors of whom we have information, for instance, one at least. 
was strongly pro-war, and the other-two volunteered for war service, 
although all three were ILP members. 
8 In the main, those opposed 
7- TC AR 1916,2; the full Council overturned this by 'a small 
majority' in favour of the Derby scheme. 
8. John A. Young (Couricillor 1909-1920; Parliamentary candidate, 
Edinburgh West, 1918) was a member of the Scottish Socialist 
Federation, and apparently had a 'relation with the British 
Workers' league through A. B. Stewart' (ILP Central branch 
minutes, 20 September 1918). William Graham, (Councillor 1913- 
1919, M. P. for Edinburgh Central 1918-31), though a 'pacifist', 
volunteere4'for war service but was rejected on medical grounds 
(T. N. Grýham, Willie*Grahad. ' The Life of the Rt. Hon. W. Graha 
(London, n. d. &c. 1948-7,60-61). Gerald Crawford (Councillor 
1912-1920,1926-1942) volunteered in 1914 and served until 
October 1917 when he was discharged as 'no longer physically 
fit for War Service' (letter, G. W. Crawford to J. McCorquodale, 
Secretary, ILP Central branch, 21 October 1917). 
f 
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to the war seem to have-been isolated, save when opposition to the 
war could be allied with criticism of an aspect of government war 
policy - as on many trade union questions, or on certain issues 
of civil liberty. 
In peacetime, labour's political activities were no longer 
self-regulated by this over-riding sense of national interest. Many 
of the arguments by which members of the labour movement had justified 
their support for the war were now freed from this restraint, and 
assumed greater weight just because they had become important 
elements in labour's (negotiated) 'war aims". Thus many popular 
definitions of the 'nation' now saw labour as an important estate: 
'national' concepts could be used to legitimise actions which might 
have been supported by principles of fairness, but with less force. 
Thus the Trades Council could argue, in relation to government 
pblicies on housing, that 
If the money*is there to lend it is 
there to tax, and no national purpose 
is served by making the housing 
scheme a pretext for fixing on the 
backs of the workers an idle money- 
lending class and maintaining them 
in perpetuity. 9- 
But in parts too, notions of patriotism and the national interest 
had-been justified by the ascription to the enemy of unacceptable 
political characteristics. Thus the war was fought, or so it was 
claimed, not against Germans so much as 'Kaiserism', a form of 
'despotism'. 10 There was, here, a sense that certain essential 
freedoms were inherent in British nationality, akin perhaps to 
traditions of the 'free-born Englishman'. 
" Where such supportive 
beliefs could buttress the national effort in time of war, they might 
redefine it when the threat had passed. 
q. - TC AR 1919,17; emphasis added. 
10. See, e. g., TC AR 1917,15. 
11. Cg E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London 
1963) esp- 77-101; see also V. Kiernan, 'Working Class and 
Nation in Nineteenth Century Britain', in M. C6rnforth (ed. ), 
Rebels and their Causýs- Essays in Honour of A. L. Morton 
(London 1978), 123-39- 
V 
ýv6 
The Russian revolutions of 1917 were initially perceived 
in this light. tA Revolution has taken place in Russia. Despotism 
12 has been overthrown and former war aims revoked' . Undoubtedly 
the fact of revolution added to the self-confidence of the labour 
movement in Britain, and was a source of unease - occasionally 
verging on hysteria - among the middle class. But theirImpact 
amongst British labour was complicated in a number of ways. The 
Octob*er revolution raised questions of socialist method which were 
related (if not always straightforwardly) to debates within the 
British labour movement. The nature of Bolshevism was itself a 
matter of dispute: inevitably associated with the question of war 
aims, it was highly susceptible to interested interpretation. ýn due 
course it was complicated by allied intervention in the Civil War. 
Within the movement in Edinburgh, there is evidence of an attempt 
to use the spectre of Bolshevism to perpetuate, in peacetime, the 
alignments which had been supported by patriotism in war. This 
effort focused, it seems, on the Edinburgh branch of the National 
Socialist Party which had its origins in the pro-war faction of the 
BSP. Clearly such an'organisation needed to find a new political 
justification after the war. In January 1919 its secretary attended 
a 'Committee appointed to consolidate Pro Ally Socialist activities 
in Scotland': 
13 
probably as a result of this came its decision to 
become a branch of the NSP.. A battle then ensued: the national 
leadership of the Party, together with a group within the Edinburgh 
branch, appear to have seen Bolshevism as the issue which could 
replace the war as a political rationale for the Party 
A circular and 3 collecting Cards were 
received from the ExZ7ecutive 
.7 Committeli. j7 of the N. S. P. Z12 
the Funds were required to kill 
Bolshevism. 14 
12. TC AR 1917,15; cp Council of Workers, and Soldiers' Delqgatqss 
What Happened at Leeds (Londgn 1917), passim.; S. White, 
'Soviets in Britain: ' the Leeds Convention of 1917', Int. Rev. 
Soc-Hist, - 19,1974 1 165-93- 
13- SSF minutes, 10 January 1919: only on 26 January 1919 did the 
SSF-technically declare itself a branch-of the NSP. 
14. NSP, Edin. branch, minutes, 9 March 1919. 
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The branch agreed to accept the cards by eight votes to six: 
but the attempt to persuade labour that Bolshevism was the 
major enemy was not to be easily achieved. When a member wrote 
a week later 
intimating his resignation from the 
Branch owing to his disagreeing with 
the effort to collect money to fight 
Bolshevism, 
the mood had changed: it was unanimously agreed to 
write asking him to reconsider and 
intimating the Branch was in 
sympathy with him, 15 
and by the early summer of 1919 the branch was responding positively 
to a BSP request 'to take joint action to protest againstthe Govern- 
ment action in Russia. Conscription, and espionage!. 
16 Yet the 
attempt was made, and may have been part of a wider, government 
sponsored, strategy. 
17 
Within the ILP we can see another aspect of the impact of the 
October revolution: initial fascination and curiosity, tempered 
by an apprehension about method; but in the course of time providing 
a partial support for. a re-assessment of political method. Just 
four months after the Bolshevik revolution, the Central branch 
endorsed a resolution protesting a gainst*attacks on the Bolsheviks 
made by Labour leaders: 
It is up to the rank and file of the 
ILP to make ourselves felt and to insist 
that the ILP shall rally to the cause of 
the Bolsheviks, which is the cause of 
International Socialism. Their methods 
may notbe our methods, but their cause 
is ours. 18 
15i Ibid., 16 March 1919. 
16i Ibid., 22 June 1919. 
17- The evidence for this latter suggestion is small, and the 
conclusion must therefore by very teniative. A prominent 
member of the branch, Cllr. J. A-Young, was attacke ,d at 
a 
meeting of the ILP Central * 
branch (of which * 
he was also. a 
member) for being a member of the, SSF and associated with the 
British Workers' League: it was even implied that the latter 
might put him. forward as a parliamentary'candidate for'Edinburgh 
Central. See ILP Central braých minutes, 20'September,. 18 October, 
15 November 1918. On the BWL, see R-Douglas ,' 'Týe National 
Democratic Party and the British Workers' Leqgue, 'Eist. -J- 15, 
1972,533-52. 
18. Letter, G. J. Hucklej Secretary, Cambridge' ILP , to Se'cre't'aryj . 'ILP 
Central'branch, 24 March 1918: the letter asked for approval and 
the forwarding of a resolution, and is endorsed 'Sent 23/4/18l: 
this I take to imply support for the sentiments expressed in the lette 
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At much the same time the branch ordered twelve copies of a BSP 
book, 'The Bolsheviks etc. '; by July it was ordering-156 copies of 
Lenin's pamphlet, 'Lessons of the Russian Revolution, ' also from 
the BSP. 19 Towards the end of the war sympathetic curiosity began 
to be associated with concern at allied intervention in Russia; 
20 
when the war ended intervention was no longer an issue clouded by 
the demands of patriotism. In January 1919 a 'Hands Off Russia' 
Conference was 
I 
called, to which the Central branch sent a delegate: 
21 
in the following months the Edinburgh 'Hands Off Russia' Committee 
began to make an impact on both trade unions and political organisa- 
tions. Although, according to one of its members, the Edinburgh 
Committee was 
a hole-and-coracrorganisation 
run by a little group of engineers 
who worked in Rosyth dockyard, mostly 
Englishmen transferred from Portsmouth, 22 
it ensur*ed that the issue of intervention in Russia were constantly 
raised. 
23 The outbreak of the Russo-Polish war in April 1920 gave 
19. ILP Central branch minutes, 19 April, 19 July 1918: Lessons of 
the Rýssian Revolution is reprinted in V. I. Lenin, Selected 
Works, vol. 2,207-21; it was written between the February and 
October revolutions. 'The Bolshevik, Etc. 's identity is unclear: 
it may have been a special isbue of The. Call. 
20. On 16 August 1918 IIP Central branch agreed to send four 
delegates to a Plebs League discussion on allied intervention: 
minutes, 16 Aygust 1918. - 
21. IIP Central branch minutes, 31 January 1919:. these minutes are 
undated, but their date is clear from their position in the 
minute book, and the pattern of the meetings. Where the 
Conference was held is unclear: a Loýdon 'Hands Off Russia' 
Committee was set up in January 1919, and although the national 
committee was not established until the middle of the year, it 
is likely. ýhat an ýdinburgh committee was also formed early in 
the. year. Cp'J. Klugýann, History of the Communist'Party of 
Great Britain; vol. 'I. Formation and'Early Years, 1919-1924 7London 1968), 78-q; 'I: -_J_-MacFarlane, "'Hands Off Russia, " 13ritishý Labouýr and the Russo-Polish War, 19201, Past and Present, 
38,1967 1126-52. 
22. F. Douglas, 'Commotion in the Capital -21, Evening Dispatch, 
9 August-1955. 
23- See e9go, TC minutes 1 April, 6 July, 9 September 1919; NUR 
Edin. No 1 branch minutes, 1ý April 1919,1 February 1920; NSP 
Edin. branch minutes 23 June, 27 July, '12 December 1§19; 4 April 
1920; ILP Edin. Central branch minutes, 19 June 1919. 
t 
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the Committee further impetus, and showed that sympathy for the 
reVolution was widespread. 'It held crowded meetings on Sunday 
night in the old Pringles Picture'House ..., 124 and further trade 
union support was won. 
25 And when, in July, the tide turnedigainst 
the Poles and British involvement against Russia seemed a real 
possibility, the Labour Party was able to mobilise and threaten 
'direct action': a telegram from Arthur Henderson claimed the 
risk of war was 'extremely menacing', and urged 
local parties immediately organise 
citizen demonstrations against ' 
interventions and supply of men, 
munitions. Demand peace negotiations, 
immediate raising blockade, resumption 
trade relations. Send resolutions 
Premier and Press, deputise local MPs- 26 
The apparent achievement of Labour's action in early August 1920 
(it was widely held that this had prevented British intervention) 
both indicates how widespread was sympathy with the Russian 
revolution, and linked this sympathy with popular revulsion at the 
prospect of further war. 'Primarily it-was war weariness that sus- 
tainedthe "Hands Off Russia" agitation's Fred Douglas recalled: 
27 
but if this was an important motive, war weariness alone could not 
have 'packed' the-Usher Hall on 22 August to hear William Gallacher's 
report of his visit to Moscow as a delegate to the Second-Congress 
of the Communist International. 
28 By the second half of 1920, Russia 
24, Douglas, 'Commotion', Evening Dispatch 9 August. 1955- 
25- The NUR No-1 branch agreed to dfiliate (Minutest 30 
kay. 1920); 
the Press and Machinemen p, ressed the Trades Council , to send 
delegates to a-ROIRC Conference (TC minutes 18-May 1920). 
26; T& LC minutes, 6 August 1920 (Special EC meeting). 
27- Douglas, Evening Dispatch 9. August 1955; cp R. Palme Dutt's 
comment that it was 'not essentially a revolutionary class- 
issue but simply an expression of'war-weariness and horror 
at being dragged into another wart' The Communist, 19 
August 
1920, quoted in S-White, 'Labour's Council of Action 1920t' 
Journal of Contemporary History 91 1974 1113- 
Augus 28. On the Usher Hall Meeting; see T& ýC minutes, 17 t 1920t 
Douglas, Evening Dispatch,, ý August 1955; for accounts , 
of 
Gallacher's visit'to Moscow, see W. Gallacher,. Revolt on the 
Cl de'(Lond6n 1936) 250-54; The Rollink_. qf the Thunder (London 
9 7-21; 
Challinor, J-S. Cla , 57-67. 
f 
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was the object of fascination and solidarity from virtually all 
sections of the labour movement: the Trades and Labour Council's 
Executive, which encompassed a wide spectrum of political attitudes, 
accepted an invitation to appear on the platform of the Gallacher 
meeting. 
29 
These changes in institutional and motivational context 
left. Labour facing a post-war political world that was both altered 
and uncertain. We should, perhaps*'summarise the effect of the 
changes induced over the wartime period: the imperatives of war 
had upset many of the alignments and perspectives of pre-war labour 
politics; but they had also provided the basis and context for the 
development of new perspectives, and the construction of new 
alle giances. These perspectives and allegiances had been subject 
to change and strain, particularly as union strength grew: but, 
broadly, they had held successfully. The Russian revolution, and 
the end of the war, again 
' 
altered the context of politics so that 
wartime perspectives and alliances were no longer relevant - or, 
at least, required to be justified in different terms. 
The labour movement, however, could come to terms with these 
new circumstances only in the light of its members' understandings 
and experiences. In previous chapters we distinguished two trends 
of thought held within the labour and socialist movement during the 
war: one focused on the wartime role of the state, drawing credence 
from its prominence, and from the movement's engagement with it; 
the other focused on the political p6tentialities of industrial 
organisation, and was the stronger for the trade unions' wartime 
advances. No clear lines should be drawn between these trends, for 
individuals drew on both; during the immediate post-war years these 
two trends cut across the entire labour movement, from right to leftj 
so that for a brief period - strategic debate occurred as much with- 
in each as between the two. In these circumstances, mobilisation 
could be achieved which transcended the 'left/right' division: this 
29. T& LC minutes, 17 August 1920. 1 
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was possible where there were principles which legitimisedrPecific 
forms of actions but which were held in common across tho p0litical 
spectrum of labour. Some such principles, of course, commonly exist: 
our claim is that, during the immediate post-war years, their ability 
to promote significant common action across the political spectrum 
was unusually great, for two reasons. Firstly, the beliefs which 
had underlain the political allegiances of wartime had not yet 
been replaced effectively: political alignments within the move- 
ment were thus, to some extent, in the melting-pot. Second, for 
reasons we have explored in earlier chapters, during the war a 
number of notions commonly associated with 'profit', notably those 
closely related to 'efficiency' and lorganisation', were raised in 
status: these principles could legitimise action - particularly 
institutional change - across a wide range of opinion. 
We can best examine this process by recounting the histories 
of three important institutional changes: the new constitution of 
the Labour Party in 1918, the amalgamation of Trades Council and 
Labour Party in 1920, and the restructuring of Marxist organisation 
between 1918 and 1921 (which is often seen as culminating in the 
formation of the Communist Party), 
9.2 Edinburgh-labour and the 1918 constitution 
In the historiography of the Labour Party - as in its lore - 1918 
figures as anomentous year. The reason is not simply that the 
constitution agreed in that year is, in large part, still with us: 
two of its aspects have been stressed. On the one hand, especially 
when considered with the new programme, Labour and the New Social 
Order, it 'unequivocally committed 
, 
the Labour Party to Socialist 
objectives'. 
30 
On the others the constitution 
transformed the Labour Party from 
a loose federation of affiliated 
30. Cole, History of the Labour Party, 56, see 
also Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism, 60-61; Coates, Labour 
Party-and Struggle for Socialism, 14-15, 
li u4 
organisations into a centralised, 
nationally cohesive P3rtly with its 
own individual members, organised ii. i 
local constituency parties and 
subject to central party discipline. 31 
In recent years both these assertions have been qualified. It has 
been sugg*ested that the socialist commitment was illusory or ir- 
relevant, 
321argely because 'Clause 4, the "socialist objective", 
was inserted in a Constitution that-c', onfirmed the triumph of the 
unions and the-defeat of Socialists, 
Xand, "the 
unions", having 
gained control, 'were not much interested in socialism., 
34 On this 
view, Clause 4 was designed to provide -'a rallying point around which 
the adherents of different ideologies and the representatives of 
different interests, 35could assemble, without committing themselves 
to anything very significant. 
Moving from historians' interpretations - largely grounded in 
national Labour records --to-the vievis of contemporaries in-tile Edinb- 
urgh jabour movement, three main points stand out. Firstly, although 
in the event 'Clause-41 may have becomea rallying point', there is 
no evidence that it acted as such during the process-of agreeing 
the-new constitution. ýSecond, -there war, little desire, on the part 
of trade unions, -to control the Labour Party: if there-was a struggle 
for control,, it was largely between political factions, -and not - 
significantly-based on union allegianc es. Nevertheless, thirdly, - 
although-the new constitution seems to have, evoked-little enthusiasm 
outside the Labour Party itself, it was widely imagined to be a good 
thing-simply for reasons of organisational efficiency. Let us 
examine these points in more detail. 
view-of the significance since invested in its passing, the 
apparent unimportance of the 'Socialist' 'Clause 41 in discussion of 
MI iliband 60i see also McKenzie,. British Political Parties, 482. 
Cp R. Barker,, Education-and'Polit: ýcs_lgoo-ý . I: aýtudX of the 
Labour Party (Oxford 1974), esp-'34; R. McKibbinj Evolution 
of the Labour Party, esp. gi-106. 
33; Ibid; j 244ý 
34; Ibid., 103. 
35. Harris6n, "'The War Emergency Workers' National*Committee', 259; 




the new constitution is remarkable. There is no record of its having 
even been mentioned, let alone discussed, at the Labour Party's 
Edinburgh branch's meetings in late 1917 and early 1918.36 The ILP 
did not look at this aspect; 
37neither did the Trades Council. 38 
The Edinburgh branch's delegate, in his report, concentrated on 
'the big question of the Conference - the New Constitution': but 
he did not mark 'Clause 41 as worthy of mention. 
39 This resounding 
silence is indicative of two facts; that the socialist objective, at 
least in the language in which it wascouched, was uncontroversial; but, 
by the same token, that it was not judged to be an effective 'rallying 
point', at least by those active in the labour movement at the time it 
was passed. 
40 
If the Constitution was i mportant, this was for other 
reasons, in the main. 
Although, again, there is some evidence that the 1918 
Constitution increased the(degree of control which unions could exercise 
36. Edinburgh branch, Labour Party, minutes, passim. 
37- ILP Central branch minutes, 17 December 1917, and passim. 
38. In part, no doubt, the Trades Council's failure to record the 
Nottingham Conference at all reflects. the timing of its annual 
reports: the Council's year*ended on 31 March, so the Executives 
report for 1917/18, which might have been expected to comment on 
such a development, may have been written prior to the Conference 
(which was held on 23-25 January' 1918); while by the following 
year it would have been overwhelmed by sheer pressure of events. 
On the other hand, the Council's minutes for 1918 are also 
silent on the constitution issue. 
39- Edin. Labour Party AR 1917-18,3- 
40. There is one interesting instance of an attempt to use the 
language of clause 4 in another context: a motion to alter 
the NUR rules to include-an aim: 'To secure for Railwaymen 
the full fruits of their industry and the most u3. ble Z-ric2 
administration and distribution thereof that my -sic-7 be 
possible, upon the basis of the common ownership of the means 
of production I WUR No. 1 branch minutes, 15 September 1918). 
But there is, unfo3ýtunately, no indication as to whether the 
motion was passed; and it should be rAmembered that the active 
membership of the branch was, at this time, aggressively ' 
socialistic in language: indeed, this formulation seems mild 
in comparison to several other motions agreed during 1918-20. 
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over the Labour Party nationally, there is little sign that this 
formed part of the motives for union support for the change in 
Edinburgh. We saw in table 8.1 that, in so far as the Trades 
Council embodied trade union opinion, its involvement in the 
Labour Party was suggestive of loose supervision, rather than close 
control. Nevertheless, this loose. supervision was real: and in the 
pre-1918 Edinburgh Labour Party it was complemented by a somewhat 
deeper involvement of other trade-unionists. Table 9.1 shows that, 
Table 9.1 Trade Union and Political Affiliation of Officers 
and Executive Committee Members of the Labour Party, 
Edinburgh branch, 1912 - 1918 
Office: Name: Affiliations identified: 
Chairman T. Hamilton Workers' Union Rosyth No- 3 
National Guilds League Edin. group 
president. 
Treasurer P. Gray Postmen's Federation. 
Secretary A. S. Wylie ILP Central branch; Workers' Union 
District Secretary. 
Executive Committee: 
A. Cameron Painters, Central Branch 
J. Grassick National League of the Blind, ILP 
Central branch. 
F. Halliday VAUL Vo. 292 branch. 
W. Hodgson Corporation Workers. 
ý. Pollock (unidentified). 
J. Rollo NUR No. 1 branch. 
sourc_e,,;: Labour Party, Edin. branch AR 1917/18; TC ARs; ILP minutes 
and correspondence; NUR Edin. No 1 branch minutes; NAUL 
No 292 branch minutes. 
even befote the 1918 Constitution was brought into force in Edinburgh, 
union members had effective control within it.. To be sure, some - 
perhaps a majority - had political links, with the ILP and so on; but 
they were trade union delegates in the main. So we cannot safely 
maintain that union activists felt any need to win control of the 
Labour Party, nor that they perceived 'socialism' as an activity 
of the middle-class, from which union members were largely excluded. 
at J5 
Trade unionists did not need to wrest control of the Labour Party: 
they already held it. 
If, indeed$ there was a struggle for control of the Labour 
Party in Edinburgh, it was between those who had already identified 
themselves with avowedly 'political' groupings: even this, however, 
seems not to have surfaced until after the new constitution was 
agreed. It was recognised that this would 'vitally affect ... 
the position of the Local Labour Parties': 
41 
in particular, the 
proposed individual membership was an implicit threat to the ILP's 
role. This was not an issue within the Edinburgh ILP in late 1917, 
but during 1918 the implications became clearer. Early in 1918, 
the Edinburgh Labour Party appointed a new secretary: James J. 
Pottinger was a member of the SSF, and seems to have pursued its 
interests as secretary. 
42 
This meant the ILP's influence was weakened 
during a crucial year. The new secretary was assiduous in upholding 
the constitution of the Labour Party to counter the interests of the 
ILP, which was, of course, distrusted by the labour 'patriots'. The 
ILP, apparently attempting to increase its hold over'the Labour Party, 
began to press for the appointment of an election agent for William 
Graham, the parliamentary candidate whom it had nominated (and whom 
the Labour Party had subsequently adopted). Having received an 
unhelpful response from Pottinger, 
43the 
ILP wrote again, 
requesting a joint conference of ... fthe ILP_7 Executive and the Executive 
of the local Labour Party, along with 
Mr. Shaw, the Scottish Secretary Z-of 
the Labour Party211to consider Councillor 
Graham's candidature for the Central 
division and to make definite 
arrangements. " 44 
Pottinger's response was to point out that the ILP, as nominatorst were 
41. Letter, Edin. Labour Party to Secretary, ILP Central branch, 
17 December 1917. 
42. When James J-Pottinger resigned as Labour Party Secretary in 1919, 
the SSF wrote to him 'thanking him for his work for the Federation' 
(SSF minutes, 10 January 1919: emphasis added). 
43- Letter, James J. Pottinger, Secretary, Edin. LP to M. Marcus, 
Interim Secretary, ILP Central branch, 30 July 1918. 
44. Letter, J-J-Pottinger to J. McCorquodale, Secretary, ILP 
Central branch, 27 June 1918. 
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'responsible for 75 per cent of the expenses' of an agent, along with 
some other requIrements, but that the appointment, controls and 
salary of the agent would lie with the Labour Party. 'That, briefly, 
is the position, and a-. onference on the question is therefore scarcely 
necessary, 145 was the crisp conclusion. 
If, then, we leave aside the motives of those who formulated 
the new constitution in London, and seek the motives of those who 
accepted it - not always enthusiastically, but without controversy - 
in Edinburgh, neither 'clause 41 nor a need for greater union control 
is adequate. When ffeiderson argued for the adoption of the new Party 
constitution at the Nottingham Conference, he stressed the need for 
both 'a broaderýorganisational basis and a more clearly defined object- 
ive' if the party was to take advantage of the expanded electorate 
after the war.. 
46 
As we have seen, the latter was not taken up in 
Edinburgh: but the former struck a chord. In his report on the 
Conference debate, the Edinburgh branch's delegato concentrated on 
Henderson's 'very clever speech' on 
-the big question . ý. - The New Constitution. HeZiderson2 pled for 
its adoption on several grounds: the 
after-war situation, the necessity for 
broadening the base of the Party, the 
possibility of a General Election 
about September of this 'year, and the 
Executive's determination to place 400 
Parliamentary candidates iiý the field. 47 
These were thoroughly organisational motives: although the delegate 
was an enthusiastic guild socialist, he did not even mention the new 
clause 4.. Whether this reflected his own outlook, or deference to his 
readers, is unimportant: in the later war years, reorganisation in the 
interest of efficiency was hard to oppose, and the advocates of the 
new constitution drew strength from this fact. The Edinburgh Labour 
45. Ibid. 
46. Labour Party Annual Conference Report 1918,98-104: 2 there is an 
extended precis and discussion of the speech in McKenzie, 475-8, 
from which the quotation is taken. 
47. Edin. LP AR, 1917-igi8i 3. The imminence of a General Election 
was one of Henderson's constant themes, especially in correspond- 
ence with local Labour organisations, during late 1917 
and early 1918. 
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Party had believed that the 1918 Conference was 'the most important 48 
yet held, owing to the discussion on draft Constitution'; it 
had largely failed to persuade the. local labour movement, however. 
For the latter, the new constitution was simply uncontroversial. 
9.3 The formation of the Trades and Labour Council 
If the . 1918 Labour Party constitution was given legitimacy by the 
strength of notions of organisation and efficiency, this was in an 
essentially negative sense: it was difficult to oppose, for ration- 
ality seemed on its side. But, of course, in 1917 the Labour Party 
was peripheral to labour politics in Edinburgh: only the prospect of 
an election (repeatedly raised by Henderson in correspondence with 
local parties) kept it alive. If, however, we were to seek one 
constitutional development whose significance was generally accepted 
in these immediate post-war years in Edinburgh's labour movement, we 
should find it in the 1920 amalgamation of the'Trades Council with 
the local Labour Party, forming a Trades and Labour Council. This 
was controversial, for a number of-reasons, but its importance was 
widely acknowledged, even by its opponents. 
We have seen that the Trades Coundil's political role-had been 
enhanced during the war years: in particular, it had - perforce - 
begun to encroach on areas, such as working class representation on 
public bodies, for which the Labour Party had been established. This 
raised questions about the relationship between the two organisations. 
Between 1917 and 1920 virtually all the trade union branches affiliated 
to the Edinburgh Labour Party were also affiliated to the Trades 




Council: the exceptions were insignificantly small. 
49 
And just as, 
in the main, union branches affiliated to the Trades Council in 
order to further their interests, so they affiliated to the Labout 
Party for similar reasons. It. was, therefore, perhaps unsurprising 
that, in the course of a discussion on the new Constitution at a 
Labour Party meeting in December 1917, 
Mr. Wylie moved that Local Trades' 
Council and branches of the Labour 
Party amalgamate as advised fin 
the draft rules circulated from head 
office, since_7... at present there 
was much wasted energy and over- 
lapping, which couldba. saved by 
amalgamation. 50 
Initially, there was little enthusiasm from the Trades Council's side:. 
perhaps because, at least during the war, it was the Labour Party's 
energy which was being wasted. The Labour Party had 1hopeZV to see 
effected, during the coming year. Z-1918_7, an amalgamation with the 
Trades Counoil., 51 But not until August 1918 did the two executives 
even meet, althougbý they did then agree (after extended discussion) 
to recommend amalgamation in principle. 
52 Within the Trades Council, 
however, the proposal encountered significant opposition. The 
Executive's recommendation was endorsed by 37 votes to 14.53 Another 
fourt. een months passed before plans were finalised - which suggests 
less than wholehearted commitment - and even then the first meeting 
of the-new body was not to be held until April 1920.54 
There were a number of reasons for this opposition and delay. 
Firstlyq there, was some mistrust: of the Labour Party within the trade 
union movement. In 1917/18 of the 80 union branches affiliated to the 
49.20 unions were affiliated to the Edin. Labour Party in 1917/18; 
24 in 1919/20. Of these, those not affiliated to the Trades 
Council were the Sawmillers and the No. 1 branch of the Workers 
Union (in both years) and the NUR No. 1 branch (in 1919/20). The 
Sawmillers and Workers Union branches were both small (on the 
basis of affiliation fees, the smallest unions affiliated); the 
reasons behind the Railwaymen's disaffiliation from the Trades 
Council were highly unusual. - 
50. Labour Party, Edin. 'branch minutes, 13 December 1917- 
51. Labour Party, Edin. branch AAnual Reports 1917-18,2. 
52. ' TC minutes, 27 August 1918. 
53- Ibid. 
54. TC minutes, 14 October 1919; TC AR 1920,13- 
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Trades Council; just 18 were affiliated to tic local Labour 
55 Party; two years later the figures were 82 and 21 respectively. 
Whilst the bulk of the remainders were content to be associated 
with the Labour Party, at least two branches withdrew from the 
Council on account of the amalgamation, and one was explicit about 
also pointed, by omissions to possible reservations about a fully 
6ocialist programme: 
That this Branch recognising the 
benefit that Labour Representation 
in Parliament has been in securing 
by Act of Parliament conditions 
commensurate with the cost of liv- 
ing, are of opinion that Labour 
Representation in the House of 
'Commons is essential to the 
continuance of direct Government 
control of Wages agreements, and to 
this end are resolved to affiliate 
with the Locol fsic2 Labour Party. 57 
Similarly, the Clerks affiliated to the local Labour branch in early 
1918, but their commitment did not extend to supporting a demonstra- 
tion to 'save the New Democracies in Europe' - despite its having 
been called by the Party. 
58 For some union-branches - if not 
necessarily for the politically active trade unionists - political 
action had a meaning short of some definitions of socialism. 
have been intensified by the Party's adoption of a socialist 
programme in 1918, for it is by no*means clear that even those 
unions which were locally affiliated toibe Labour Party were 
unanimous about socialism. When the rubber workers' branch of 
the NAUL set down its reasons for affiliating to the Party, it 
56 thepolitical reason for its decision. Some of this reserve may 
Secondly, what was commonly referred to as an $amalgamation' 
was in reality also a thorough reorganisation of the*Labour Party' 
in line with the new rules. As the merger took place, so at the same 
time the Labour Party was shifting from a haphazard structure (a 
55. TC ARs 1918,25-8; 1920,27-31; LP ARs1917-18,8; 1919/20 
in TC AR 1920,22-3- 
56. TC minutes, 23 March 1920 (ASLE&F); 2 November 1920 
(Amalgamated Portmanteau, Bags and Fancy Leather Workers' 
Trade Society). 
57- NAUL No. 292 branch minutes, 21 April 1918. 
58. NUC-Edin. branch minutes, 4 March, 17 June, 4 November 1918, 
14 Juiy 1919. 
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N 
series of ward committees under the aegis of the Edinburgh branch), 
to a more contralised three tier structure, in which divisional 
Labour parties in each constituency superseded the single Edinburgh 
branch, but were all subject to the authority of the Trades and 
Labour Council. The secretary of the local branch gave a lucid 
account of how 
in a city which is divided into 
several constitutuencies, a Local 
Labour Party mustbe formed in each 
constituency. Each of these Local 
Parties are entitled to five 
representatives on the Central 
Labour Party, which would be the 
controlling authority for the 
whole area. 59 
But he confessed that he found it 'somewhat difficult to explain's 
and expected to have to meet affilated organisations' representatives 
in order to do so. 
60 - One union branch committee thought the Draft 
'Constitution and Rules 'were complicated', and put consideration off 
until the next meeting 
61- 
where, 'after considerable discussion it 
62 
was agreed ... that the letter "lie on the table"' . 
The sheer complexity of the new structure, and the length of the 
rulebook - 'S , et 
D (pp. 45-53) in the set of rules applicable to cities 
like Edinburgh's wrote the Edinburgh Party's secretary 
63 
-, were of 
course only symptoms of the view that organisational efficiency was 
to be derived from a centralised and hierarchical structure. In the 
course of time, this structure proved to have both strengths and draw- 
backs: it required an increase in the resources available at the 
upper levels of the Party structure, and an acceptance of a sub- 
ordinate role by the members of local Labour parties and affiliated 
bodies. In the event, commitment to reorganisation, and to the Labour 
idea, was not adequate to carry through the original plans. Very 
likely, amalgamation was initially intended to allow Trades Council 
and Labour Party together to sustain a central organisation which was 
59. Letter, J-J-Pottinger to J. McCorquodale, 27 June 1918. 
60. Ibid. 
61. NAUL No. 292 branch minutes, 17 JulY 1919- 
62. Ibid., 7 August 1919. 
63- Letter, Pottinger to McCorquodalej 27 June 1918. 
311 
beyond each alone: as the Labour Party had it: 
Whether a scheme of amalgamation 
matures or not, the Party must be 
prepared to take its place in the 
forefront of the political life 
of the City, &I in this connection, 
we would emphasise the need for a 
full-time Secretary-Organiser with 
an office & t!: e necessary clerical 
staff. 64 
Neither, however, appears to have been prepared for the degree of 
opposition - not, inýeed, to the principle, but to the cost. The 
original proposal was for an affiliation fee to the joint Council of 
is. per member per year. 
5 The current Trades Council affiliation fee 
was based on a scale which, though far from simple, ranged from less 
than 1d. per member (for very large branches), to a maximum of 4d. 
(for the smaller branch). 
66 One branch, 500 strong, paying F-3 annually 
to the Trades Council on the old scale, ' feared it would have to pay 
925 insteadjand its 
delegates were instructed ... to question 
the affiliation fees, and to vote down 
everything higher than 6d. per member. 67 
As unions were represented on the Council in proportion to their size 
(not to their financial contributio n), we need not be surprised that 
68 
a fee of 4d per member was settled upon: what is remarkable - and a 
testament to the strength of the belief in the need for reorganisation 
is that Is. was ever seriously suggested. 
The Trades Council's Executive gave, in 1920, a heartening view 
of its-diligence: 
At first the combination of the two 
great forces seemed to bristle with 
difficulties, financial and other- 
wise, but after an incredible amount 
of work on the part of the Joint- 
Executives, the scheme became an 
accomplished fact. 69 
64. Edin. LP Annual Report 1917/18,2. 
65. NAUL No. 292 branch minutes, 23 June 1919. 
66. TC AR 1919,55- 
67. NUC minutes, 23 June, 1919. 
68. TC AR 1920,55. 
69. Ibid., 13- 
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But even incredible amounts of work will only prevail if their 
purpose is seen as relevant. The great advantage possessed by the 
advocates of amalgamation was that their opponents had no argument 
which grappled with the major issues confronting the labour move- 
ment. Indeed, the impression is often given that there was no 
legitimate basis for opposition to the reorganisaticn - those who 
criticised it on financial grounds do not seem to have coupled their 
case with arguments that centralisation was a mistake, for example, or 
that it was more important to strengthen the various affiliated 
unions and parties. It is almost as though the opponents were 
ashamed of their arguments. Conversely, the arguments for re- 
organisation were strong; based upon the strength of notions of 
administrative efficiency, and hierarchical structures. There was, 
for instance, an assumed congruence between the 'Amalgamation, of 
Edinburgh with Leith Cany measure which tends towards efficiency, 
economy, and the prevehtion of overlapping should receive ... 
fthe 
workers12 heartiest supportl)? 
Oand 'Our Own Amalgamation1: 71 the 
two items were juxtaposed in-the Trades Council's Annual Report. 
As in the trade union sphere, this rdlected a simplisýic 
view of organisation: not only was-efficient organisation necessarily 
mechanistic - highly centralised and hierarchical; efficiency was 
a characteristic of the organisation, and not of the relationship 
between the organisation and its environment. Thus the new structure 
was seen as an advance which transcended the strategic divergences 
within the movement: 
With regard to this new machine, it is 
unnecessary to embark on any academic 
disquisition regarding principles or 
policy. Whatever views on these may 
be held by the various units of the new 
body, we are all agreed that the need 
for a transformation of our system of 
government is becoming more insistent 
and more clamant than at any time in 





This 'effective machinel was to be required to giva 'adequate 
expression to the aims, the hopes, and the aspirations of the working 
class of this city,: 
73 it was to be capable of carrying through 
whatever policy the movement roquired of it: 
Trade Unions and Socialist Societies 
will not come to us to be told what 
wants doing. They will come to get 
thingo done. They must forge the 
bolts: we are commissioned with the 
duty of firing them. For long the 
worker has sighed for the two-edged 
weapon, that would enable him to cut 
his way to freedom. The tool is 
here; we place it in your hands. 
Emancipation awaits you. 74 
9.4 Restructuring Marxist orgnnisation 
As the unity of the post-war labour movement was built, in essence, 
on the submergence of argument about method or strategy beneath an 
apparent unity on organisation, so also with Marxism. The political 
differences which, in pre-war years, had led to the growth of a variety 
of organisations did not disappear; rather, having been reassessed 
in the light of wartime experiences, they were outweighed by a belief 
in the value of organisational unity. 
We have seen that the Bolshevik revolution won widespread support 
within the British labour movement. But there is a difference between 
sympathy, even vicarious pride at working class achievement, and 
acceptance of Bolshevik methods. Bolshevik success raised questions 
of socialist strategy in a strong 'forms and lent legitimacy to methods 
involving someelement of 'direct action' or force. Buts its impact 
was confused by virtue of-the revolution's being perceived in the light 
of varying conceptions of the British experience. James Hinton has 
argued that 
The enthusiasm with which sections 
of the left took up and developed 
the soviet idea in Britain is to be 
73. Ibid. 
? 4. Ibid. 
x* 
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explained not only by understandable 
elation over the Pussion Revolution 
but also, and primarily, by the fact 
that this idea answered to a real 
theoretical need felt by British 
revolutionaries as a result of their 
own domestic experience. ?5 
In relation to the Workers' Committee movement, Hinton's case is 
per-suasive: 'attempts to spell out the potentialities apparent in 
the Workers' Committees resulted in equating them with Soviets. 
?6 
But this experience was limited to a section of the left: in 
Scotland, it was concentrated in the engineering industries of 
Clydeside. Other sections interpreted the revolution in the light 
ofdifferent experiences, and these had not always gencrated other 
'theoretical needs'. 
Some elements of Edinburghls labour movement, of course, were 
theoretically predisposed to see-the revolution in industrial terms 
by a background in syndicalism or industrial unionism. For there 
were other forms of wartime industrial experience than tile workers' 
committees: to many who had not expcrienced the latter, the Isoviet 
ideal did not always appear relevant, or even comprehensible. ' There 
is evidence in Edinburgh that the soviet idea had a strong impact on 
those who had been involved in the workers' committees of the engineer- 
ing industry. Inside the ILP Central branch, for instance, it was 
Bob Foulis, an ironnoulder and leader of the engineering and ship- 
building workers, who pressed the Bolshevik case in 1918.77 The 
'Hands Off Russia' Committee was run by a group of engineers, and 
seems to have been started, in early 1919, during ýust those months 
when the Forth Workers' Committee (never the strongest such body) was 
75- Hinton, First Shop Stewards Movement, 307. 
76. Ibid.; on the sQviets in Russiat see Anweiler, The Soviets, 
esp. 111-16,125-7- 
77. ILP Central branch minutes, 19 April 1918; on Foulia, see 
John McArthur's recollections in I. MacDougall (ed. ), Militant, 
Miners. Recollections of John McArthur, -Buckhriven; -and 
letters, 
1924-26, of David Proudfoot, Methil, to G. Allen Hutt (Edinburgh 
-1981), 21; Douglas, 'Uommotion's Evening Dispatch, 11 August 
1955; G. Brown, 'The ýabour Party and Political Change in 
Scotland, 1918-1929. The Politics of Fivp Elections' (Ph. D 
thesis, University of Edinburgh 1981), 115-6. 
I 
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on the wane: it may be that the two organisations shared active 
members. 
78 Certainly a critic found the 111ands Off Russia' Committee 
'more anxious for the formation of Soviets here than anything elre. -, 
79 
But on the railways sympathy for the revolution's methods reflected 
another view 61 what was important. It demonstrated the need for 
'a General Strike to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat in 
80 81 
this country, '. toorganise our forces', to 'line up with all workers 
82 
to take hold the means of wealth production' , This is the language 
of syndicalist industrial unionism: not of-soviets or workers' 
committees. Lacking strong workplace organisation, the soviet-idea 
answered no Itheoretical needs. ' (Nor should be ignore an important 
fact: in those sectors where union organisation was but recently 
established, the revolution's relevance was unlikely to be perceived 
in industrial terms - it was just too remote. Neither the Clerks nor 
the Rubber*Workers showed any real sympathy for the revolution, and 
certainly do not seem to have perceived it as having any relevance to 
their organisation. ) 
83 
The Russian revolution could, of course, be interpreted in 
another perspective: by those who, impressed by the strength of the 
British state during the'war, saw it as a potential source of power 
for soý. -ialists, and felt that labour's failure to win control of it 
was partly due to organisational factors. For such as these the 
lessons of the revolution were political, rather than industrial. 
Through the soviets, or the Bolshevik party, the Russian working 
class had been more efficiently organised than its counterpart in 
Britain, and had been able to advance just because it had won state 
power. The Bolsheviks had broken with the 'compromising' and 
78. Douglas, 'Commotion, Evening Dispatch, 9 August 1055; Hintont 
First Sho-P-Stewtirds Movement, 270-71, recounts the decline 
of the workers' committees from 1919- 
79. NSP Edin. branch minutes, 2 May 1920: the delegate was 
reporting on meetings 'some time' earlier, having been ill. 
80. NUR Edin. No l'branch minutes, 10 November 1918. 
81. Ibid., 7 July 1918. 
82. Ibid., 29 September 1918. 
83- NUC Edinburgh branch minutes, passim, 
' 
and esp. 23 September 1918; 
NAUL No. 292 branch minutes, passim, esp. 20 May 1920. 
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'treacherous role' of the Menshoviks and Soviet-Revolutionarios. 
84 
Now lessons such As these would also be perceived in relation to 
established political views: thus, for instance, it may have been 
possible to have seen the importance of state power and efficient 
organisation clearly demonstrated, yet to have demurred at the 
Bolsheviks' attitudes to reform and thepossibility of constitutional 
change (e8pecially in relation to Britain). Certainly the Bolshevik 
experience seems to have been at least catalytic in inducing an 
element of Edinburgh's ILP to question the methods and organisation 
of labour politics: *they began to press the ILP into debate with 
leftist oreanisixtions such as the SLP and to subscribe to their 
85 
press; they attacked those in the ILP who were pro-war, or who 86 
appeared in other ways to compromise with the state; they attempted 
to promote common action between the ILP and various revolutionary 
organisationsý7 During, 1918 and 1919, at least, they seem to have 
had considerable success: by the surrner, a motion 
to arrange an immediate Conference 
of the Local I. L. P., B. S. P., S. L. P., 
B. S. I. S 
* 
L. P.,. and Communist Workers' 
ýeague with a view of consolidating. 
local Socialistic efforts 
could be passed by 25 votes to 7.88 
84. The quotations are from Leni n, 'Lessons of the Revolution' as 
reprinted in Selected Works, volume 21 209-21. We know, of 
course, that this pamphlet was circulating in Edinburgh in 
English during the latter half of 1918 (ILP Central branch 
minutes, 19 July 1918). 
85. ILP Central branch minutes; 7 March 1918 (subscription to 
The Socialist, an SIP newspaper), 22 March 1918 (debate with 
SLP 'That the ILP is worthy of working class support' proposed 
by RfFoulis, but rejected, 11 to 4), 14 January 1919. (a reed 
by 27. to 2 that 'it is desirable to have an open Z-Ii; 
j 
platform for disQussion-from opponents!, proposed by Foulis). 
86. Ibid., 20 September 1918,29 91 23 MaY*1919- 
87. Ibid, 19 June, 1919. 
88. Ibid., 16 May, 19 June 1919; on the national context of such 
developments, cp Dowse, Left in the Centre, 47-8; Marwick, 
'The Independent Labour Party', esp. 64-92,96-101; Klugmann, 
Z5-38; Kendall, e, sp- 197-219,. 269-70. By January 1920 the 
ILP in Scotland had Voted for affiliation to the Third Inter- 
national by 151 votes to 28; this was overturned at the national 
conference in April 1920 by 472 to 206. 
I 
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It is, of course, a mistake to see these perspectives on the 
Russian revolution as dividing Edinburgh18 Marxists into two clear 
groups: rather, they identify, sources of motive and understanding. 
For as the months passed after the Armistice events in Britain also 
led to political reassessments among revolutionary socialists. We 
can discern two main strands in this reassessment. On the one hand, 
the war and the months that followed it saw the growth of a number 
of organisations, largely issue-based, which brought Karxist 
socialists together to pursue common objectives. Defence of the 
revolution led, as we have seen, to the 'Hands Off Russia' Committee. 
The Forth-Workers' Committee, which had led the 40 hours strike in 
Edinburgh, involved not only those with a background in the SLP: 
one of its leaders was a member of the ILP, and had been a Labour 
parliamentary candidate in 1918.89 The history and economics class, 
run by the Central Laýour College for Edinburgh District of the NUR, 
had for several years been taught by John S. Clarke, a leading member 
of the SIP: it had become a focal point of the railwaymen's rev- 
olutionary industrial unionism6 
go From 1916 the Labour College (or 
Plebs-League) grew in the city, and its interpretations of Marxism 
broadened. -Tl-e Railwaymen's class was opened to members of other 
occupitions. Other classes were started, with organisations like the 
Engineers and the- ILp. 
92 New tutors were found, by no means all of 
whom had backgrounds in the SLP. 
93 In February 1920, what had become 
the Edinburgh District of the Scottish Labour College merged with the 
Marxian School of Economics, 
9ý leaving a single organisation for 
Marxist education in the city. Perhaps a consequence of this increased 
89i Brown, 'Labour Party and Political Change's 115-6. 
go. Millar, -The Labour College Movement,, 20. 
91. J. H. Roberts, 'The National Council of Labour Colleges, - An 
Experiment in Workers' Education. A study of the growth of 
the Labour Colleges with particular reference to independent 
working class adult education in ýcotland. l (M-Sc. thesis, 
University of Edinburgh, 1970)i 40. 
92i Ibida, 49; Plebs November 1917- 
93- E. g., Tom Drummond (ILP$ formerly SLP), *James Clunie (BSP), 
J. P. M-. Millar (ILP): Plebs December 1918, November 1920. 
94. Roberts, 55- 
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intercourse between the various strands of Marxist thought - although 
by the same token, it must have made it easier - was a weakening of 
the internal cohesion of the various socialist parties. Within the 
ILP, for instance, a group began to identify with Marxism an well 
as - perhaps rather than - the Party itself. It began to attack anot- 
her group which identified with the aims, and sometimes the organisat- 
ion, of the NSP, and more generally on the ILP's right: one such 
attack is revealing. Euphemia Laing, a former'suffragette later 
. 
to become a Communist, moved the expulsion of Thomas Drummond Shiels 
(who liked to be referred to as 'Captain', and was to become a 
Labour councillor and MP) as 
Mr. Shiels had taken office in the 
Edinburgh branch of the National 
Socialist Party, a party which had 
consistently opposed the policy of the 
I. L. P. throughout the War. 95. 
Drummond Shiels did not deny the facts: only that 'he had done 
nothing to violate the Constitution of the ILP'. The motion was 
narrowly defeated (by 36 votes to 33) 
?6 interestingly, many members 
did not find membership of another party improper. Similarly, a 
division opened within the SLP, essentially between those who had been 
involved in the workers committees (and thus jointly with other Marxists 
in industrial conflict) and those who had remained in the older mould 
of SLP separatism. 
97 
. 
At the same time as the institutional identities and alignments 
of socialist politics were thus in flux, those revolutionary 
socialists whose outlooks were grounded in industrial experience 
found reason for reassessment. These reassessments varied, however, 
for post-war inductrial experiences were not uniform. So far as 
Edinburgh is concerned, Marxist views had flourished in two main 
settings. In engineering and shipbuilding the shop stewards move- 
ment, ýever as strong in Edinburgh as on Clydeside, had suffered the 
national defeat of the early months of 1918, and had swung to 
95. IIP Edin. Central branch minutes, 2 May 1919; the case had 
ýxýready been referred to the ILP's Divisional and National 
Advisory Councils (ILP NAC minutes, 6-7 March 1919). At the 
following meeting p4iels resigned but was also declared to have 
cedsed to be a member 'automatically' by virtue of the 'Inter- 
national' section of the new ILP rules: the minutes were 'not 
adopted'. bY 31 votes to 7 (Central branch minutes, 9 May 1919). 
96. Ibid., 2 May 1919. 
97- Hinton, esp. 301-02; Challinor, British Bolshevism_, 240-44; 
Kendall, 196,198-201. 
319 
political agitation when industrial methods seemed to have failed. 
98 
By October the Forth Workers Committee had established an economics 
and induatrial history class in conjunction with the IL-ba League. 
99 
After the Armistice, the defeat of the Forty Hours strike further 
undermined the industrial support for the shop stewards' movement; 
yet at the same time - and of course just for a brief period - 
employers were able to undercut union militancy by offering con- 
cessions (in pay, hours and conditions) to official union leaders. 
And by 1920 the depression was beginning. In these circumstances, the 
thinking of the revolutionary shop stewards became, as it were, 
political rather than industrial: from. workers' committees, the 
movements' leaders began, for instance, to propose tho formation of 
'social committees'. 
10OThey 
no longer perceived 
. induatry as providing 
A fundamental source of social power: if advances were tote made, 
it was necessary to mobilise power resources elsewhere. Hence they 
were prepared to participate in debate, and joint action, of the type 
we have described above. 
Marxist views had also flourished among Edinburgh's railwaymen. 
Their wartime experiences, however, had ýeen different from the 
engineers'. Government control and national negotiation, among other 
factors, had prevented'the emergence of strong, unofficial, workplace 
organisation. During 1919 and 1920, however, the railwaymen moved 
back into the vanguard of industrial struggle. They were mobilised 
in national strikes. The victory of October 1919 whs seen as a 
vindication of industrial unionism; and industrial action - solidarity 
action - as a realistic strategy for revolutionaries. Effort was 
therefore put into organising the local Triple Alliance. 
101 But 
just as the Triple Alliance was fragile nationally, so in Edinburgh 
these efforts were often frustrated. At a local conference of the 
Alliance summoned in December 1919, 'only railwaymen turned up I, 
102 
Nearly three months later a Railwaymen's delegate was still reporting 
that 'The miners had not responded. An it stood', he continued, 'the 
98. Hinton, 255-69. 
99. Plebs, December 1918. 
100. Hinton, -320-24. 
101'. Edin. NUR No. 1 branch minutes, 7,21 December 1919. 
102. Ibid., 21 December 1919. 
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T. A. is largely a farce'. 103 At the same time the union's revolution- 
ary elements came deeply to mistrust their national leaders; whom 
they saw as unwilling, for political reasons, to exploit industrial 
advantages to the full. 'Thomas and his political clap-trap had 
done our*movement great harm. 
104 Gradually, however, they came to 
mix the language of syndicaliom with a sense that some kind of 
political organisation was necessary. Thus a resolution in early 
1920: 
That Edinburgh No 1 branch NUR 
calls upon all railway workers to 
organise in a revolutionary 
political party and in one great 
Industrial Union of the working 
class in order to destroy the 
robber system, and to hold the 
means of wealth production .... 105 
Daring 1920 this had no practical effect: the emphasis remained on 
industrial organisation, especially when autumn brought the prospect 
of a miners' strike. The No I branch demanded 
a strike of NUR members ... in 
support of the miners if the 
Government compel them to strike. 
Failing a settlement in three days 
instruction be sent to each 
locality to take possession of 
Railways, Mines, etc and work them 
in the interest of the working class. 106 
Here is aclassic call, in the syndicalist tradition, for a strike 
to be used for political ends. But as the months passed, and 1920 
became 1921, the failures of the Triple Alliance hecame more numerous. 
The explanation was generally similar ('The dissension of Mr. Thomas 
and his wrecking tactics ... 1)', 
O? 
ut confidence began to wane. In these 
circumstances, the realisation of a need for political organisation bore 
103- Ibid., 29 February 1920. 
104. Ibid., 28 March 1920. 
105. Ibid., 29 February 1920. 
106. Ibid., 12 September 1920. 
107- Ibid., 24 October 1920; cp 24 April, 8 May 1921: on the latter 
occasion, it was recorded that the local Triple Alliance strike 
committee 'condemns the procrastination, and the lack of courage 
displayed'. by the national leaders. 
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fmit. 
In June 1921, just seven weeks after the Triple Alliance's 
final fiasco ('Black Friday'), the No. 1 branch of the Edinburgh 
Railwaymen agreed to set up"its own political Committee with a view 
to running its own Mu'nicipal'and other Council candidates. ' 
108 
The Committee is the political expression 
of a very large and active branch of 
railway workers. It will oppose other 
political bodies in ao far as such bodies 
do not express the_interests of the working- 
class, and whoes ý sic2 political outlook 
is not that of the class struggle. It will 
defend, and work for the Industrial develop- 
ment of the workers' organizations, and 
stands for the unity of all workers, on 
behalf of all workers against the common 
enemy - the capitalist class. 109, 
So the realisation of a need for. political organisation was interweaved 
with týe syndicalist tradition. 
The pecularity of the revolutionary movement on the railways 
should not, however, obscure the central reality: the weakening of 
the industrial militancy was leading to a receptiveness, among those 
who regarded themselves as revolutionaries, to political debate and 
action. The weakening cohesion of many of the political parties of 
the left was allowing political strategy tobe considered in a new 
context; and there developed, in the Labour Colleges, and the 'Hando 
Off Russia' Committees especially, institutions which - though'for 
limited purposes - reSrouýed Marxists within the labour movement 
without limitation to any particular party. Some indication of the 
impact of Marxism on Edinburgh labour, and more importantly of 
the extent to which intercourse developed among the Marxist left, 
can be gained from the growth of the Colleges in Edinburgh. Although 
in mid-1917 Edinburgh took more copies of Plebs than any other city, 
110 
there was just the single class based on the NUR. In the autumn & 
108. Ibid., 5 june 1921. 
109. Ibid., 14-kugust 1921: this is the 'Platform' of the Committee. 
110. Plebs, June 1917. 
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branch of the Plebs League wv%s started: 
ill the District Organiser 
began to attena union meetings to promote claases: another was started 
in Leith. 
112 
Progress was still slow, howeverl the Leith Class 
113 
enrolled only 17 memberst and even in April 1918 the Edinburgh 
class could report an-advance only 'in ki)owledge not aumbersf' 
114 
The real advauce seems to have come, in 1919 and 1920t as the post- 
war ferment began. During 1919-1920, what had become the Edinburgh 
District of the , Scottish Labour College enrolled 120 students in 
four classes; in 1920-1921 an initial October enrolment of 490 students 
in eighteen classes 
115 
rose over the succeeding months to 617,116 654,117 
and finally 'nearly 700' in 21 classes. 
118 Sales of Plebs rose from 
eleven, to twenty and then thirty dozen monthly. 
119 
We lack evidence in depth about the formation of the Communist 
Party in Edinburgh: 
120 
we know more of the overture than the first act. 
What there is, however, is consistent with the picture we have sketched. 
Fred Douglas recalled being drawn into the Party almost as a natural 
progression, having been involved in 'Hands Off Rus6iat agitation, in 
a Marxist economics class, and in distributing The Worker. 
121 Bob 
Foulis, having led the Forty Hours strike and the left group within the 
ILP, moved into the Communist Party, perhaps through the Red Internation- 
111i Ibid;, September 1917. 
112. Ibid., November 1917; the Organiser was James Stobiel a Railway- 
- man whom we have encountered above. 
113ý Ibidij January 1918. 
114i Ibid;, April 1918. 
115- Ibid-j November 1920ý 
116. Ibid., December 1920. 
Edinburgh district, Scottish Labour College, minutes 15 January 
1921,. quoted in Roberts, 'NCLC'j 57- 
118i Plebs, j June 1921. 
119i Ibid., December 1920, August 1921. 
120. There are no surviving records of the Communist Party in Edinburgh 
before 16, he Second World War; neither locaUyýnor in London. 
121. Douglas, 'Commotion', Evening Di_spatch, 9,10,11 August 1955- 
323 
al of Labour Unions - of which he became Scottish organiser. 
122 
Arthur Woodburn, having led the Marxian School of Economics into 
its merger with the Labour College, joined the new Party. 
123 The 
common theme was neither personal background nor agreement over 
strategy: rather it was that sense, by no means limited to the 
revolutionary left, that effective political (or industrial) 
action required effective-organisation; and that this was best 
achieved through a single, centralised institution after a military 
model. 
Walter Kendall has noted that, in the years before the 
formation of the Communist Party, in Britain 
The marxist movement lacked an 
adequate organisational theory. 
Both in the unions and in the 
political field it proved capable 
of striking an important response 
yet in neither case did it have 
the means to turn the response to 
advantage. 124 
Similarly the shop stewards allowed their critique of bureaucracy 
to obscure-the fact that 'long term organisation is ... impossible 
without ... bureaucratic organisati'Onl. 
125The 
war simultnneously 
exposed these inadequacies, demonstrated the advantages which the 
state possessed through effective organisation, and provided a 
working model in the organisation of-the nation-for the war effort. 
It also showed what workers could do, given adequate organisation, in 
the industrial field. In the immediate post-war years the revolution- 
ary movement became acutely conscious of its organisational failings, 
especially in politics. Toward the end of the first year of peace, 
John S. Clarke expressed this view: 
The capitalist class confronts its 
enemy with the up-to-date organisation 
of capitalist high finance - the worker 
122. TUC minutes, 23 August, 6 September-1921. 
123. Millar, Labour CollegeMovement, 186; Roberts, INCLCI, 103- 
Woodburn's-membership of the CP was only brief. 
124; Kendall, 294. 
125. Ibid. 
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feebly wields the out-worn weapons 
of a century ago. Against the tank, 
Howitzer, Lewis Gun, and'aeroplane, 
the worker hurls himself, heroically 
armed with -a muzzle-loader of the 
days of Waterloo. Is it any wonder 
he is ignominiously defeated? 126 
Or, as Gallacher and Campbell had it, 
Old tactics and old methods of organ- 
isation have to be overhauled and 
brought up to date to enable us to 
meet and overcome the latest develop- 
ments of organisation from the 
employers' side. Delay spells 
disaster. Everywhere the organisation 
of the employers and their catspaw 
government is being improved to meet 
all eventualities. 127 
Kendall is, therefore, correct to suggest that the formation of the 
Communist Party represented, above all, an'organisational innovation 
among British revolutionaries; conversely it seems misleading to 
128 
represent this as a function of Co mintern manipulation. There 
was, within the British labour move. ment,. and among-British Marxists, 
a strong sense of the need to reorganiset to unify; and the available 
models of organisation were hierarchical, often military. The 
Bolshevik experience was catalytic; it provided one unifying issue; 
aand no doubt there was Comintern intervention in the restructuring of 
the British socialist movement. But, beyond doubt, the demand for 
reorganisation had arisen within the British movement in any case; 
and it seems likely that any such reorganisation would have drawn 
on the models which underlay the contemporaneous developments in 
Labour and trade union organisation. 
126. John S. Clarke, 'Foreword' to W. Gallacher and J. R. Campbell, 
Direct Action. An Outline of Workshop-and Social Organisation 
(Glasgow 1919; reprinted London 1972), 10-11. 
127, Ibid., 32- 
128. Cp Kendall, esp- 300. 
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Chapter 10 
The Struggle for Labour Politics 1921 - 1927 
'10.1 
Introductory 
The apparent unity which was achieved within the labour movement 
during those brief post-war years was founded bn specific sets of 
understandings and beliefs: about the nature of politics, about 
political and industrial action, about their relationships and 
possibilities. These understandings and beliefs were grounded in 
the pre-war experience of the labour movement, but had in most cases 
been fundamentally modified by the impact of war: in addition, the 
war had given legitimacy to certain principles which had an overarch- 
ing effect in the post-war reconstruction of the political organ- 
isation of labour. Essentially, these latter principles had pointed 
the way to more 'efficient' organisational structurest which meant 
hierarchical, centralised structures after the military model. 
'Organisation' in this sense was attractive almost universally, for 
it appeared t6 provide the solution - or at least a part of the 
solution - to many of the problems which the movement confronted: and 
it appeared to do so despite varying definitions of the problems 
themselves. However, thislunity'did not run deep. It couid justify 
a need for better mechanisms, but it could not point to how these 
mechanisms should be used. Thus although, for instance, some of 
the motives which lay behind-the formation of the Trades and Labour 
Council and of the Communist Party were the same, the former was not 
seen by Marxists as a substitute for the latter. 
At the same time, unity was not only achieved in relation to 
organisational change: it was enhanced in the immediate post-war 
years by a number of factors. Firstly, during 1919, to an extent into 
I' 
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1920, industrial organisation could reasonably be seen as a 
major source of political power for the labour movement: it had 
shown great possibilities during 1910- 1914 and during the war; 
its failings'during 1919 (and earlier) could plausibly be ascribed 
to poor leadership (or organisation). In addition, although the 
1918 Representation of the People Act had given Labour a means of 
constitutional advance, the General Election had been a disappoint- 
ment. William Graham's victory was against the tide; Ramsay 
MacDonald, who lost his seat in the debacle, expressed a co=, on view 
in Forward in January 1919: 
this Parliament has no moral authority. 
When political organisation is crushed 
by-fraud or force industrial organisation 
is the only defence that is left. 1 
Opinion and author are both significant: many who, in normal 
circumstances, would have opposed strenuously any 'unconstitutional' 
I 
action were prepared to contemplate it as a means to press a 
deceitful government back to responsibility. Industrial action, 
in short, might be used to redress the balance of the constitution. 
2 
In Edinburgh, certainly, this seems to have been a common view: 
Graham, for instance (who did not share it) was strongly attacked 
within the ILP for, among other reasons, stating that 'he was no 
believer in the 11calcanny" policy'. The first Labour MP in the city, 
1. Forward, 11 January 1919, quoted Brown, 'Labour Party and Ylýolitical Chqnge, l 107- 
2. This case is argued strongly by Brown, ibid., 101-09; it is 
put less forcefully by Dowse, Left in the Centre, 60-65- 
Miliband's discussion, Parliamentary-Socialism, 65-76, 
permits such an interpretation, though he does not argue it. 
Philip Snowden thought MacDonald's attitude in these years was 
a 'canvassing ... for support': his Forward articles 'played 
up. to, the Left Wing' (An Autobiography, Vol II, (London 1934), 
574). But it is difficult to see MacDonald's writings and 
spe9ches, of early 1919 as designed to enhanQe a parliamentary 
career which apparently had just ended; and, in any case, 
MacDonald'-s attitude is significant in part because he thought, 
clearly, that it would strike a chord. 
1* 
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within seven months of his election, survived a vote of no confid- 
ence from one of the branches which had 
3 
nominated him by Just 36 
votes to 25: - and at a public meeting. 
Thirdly, as we have seen, the political differences within 
the labour movement in 1918-1921 were often within, as well as 
between, its various parties and organisations. This had two 
aspects. On the one hand, it discouraged the development of 
clear central'principles within any organisation. Of course, the 
ILP and the Labour Party had always favoured very general statements 
of objective in any case; but the corollary of encouraging the widest 
a 
possible recruitment might be/certain lack of commitment. Daring the 
later years of the war, the Scottish secretary of the Labour Party 
expressed concern about this: 
It is a'little aggravating to find so 
many organisations cropping up and 
appealing to our clientele and more 
or less overlapping. ours. It cannot 
be helped meantime ... when challenged those persons point to the fact that 
the Labour Party has no programme. 4 
But even after February 1918 the Labour Party's programme was a very 
general one, which allowed both Graham and John Maclean to be official 
Labour candidates in 1918. On the other hand, the structure of 
labour politics hindered attempts to impose any clear definition of 
its purpose or boundaries. The main organisational sources of 
power within the movement were the ILP (and to a lesser extent the 
other socialist parties), and the various trade unions: they had 
members who could spread the word, or they had money, or both. 
The Labour Party had neither: the growth of the apparatus of 
individual membership after 1918 was painfully slow; 
5 
and many of 
these members seem also to have been ILPers or Communists - their 
3- ILP Edin. Central branch minutes, 9 June 1919: Walter McPhail, 
editor of the Evening News and an old friend, wrote to Graham 
in 1919: 'you are getting - praised so much from the capitalist 
press that2 the rumour strongly prevails that you will 
be the Liberal candidate for Central Edinburgh at the next 
election. N. B. this is not a joke. ' (Quoted Graham, Willie 
Grahaml 93).. 
4. Ben Shaw to J. S. Middleton (Assistant Sec-, LP), 3 April 1917, 
LP NEC correspondence, quoted Brown, 'Labour Party and Political 
Change, ' 55. 
5. See Appendix A. 
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membership a matter of convenience, and their prime loyalties else- 
where. The Labour Party's main source of power was its electoral 
role: it claimed the right to control the movement's interventions 
into elections, a claim which was generally acceded But the 
electoral setback of 1918, followed by ýoor'showings in municipal 
elections in 1920 and 1921 (Labour representation fell from six to 
to two) meant that this was not a strong source in these early years. 
This I'S graphically illustrated by the inability of the Labour Party 
to prevent the Railwaymen from fieldingin 1921, its own municipal 
candidate in Opposition to Labour - despite support from the national 
leadership of the Union, as well as the Party's. 
6 When electoral 
politics did not convince as a route to power, the Labour Party's 
ability to control the disparate elements of the movement was small. 
Consequently, it was unable to assert effectively any definition of 
what Labour politics was. During the early post-war years, labour's 
political 'unity' was based, in large part, not on agreement, but on 
confusion about the nature of the disagreements, and on inability 
to enforce any particular version of the movement. 
The years from 1920 can be seen as a period in which new 
allegiances, new coalitions, began to form within the labour move- 
ment. Some did not last; but by 1927 the politics of labour were - 
ideologically as well as in organisation - recognisably those which 
havepersisted for half a century. The purpose of this chapter is to 
examine how these new coalitions were formed, and their character: 
one preliminary point must, however, be made. These coalitions were, 
first ýnd foremost, based on common understandings of the political 
world: the strength of the working class; whether its strength was 
primarily 
'industrial' or 'Political'; what these terms meant; the 
possibilities of parliamentary action; and so forth. Only second- 
arily were they coalitions in the more common sense, of alliances 
formally arranged between recognisable political or social groups. 
NUR No. 1 branch minutes, 14,28 August, 11 Septemberl 9 October 
20 November 1921; TUC minutes, 31 August 1921. 
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In many cases, the construction of such a coalition depended as 
much on the recalculation of understandings to reduce the internal 
contradtbions of individualslor groups' political outlooks. 
10.2 The failure of direct action, 1920 
Although the early post-war years saw the coalescence of forms of 
unity which reorganised the political institutions of labour, they 
promised far more, at least to some. The main hope was that 
substantial advances could be achieved-by 'direct action': for some, 
of course, this meant revolutionary change, but for others (such as 
MacDonald), the election had 
created a Parliament that has none of 
the democratic safeguards of a 
Parliament - especially a well-equipped 
critical Opposition and a guarantee of 
full discussion and exposure. Therefore 
the Parliamentary Opposition must come 
from the outside. 7 
Two examples of direct action in 1920 and 1921 in Edinburgh deserve 
examination. 
The chief instance which has received historians' attention 
is the-Council of Action campaign against British intervention in the 
Russo-Polish war in 1920: 'Labour's Fling', according to Miliban ,8 
and no doubt one of those times which, for-David Coates, demonstrate 
that the working class will on occasion respond 'to very radical 
political leadership indeedelý We have already touched on this: 
10 
the Labour'Party was able - for-the first and last time - to initiate 
substantial 'extra-parliamentary' action. The reasons are several. 
7. J. R. MacDonald in Labour Leader, 2 January 1919, quoted in 
P. R. ThoTas, 'The 4ttitude of the Lgbour Party to Reform of 
Parliament, with particular reference to the House of Commons, 
1919*1951", (Ph. D thesis, University of Keele., 1974), 27- 
8. Miliband, -76-82. - 
9. Coates, Labour Party and Struggle for Socialism, viii. 
10. See chapter 8. 
I' 
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The leadership of the Party was itself in large part outside the 
Commons, and, as we have seen, prepared to countenance such 
methods: at least, it found it more difficult to oppose them. 
Elections were still distant, and the parliamentary Party relative- 
ly weak, particularly within the movement. The 'Hands Off Russia' 
committees had been forcing the pace around the country: the 
movement was prepared. But, above all, the issue of defence of the 
Revolution was inextricably associated with defence of the Russians' 
right to choose their own form of government (which hadlof course, 
been one of the main public reasons for labour support for the Great 
Warý and with opposition to further war and conscription. 
11 It was, 
therefore, in one sense a particularly straightforward issue on which 
to mobilise for direct action: it was also one on which the objective 
of the action was clear, and the method appropriate. 
Edinburgh played its part in the Council of Action campaign. 
But the latter's impact was not so unambiguous as we might expect, 
at least in Edinburgh. For at precisely the same time, the city's 
labour movement was embarked on another exercise in direct action: 
one which occupied its main institutions for much longer, yet which was 
destined to fail. This was the Scottish rent strike of 1920; it 
bears further examination, for it deeply influenced the perceptions 
of what direct action could achieve, at least for the 'mainstream' 
of the labour movement. 
Housing, as earlier chapters have shown, had long been an 
important issue for labour. 
12 The war, however, brought major 
changes. The most impoibant were, firstly, the severe pressure on 
accommodation leading to rent rises; 
13 
secondly, the rent strikes, 
11. See S-White, 'Labour's Council of Action's esp. 112-16. 
12. Cp J-Buttj 'Working class housing in Glasgow, 1851 - 19141, 
57-92; Butt, 'Working Class. housing in Glasgow, 1900-39'. in 
I. MacDougall (ed. ) Essals in Scottish Labour History (Edinburgh 
ndZ 1978? _/)1,143-69; 
Gray, Labour Aristocracy, esp-91-1201 
1ý8,182. 
13- See esp. s. 4.6 above. 
t' 
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especially that on the Clyde, which forced the rent restriction 
legislaýion, and led incidentally to the formation of the Scottish 
Labour Housing Association; 14 and, thirdly, the publication of the 
Report, in 1917, of'the Royal Commission on working-class-housing 
in Scotland. 
15 Together these shewed that successful action on 
housing was possible, and lent strength to those who argued for 
drastic action. Initially, after the war, the Government seemed 
ready to move: the provision by the state of 'habitations fit for 
the heroes who have won the war', 
16 
which would, be of superior design 
and in much larger numbers, was'promised by the 1919 Housing Act. 
17 
By late 1920, of course, the Government had begun to downgrade 
this commitment, as the Treasury won the battle for 'economy', and 
the threat of revolution receded. 
18 But in Edinburgh'the Town 
Council did not slure the Government's apprehensions, it seems, even 
in 1919; or perhaps other fears seemed more immediate. Even in 1925 
14. On the Clyde rent strike, see McHugh, 'Clyde Rent Strikel, 
56-62; Melling, 'Glasgow Rent Strike',. 39-44; B. Horne, '1915 
The Great Rents Victory', Scottish Marxist 2,1972 19-26; 
S. Damer, 'State, Class and Housing: Glasgow 1885 - 19191, 
esp. 91-106, and Melling, 'Clydeside Housing', esp. 1477151, 
both in Melling (ed. ), Housing, Social Policy. and the State. 
The last, 151, amd McHugh, 61, mention the origins of the 
SLHA - though both refer to it incorrectly as the Scottish Labour Party Housing Association, Other accounts of the 
rent strike. are to be found in Hinton, First Shop Stewards' 
Movement, 125-7; Gallacher, Revolt on the Clyde, 54-5; A. and V. 
Flynn, 'We shall not be removed', in L. Flynn (ed. ) We Shall be 
All (Lopdon 1978), 18-33; Kendall,, 115; Moorhouse, Wilson, 
Cha#erlainj 'Rept Strikes', esp- 135-6,151-3- 
15- Report of the Royal Commission on the Housing of the Industrial 
Population of Scotland, Rural and Urban, Cd. 8731 (19173-- 
16. Lloyd George in The Times, '13 November 1918: quoted in 
B. B. Gilbert, British Social Policy 1914-1939 (London 1970)9 19- 
17- ý. Swenarton, *"'Insurance against Revolution"', 87-9- 
18. Ibid., 95-8. 
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the majority of councillors were property-owners; they dominated 
the key council committees: they made up 69 per cent, for instance, 
of the Housing and Town Planning Committee. 
19 And after the war, 
the housing issue, 
directly affected property and building 
interests. Landlords were threatened 
by an increase in the supply of modern 
council houses and local builders by 
plans to use direct labour to build them. 20 
Whatever the reason (and the council's language was that of 
community, rather than personal, interest), 
21 the Town Council's 
record in house-building fell well-short of labour demands in-the 
early post-war years: 
For six months, demobilised men and 
civilians have been clamouring for 
employment, but not a stone or brick 
has been laid in Edinburgh. The 
public were assured that schemes were 
ready; that, as soon as labour could 
be found, the work would be tackled. 
The Town Council now blame the Local 
Government Board / which_7... denies 
responsibil#y, 22 
the Trades Council reported in 1919. Eventually building began, on 
various schemes, but they IproceedZ - eg at a painfully'slow pace, ' 
although the need became 'daily ... more clamant' . 
23 Throughout our 
period, this refrain continued. 
In the summer of 1919, a rent strike occurred in Rosyth, which, 
as we have seen, had close links with Edinburgh. The two accounts of 
the number of householders involved differ: 700, and 1500 to 1600 
out of 1602 houses. But in either case it was substantial: and 
despite legal action against fourteen strikers, 
thanks to the amazing solidarity on the 
part of the workers' wives in witholding 
the rents for over six weeks, they were 
19. Elliott, McCrone and Skelton, 'Property and Politics', tables 
1 and 2. 'Property' here excludes own place of residance. 
20. Ibid., 19; - 
21. The main argument was the need for 'Politics' and 'government 
ýepartmentsl to be kept out of municipal administration: see 
the useful discussion in ibid., 16-20. 
22. TC AR 191% 14, 
23. TC AR 1920,5. 
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successful in compelling the 
Government to have their claims 
fully investigated .... 24 
This set the labour movement in Edinburgh thinking: the Trades 
Council, for instance, commended 'a novel method of dealing with 
the Rent Question'; 'a precedent which will not readily be lost 
sight of by the working class of Edinburgh'. 
25 The strike reached 
its successful conclusion in August 1919; in October the Trades 
Council convened a conference on housing, 
26 
and in December it agreed 
to call a public meeting to establish a Tenant's Defence League. 
27 
This was 'manned and officered by men of legal training, ' and was to 
'keep a jealous eye on the rights of its members': within three 
months it had a membership of 'quite respectable proportions' . 
28 
This was an institutional mechanism designed to associate the 
labour-movement with the: hterests of tenants. It was probably also 
intended to mobilise: the main activity of earlier 'Tenants' Defence 
Leagues', notably in Glasgow and Rosyth, had been just the prosecution 
of rent*strikes. There had, then, been over six months' local 
preparation when, in May 1920, the Scottish Labour Housing Association 
summoned a conference in Glasgow, to consider what action should be 
taken against the prospect of rent increases under the 1920 Rent Act. 
29 
There was a strong difference of opinion, certainly among Edinburgh 
labour, as to what the action should be. The Trades Council's 
delegates' report was rejected by 33 votes to 10 when it became 
clear that they had supported a rent strike if rents were increased. 
30 
A Railwaymen's delegate, a strorg revolutionary syndicalist referred 
in particular to the suggestion that the rent strike should be 
aspociated with a stoppage of work. He thought 'the proposed 24 
hours strike discussion had been rushed'; he was not opposed to 
24. TC AR 1920,5; this account also draws on TC minutes, 27 JulY 1919. 
25. TC AR 1920,5. 
26. TC minutes, 26 October 1919. 
27- Ibid., 2 December 1919. 
28. TC AR 1920,5- 
29. The Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 
1920 allowed a rent rise of 15 per cent. 
30- TUC minutes, 1 June 1920. 
I. 
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industrial action for political ends, but to the entire objective: 
He thought it was a waste of time. 
The real issue is not restrict rents 
but to get houses damn the high rents, 
get this in your wages. 31 
So in Edinburgh there were serious doubts about whether a 
rent strike, and associated industrial action, could succeed - 
perhaps also, in some quarters, about the rent strike as a tactic. 
Perhaps this view was shared elsewhere: the SLHA felt it necessary 
to summon another Conference; the STUC issued a circular calling on 
its affiliates to attend and support the call for a 24 hour stoppage 
of work. 
32 Under this pressure the Trades Council's Executive met 
with eight members of the Tenants'- Defence League: their view was 
that a rent strike alone was unlikely to succeed, and that it. should 
be associated with a stoppage of work which was more than symbolic. 
Recommended to support either 'no strike' or a 'complete strike', the 
Council instructed its delegates to argue for a, complete strike until 
the 1920 Act was withdrawn. 
33 The Railwaymen, still reluctant to act 
on rents, nonetheless agreed to send delegates to Glasgow 
on ground that workers must be up and 
doing. If Glasgow workers resisted 
paying rents we cannot stand by with- 
out giving them help. ' 34 
At the Conference, attended by '14 or 15 hundred delegates from all 
over Scotland,, 
35 the Trades Council's motions were ruled out of order, 
36 
and it became effectively committed-to the resolutions agreed: a 24 
hour stoppage of work on 23 August in opposition to the Government's 
allowing rent rises; a refusal to pay the increases_ proposed by the 
new Act; and the organisation of meetings and demonstrations in support 
of these. 
37 
31- NUR No. I branch minutes, 20 June 1920. 
32. Circulars from SLHA (June 1920) and STUC (15 July 1920) cited 
in I. MacDougall (ed . 
), A Catalo82e of Some Labour Records in 
Scotland and some Scots records outside Scotland (Edinburgh 
1978), 157,214. 
33- TUC minutes, 18,27 July 1920- 
34. NUR No. 1 branch minutes, 18 July 1920. 
35- Ibid., 4 August. 1920. 
36-* TUC minutesi 3 August 1920. 
37- NUR No. 1 branch minutes, 4 August 1920. 
f, 
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The misgivings expressed in Edinburgh were to prove well 
founded. Substantial preparation took place: a manifesto, and a 
covenant to ID signed by tenants refusing to pay, were drawn up: a 
public meeting was called in the Meadows to demand 'No Increase 
in Rents'. 38 The Trades Council's Secretary, Alexander Smith, was 
exceptionally paid a salary to work, full-time as organiser of the 
campaign: lie opened a 'central bureau' at the Council's rooms in 
Bristo Port. 39 Yet although the 6rie-day stoppage of work was 
judged a success (according to Forward, 10,000 attended the demon- 
stration that Monday), 
4o 
by 31 August the Council's Executive virtually 
admitted defeat: only about 15 per cent of tenants were witholding 
payment, and 'owing to the number of people paying rent they recomm- 
ended that tenants should not rezist eviction 
41 
Attempts were 
made to resuscitate the action: a conference of union officials 
was summoned, advertisements were placed in the press for financial 
support, an effort made 'to organise for Bovember'. But all to no 
avail: by late October the Rent Strike Committee was Z80 in the 
red, and in early December it was wound up. 
42 
This, set-back, whilst coinciding with the apparent achievement 
of the 'Hands Off Russia' action, had a far more profoundimpact on 
the political thinking of labour in, Edinburgh. It provided evidence 
of the fragility of the labour movement: its image as an army, a 
machines organised for the struggle, crumbled before a differont 
reality. The 'unity' which could produce institutional change was not 
strong enough to achieve a successful mobilisation in 'direct action'. 
A number of institutions within the movement (from-the Parliamentary 
Labour Party to local union branches) opposed the rent strike. A 
number of union branches doubted their ability to mobilise even for 
a 24 hour strike on the issue; two rejected the Tradeo Council's 
proposals outright. 
43 
But perhaps more tell. ing, of tbe organisations 
38. TUC minutes, 3,6,10 August 1920': the ineeting, to be held on 
7 August, was cancelled when the Council of Action campaign 
against war with Russia intervened. 
39- Ibid., 159 27 August 1920. 
40. Forwa rd, 28 August 1920, cited Brown 'Labour Party', 140-41. 
41. TUC minutes, 31 August 1920. 
42. Ibid., 31 August, 12 September, 24 October, 5 December 1920. 
4 3- Ibid., 10 August 1920. 
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represented at bhe Edinburgh conference, which had given 
instructions to proceed with the rent strike, no less than 32 
had not contributed financially over two months - the two critical 
months - later. 
44 
In short, the action failed not because the forces 
of the landlords, or9fthe state, had proved too powerful in open 
conflict: the labour movement had simply proved unable to brine its 
battalions on to the field. 
There were, roughly, two ways of responding to this situation, 
not mutually exclusive. The first takes us back to the discussion 
of the last chapter: it could reinforce the notion that the major 
failing of the movement lay in the area of organisation and co- 
-ordination. But the more important response was to question the 
appropriateness of the strategy, or at least of the tactics. Of 
course, the various currents in the movement developed different 
criticisms of the strategy. For some syndicalists, for instance, the 
rent strike was 'dragging the workers into a mess'; the answer was to 
task the working class to organise themselves to abolish the cause 45 
of rising rents and all their other problems - the capitalist system. ' 
For others on the left, although the 'only thing to cause the oppressors 
to think was to stop the wheels of industry', the rent strike should 
be supported because it was necessary to act 'on the ground of the 
class struggle as we found it, this on the ground of historic 
development. ' 
46 
For one important element of the movement, however, the lessons 
of. the-rent agitation were lessons about direct action, and about 
the possibilities of any industrial action. This interpretation also 
drew on recent industrial experience, and a sense that 
with overwhelming numbers of unemployed, 
with'Capital armed with large reserve 
funds and replete with carefully pre- 
pared machinery, the power'of the strike 
can only be effective to an uncertain 
degree .... 47. 
44. Ibid. $ 24 October 1920. We do not know how many organisations 
attended the conference on 14 August, but 95 organisations were 
affiliated to the TC in 1920-21. 
45- NUR No. 1 branch minutes, 4 August 1920. 
46. Ibid. 




It was therefore necessary to find an alternative strategy to 
cope with the now situation. This was presented as a 'return to 
political-effort': 
48 
that is, a concentration on the development 
of local Labour Parties 'to carry out the necessary Parliamentary 
and Municipal propaganda', 
1+9 
and a shift away from direct action - 
now characterised as 'revolutionary industrial methods., 
50 
The failure of direct action, and the erosion of union strength, 
placed intolerable strains on the post-war labour coalition. This, 
of course, had not been deeply-rooted, but had rested on two main 
elements. The first was the strength of notions of organisation 
and efficiency, which provided the basis for the restructuring of 
the movement's political institutions. In essence, this remained 
unchallenged* The second was the commonality over method which, 
temporarily and over a limited range of issues, had seen labour 
politicians prepared to take 'direct action'. Many factors were 
required for this, but perhaps the most basic was a belief that the 
methods of 'direct action' worked. During 1920 this belief was 
knocked away; not, indeed, for the entire spectrum of labour 
thought, but for a crucial segment. From late 1920, therefore, 
we can view labour politics as grouping around two new positions; 
we now turn to an examination of this new situation. 
10.3 Labour socialism, Marxism, and their coa3itions 
in an important work, Stuart Macintyre has proposed that labour 
politics in the 1920s can be understood in terms of 'the opposition 
of two doctrines, Marxism and Labour Socialism'. The latter was 
'the political perspective of the Labour activists of the period, 
4& Ibid. 
49. Ibid. , 5. 
50. Ibid., 2. 
338 
i 
along with the more general understanding of the social and 
51 
economic processes which supported this perspective': it was 
most clearly articulated by men such as MacDonald and Philip 
Showden: 
The purpose bf Labour Socialism ... 
was to lift the working class up from 
its lowly pre-occupation with wages 
and conditions, and to endow it with 
a sense of social purpose. This 
involved the articulation of an 
elaborate theoretical edifice: a 
historical perspective of social 
progress in the nineteenth century 
positivist tradition; an economic 
-analysis to show that the worker was 
denied the full fruits of his labour; 
an organic view of society to indicate 
how this injustice ought to be 
corrected. 52 
This doctrine implied considerable scepticism about strikes, which 
threatened the concept of an organic society; it also involved great 
confidence in the power of moral appeal, and of education. Now, as 
we have seen, in the immediate aftermath of war, this doctrine was 
weak: MacDonald, ejected fron Parliament, found a justification for 
'direct action'; William Graham, recently returned, was more 
ambivalent. Graham was probably the most prominent of Edinburgh's 
Labour Socialists: yet even he felt a need, in those early post; -war 
years, to go some way to meet the ý. direct actionists'. Certainly he 
expressed doubts about the House of Commons, whose Iv%rhole atmos- 
phere ... was almoat fatal to men who were in earnest.... Hardly 
any measure within recent times had gone to the roots of the social 
and economic wrong. 
53 And at the same time he extended a hand to the 
'direct actionists1i essentially inviting them to enter the Labour 
Socialist fold: 
The most ardent advocate of direct 
action would not dispute that it 
was wrong to concentrate on industrial 
51- Macintyre, A Proletarian Science, 47- 
52. Ibid., 55- 
53- Graham, 100. 
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issues. After all their discussion 
they had always to come back to 
general well-being, to a real 
community of effort, in which 
sectional demands were sub- 
ordinated to public progress, and 
to such a combination of activity 
in the industrial field and in 
politics as would achieve the 
proper relationship of industry to 
the State and the State to industry 54 
As the post-war boom passed, however, the self-confidence of 
Labour Socialism increased. Direct action no longer seemed capable 
of providing solutions; the Labour Socialist commitment to progress 
through moral appeal was no longer threatened. Thus we find Graham 
attacking 'the "Left Wing" Cand_, 7 ... the harm they were doing to 
the Labour Party'55at a Trades and Labour Council meeting; and the 
Council's Executive regretting that 
The easily seen benefits and quick 
returns of war and post-war trade 
union activity gave ah undue 
prominence to the possibilities of 
revolutionary industrial methods, -and 
created an attractive school of thought, 
which found expression in the growth of 
some revolutionary bodies and the creation 
of others. 56 
It was a Ilamentgble fact that these organisations attracted undesir- 
#57 able elements',. and 
the ebullient propaganda of theZ-se-7 
bodies which dub themselves 
revolutionary have entirely failed 
to attract any substantial support 
fr. o, n the workers generally. 58 
This1fact' was itself comforting, for it seemed to underline the 
Labour Socialists' belief that 'revolutionary heroics do not readily 
accord with the temperament of the men and women who make up the great 
body of our people,, 
59and 
that 'the development of the local Labour 
54. Ibid. 
55. T&LC minutes, 29 May 1920. 
56. TUC AR 1921,2. 
57- Ibid. 
58. Ibid. 
59. Ibid., 5. 
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Parties ... to carry out the necessary Parliamentary and Municipal 6o 
propaganda ... will put a power into our hands that cannot be denied. 
In practice, of course, Labour Socialism was important as the 
central, justifying, doctrine of an important section of labour. 
The adherents of the doctrine - men and women in the mould of William 
Graham - were as nothing unless they could construct effective 
coalitions with other elements of the movement. (In 1919 and early 
1920 this had been impossible: indeed, the Labour Socialists' 
isolation had been such as to induce confusion among some of its 
leading exponents. ) These coalitions could not, however, require the 
wholesale acceptance of the Labour Socialist doctrine: rather, they 
were built around certain central notions. In some cases these were 
fragments of Labour'Socialist doctrine; in others, they were (so to 
say) the outcome of 'negotiations' between Labour Socialism and the 
gui . ding assumptions of other groupings. These notions were týe 
principles which legitimised common action by these various groupings; 
the coalition existed only in relation to the actions that it took. 
The constituent elements of the coalition were not static, and 
much of the discussion that follows is concerned with the processes 
whereby its size and cohesion ebbed and flowede Nevertheless, it is 
possible to look at the main principles on which it was grounded. Two 
stand out. First, political and industrial action were perceived as 
distinct; in particular, the latter could not be used legitimately 
in pursuit of the former. This distinction formed the basis of the 
alliance between Labour Socialism and the more oconodistic, 
Ilabourist', views of many prominent trade unionists. 
61 
For while 
Labour Socialism was essentially unsympathetic to industrial actions 
labourism often involved an acceptance that militant industrial 
action was necessary in the. pursuit of a 'fair day's pay. The 
resolution-lay in the ability of Labour Socialism and labourism to 
agree that, at least, industrial action should be confined to a 
60. Ibid. 
61. 'Labourism' here is used in'the'sehse defined by Saville, 
'The ideology of Labourism', 213-26. 
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collective bargaining role. This was, of course, a notion which 
was enshrined in law: unions' entitlement to take industrial 
action 'in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute' had 
been hard won and not easily maintained; ardent defence of this 
position no doubt enhanced still further the status lent to it 
62 
by stqtute. Moreover, this formulation allowed the Labour 
Socialists to justify their apparent sympathy with some of the 
'direct action' of 1919 and 1920: retrospectively, it could be 
redefined as industrial action, pure and simple. 
Second, political action was constitutional action: fighting 
parliamentary and municipal elections, and propaganda and organ- 
isation to this end. This was not, in itself, a meeting-point with 
other sections of the movement; but there was a widespread agreement 
that this was a fundamental form of politics even among those (many, 
for instance, in the ILP) who. did not agree that it defined the 
boundaries of politics. Thus it enabled Labour Socialism to adopt 
a clear strategy which could be pursued at all times, and which (at 
almost all times) could be pursued in co-operation with the Labour 
left. 
We have suggested that Labour Socialism-was a doctrine whose 
main opposition was Marxism. Between the two, however, there were 
at least three political trends which provided the motivation for 
significant numbers within the labour movement. Two, labourism and 
the ILP left, we have already touched on; a third was syndicalism. 
These were the main trends whose support the Labour Socialists 
could seek; 
63 
by the same token they were also objects of Marxist 
blandishment. Again we must bear in mind that these trends were not 
constant in size: their strength waxed and waned in relation to 
many factors - not least, as we have seen, their successes. Thus 
the objective, though not always consciously or clearly stated, of 
Labour Socialists and Marxists was not merely to mobilise these 
62. See Wedderburn, Worker and the Law, 305-27; J. Saville-I 'Trade 
Unions and Free Labour: the Background to the Taff Vale 
Decision' in A. Bri5gs and J. Saville, Essays in Labour 
History. (London 1967 317-50- 
63- Cp Macin tyre, A Proletarian Science, 60-65. 
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trends in common action, but to shift individuals' outlooks 
nearer to their own. But since this particular objebtive was 
achieved only to a limited degreel what we may term the Labour 
Socialist and Marxist coalitions 
64 
were inherently unstable. 
They were achieved around a limited range of issues, and on the 
basis of certain sets of. legitimising principles; when the 
issues (or the way they were perceived) changed, the alignments 
might shift. 
10.4 The Labour Socialist coalition and labourism 
The foundation of the eventual success of Labour Socialism was its 
ability to form working-relationships with trade union labourism 
and'withthe Labour left, ' largely grouped in the ILP. In this 
section we examine how the first of these was achieved. 
When the possibilities of direct action began to seem more 
remote, perhaps from the summer of 1920, Labour Socialism began to 
assert itself. At this stage there was no clear appreciation of 
future allies and adversaries. To be sure, in a paper probably 
written in 1921, Graham app8aled to the trade unions to 'determine 
their attitude to political action', claiming that 
The extravagancies of some of the left- 
wing theorists of recent years have been 
costly -to the trade union movement and 
they have in part contributed to present 
chaos. 65 
At the same time, he claimed to note a 'healthy reaction in favour of 
reliance on the ballot box. 
66 
But whilst the ideas of direct action 
64. These terms Mabour Socialist coalition' and'Marxist coalition') 
thus imply only that*Labour Socialists and Marxists formed their 
core; not that all members of the coalition were, or became, 
Labour Socialists or Marxists. 




might be wrongheaded, there was in 1920 and 1921 an attempt to win over 
the people who held them. Many of their contributions and achieve- 
ments were praised. The revolutionary bodies, for instance, 
have undoubtedly generated sincere 
enthusiasms, and, of more importance, 
they have created a healthy movement 
for economic study, untrammelled by 
the accepted nostrums of orthodox 
defenders of the system of big and 
easy profits. 67 
Apparently, it was felt that some of the institutions created in 
this period were now established parts of the labour body politic, 
which might in time be converted. Thus the Trades and Labour 
Council's Executive in 1921: 
The Scottish Labour College, and like 
institutions, have sprung into permanent 
being, and when they emerge from the 
inevitable limitations of immature 
experience, they will undoubtedly con- 
tribute greatly to the real progress of 
Labour. 
Labour Socialism needed, not indeed the ideas, but the effort, of 
syndicalism's erstwhile or temporary adherents. The 'ebullient 
propaganda of the bodies which dub themselves revolutionary, ' and 
their 
Enthusiasm, ability and genuine effort 
have undoubtedly attracted a goodly 
number of keen workers who would normally 
have been useful units in the great work 
of the Labour Movement. 69 
The Labour Socialist endeavour was an ambitious one: it needed 
this enthusiasm and effort, but demanded that it be directed toward 
the electoral strategy. 
During 1921, as we have seen, the hopes of syndicalism were 
dashed as the Triple Alliance fell apart. The syndicalista themselves 
were increasingly isolated: a railwayman, for instance, who attacked 





his union's election manifesto as 'not ... in line with 
revolutionary socialism' found himself in a-small minority. 
70 
This had two important implicatiois. On the one hand, direct 
action waned in importance as a political tendency: in particular, 
it lost the strategic direction which an ascendant and self- 
confident syndicalism had been able to provide. For Labour 
Socialism, thereforelsyndicalism became a less important 
competitor. On the other hand, it became more easy for the 
Labour Socialists to establish links with those who, for several 
years previously, had advocated the tactics of direct action. 
In short, sydicalism was less of a threat and its former supporters 
more open to attempts to win them into alliances on other bases. 
. 
Trade union support was essential if the Labour Socialist 
strategy was to succeed. Union membership was the only substantial 
and reliable source of income for the Labour Party, particularly 
during the early years when membership and electoral success might 
prove elusive. This became especially clear after the debacle at 
the 1919 municipal election: for the ILP's contribution to the 
Election Fund in that year (f-55 8s 9d ) slumped to Z2 7s 2id in 
1920, whilst union contributi6ns (which had been larger anyway) fell 
just 97 3s 6d to z61.6s. 
71 The ILP's achievement in 1919 had been 
based on the efforts of individual collectors: 
72 this method was 
clearly more sensitive to moods of success and failure than one 
which depended on the institutional decisions of union organisations. 
Yet electoral success was expensive. In 1919, for instance, 
Z223 18s 10d had been spent on elections in Edinburgh alone; but 
all six Town Council candidates were defeated, and only two 
Parish Council candidates were victorious. 
73 The rate of return was 
poor; other indications from this first-post-war contest were 
equally inauspicious. The defeats were, at least in part, due to 
70- NUR No. 1 branch minutes, 9 October 1921: the vote was 42 to 
11. The manifesto is reproduced in Appendix B. 
71- See Appendix A. 
72- TC AR 1920,24-51 lists 28 individual ILP collectors; far 
more than in any subsequent year in our period. 
73- Another threee were returned unopposed: TC AR 1920,18; 
The Scotsman, 5 November 1919. 
345 
i 
'a new coalition, a combination of all sections of Liberals and 
Unionists against collectivism in municipal affairs', The 
Scotsman reported: 
the electors did not ask the politics of 
the candidates who stood against the 
Labourists; in several cases it was, indeed, 
not known to which party a non-Socialist 
candidate belonged. It was enough for the 
average citizen to be appraised of the man 
who represented the Labour ticket. That 
knowledge determined his choice; and by 
agreement between, the non-Socialist 
parties the door of Edinburgh Town Council 
has been closed against preachers of the 
street corner gospel of extremism. 74 
If Labour was to le thus opposed, the road to electoral victory might 
be long, arduous, and expensive. 
The onset of the depression broke the liaison - always 
unstable and tenuous - betweensyndicalism and labourism. The 
apostles of direct action had been of some value when industrial 
action seemed a viable union strategy: they had various organisation- 
al and tactical skills, and their activism was dedicated to trade 
union (rather than 'political') organisation. But even in 1920 the 
liaison had been limited to a relatively narrow range of issues. 
When, for instance, an active Railwaymen's departmental represent- 
ative applied for promotion to inspectors 
75some 
argued from a 
syndicalist position against 'active members taking official 
positions': 
It being a mere impossibility for a 
member to fight on both sides. Too often 
it meant that such members 'emancipated' 
themselves and not the workers. 76 
But they were isolated, unable to overcome the. labourist assumption 
that a good man could exercise managerial tasks in the interests of 
the workers. From 1921 the areas on which syndicalism and labourism 
74. The Scotoman, 6 November 1919. 
75- 'Departmental representative' was a union post; 'inspectors' 
were junior managerial grades. 
76. NUR No. I branch minutes, 20 May 1920: the vote was 31 to 21 
but the argument was interwoven with ýlaims that the represent- 
ative concerned was being accused of 'belly crawling' and 
being a 'traitor to the NURI. 
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could find common ground diminished further, leaving room for the 
Labour Socialists' advances. In a conscious re-evaluation of 
strategy in 1921, the Trades and Labour Council's Executive 
implicitly criticised post-war union policies. 'The Strike is 
one of the most important rights which we possess, and your 
Executive would be the last authority to suggest that the Strike 
weapon must be abandoned or relaxed. ' But 
while it is a weapon, it is only a 
weapon. It cannot become a policy 
ahd-only foolhardy men, regardless 
of consequences, can be blind to its 
limitations. ý 77 
Here was labourism distancing itself from syndicalism and direct 
action. 
Labourism, however, was never a coherent and consistent 
political standpoint, as Marxism and Labour Socialism were (or as 
syndicalism aspired to b--). It had no theorists: it was, rather, 
an amorphous amalgam of attitudes and policies, with a more or less 
specific relationship to collective bargaining. Although this lent 
it great flexibility, it was also a limitation. For while 
syndicalism and the theorists of direct action might have been 
peddling a 'foolhardy' strategy, it was at least a strategy. This 
was where Labour Socialism found a role. The war and its aftermath 
had demonstrated that 
whatever our trade while 
Governmental power is in the hands 
of Capital interests, the strength of 
the State stands armed against the 
worker. 78 
Labour Socialism promised that this power could be won by electoral 
means: 'it proposed a strategy in which the unions had a vital role, 
but not one which would jeop'ardise their industrial position. It did 
not suggest, unlike syndicalism or Marxism, that industrial action 
could further political ends. Rather, it allowed the unions to retain 




flexible, empirical, industrial attitudes: 'a positive industrial 
policy includes much more than the use of the Strike in every 
emergency', but it 'should be supplemented by vigorous and 
sustained work by Labour in the political field. 179 
In essence then, Labour Socialism and labourism could marry 
because each accepted a division between 'political' and 'industrial' 
issues; and because the latter were acknowledged to be the preserve 
of trade unions. Their relationship wastnot always an easy -ohe. 
The labourists' economism (perhaps most explicitly expressed when the 
Plasterers condemned the Town Council's 'stopping the work on 
Housing Schemes in the City' not because of the resulting shortage 
of accommodation but because it was 'preventing a worker from selling 
his Labour in the Highest'Market') 
80 
lay uneasily with Labour 
Socialist notions of social unity and harmony. And when economism 
became militant, or when employers took the offensive, the axis of 
labourism could shift again toa point where the direct action of 
syndicalism or - increasingly Communism began to seem relevant. 
But the liaison was underpinned by the growth of-the Labour Party's 
apparatus. This enabled Labour Socialism to promote a definition of 
politics which severely restricted the left, and provided a structure 
which sought to separate political from industrial action, and thus 
supported labourist views of trade unions' role. Let us look at 
how this liaison developed. 
The assumption of those who had formed the Trades and Labour 
Council was, as we have seen, that it would be an organisation which 
could be turned to whatever end its members and affiliates might 
desire.. During our period it did indeed serve as a 'council of 
action', as well as directing the local Labour Party apparatus. But 
the Council should not be looked at in isolation: - these-two roles, 
which typify the syndicalist (or Communist) and Labour Socialist 
strategies respectively, made structural demands of the entire local 
79! Ibid. 
80. TUC minutes, 8 August ý1922. 
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labour and trade union movement. We shall suggest that these roles 
were incompatible. 
Before the Trades and Labour Council was formed, local 
Labour organisation in the city was haphazard; ward committees 
varied in strength, but were concentrated in some - by no means all - 
of the working class wards. Probably they existed sporadically, 
being formed on a more orless ad hoc basis when-an, election was 
imminent, and fading away thereafter: they had, -after all, no other 
function. 
81 
By 1920, when the amalgamation took place, there was 
'the nucleus of three Divisional Labour Parties in the city - Central, 
West and North': 
82 
a formulation which suggests there was little more 
than a nucleus. 
83 
The Labour Partyq therefore, had much to gain from 
its organisational fusion with the tradq unions, but little to offer 
save hope for tg future: 'The remedy is obviously not to petition, 
but to control'. Save financially,. however, gains did not 
automatically accrue; in 1920 and 1921 the trade union delegates 
(who were a substantial majority of the nevy Council) 
85 
showed little 
81. E. g., a Istrong committee' was formed in George Square ward 
in late 1917; a 6ommittee was formed in. Dalry Ward in mid- 
1918. But Dalry, at least, had been fought successfully by 
Labour on several o'coasions'before the war. (Edin. LP minutest' 
22 November 1917,13 June 1918; 'Fox, 'Latour Town Councillors', 
1-2). Only two ward committees, Gorgie and St. Leonard's, paid 
dues to the Edin. LP in 1917/18 (ARj 8). 
82. Edin LP AR 1919/20 in Md AR 1920,18. This excludes Leitht 
of course, which hEid a separate burgh LP: see'Ruies of the Le-i'th 
United Trades Council and Labour Party (Leitlis'1918). 
83- Only four wara committees paid dues*tp the Edin. i, ý'in 1919/20: 
George Square, St. Loonard's and St-Gilesl(wh#h were in Pentral 
Division), and Gorgie (West Division); a Dal; y committee 
(West Division) is recorded 
* as 
existing, but paid no dues; and 
a West Division Womenls*Section also existed. Edin LP AR 
1919/20 in TUC AR 1920,22. 
84. TUC AR 192218. 
8,5. In 1920/1921 there were 32 delegates from political 'bodios, 282 
from trade union branches (T&LC AR 1921,2,1-6)..., Thepe. was, of 
course, no restriction in our period of voting on, political 




sign of concern for their new charge. This is perhaps most 
clearly shown by the Council's unwillingness to postpone or 
rearrange its regular fortnightly meeting which fell on election 
day in 1920.86. Apart from agreeing election addresses and select- 
ing candidates, 
8? 
Party organisation was not discussed until June 
1921. 
So for the first eighteen months, or thereabouts, of the 
new Council's existence, the Labour Party had handed over its 
government in Edinburgh to trade union delegates - amongst whose 
notions of political activity the electoral strategy of the Labour 
Party did not loom large. During the latter part of 1921, however, 
this began to change. As we have seen, the dominance of 'direct 
action' as a political strategy was eroded. Within the Edinburgh 
labour movement a loose Labour Socialist grouping, which centred 
on the local branch of the Social Democratic Federation, began 
to take advantage of this. A substantial number of SDF members 
held important positions in the local movements and especially in 
the Trades and Labour Council; 
88 
they seem to have realised that the 
86. TUG minutes 19 October 1920; the meeting in question was 
that held on 2 November 1920. 
87- TUC minutes 18 May, 18 August (EC), 14,15 September (both 
EC), 12. October 1920 (EC). 
88. The following can be firmly identified as SDF members who 
were also TUC officers or executive committee members: 
T, A. Cairns (T&LC Treasurer 1922-4, President 1925, EC 
1926-ý9); W-Elger (TUC EC 1920, President 1921-2; Sec. 
STUC, 1922-46); A. Eunson, '(TC President 1916-18); G. Hogg 
(Leith UTC & LP President, 1920; TUC Vice-President 1921, 
President 1922-4; EC 1925-7); R. Martin (T&LC Librarian, 1921); 
T. E. McDonald (T&LC EC 1921-22); R-McKenzie (T&LC Librarian 
1920); J-J-Pottinger (TC Assistant See., 1918); F. Smithies 
(TUC Librarian 1922, Political Officer, 1923-30); 
G. Williamson (Treasurer, T&LC, 192C-22). 
Other prominent SDF members were: T. Drummond Shiels 
(Councillor 1919-20, MP for East Edinburgh 1924-31); 
. A. Young 
(Councillor 1922-24,1926-32; MP for Glasgow. * Partick 1923-24) 
J. A. Young (Councillor, 1909-20). 
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Labour Party apparatus could be used to develop a strong, 
constitutional, political bloc within the movement. So it waa 
William Elger, the Council's President and a member of the local 
SDF Executive Committee, who in June 1921 set in train the 
organisation of the Party machine. A meeting of the Council's 
Executive heard reports from divisional Labour Parties: Elger 
stressed the need for 'perfecting machinery', and insisted on 
statements of the 'actual position' of membership and finance 
from each. Each local party was then instructed to meet within 
three weeks, and a special sub-committee of Council Executive and 
DLP representatives would meet monthly. 
89 
Over the following 
months this detailed work was started: questions of finance, 
propaganda, literature, registration of voterst were tackled. 
Previously, it seems, the Party had not even had copies of the 
voters' roll. 
go Then, when the 1921 municipal elections were over, 
a system of central funding to DLPs was agreed. 
91 
All this could be achieved for three main reasons. Firstly, 
the pressure from national and Scottish Labour Parties was backed 
by politically and organisationally able local supporters. 
Secondly, direct action was beginning to seem less and less 
plausible as a political strategy. And,, thirdly, the direct 
action coalition had never, in any event, defined political 
action to the exclusion of electoral methods: it had simply won 
a commitment to its own. In addition, -it had-developed no 
institutions which could impose, and 'police'-, such definitions. 
So there was no basis for the emergence of opposition to tho 
Labour Socialist proposals. The strength of. the Labour-Socialist 
strategy, thentwas its ability to mobilise widely held principles - 
essentially, those based around notions of organination, which were 
non-ocntentious - to promote a form of political organisation; a 
form, moreovert' which promoted a particular type of political 
89. TUC-minutes, I June 1921 (EC). * 
90. ' Ibidis 5t 6 July, 2 August-1921- 




activity. Although Labour politics was nof narrow, encompassing 
right and left trends, it did increasingly define the strategy 
(as electoral) within which these trends could oterate. 
A critical decision was made in April 1922: the Trades 
and Labour Council appointed a Political Officerv 
92 to'be 
responsible for those duties appertaining to the activities of 
Local Labour Parties., 
93 This allowed the Labour Party apparatus to 
develop with greater independence from the vicissitudes of the 
Council: the trade union delegates had, in effect, granted a 
measure of autonomy to the Party apparatus. But, in addition, it 
meant that one man was responsible for the Party. The first 
Political Officer was relatively ineffectual; but he was succeeded 
in April 1923 by a man of considerable energy and ability, Frank 
Smithies. In his early forties, Smithies was a long-standing 
member of the', SDF; he was in a position to organise his own time, 
94 
earning his living after 1921 as a conjurer and Punch-and-Judy man. 
He also had the good fortune to take on the post when the Labour 
vote in Edinburgh was growing most rapidly. 
95 Apart from pres. sing 
on with the development of local organisation, 
96 Smithiec fought to 
expand and consolidate the role of the Political Officer, ensuring, 
for instance, that he should attend all selection conferences as of 
right 
The gradual strengthening of-the divisional Labour Parties 
continued over the following years, helped, no doubt, by Labour's 
successes at the general elections of 19'22,1923, and 1924.98 By 
the spring of 1924 the Trades and Labour Council was claiming that 
'Ward Committees have been established in all wards of the City, and 
are working energetically-199 As a result; the status and strength of 
92. Ibid., 21 March, 4 April 1922. 
93- Edin. TUCI Constitution and Rules (Edin. 1922), 8. 
94.1 am grateful to Dr. F. Smithies, of Cambridge, for biograrhical 
information about his father. 
95; See Appendix A. 
96. The development of Labour Party organisation is surveyed in 
Appendix A. - 
97- TUC minutes, 18 December 1923- 
98. Although, nationally, 1924 was a small setback for Labour, in 
Edinburgh the Party captured its second seat. 
99. - TUC AR 1924,7. 
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the Party, in relation to other sections of the movement, 
improved. Of course, many of the ward committees were weak 
creatures; and the ILP continued to be the main source of active 
support. But the divisional Labour Party delegates were, in the 
main, more assiduous in their attendance at the (governing) 
Council's meetings (as table 10.1, shows). Thus, in large part, 
they determined the political direction of the movement as a whole. 
Table 10.1 Participation of ILP nnd Labour Party delegates 
iii Trades and Labour Council 
1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1025.1926 
-21 -22 -23 -24 -25 -26 -27 
No. of 
-zo delegates: LP 18 21 24 27 30 31 
ILP 96 .6 15 20 21 23 Mean no. of 
meetings 
attended .: LP 8.00 6.43 10.12 5.52 5-97(b) 10.00(b) 7-13 
by each 
delegate (a): 
iLp 8. oo 16. oo 7-83 4*46 7.80(b) 4-48(b) 5-78 
Mean no. of 
delegates 
attending LP 5! 33 5! 40 9? 35 5t52 5! 59(b) 8-33(b) 7-89 
each 






Notes: (a) because the number of meetings held v'aried from year to 
year, the figures are not stric ' 
tly comparable between years; 
(b) this is especially true for 1924-25 and 1925-26, when 
substantially more meetings were held. 
Source: calculated from TUC ARs, each year. 
Increasingly, too, the DLPs began to exercise a certain autonomous 
authority, in relation to elections at least - and, so far as 
Labour Socialism was concerned, could be a counter-weight to the 
Trades and Labour-Council 
, 
when the left gained a (temporary) 
ascendency. When, for instance, a Council Executive member and ILP 
leftist 'called Ramsay MacDonald a traitor' at a Council meeting, 
100 
she vlas forceLl to resign as a Town Council candidate by her Ward 
loo. TUC minutes, 18 August 1925. 
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Committee and DLP, despite support from the Trades and Labour 
Council. 101 In additi6n, whilst the DLPs could not directly affect 
the activities of the various other labour political parties, the 
latter - above all, the ILP and tho Communist Party could be 
'boxed-in' by a variety of means; prevented from gaining access 
to important areas. In 1924, for instance, as table IO. 'l suggests, 
the ILP seems to have made an effort to asserL its authority within 
the local movement: the Trades and Labour Council made sure it did 
not succeed. The ILP was for , 
bidden to ask union branches for money 
without the Council's approval; 
102 the Central ILP branch was excluded 
from the East'Division parliamentary nomination meeting; 
103 
an 
attempt by an ILP branch to summon a parliamentary selection meeting 
in South Edinburgh was sevo'rely squashed. 
1o4 The process by which 
the Communist Party's influence was attacked, though similar, was 
more protracted; we shall deal with this later in the chapter. 
10.5 The Labour Socialist coalition and the Labour left 
Most of the Labour left in the early and midLtwenties was grouped 
in the ILP. The ILP had always, of course, been noted for its 
missionary zeal, and this was the basis of LabourS Ocialism's 
coalition with the left. In essence, the ILP, and-the left, was 
permitted, even encouraged, to indulge in propaganda; generally, 
no bounds were put on this. The Trades and Labour Council did not, 
for instance, attempt to control the ILP's public speakers, or 
reprimand them for unacceptable utterances. Within this sphere, the 
ILP was very active; the left was involved in much work. And 
because, as Dowse has pointed out, the ILP in the early Itwenties bad 
101. Ibid., 1,81 25 September 1925. 
102. TUC minutes, 25 March 1924; Appendix kimplies that this 
prohibition may not always have been effective. 
103. Ibid. o 8 July 1924: ILP branches were not delineated by ward 
or parliamentary boundaries, and the Central branch would have 
had a number of members in East Edinburgh. 
104. Ibid., 14 October 1924. 
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I no conception of a disciplined and. centralised party 
permeating the looser organisation of the Labour Party, 1105 
when it did wander, outside its appointed area, it tended to do 
so in a confused and ineffectual way. These 'frontier skirmishes' 
became more common from 1923 onwards, as the ILP drove to strength- 
en its organisatipn and increase its membership and number of 
branches; and as, in reaction to the experience of the Labour 
Government, the ILP left attempted to change the nature of its 
Party. But they remained the exception: in general, the 
achievement of the ILP was its enabling radical opinions to be 
expressed, but in an institutional context which minimised their 
effect on the direction of Labour politics. 
The ILP, in the years after 1921, had many policies; it 
contained both. constitutionalists and apontles of direct action. 
But both shared an assumption - rather than an explicit strategy - 
that the working class could be won to socialism within the frame- 
work of a capitalist society, by the creation of an all-embracing 
socialist movement. This was, indeed, common ground with Labour 
Socialism, although they might have differed on the content of 
'socialism', and on how this socialict faith would lead to 
political change. (For the ILP left the Labour Socialist assumption 
of social unity, of society as an organism evolving toward a true 
essence, was unfounded: the left saw the winning of the workers 
to socialism as a necessary precondition of mobilising them against 
the rule of Capital. ) We now look briefly at three major areas into 
which the left's energies were channelled: the organisational and 
propaganda workcf the ILP; the socialist movement's attempts to 
integrate the young; and the promotion of a local*labour papers 
The Labour Standard. 
The ILP reached a Peak of membership in 1920, from which it 
declined over the following two years. But from 1922, under a new 
national leadership, and spurred by the election results of that year, 
10, q. Dowse, 71. 
p- 
j 
it embarked on a period of furious organisational growth; Scotland 
made the pace. 
106 The increases in the number of ILP branches in 
Edinburgh, and in their total membership, were dramatic; although 
the figures in table 10.2 are not a wholly reliable guide ULP 
Table 10.2 The ILP in Edinburgh, 1919 - 1927 
Year (a) No. of branches: MC affiliation fees: 
affiliated to Paying affiliation amount no. of 
T&LU fees to TUC paid members 
paid for 
1919/20 3 















I igs Oci 76(c)) 
4 Z5 7slOd 323 
4 Jt 4 8s 4d 265 3 -0 8s 4d 265 5 L6 12s Od 396 
8 CIO 5s 6d 616 
8 E9 13s 2d 579 
Notes: (a) 1 April - 31 March; (b) no record survives of the fee 
scales for the Edinburgh LP before amalgamation; (c) 
the affiliation fee to Edinburgh T&L Cwas 4d. per 
member throughout; the affiliation fee to Leith 
United TC & LP was 3d- per member; (d) the Central ILP 
Women's section was also affiliated in 1925-26, paying 
6s8d. (representing 20 members): it'has been excluded 
from these figures, on the ground that its members were 
probably also members of the Central branch proper. 
Sources: T&LC AR, each year; T& LC Pules, 1922; Leith United TC & LP 
Rules, 1918. 
branches were not obliged to affiliate to the Trades and Labour 
Council, and there was no effective method of ensuring affiliation 
on full membership), the scale of the changes leaves little room for 
doubt. 107 The early and mid-'twenties was a period of massive 
upheaval for the ILP in Edinburgh. New members had to be integrated, 
106. Ibid., esp. ch. 7; Marwick, 1ILP'j esp. 222-9. 
107- This picture is albo supported-by surviving records of 
affiliation fees to ILP head office (Affiliation Fees ... Year 
Ending February 1927,. ILP papers, LSý7, aiid by the estimate of 
Marwick, 1ILP1 , 228. 
f-1 13s 8d n-a-(b) 






educated into the outlook and methods of the ILP. Branch 
management was a major problem; many branch officials were 
inexperienced, and themselves needed training. And this is to 
leave aside tbh e Party 's political work: I doing propiaganda Iao. 
watching our interests within the Labour Party, ' and so forth. 
io8 
It is clear that the organisational problems were but partially 
surmounted, not least because all the ILP's local officials were 
volunteers. A special report on the ILP's Scottish organisation 
found that in Edinburgh 'there is not the proper spirit amongst 
the Federation officials, ý and that 
We have no co-ordinate scherie in 
attending to the needs of the area, 
and I am afraid we cannot get the 
best results until full time work 
in organising the district is 
establishedo log 
We have seen that the ILP's interventions in the work of the Trades 
and Labour Council were ineffectual, and that its delegates were 
erratic participants. In late 1926 the Chairman of the Council, 
in the course of a speech to a local ILP branch, made a revealing 
observation: 
Six years' membership of the ILP, he 
said, had. left him woefully lacking 
ill Socialism, but ithad imbued in him 
a taste for literature. I. L. P. literature 
was second to none at the present time. 110 
ýIiere the first comment is a reflection both on the character of 
the ILPIa socialism, and on the problems it encountered in integrating 
new members over these years, the second points to that strength of 
the ILP, its propaganda. 
For the author of the Special Report on the Scottish ILP, 
organisational inadequacies were important because they m'eant 'we 
are not getting the best service' from 'quite a number of good 
propagandists In Edinburgh. 11"'Propaganda' was evangelism: the work 
108. 'Spocial Report, t Division 1: Scotland', ILP papers, LSE. This was prepared for the ILP NAC, probably in 1927- 
1090 Ibid. 
110. - Labour Standard, 9 October 1926. 
111. 'Special Report'. 
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of able speakersat public meetings, and acknowledged to be the ILP's 
main task. Its purpose was 'the creation of an atmosphere 
in the country't among 'the great mass of non-political voters, 
who have little time or inclination for prolonged and intensive 
study of a political issue. 
They tend to have a vague fear of new 
methods and ideas. They are suspicioua 
of social changes. It is the work of 
the propagandist to make the new idea 
familiar, by explanation, discussion 
and repetition, until that intangible 
but formidable distrust, given place 
to an atmosphere of confidence .... 112 
The bulk of the-propagandists were local men (and some women), schooled 
in the cut-and-thrust of the street-corner meeting; but on occasion 
a nationally-renowned speaker (Maxton, for instance) would be billed. 
The pattern was well-established: a planned programme of winter 
meetings, indoors, mostly in ILP halls; and, in the summer and at 
election times, on street'corners-113 
The ILP's conception of a socialist movement extended from 
cradle-to grave. Where for adults there was propaganda, for children 
there were Socialist Sunday Schools, and the Guild of Youth. By a 
proces-, of 'permeation', the young would grow into the movement. 
114 
One of the 'Woman's Outlook' columns in The Labour Standard, explained 
how 
At our Z-Socialist Sunday2 schools we 
try to point out to the children how these 
things can be put right by the people owning 
the land, and using it for the benefit of 
all, instead of its being used under the present 
system of private ovmership, for the benefit of 
the lucky few. ... the basic aim of our Socialist 
teaching is human equality. 115 
112. M. Pallister, The Orange Box. Thoughts of a Socialist-Propagandist 
(London 1924)TT-9. This -short (62 page) volume is an excellent 
introduction to the ILP's propagandist methods, by an experienced 
and celebrated exponent. 
113- For accounts of local propaganda, see Labour Standards 3 October 
1925,2 October, 25 December, 1926. Pallister, -47-51, argues 
that the growing number of women voters needed a different 
approach: in Edinburgh, there is little sign of this. 
114. Pallister, 52. 
115, Labour Standard, 19 September 19,25- Cp F. Reid, 'Socialist 




The link between the Sunday Schoola and the 'adult organisstion' 
was the ILP Chaild of Youth, whose object was* 
to give an opportunity for the 
physical, intellectual 6. nd 
aesthetic development of young 
people between the ages of 
fourteen and twenty-five years. 116 
In 1925 the seven guilds in Edinburgh had a total membership of 
350: activities included football, socials, whist drives, 
educational meetings (most were affiliated to the Labour College), 
theatre visits Oa large parti 7 of enthusiasts' saw 
Shaw's Saint 
Joan at the King's Theatre). Their Cycle Clab went on-'runs 
throughout the Lothians', sometimes stopping to apread the word 
Olast weekend, a propaganda' meeting held in Dunbar: quite quickly 
a-crowd gathered around the 26 cycl, sts, ), 
118 
This, then, was the politics of the ILP: much effort, much 
enthusiasm, but directed so as to win the hearts and minds of the 
workers, rather than to intervene in the politics of the Labour 
Party - and not always well-directed. But the commitment of many 
ILP members to their own conception of political method, and to 
their Party, is undoubted. Orle illustration will suffice: in early 
1926, Leith ILP moved to new premises. 
The work of adaptation rof two 
wooden huts into a hall to seat 
3007 cost nothing, beyond the 
material required.... Morris's 
'News from Nowhere' came true; 
friends from near and far came 
to assist in the work. Only 
devotion to a cause could perform 
such a transformation as can to- 
day be seen at Bonnington Toll. 119 
Perhaps -the supreme example of co-operation between Labour socialism 
and the ILP left in Edinburgh was the formation and publishing of a 
weekly Labour newspaper. As early as 1919 the Trades Council had 
thought a Scottish Labour'daily 'long overdue's for the 'capitalistic 
116. Ibid., 24 October 1*925. 
117- Ibid., 24 October . 1925,6 June 1926. 
118. Ibid., 17 July 1926. 
119. Ibid., 1 May 1926. 
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press ... misrepresents the cause of the workers and is biased in the 
employers' interests'; 
120 but this proponal had no result. In 1920 
the Trades and Labour Council had made a half-hearted attempt to 
set up a local Labour paper, but the scheme was ill-founded, and 
came to naught. 
121 It was in January 1924 that the Council became 
involved in discussions with members of the ILP: this led to a 
committeel. s being formed with representation from the Council, the 
122 ILP, Labour Parties and trade unions from throughout the Lothians. 
A business manager-cum-editor was appointed (an ILP stalwart), a 
company formed, and the first issue of The Labour Standard appeared 
on the streets on 21 February 192.5. It was, indeed, a paper in the 
ILP tradition: although (contrary to early fears) the newsagents 
did sell it, all its contributors were unpaid, and all its (f, 500) 
capital was raised from the labour movement. 
123 
In many ways, the paper was a success: its journalism was of 
a remarkably high standard, considering that it was entirely the 
product of voluntary effort. Its columns were open to a wide range 
of views - perhaps just because, if this voluntary commitment was to 
be sustained, no narrow definitions could be imposed. It made an 
impact on local politics. But it never achieved its target circul- 
ation of 10,000; advertising revenue must have been small. Only 
nine months after starting, 'finance was urgently needed', and b4 
mid-1926 it was obliged to reduce its number of pages to four. 
12 
Let us summarise our discussion thus far. When the basis of 
syndicalist and revolutionary influence subsided during 1920 and 1921, 
120. TC minutes, 11 March 1919. 
121. TUC-minutes, 71 14 September, 12 October 1920. 
122. - Ibid., 61 81 13,22 Janaury, 10 February 1924. The Committee 
was made up thus: representing ILP br 
, 
anches: 5; LP branches: 





TU branches: 5; T&LC: 3; and tlýe business manager. The Labour 
Standard was thusl technically, not an 1ILP paper' (as Harrison 
et al. assert), thought its editorial , 
policy was of the ILP left. 
cp R. Harrison, G-Woolven, R. Duncan, The'Warwick Guide to British 
Labour Periodicals, 
--, -1790-1970. 
(Hassocks,. 1977T, 26E; 
123. TUC minutes, 10,19 February, 19 August, 7,14 October 1924; 
Labour Standard advertising leaflet. 
124. TUC minutes, 20 00tober 1925; Labour Standard, 2 June 1926. 
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Labour Socialism. developed a strategic vision which enabled it to 
build coalitions, over certain issues and within more or less 
limited spheres, with two vital political traditions: labourism 
and the ILP left. Two principles underpinned the Labour Socialist 
vision, and allowed these coalitions to be generated: firstly, 
that political and industrial action were distinct; secondly, that 
political action was constitutional action. These made it possible 
for Labour Socialism to find common ground with trade union 
labourism and with the ILP left: in each case, it required an 
acceptance that their efforts would be limited to certain categories 
of activity. In particular, trade unions were offered a path to 
working class power which did not put them in the front line, whilst 
the ILP was encouraged to continue in the strategy to which it had 
long adhered. 
10.6 The Marxist coalition and the syndicalist traftion 
Ultimately, of course, the Labour Socialist coalition was victorious: 
but it was consistantly criticised - and sometimes threatened - by 
Marxism. Marxism had two main institutional forms in 'twenties 
Edinburgh: the Labour College movement and, above all, the 
Communist Party. These played different roles. The Labour College 
ensured that the City's labour movement was permeated by a sub- 
stantial number of people who took Marxist views - or at least some 
Marxist views for granted; and it successfully established a 
belief, even among those who were not Marxists, that 'Marx gave 
Socialism a scientific foundation by looking at history through 
working-class spectacles'. 
125 The Party was different. Its notion 
of Marxism was more specific, linking broad understandings to firm 
125.. Michael Marcus, B. L., 'Leaders of Modern Democracy-I. - Karl 
Marx's Labour Standard 17 April 1926. Marcus, an ILP member-, ' 
was MP for Dundee from 1929: he was described as one of the 
'safe men' in the PIP under MacDonald (Anon., The Scottish F Socialists. A Gallery of_Contemporary Portraits London 1931), ý37)- 
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(if sometimes changing) views on strategy. It intervened 
politically, both in industry and elsewhere. It can be seen, 
perhaps, as playing a role analogous to that of the Labour 
Socialists, for it too attempted to alter the pattern of labour 
politics: forging new allegiances, changing concepts of the 
political, and so forth. Like the Labour Socialists, the 
Communists could achieve little unless they succeeded in 
mobilising the support of other sections of labour: again, 
given the fragmented nature of class consciousness, this was more 
likely to be achieved in relation to particular issues, and to 
particular legitimising principles, than in general. 
There were two political tendencies with which Communism 
could hope to find significant common ground. One we may term 
syndicalism - but using this term in a wide sense, to include many 
forms of militant o. - revolutionary trade unionism. The second 
was the ILP left. (There might, on occasion, be ground for common 
action with labourism: but this would only be likely to occur in 
extreme circumstances, as during a strike. ) With both it achieved 
a substantial degree of co-operation, although for different reasons 
thid did not prove well-founded. Let us now look at the Marxists' 
relationship with these two political tradtions. 
Marxism, and particularly Communism, very largely succeeded in 
weaving the various threads of revolutionary trade union theory and 
practice into a single strand. There is no question but that, from 
1921 or 1922 onward, the Communists set the agenda for-theoretical 
strategic debate in this area. Unfortunately for them, -each of the 
threads which they sought to weave had weakened markedly-since the 
heady days of 1917-1920, . and 
the final product was decidedly- 
frayed. Local Marxists had begun'to proselytise-for-the-Red Inter- 
national of Labour Unions 
126 
early in 1921, perhaps even befoxi. e a 
126. Until the late summer of 1921, the Prpvisional'*Inter'naiional 
Council of Trade and Industrial Unions - but even then, 
colloquially, the 1ýed*Internationall- 'Cp NUR'N6. I býanch 
minutes, 24 April 1921; T&LC. 'minuies, 5,12 July, 2,23 August 
1921; Klugmann, Com'nMnist Party 1,108-11. 
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local branch of the Communist Party was formed. 
127 Their 
argument was a simple one: 
The Capitalist system is forcing us 
to the point where we will be forced 
to fight, and we must be prepared, 
nationally and internationally. 
Thus the need of the Red Trade 
Union .... 128 
But it was attractive: it offered the possibility of separate, 
revolutionary, unions, but it did not require individual. trade 
unionists or union branches to move in isolation; and it stretched 
out an arm of-international support to trade union revolutionaries 
who were under great pressure at home. (It is perhaps no coincidence 
that the No. 1 branch of the Railwaymen voted ýto affiliate to the 
Moscow International' just nine days after 'Black Friday'. ) 
129 
Certainly it is possible that they believed, or at least hoped, that 
the existence of the revolutionary government in Russia would make 
far more practical difference to the working class movement in 
Britain than proved, in the event, to be the case. But the main 
problem was that, as we have seen, the economic basis of working 
class strength was eroding - and, with it, the basis of revolution- 
ary strength in-industry. 
Two examples will illustrate this problem. Although, firstly, 
the shop stewards movement in engineering and shipbuilding had never 
been strongest in Edinburgh, it had made some mark during 1918 and - 
early 1919. OAe of its most prominent leaders, -as mentioned before, 
was Bob Foulis, a Labour parliamentary candidate who left the ILP 
to join the Communists. It was'he who became Scottish Organiser of_,,, 
the Red International in 1921.13OYet it wao he, too, who in Se ptember 
of the same year was a leader of the unemployed in Edinburgh: 
131 the 
127. There is no firmýevidence on when a bran, ch. of the CTý was first 
formed in Edinburgh. Fred Douglas (Evening, Dispatch, 11 August 
1955) recalls attending 'the rules conference' in Manchester 
as an Edinburgh delegate: this was held on 23-24 April 1921. 
128i TOR No. 1 brancli minutes, 24 April 1921. 
129. Ibid. 
130', T&LC-minutes-, 23 August, -6 September 1921. 
131- Ibid., 20 Septerýber 1921. This was'the common lot'throughoUt 
the country: cp, e. g., W. Hannington, Unemployed Struggl esp. 
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militant. shop stewards had lost their base in the workshops. 
Secondly, among the Railwaymen the dismissals of 1921 had undercut 
the syndicalists' support. The revolutionary rhetoric of 1919-1920 
was supplanted by a sectionalist labourism which continued to use 
the language of 'industrial unionism', but for very different 
purposes. It was no accident, for instance, that some of the 
syndicalists joined ASLEF in 1924: during the ASL17 strike, the 
Edinburgh NUR's footplatemen had voted overwhelmingly to strike 
with them; the No. 1 branch then voted to tell 
our Loco members to immediately return 
to work and thereby preserve the 
principle of one Union for Railwaymen. 132 
This labourizml could, of course, justify solid and militant action, -- 
as, say, in the General Strike: but the No. 1 branch's reaction to 
the latter is telling. At a mass meeting, it agreed 
a vote of censure on our leaders for 
their lack of foresight in leading 
us into aZV illegal strike. 133 
This was a long way from revolutionary syndicalism. 
In this situation, the coherence of the syndicalist tradition 
was seriously threatened. The extent to which Communism could find 
common ground with it was limited: for in practice it was often too 
weak even to confront an issue in a concerted way. With rare 
134 
exceptions in Edinburgh, the tradition found'expression in just two 
areas. The first wa a amongst trade union activists, and especially 
within the Trades and Labour Council. Here it remained possible for 
syndicalist and Communist ideas to co-incide in the pursuit of a 
132- NUR No. 1 branch minutes, 27 January 192Ljý' One man who le, ft 
the NUR for ASLEF in 1924 was James Stobief The ill-feeling 
between sections of the NUR led, in July 19ý4, to the 
establishment of a special branch for locomen in Edinburgh:.. 
this was explained in the No. I branch Jubilee Souvenir, 331 
as Ia means to combat the many calumnies of the A. S. L. E. &F., 
which is largely their stock-in-trad. e. 1 
133- NUR No. I branch minutes, 23 MaY 1926: only four votes were 
cast-against this resolution. 
134. E. g., Communists made significant headway within the railway 
workshops at St. Margaret's. 
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number of objectives. Perhaps the main issues were the need for 
union solidarity and the more effective organisation of the 
Council: both perspectives saw the former as a consequence of 
the latter. The view was pressed, on occasion with success, that 
the Trades Council should properly be seen as, or should turn itself 
into, a Council of Action - in effect, a general staff of the local 
labour and trade union movement. For examples in the period 
leading up to 'Red Friday' in 1925, the Council agreed to establish 
itself as a Council of Action, appointed a special committee to 
organise accordingly, and summoned a conference of shop stewards. 
135 
But this current of thought,, which had been so strong five years 
before, could by this time command a majority on the Trades arid 
Labour Council only in extreme circumstances, and on a limited range 
of issues. Essentially, these were when large-scale industrial 
action seemed imminent or unavoidable, as in 1925 and 1926; and 
(though to a lesser degree) in support of Russia when she seemed 
threatened by the British government (as over the Curzon ultimatum 
in 1923)- 
136 Communism and syfidicalism were permanent currents of 
opinion on the Trades Council. But in normal circumstances their 
influence was limited. Thus during 1923 and 1924 a number of trade 
union delegates became concerned that the 'political' role which the 
Council had taken on since-1920 was hindering the Council's 
industrial work. This was, of course, an expression of labourist 
concern. An industrial committee was appointed to consider how these 
problems could be overcome. Reporting to the Council, the convenor of 
the committee, a Communist, said that the 'work of Zt-he_7 Committee 
had been hampered by a feeling among Z- union2 branches that it was 
a Communist Comfmigtee': this, he felt it necessary to point out, 
Iwas. not the case'. 
137 But the suspicion illustrates a real limitation 
in Comranist influence. 
135. TUC minutes 3 March 1925 (these moves were initiated by 
a Coimnunist), - over 100 delegates attended the conference held 
two days after Ted Friday! (ibid., 4 August 1925)- - 
136. TUC minutes, 8,15 May, ' 5,12,19-June'1'§23:. although a 
Council of Action was agreed (after CP presýure ,) on 
this 
occasion, its prepa; rations give an impression of hqLlf- 
heartedness when compared with 10,20 or 192ý- On this 
Communist Party, 1,148-57- campaign, cp Klugmann 
137- TUC minutes, *8 July 1924. 
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The second area in which the syndicalist tradition of 
direct industrial action continued to have an impact, and in. 
which Communisn was able to take a lead, was the organisation 
of the unemployed. Fred Douglas describes various factics 
designed to press their demands: one, the 'irritation march' 
consisted in setting off from the Mound 
at an ordinary pace. Reaching the West 
End we wheeled round to march back along 
Princes Street on the othercide. An at 
this point we brought the pace down to 
dead slow. With a couple of thousand men 
behind us this meant a traffic jam for 
a considerable time. 138 
They would then speed up, and let out 'barbaric cries' while the 
police 'helmeted and buttoned up to the chin in blue, heavy serge, 
sweated to keep abreast, ... 
'and 
near panic set in among pedestrians' 
139 
Such demonstrations could make a considerable impact, and the Unem- 
ployed Committees also built up considerable-reputations through 
contesting local elections', 'fighting cases', and 'propaganda'. 
The only surviving figures suggest that they had perhaps 1500 members 
14o in the Edinburgh area - though, if Douglas is to be believed, 
demonstrations could be rather larger. YeLt, n1though these methods 
succeeded in making unemployment a major issue (it was, for instance, 
by a long way the matter mostfrequently discussed at the Trades 
Council in the early 'twenties), the structural weakneso of the 
unemployed prevented their having any decisive impact. And within 
the labour movement a coalition of Labour Socialism (which saw the 
Unemployed Committees as thinly-veiled Communist fronts) and 
labourism (for which the unemployed were primarily a threat) ensured 
they remained marginal: frequently listened to and discussed, but 
always without real power. 
138- Evening_ Dj*f3patch, 12 August 1955. 
139- Ibid. 
140. TUC minutes, 28 January 1927: the figures were: - Leith, 400; 
Edinburgh, 450; Portobello, 360; Musselburgh, 250- 
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So both syndicalist and Communist traditions could find 
expression only in limited areas, and were unlikely seriously to 
influence the movement's direction. Their sources of industrial 
strength rapidly waned after 1920, re-emerging only for brief 
periods of militancy. They did not:, therefore, have a lasting 
institutional source of power within the labour movement. 
10.7 The Marxist coalition and the Labour left ' 
In January 1926 an epigram appeared, without comm6nt but in a manner 
indicating endorsement, at the foot of a column in the Labour Standard: 
Speaking as one who has broken the law, 
I say most deliberately that it is true 
what the warder said to me when I first 
went into Brixton Prison: 'Cheer up, 
Mr. Lansbury, there is never anything 
accomplished in England till somebody 
goes to prison. ' - Mr. GEORGE LANSBURY, M. P. 141 
This neatly, if accidentallyi encapsulates the motivational basis 
of the Labour left's relationship with Communism during the early 
and mid-ltwenties. - On the one hand, the left saw a state operating 
in the interests of a single class, and doing so without mercy; this 
had to be opposed, and not only by parliamentary means. But, on the 
other, there remained a fundamental assumption that appeal could be 
made, by exposing the inequity of such class justices to a wider 
political community: at root there were a rationality and a justice 
which transcended those of class, and this rationality and this 
justice explained society'3 tendency to progress toward democracy and 
socialism. 
142 It was, of course, this letter assumption which linked 
the Labour left with Labour Socialism; but the first assumption meant 
that the left was continually impatient, discontented, with the bounds 
141. Labour Standard, 23 January 1926. 
142. Macintyre is thus mistaken in asserting that the Labour left's 
'crucial characteristic was the commitmentto, parliamentary 
action' (Proletarian Science, 63)- Certainly in Edinburgh the 




on political action which the parliamentary process seemed to 
require. The Labour left was, therefore, always ready to consider 
tactics similar to the Communists'; perhaps, too, its concept of 
supra-class justice and rationality was, in practice, little 
different from the Marxist concept of proletarian justice and 
reason. 
When the Communist Party was formed, in 1920 and 1921, a left 
section of the ILF'had, of course, joined it. Especially at a 
local level, they seem to have regarded this, very much, as a 
realignment within the Labour movement; and, indeed, it is quite 
likely that many of those who joined the Communists also remained 
143 ILPers. Many of them, however, seem to have drifted away from the 
Communist Party-during the following two or three years, particularly, 
perhaps, after the reorganisation of the Party (on 'bolshevik' lines) 
in 1923.144 Willie Joss, a prominent Scottish Communist, recorded in 
1924 that many 'old-timers.... seem to miss the resounding revolution- 
ary speeches of-the earlier movements. 
145 There was, therefore, a 
close relationship between the ILP left and the Communist Party over 
the period up to, spy, 1924 -a relationship, moreover, which was not 
political only, but also personal. So when, for instance, Euphemia 
Laing, a former ILPer, stood as Communist candidate for St. Leonard's 
ward in the 1921 Town Council election, it is highly likely that she 
was popularly regarded as the Labour candidate, and that she received 
support from ILP activists in this ILP stronghold. 
But the left's flirtation with Communism was dependent on a 
concept of the socialist movement which, from 1921 on, rapidly cBased 
to be a reality. As early as September 1921 the Trades and Labour Counuil's 
Executive decided an application for affiliation from the local branch 
of the Communist Party 'could not be accepted' since their Party was 
143- Cp ILP NAC minutes, 28-30 August 1924, on the problem of 
Communists in the IIP: in reply to enquiries from branches, 
the NAC held 'it is difficult to understand how a member of 
the Communist. Party could accept the constitutionof*the ILP'. 
144. For a summary of estimates of CP membership, see Macintyre, 
Proletarian Science, 27-8. 
145- W-Joss, 'Three Months of CP Propaganda', Communist Review, 
November 1924; quoted in Klugmann, Communist Party, Is 332. 
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not'nationally affiliated to the Labour Party. 
146 At this 
time, however, the Council'could do little to extend such 
a ruling beyond mere affiliation - and there is little sign 
that it would have wished to do so. In that year just four 
Labour candidates stood in the Town Council elections, for 
instance, whilst there were also 
4 
Unemployed, Railway Workers, 
Ex-Service, and SLP candidates. 
' 7 No narrow definition of the 
socialist or labour movement could be enforced, therefore; -and 
over a wide spectrum of the left, it is unlikely that one 
existed. During the following years, up to 1925, however, a 
definition of the Labour movement was developed and enforced by 
the alli6nce of Labourism, and Labour Socialism: this definition 
was initiated nationally, and transmitted to the Edinburgh Labour 
Party in a series of decisions and meetings; its essence was to 
exclude Communism by establishing commitment to the parliamentary 
system as central to Labour Party membership. Ben Shawl the 
Scottish Secretary of the-Labour Party, explained to the Trades 
and Labour Council's Executive in'. 19231 that he 
was of ` opinion that a fundamental 
difference of policy was shown when 
Mr. Newbold, M. P. stated in House of 
Commons that his CCbmmunisg Party 
did not believe in Parliamentary 
Government. 148 
This, Shaw held, justified a requirement that all delegates to the 
Council should sign a pledge accepting the conditution and rules 
of the Labour Party. 
If the Labour left and the Communists had been able to 
consolidate their alliance, this re-orientation of Labour politics 
might have been resisted with more success than it was. But they 
were beset by a shortage of issues around which they could work 
successfully together. The main reason was that their strategy 
for political change required a scale of mobilisation which, in the 
economic circumstances of the -1920s, was most difficult to achieve. 
146. TUC minutes, 13 September 1921. 
147- The Scotsman, 2 November 1921. 
148. TUC minutes, 11 Septebmer 1923 (EC); fo. - a more subtle 
discussion of British Marxist views on Parliament, see 




Apart from those discussed in the previous section (for the 
distinction between the Labour left and militant trade unionism 
was always unclear), there were just two categoriea of issues on 
which Communists and the Labour left could make common cause: 
international issues, and housing. Yet on neither were they able 
to achieve the level of action which could make their strategy 
a threat to the electoralisin of the Labour Socialist coalition. 
Let us look briefly at each. 
Undoubtedly the Communists brought international questions 
into the Labour movement to an unprecedented extent. They called 
for a Council of Action against British sanctions against Russia 
in 1923; 
149 they wanted 'to start a movement in support of German 
workers' later in the same year; 
150they drew attention in 1925 to 
'recent-political events' in Bulgaria and Italy, warning of the 
dangers of a 'seizure of power by Fascisml; 
151and 
so forth. But 
whilst they could win the - virtually unanimous - support bf the 
labour movement on these, in passing resolutions, they could 
achieve little else. 
152 Symbolic of this, perhaps, was Robert 
Wilson's decision to make 'Imperialism the Issue' of his campaign 
in the, 1927 Leith by-election. I'll shall, " said Mr. Wilson, "make 
China the acid test of this by-election., 1,153 Wilson, a leading 
local Labour left-winger, did just that -'and lost. Hew Robertson, 
the local Communist organiser, tacitly acknowledged the problem 
when calling, at a Trades and Labour Council meeting, for 'all 
active workers in working class bodies ... to pledge support to 
German workers': 
Asked what was meant by pledging support 
Mr. Robertson stated that had not been 
considered by his committee. 154 
149. TUC minutes, 8 May 1923- 
150- Ibid., 24 October 1923- 
151- Ibid. 17 Jily 1925- 
152'. Excepting support for the Workers' International Relief 
(which had to deny it was a Communist organisation: TUC 
minutes, 17 June 1924) and like organisations. 
153- Labour Standard, 12 February 1927. 
154. TUC minutes, 24 October 1923- 
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The problem wasprecisely the meaning of 'support'. If it was to 
be simply rhetoric, it would be widely seen as unimportant and 
uncontroversial: 'unity' would be easy to achieve, but would have 
little import. If, however, it was to require industrial or 
political action, the scale of action required was very great, 
while its effect might be small; and in any case, it would be 
felt only in far-away climes. It demanded too much in an 
adverse econoinic situation. United action on international 
issues was thust almost inevitably, ineffectual, and could 
generate no solid base for a lasting coalition. 
After the defeat of the 1920 rent strike, the focus of labour 
activity on housing shifted from rents to the volume and quality 
of new housing provision. These were pursued through propaganda 
(including one excellent pamphlet), 
155deputations, 
and so forth: 
the apparatus of 'reasoned' , 
debate with the city authorities. No 
attempt was made to mobilise people in action, until in 1923 a 
public meeting was called 
to organise against the eviction of 
people for arrears of Rent arising 
from Unemployment or Low Wages. 156 
A Central Tenants, Defence League was re-established157_ soon said 
to be 'on a functioning basis'. 
158 
But although similar bodies were 
formed'in Leith and elsewhere; led by the left and by Communists, 
159 
they seem to have found mass mobilisation exceedingly difficult to 
achieve. They occupied themselves largely in processing grievances, 
leading deputations, fighting court cases. 
160 On occasion, they 
expressed a desire to take more radical action: the Leith Tenants' 
Defence A5sociationt fo4- instance, criticised an attempt t. o raise 
money (f, 25 - f, 50) for counsel's opinion; the money should have been 
used to 'fight insanitary dwellings. 1161 But there is no record 
. 
(in con#ast to Clydeside in the same period) 
162of 
substantial 
popular action having occurred. Again, this meant that the unity Of 
155. Edin. T&LG,, Our Unseen City Revgaled. A Tale of-Housing 
Atrocities (Edin., n. d. ý_1922_/)- 
156. T&LC minutes, 6 February 1923- 
157- Ibid., 13 February 1923- 
158. Ibid., 27 February 1923- 
159. Labour Standard, 31-October 1925. 
160. See, e. g., T&LC minutes, 22 August 1923- 
1ý1- Ibid., 19 Sept. 1923- 162. Moorhouse et al., 'Rent Strikes'136-8 
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Communists and the left was relatively ineffectual. At the same 
time, it prevented the Tenants' Defence League from becoming a 
powerful institution within the movement, and thus ensured that 
the former's left-wing leadership remained relatively isolated. 
The oentral problems 
* 
confronting attempts to develop a 'Marxist 
coalition, ' after 1921, therefore, were these. First, the tactics 
on which the coalition's elements-could find common ground were 
rendered highly problematical by the prevailing economic environ- 
ment: they demanded large-scale mobilisation. Second, since the 
tactics were rarely achieved, the institutions which might have 
given shape and. authority to the coalition were also generally 
absent. (The major exception, of course, was the General Strike. ) 
Thirdly, the organisational developments which the left had supported 
in 1920-1921 provided the'Labour Socialist coalition with an 
institutional base from which to oppose the left: perhaps as 
important, electoral activity and 'pure-and-simplel trade unionism 
provided routine forms of activity for this new organisation. In an 
adverse political and economic situation, the Marxists were unable 
to develop a strategy which could offer the type of sustained and 
regular activity necessary to organisational, development. 
10.8 Concluding: responses to the General Strike 
Probably the supreme achievement of the Marxist coalition was 
organising, and legitimising, the General Strike over nine days in 
May 1926.163 It was a cruel irony that it was Labour Socialism which 
163. The General Strike in Edinburgh is very fully covered by 




reaped the re, ýards of this achievement - and crueller, perhaps, 
as the Labour Socialists had little enthusiasm for the Strike, 
164 
as the labourist union leaders appeared to have 'sold it out', and 
as it was the industrial militants, Communists, and so forth*who 
bore the brunt of employers' victimisation. 
165 
The Strike was experienced as an outstanding achievement of 
collective working class action. 'From the first our ranks were 
solid and disciplined. ' 
166 This had been complemented by 'Splendid 
Organisation'. 
167 Undoubtedly, it was a major achievement-of 
mobilisation; which appears to have had important effects of working 
class political outlooks. But the defeat of the Strike dealt a 
powerful blow to strategies, industrial and political, of mass 
action. For the left, there was much rancour. Why was it called 
off? 
Were the workers showing signs of 
weakening? Were there holes in our 
ranks? So far as we heard in Edinburgh, 
ýthere were none. Then for why? For the 
sacred shibboleth 'Constitution'?. For 
the alleged threat' i 
to the Communityý 
Because miners, railwaymen, transport 
workers, printers, and a hundred other 
trades had struck at a community that 
is themselves, with but a few millions 
of an antagonistic class in the great 
minority? So it was. For that and for 
that alone, the General 
, 
Strike, even 
before it had time to reach its height, 
was called off. 168' 
Yet, through the rancour, confidence in the method was destroyed. 
The sense of despair at this is clear in William Elger's contribution 
to a Labour College weekend school on1he General Strike: a 
General Strike could only arise as a, 
spontaneous movement of the rank and file 
of the workers, and ... therefore ... 
164. Cp G. A. Phillips, 'The Labour Party and the Qeneral Strike', 
Llafur 2 (2), 1977,44758. 
165- MacDougall, 'Edinburgh', esp. 153-4; Labour Standard 29 May 1926; 
NUR No. 1 branch minutes, 16,23 May 1926. 





could neither be definitely predicted 
at any given moment, nor could it be 
adequately prepared for. In any cane, 
it had only a limited value, and that 
mainly as a defensive weapon against 
the aggression of the employers and 
as a 'political demonstration. ' 169 
Elger, of course, can hardly be counted on the left, and as 
secretary of the STUC no doubt fAlt defensive: but his speech 
evokes a sense of hopelessness, at the ability of the movement to 
run so major an event. The confidence was Cone. 
In these circumstances, the Marxists' alliance with other 
elements of the left could not hold: for the latter, only the 
electoral strategy offered a way forward. 
Let all lip sympathy, hypocritical 
jejunes reckon with a conscious 
awakened eloctorate in November, 170 
the Labour Standard remarked. Those who sought to 'draw political 
capital out of the results pf the strike', arid to 'discredit the 
strike weapon, ... pointZ3-nr, 
7 with outstretched arm to the ballotbox 
as the only hope of the workers, 
171_ 
such people reaped the political 
harvest of the General Strike within the labour movement. 
Margaret Cole observed that 
what really perished in 1926 was the 
romantic idea, - dating fromb3fore the 
first world war, of the power of 
syndicalism, 'direct action', and the 
re6t of it. . 
172 
In an important sense, she was right. But 1926 could only mark the end 
of an idea (which had been far more than merely romantic), because 
the electoral alternative was already strongly positioned to exploit 
its weakness. 
169. - Ibid., 9 October 1926. 
170. Ibid., 19 June 1926. 
171- Ibid., 12 June 1926. 




'The truth is that one cannot choose 
the form of war one wants, unleos from 
the start one has a crushing superiority 
over the enemy. ' 





In the decade or so which began in the midst of the Great War, 
the politics of labour were reformed. During the last years of 
the nineteenth century, mainstream trade union opinion had broken 
with Liberalism, and edged toward an accommodation with socialism 
on the basis of an independent Labour, electoral strategy. 
Although this had some success, it was severely challenged by the 
'labour unrest' of 1910-1914: in this a coalition of militant 
trade unionism, industrial unionism, revolutionary syndicalism, 
and so forth had shown that industrial action could be a major 
'source of power for 1ýbour. So when war broke out neither 
'parliamentary' nor 
. 
'direct action' strategies held sway uncontest- 
ed within the movement. The war did not destroy these political 
traditions, but it changed their environment (and overlaid them 
with news or at least newly strengthened, bases of allegiance 
associated with patriotism). This meant that the traditions evolved: 
responded to changing circumstances; were strengthened, weakened, or 
altered by such factors as the growth in union strength or Labour's 
participation in the Lloyd George government. But it also meant 
that certain aspects of these evolutions became, as it were, 
recessive, emerging only when patriotic impulses waned after the 
armistice. 
The period from about 1917 until the later 'twenties was a 
critical onein labour's development. In it, the essential contours 
of the modern movement were mapped. By the later 'twenties labour 
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politics were dominated by a coalition centred on an electoral, 
parliamentary, strategy which was bolst. ered institutionally. 
Trade unions had developed structures and methods which assumed 
they could intervene in 'politics' only through the Labour Party, 
and which defined unions' roles in a close relationship to 
collective bargaining. The element which advocated 'extra- 
parliamentary' political methods (especially industrial action 
for political purposes) had not been eliminated, but it was confined 
to a subsidiary role: of criticising what had become the mainstream 
of labour, of motivating many industrial militants, and so on. 
Our study has attempted to'contribute to the understanding 
of this important decade: to examine the processes of labour's 
reformation in a local context. We have conducted this examination 
at a number of levels. To begin with, ýwe argued that political 
'consciousness' may usefully be regarded as a matrix of (more or less) 
discrete 'legitimising principles' which can motivate political 
action for individuals or groups. These principles need not be 
mutually consistent, even for an individual; but (in general) the 
more consistent they are, the greater the likelihood of coherent 
action. For various reasons, essentially associated with the 
multiplicity of its sub-groupings and the contextual specificity 
of its institutions, principles generated by the working class are 
relatively inconsistent, one with another; in particular, they tend 
to be in contradiction with principles generated by institutions of 
the ruling class, many of which are asserted verbally within the 
working class (despite their being generated elsewhere). This tends 
to produce 'a condition of-moral and political passivity'. 
' (Among 
the ruling class, principles tend tobe more consistent, lending 
themselves more easily to the motivation of action in the class 
interest. ) This view of political consciousness directs our 
attention toward several factors: the importance of principles which 
1. Gramsci, 333- 
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are common to a number of groups within the working classl and 
can thus motivate widespread action; the role of institutions in 
generating and sustaining principles; the importance of the 
contradiction between ruling and working claso principles (aspects 
of Gramsci's 'theoretical' and 'practical' consciousnesses) in 
stemming self-interested working class action. 
In the light of this approach, we briefly surveyed certain 
issues concerning the structure of the working class in Edinburgh, 
and its relationship to the city's middle class. There were grounds 
for believing that the social distance between classes was strength- 
ened by an increase (from the mid-nineteenth century) in the spatial 
segregation between their residential areas. This may have 
encouraged the development of more indepe ndent, working class 
values. Especially during the war, inequalities within the working 
class (particularly in relation to housing) were compressed: this 
eroded such intra-class groupings as the Ilabour aristocracy'. Never- 
theless, after the war, the working class continued to be fragmented 
in important ways. Some were of long standing, as the city's 
industrial and occupational diversity. Others were functions of the 
economic performance of the various industries; unemployment; and 
similar factors. But the extent of overlapping and intersection of 
the various sources of fragmentation tended to reduce the significance 
of any single grouping: a labour aristicracy could not persist 
when income differentials within industries might be less than those 
between skilled workers in different industries (especialLy in so 
industrially diverse a city). So whilst Edinburgh's working class 
was by no mean homogeneous, the intensity of its internal divisions 
seems to have lessened somewhat. As a results the distinctiveness 
and incompatibility of the cultural patterns associated with its 
various groupings probably diminished, so that a common vocabulary 
of motivation could become more widely held and effective. 
The impact of this trend should not, however, be exaggerated: 
overall, Edinburgh's working class remained more diversified and 
fragmented than that of many other towns and cities. Nor did it imply 
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of necessity a greater receptiveness to the principles by which 
trade unions and labour political organisations attempted to 
motivate action: although this was a possible outcome, it might 
alternatively imply an increased inclination to take concerted 
action in response to princIples deployed by elements of the ruling 
class. Certainly in wartime the vocabulary of patriotism was 
extremely effective, for instance. But we may surmise that, after 
the war, no similarly effective language could be found to replace 
it. The strength of (and the existence of a legitimate role for) 
labour appears to have been accepted; no attempt seems to have 
been made, by the state or the major non-labour political parties 
(at least after the fall of Lloyd George), actively to mobilise 
working class opinion. Rather, they appear to have relied upon 
the contradictions between theoretical and practical consciousness 
producing 'moral and political passivity' or, as the Labour 
Standard had it, 'Apathy! Apathy! Apathy: ' In Edinburgh, an 
effective anti-labour stra tegy at this level may have been made still 
more problematic by the diversity of-the city's middle class, riven 
at it was by differences between professional, administrative and 
financial sectors, and by status differences within these also. 
The significance of the labour movement's development during 
the decade after 1917 suggests that short-run, as well as long-term, 
factors were important., In relation to union growth, no adequate 
explanation is tobe found in general accounts of late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century industrial development. At the same 
times the experience of widely differing industries was of union 
advance during and just after the war, followed by retreat from 
about 1920. Although this took different forms in various 
industries, neither can we be satisfied with explanations which rest 
on the specific features of their industrial development. Rather, 
we suggest that fundamental short-term changes occurred during the 
war whose effects were felt in all sectors of industry (though there 
2. Labour Standard, 21 March 1925; cp Macintyre, Proletarian 
Science, esp. 198-218. 
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was some variation in their particular manifestations). 
These changes were of two broad types. Firstly, the balance 
of power in industry shifted in favour of workers, as the war 
effort intensified the need for high levels of production: in 
general$ the demand for labour now outstripped its supply. This 
persisted into the post-war boom period of 1919- 1920. But, 
secondly, and equally important, a number of factors combined 
to enable this power to be exercised: in effect, not only was 
labour stronger; it felt its strength - and the justice of its 
actions - more. Chiefly, the factors stemmed from the war: the 
central role of the state in industry, the importance of notions 
such as 'profiteering', working people's sacrifice in France, and 
so forth. These meant that notions such as 'efficiency' and 
forganisation' became distanced from commonly associated notions 
(above all, 'profit'); increasingly, they became effective in 
legitimising action'in the labour interest. By the same token, of 
course, they became less effective as principles legitimising action 
by'employers. In a numberof respects, moreover, the law became less 
unfavourable to unions; while the state was less concerned with 
employers' rights and profits than with ensuring continuity of 
production. Finally, the problems generated by the war - rising 
prices, above all were such as could link general principles to 
workplace action. During1919 and early 1920 these factors continued 
to hold sway; they were compounded by the loss of self-confidence 
which occurred among important elements df capital and the state. 
With revolution apparently on the agenda, material concessions 
could seem a cheap insurance. 
In effect, therefore, the motivational basis of trade union 
advance during and immediately after the war was a fortuitous 
consequence of the international conflict. To be sure, the notions 
to which the latter lent strength were interpreted in the light of 
workers' experiences: but, fundamentally, they were available to 
labour because of the changes in the meaning of the 'nation' and in 
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the operation of state and economy, which total commitment to the 
war entailed. In order to ensure sustained and active working 
class supporb for the war effort, the latter required Justification 
in avocabulary acceptable to workers: yet deployment of such a 
vocabulary by the dominant political institutions was, ipso facto, 
a strengthening of it, and an opening of it to more effective use by 
labour in its own interest. In Gramscils language, the contradiction 
between theoretical and practical consciousness had been reduced by 
the ruling class's having shifted the former more into line with the 
latter: the working class was thus more likely to act, but also 
to act in its own interests. 
, 
Labour politics were also affected by the war; but its influence 
was less unambiguously positive than it was for the trade unions. 
The pre-war labour movement bad been by no means united on methods 
but 
' 
the question of whether or not the war was Justified split 
virtually every section of the movement. The achievement of united 
action consequently became more difficult. Wartime events led to the 
development of two conceptions of political action within the movement. 
One drew strength from the power of the wartime state, and saw labour's 
task as the winning of control over the state. The second drew 
strength from the power of the wartime trade union movement. But 
these images of politics developed in a period when nationalism, 
patriotism, was the fundamental determinant of allegiances within 
the labour movement: during the war, they did not structure coherent 
political groupings or coalitions. Indeed, since they were not 
mutually exclusive, individuals often drew on both perspectives. 
During 1919'and 1920 patriotism ceased to be very effective as 
a principle legitimising action within the working class: ort rather, 
having formed the foundation of a coalition supportive of a 
Inational'effort , it now became, if anything, supportive of a 
general improvement of working class self-confidence and assertion 
independent of other classes. But within the working class, the 
images of political action ýhich had been developing (but secondary 
and ineffective) during the war, remained indistinct. Trade union 
action continued to seem an important path to political-power, 
381 
i 
particularly since electoral methods (which had in any case 
become less prominent during the war) seemed increasingly unlikely 
to be effective after the 1918 general election, and the municipal 
contest of 1919. At the same time, both 'right' and 'left' 
continued to stress the power of the state: many had experience 
of it during the war; for many, the Bolshevik revolution shewed 
the importance of gaining control of the state. In short, this 
immediate post-war period was one of ferment in which confusion 
reigned concerning the strategic issues in labour's political 
advance; no clear allegiances had developed within the movement. 
In this situation, a broad coalition formed, based on some 
of the motives which had become available to labour during the 
war: primarily, those associated with 'efficiency' and lorganisation'. 
This coalition was limited to the restructuring of, the labour move- 
ment itself: it carried through the amalgamation of the Trades 
Council and the Labour Party, and, at another level, brought most of 
the city's disparate Marxist elements into the Communist Party. It 
was based on the assumption that efficiency was aninherent attribute 
of certain organisational structures; all could thus concur on 
organisational change, for the structure created would be appropriate 
to all political tasks. The organisational form perceived as 
efficient was centralised and hierarchical, drawing not only on 
managerial images (and, to some extent, managerial practice), but 
also drawing strength from military organisation, and from the 
state's methods of controlling the wartime economy. This structure 
promised unity in action: disagreements would be settled in a 
central, representative forum (the Trades and Labour Council$ in 
our particular instance; but by analogy the TUC, Labour Party 
Conference, or whatever); thereafter, all elements of the movement 
would act in concert, directed by central organs supported by a 
central administration. The virtues of such a structure were 
acknowledged at once in both political and industrial spheres. 
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Yet the reorganisation achieved within this perspective did 
not produce structures which were - so to say - neutral between 
different strategies. The structures were not universally 
efficient; and, when combined with a number of other factors, 
their effects over the following years, was to enable the right 
of the movement to establiGh an ascendancy. Such 'mechanistic' 
structures are effective chiefly when their environment is stable, 
and when the commitment of their constituent individuals and 
institutions is assured. These conditions were largely fulfilled 
in the actual prosecution of industrial (and other 'direct') 
action during 1919 and 1920: the action was relatively brief, so 
the environment was quite stable; the objectives and methods were 
(more or less) clear; attitudes were militant. Neverthelesal many 
of the wartime and immediate post-war advances ware in fact achieved 
not by. such structures, but despite them. The enormous expansion of 
union membership, for inctance, depended upon the ability of groups 
of workers to act on their own initiative - it required an acceptance 
of common aims and attitudes, but not strong, centralised resources. 
But this went largely unrecognised. The expansion was perceived as 
achievement despite a lack of organisation, rather than as being 
contingent upon the existence of a distinct, looser, type of 
organisation,, albeit in embryonic form: it was consequently taken 
to indicate how much greater the advances might be if all were 
properly 'co-ordinated'. 
Moreover, to see but a single, and universally efficient, 
form of organisation was artificially to divorce technical structures 
from their moral, their motivational, context. Thus it was that 
organisation fxnd propaganda were widely seen as distinct: the 
latter 
was a task of certain organisations, but organisati6n itself was not', 
seen as intimately associated with the moral climate in which it 




saw propaganda as a task which belonged elsewhere, and did not 
develop central propagandist institutions; the Trades and Labour 
Council's attempts to forge unity in political outlook among its 
constituent elements were desultory. 
Whether the labour movement could have developed strong, 
mobilising, institutions during 1917-1920 must be doubtful: 
even coping with the administrative burdens of growth stretched 
its resources to their limits. Whether such institutions could have 
survived the rigours of depression is still more uncertain. From 
1920 onward the balance of power in industry turned against labour. 
Unions were weakened; in more recently organised sectors, sometimes 
eliminated. At the same time, the balance of legitimation shifted 
away from the working class: press support for union objectives 
evaporated; state recognition was increasingly restricted to very 
narrow definitions of union activity; working class purchase on 
notions of 'efficiency', lorganisationt, and so forth was reduced 
as wartime understandings-became more distant; above all, few 
problems were now soluble within the workplace - and even where 
issues did exist, unions might be unable to mobilise around them. 
As a result, the degree of unity of purpose within the trade union 
movement deteriorated: its central aims became less widely power- 
ful; sectional and self-interested motives became more pronounced; 
it becamc more difficult to achieve united action around common 
princitles. 
Similar problems beset labour politics. Industrial action 
seemed loss and less a realistic path to political power; Idirect 
action'. of other kinds also began to fail for lack of mass'support. 
It was, in these circumstances that the strategic 'bias' inherent in 
the movement's images and structures of organisation began to 
reveal itself. The prevalence of mechanistic structures and 
images encouraged union organisations - at every level - to respond 
to their new environment in certain ways. Firstly, they came to see 
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propaganda as important (though they did not link it with a 
critique of organisation which went beyond existing models). 
Second, since propaganda did not bring success, they took steps 
to strengthen the coherence of their structures: in particular, 
internal discipline was tightened. Thirdly, they attempted to 
stabilise their external environment. In this they could, of 
course, have only limited success; but though they could not 
control itt they could attempt to minimise its unpredictability. 
In industrial relations, this meant supporting national bargaining, 
'procedure'-, and so forth. In politics, it implied support for a 
strategy which encouraged the consti-uction of stable institutions, 
and minimised the exposure of-union institutions to. weakening through 
political conflict. 
All these responses shifted union opinion away from support 
for 'revolutionary industrial methods'. At the same time, a 
coherent Labour Socialist grouping began to form, criticising the 
policies of 'direct action' increasingly vociferously as the latter's 
successes became rarer. Under these pressures, the shallow found- , 
ations of labour's post-war coalition were undermined. The electoral 
strategy now became the foundation of a new coalition, in which 
Labour S-ocialism was able to unite the Labour left with trade union 
labourism. Based on a clear distinction between political and 
industrial action (and a definition of the former in constitutional- 
electoral terms), this permitted the development of routinised forms 
of political activity, and institutions, which were a vital counter- 
whigýt to the development of a leftist (what we have termed 'Marxist') 
coalition. Initially unstable, because based around a limited 
range of issues, the fLabou. r Socialist coalition' was, by the later 
'twenties, possessed of a strong institutional base which could 
resist the lure of more radical conceptions of 'political even (say) 
after the debacle of 1931. For its competitorl*the current based 
around revolutioriary socialism and industrial militancy, and now 
led by the Communist Party, was unable to develop countervailing 
-institutions; it could win. widespread support only in situations of 
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militant industrial action - and these were neither lasting 
enough, nor successful enough, to onable its consolidation. 
Our account has not simply restated standard versions of 
labour's development, adding a little local colour. We have, of 
course, broadly confirmed that revolutionary socialists had been 
confined to a marginal role in the labour movement by the later 
1920s: to have found otherwise would h. -;, ve been surprising indeed. 
But our theor6tical perspective, together with our local research 
base, have allowed us to add to existing accounts in a number of 
ways. Three, perhaps, we should heýre briefly restate. 
We have, firstlylbeen able to stress the shifting sources 
of political motivation, and their effect on labour politics. This 
has shewn the importance of the transition from a wartime (and 
immediate post-war) phase, during which dominant political and 
social institutions gave some support to labour interests, to a 
period when this support dissipated. We do not claiT that the 
working class is incapable of generating comparable instituti6nal 
sources of political motivation; but that it did not is clear. 
But we also pointed to the importance of the character of the 
support given. The wartime, and immediate post-war, state and 
ruling class made concessions at this motivational level partly 
because they seemed necessary for the winning of workers' support 
for the war; but partly because they had no choice. But*even where 
the concessions were unplanned, their impact was selective. If 
the working class, for instance, gained unprecedented purchase over 
notions-of organisation and efficiency, how it could use them was 
significantly determined by their historically- and socially- 
given meanings. This was not a cunning mling class plot: but it 
was important. 
Second, by breaking down the sources of legitimation of 
political action, and discussing their content, we have been able 
to chart some of the complex processes by which coalitions are 
6 
formed, sustained, and broken down. By shewing the relationship 
between the building of-these alliances and the specific principles 
on which they are based, we have been able to move away from the 
assumption - so strongifor instance, in Miliband's work 
3_ 
that 
parliamentary methods have always been fundamental to Labour 
politicsi towards an explanation of how this came about. In 
particular, it has been valuable to view alliances in terms of the 
principles which underlie them; and to recognise the propensity of 
individuals and institutions to hold (albeit an inchoate and 
fragmentary form), simultaneously, principles which may legitimise 
more than one - and perhaps inconsistent - courses of action. 
We have, thirdly, tried to examine the development of 
labour organisation (both industrial and political) without 
supposing them necessarily to have been in a process of evolution 
4 
toward an absolutely superior organisational form. On the contrary, 
we have attempted to recognise the importance-of context in determin- 
ing the appositeness of specific forms; it is, in short, significant 
that the trade union and labour movement developed the structure 
that it did. This has enabled us to view the development of the 
Labour Party in a new light: not as, from the beginning, an independent 
institution affected by a range of external and internal factors, but 
as an institutional element of a wider lorganisation' (a labour 
movement), with shifting internal relationships. Only from about 
1922 or 1923 could the Labour Party genuinely be termed an 
independent institution; not until the later 'twenties had it 
established a supremacy over the politics of the labour movement. 
Let us conclude by making some observations on future research. 
This study has been based upon two essential propositions. It is, 
on the one hand, not only the political predilections of historians 
Parliamentary Socialism. 
Such assumptions are implied even in the title of McKibbin's 
Evolution of the Labour PaEty -a study of party organisation. 







which can bias our understandings of labour history; indeed, these 
are of less import than their methodological and theoretical 
presuppositions, for in general the former are public, while the 
latter-may be obscure even to the author. Empirical research 
should, then, be complemented by methodological criticism. On 
the other hand, we bave held that our understanding of labour 
politics, the politics of the working class, mustba truncated unless 
we are prepared to examine their social and industdal generation 
in the lives of working men and women; this implies the necessity 
for local studies. Ours has shown, for instance, significant areas 
of divergence from the experience of the Clydeside. Perhaps Edinburgh 
was more typical: perhaps neither was. Further studies might 
concentrate, too, on areas we have but touched upon: the importance 
of residential factors in the development of political attitudes and 
organisation, for instance; or a more quantitative study of the 
relationship between industrial background and union and political 
behaviour. During the later 'twenties Labour's growth in local 
government was to have an effect on the Party's direction. But only 
through shifting the focus of research away from national institutions, 
which are already well covered, and toward the local experiences 
of working people, will we be able properly to understand the complex 
inter-play of motives and organisation which reformed the British 





Appeadices and Bibliography 
389 
Appendix A 
Labour Party Organisation iri Edinburgh, 1917 - 1927 
Few studies exist of the growth of local Labour Party organisation 
in the early years after 1918; 
1 
although it is now widely 
acknowledged that this grew more slowly then, says McKenzie or 
Miliband assumed, so much detail is missing that many of the 
implications are obscure. This appendix analyses the organisation- 
al development of the Edinburgh Labour Party, and explores some of 
the implications. 
The major problem is a shortage of direct evidence: there is 
but a single surviving item produced by a divisional Labour Party 
or Ward Committee*during these years - and that not very useful. 
2 
Any account must therefore be gleaned from data in other sources: 
much of this is useful, but some gaps must remain. 
Divisional and Ward organisation. In chapter 10, we saw that 
pre-1918 Labour Party ward committees had been few in number, and 
fleeting in existence. Only two were strong enough to pay dues to 
the Edinburgh branch in 1917/18; only four in 1919/20.3 At the'time 
of amalgamation, confidence was expressed about the progress of 
Party organisation, 
4 
but the indications are that thin was premature. 
Table A. 1 summarises the surviving evidence on when Division Labour 
1. The most important and valuable study is still McKibbinj 
Evolution of the Labour Part I despite its being substantially based in national data. 
2. This is an account book, almost certainly of Edin. South DLP; 
but even here the most complete sections relate to 1929-1930. 
3- Edin. LP ARs 1917/18,81 1919/20,22. 
4. Edin. LP AR 1919/20,18-21. 
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Parties and ward committees were formed (or first known to have 
been in existence). Although some ward committees may not be 
recorded, this is more likely in the later years, after their care 
Table A-1 The Growth of Labour-Party institutions in Edinburgh 
1917 - 1924 
Year Central North South East West Leith 





1919 St. Giles I 
(E) 
1920 'Nucleus' 
of DLP(E) DLP(T) 
1921 
1922 


















1924 DIP(E) Committees DLP(F) 
in 4 wards 
(F) 
Notes: F: institution recorded as having been formed in this year. 
E: institution recorded as having been in existence ' 
in this 
year; this cannot be taken to imply that the institution 
was not also formed in the same year. 
We may assume that the formation of a DLP in Leith in 
1921 was merely a constitutional nicety, consequent upon 
the amalgamation of Edin. TUC and Leith UTC & LP. 
Source: all labour and trade union records researched. 
could be delegated to DLPs and the Political Officer. And it is, at 
least, clear that in several cases DLPs were not formed until four or 
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or more years after the new national constitution decreed their 
existence. 
At the time of the 1918 General Election, trade union and ILP 
branches seem to have co-operated on an essentially ad hoc basis to 
fight it: they sent delegates to the selection conferences (held 
under the auspices of the Edinburgh branch of the Labour Party), 
and very likely their commitment to the resulting electoral effort 
depended upon their success in ensuring the seloction of their 
favoured candidate. Election agents were appointed by the branch, 
though largely financed by the organisations nominating the successful 
candidates. Municipal election organisation was similar; but 
although it was elections which provided the catalyst for organisation, 
it is by no means clear that organisation thus created always outlived 
the elections. The West Division, for instance, was fought in 
December 1918; in early 1920 a DLP was only in the process of 
formation. 5 And while the danongate Ward, where a Labour candidate 
6 
had been victorious in 19131 was contested in 1919,1920 and 1922, 
the Trades and Labour Council was endeavouring to form a ward committee 
as late as 1923- 
7 
Even when formed, however, local Labour Party organisation 
seems often to have been less than vibrant. We know little of 
Ward Committees, but we can say something of DLP membership. DLPs 
were required to 1pay an annual affiliation feecf 2d. 
8 
per member to 
the Trades and Labour-Council, witha. minimum of 30s- Until the 
year 1924-1925 no DLP did so; table A. 2. shows progress over 
1924-1928. Two points stand out. First, in neither the two 
divisions won by Labour dur#g these years (Central and East)j nor 
5. Ibid. 
6. In 1921 it was, of course, contested by the NUR No. 1 branch. 
7- T&LC minutes, 28 August'1923; only fiv .e people attended its 
first meeting (ibid., 26 September-1923). 
8. T&LC Constitution and Rules (1922), 5; this fee was then 
forwarded by the TUC to Labour Party head office. 
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1927-28 West 53s(c) 
North 30S 
South 30S 
1928-29 West 7os4d(c) 
North 30S 
represented 
186 or less 
180 or less 
180 or less 
. 180 or less 
330 
180 or less 
180 or less 
318 
180 or less 
180 or less 
422 
180 or less 
Notes: (a) In 1926, DLPs were called upon to pay a double affiliation 
fee: North and West Divisions each paid an extra 30s; 
this is excluded here; 
(b) 17s8d of this*was not paid until the following year, but 
is included in the 1926-27 figurq; 
(c) West DLP's payment in 1927-28 is marked "part 1927"; but 
there is no indication of how much of the following year's 
payment is for the previous year. The 1928-29 figure, 
therefore, may well overstate that year's fee and member- 
ship whilst correspondingly understating that for 1927-28. 
S. our . ces: T&Lq ARs, 1925 - 1929. 
in Leith where Labour's challenge otherwise came closest to victory, 
was there a Divisional Party. We may account for this, in Central 
Edinburgh and Leith, largely by the strength of the ILP; in East 
Edinburgh, the DLP may well have been hindered by the distance 
between the three'main areas of Labour strength (Cannongate, Porto- 
bello, arid Musselburgh); we know, in any case, that it was only formed 
in early 1924.9 Second, two of those DLPs which were strong enough to 
affiliate, had less than 180 members each throughout the period - 
both, of course, were in barren Labour territory. Only one built up I 
9. TUC minutes, 19 February 1924: it had been formed two days 
earlier. 
i 
a membership greater than 180: here (West Edinburgh) was a 
division with a pocket of long-standing Labour strength (Dalry 
and Gorgie had been the first wards won by Labour, in 1909 and 
1911 respectively), yet even here the DLP probably never had more 
than 400 members@ 
10 
In these circumstances, the role of the Trades and Labour 
Council, and of its DLPs, was chiefly the mobilisation and co- 
ordination of other bodies (especially the ILP, but also trade 
unions) in electoral work: the DLPs did not. have, in themselves, 
adequate strength. We do not, unfortunately, have a full descript- 
ion of the organisation of electoral work during the early 'twenties, 
but after the 1925 municipal elections, a reassessment took place 
which reveals, at least, somle of the perceived-weaknesses of earlier 
practice. (Although set in train early in 1926, most of this 
reassessment seems to have taken place after the General Strike, 
which strengthened centralist conceptions of organisation. ) A 
Political Committee of the Trades and Labour Council was to take 
charge as a 'Central Election Committee' (CEC): this was to 
organise and allocate speakers 'in the same manner as was being 
done by the Strike ComCmj7ttZ7eej for the Miners meetings'; it would 
control all press advertising on the basis of information supplied 
by ward committees; rather than granting money to wards, it would 
itself incur expenses (up to a maximum of 920 per contested ward); 
no ward committee would be empowered to issue publicity material 
without prior approval from the CEC; a 'motor cycle corps' would 
ensure 'rapid distribution of messages and information from C. E. C. 1, 
and the latter would 
ýe in constant session each evening for, the 
four weeks preceding polling day 'to ensure 100% efficiency'. 
In view of the occasion of this reassessment, we must treat with 
some caution its perceptions of earlier failings. We know from 
10. In addition, of course, DLP members' primary loyalties were 
to other organisations, especially the ILP: 'The people P. f 
St. Leonard's ... have built up aýi organisation, an arm of 
the Labour Movement, and they are represented , 
now by three 
Labour Councillors. No wonder St. teonard's ILP grdws by 
leaps and bounds' (Labour Standard, 25 December 1926). 
11. TUC Minutes, 10 September 1926; these proposals were watered- 
down somewhat after pressure from the DLPs and ward committees: 




earlier evidence that, after the formation of the Trades and 
Labour Council at least, political control of Labour candidates 
was centralised: in 1925, for instance, wards had to get the 
Council's permission for such matters as whether to issue an 
extra handbilljoi whether to include a statement of their candid- 
ate's lbonafides' in their publicity. 
12 The criticism is not of 
decentralised organisation, but rather of the failings of a 
centralised struc, ture: during the General Strike lessons had been 
learnt about how these could be made to operate efficiently. 
Finance. In chapter 10, we suggested that trade union 
finance was vital to the electoral strategy. This fact is clearly 
shown in the income and expenditure of the Trades and Labour Council, 
some statistics of which are gathered in table A-3- Financially, 
political bodies were of marginal importance to the Councilts work. 
Their contribution to the routine income was insignificant: during 
the years with which we are concerned, it did riot rise above 3 per 
cent of affiliation fee income. Even if we look at income raised 
for elections, the story is similar. Although the ILP and the 
Labour Party contributed significant proportions in 1919/20 and 
1920/21, and individual donationVFrPthe following year, thereafter 
contributions from these categories declined both relatively and 
absolutely; trade unions' contributions, however, grew rapidly 
in both respects, and for the four years from 1923 constituted 90 
per cent or more of election income. Of course, these figures must 
be treated with some caution; in particular, we might expect local 
Labour Party organisations to retain income for their own purposes, 
rather -than contribute it to a central fund, whil8t this would be 
the natural route for union contributions. Yet bodies which found 
difficulty evcn in meeting minimal and obligatory - affiliation 
fees can hardly have been wealthy, and the scale of union electoral 
contributions from 1923 onward is beyorid anything the political 
bodies had managed, even in the 'affluent' years just after the war. 
Control. Union opinion was vital to the Labour Party not 
only for financial reasons. From 1920 onward, the union delegates 
at the Trades and Labour Council could, in theory, control the policy 
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of Labour in Edinburgh. Table A. 4 shows that, even at the end 
of our period, delegates from the Labour Party and other political 
organisations constituted less than one-fifth of the total number 
of Trades and Labour Council delegates; nor were they in a position 
to gain effective control through more assiduous attendance. Indeed, 
if anything their attendance rate at the Council's meetings was 
poorer than that of their trade union comrades. Save in the two 
years 1921-1923, the average political delegate attended fewer 
meetings. They did, it is true, achieve generally better represent- 
ation on the Council's Executive Committee, and this was clearly 
important: nevertheless, they remained in a minority throughout 
(see table A-5)- It is, however, important to bear in mind that many 
Table A-5 Organisational background of Trades and Labour Council 
Executive members, 1920 - 1928 
Delegates, 12LO-Ll 1921-22 1922-23 1923-24 1924-25 1925-26 1926-27 1927-28 
from: 
Trade 
Unions 12 11 11 10 11 11 15 14 
M (70.6) (64-7) (64-7) (58.8) (64-7) (64-7) (75-0) (70-0) 
Political 
bodies 55676656 













Committee: 17 17 17 17 17 17 20 20 
Source: TUC ARs, 1920 - 1927- 
trade unipn delegates - espocially, perhaps, those on the Executive 
Committee - had political affiliations, even though they were not 
delegates of political bodies. Save in 1920-21, for instance, we know 
that there was always at least one, mmetimes two (and possibly more) 
OF members on the Executive who were trade union delegates. 
13 
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Elections. The Labour Party's performance in parliamentary 
elections is summarised in table A. 6 Several points deserVe attent- 
ion. Not until October 1924 did Labour contest more than three of the 
city's six divisions; in 1922, it could manage only two. Contests 
seem to have occurred where Labour organisation was strong, rather 
than where the prospects of success were greatest. The two were not 
always identical. East division was won on the first occasion a 
Labour candidate entered the field, and just eight months after a 
UP was. formed; West division war, consistently fought, though the 
prospects of success were poor. On three occasions (once in 1924, 
twice in 1929) Labour won because other parties were unable to come 
to an agreement; Leith, however, might well have been captured at 
the 1924 -and 1929 general elections had the Conservatives not stood 
down in favour of the Liberals. Although, taking all constituences 
which Labour contested, the main advance in votes seems to have been 
between 1918 and 1922, this statistic is misleading: when we look at 
those constituencies whichýwere contested by Labour in every general 
election (just Edinburgh Central and Leith), it is clear that the main 
advance in electoral support came between the 1922 and 1923 elections. 
Labour's municipal election performance is surveyed in table 
A-7 After the War, the record was initially poor. In 1919 there was, 
according to The Scotsman, a 11feavy Defeat for Labour'; 
14 in 1920 
'Labour received a severe setback' 
15 
when only two of its nineteen 
candidates were victorious. Whereas Labour had a significant 
presence on Leith Town Council before amalgamation, 
16 'not a single 
Labour Municipal or Parish Council nominee was returned for the Port' 
in 1920.17 In 1921 the number of Labournominees slumped to four, 
only one of whom was returned. Over the following years, as Labour 
organisation improved, the number of candidates increased rapidly: 
this seems, chiefly, to have allowed Labour to expand within favour- 
able areas, for the mean vote obtained per opposed candidate also 
rose. 
14. The Scotsman, 5 November 1919. 
15. Ibid., 3 November 1920. 
16. In 1919, three Labour candidates had been successful in the 
Leith Town Council Election (The Scotsman, 5 November 1919); 
the Wards were redrawn on amalgamation, however, and comparison 
is not easy. 
17- The Scotsman, 3 November 1920. 
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Official Labour Candidates only: 
Number: 6 19 497 11 14 14 16 
Wards 
contested: 6 12 497 11 14 14 15 
Total vote: 6435 21336 5320 9736 12270 17684 25872 32725 36861 
Mean vote 
per opposed 
candidate: 1072-5 1122.9 1330.0 1217-0 1752.9 1607.6 IM-02337-5 2303.8 
No. of Labour 
councillors 
after election 6423356 14 15 
Notes: (Dexcludes by-elections: refers only to election held on first 
Tuesday of November each year; (ii) where more than one vote appears, 
more than one seat was contested in the ward that year; (iii) 
references: (a) Not within Edinburgh until 1920; (b) Labour candidate 
returned unopposed; (C) A Communist candidate stood in St. Leonard's in 
1921, against a sitting former Labour councillor who stood as an indep- 
endent after a dispute with the Labour Party; (R) Candidate of NUR No-1 
branch's Political Committee: he stood as Labour candidate in the same 
ward in 1922; (U) 'Unemployedlcandidates: TUC AR 1928,10, retro- 
spectively includes the 1923 vote as 'Labour' perhaps because the cand- 
idate was, by then, TUC President. 
Sources: The Scotsman, 5 Nov-1919,3Nov. 1920,2Nov. 19219 BNov. 1922, 
7110-V-1925, '? Nov. 1924,414ov. 1925,3Nov-1926; TUC AR 1928,10; 
.I R. A. Fox 'Members of the Labour Party elected to Edin. Town Council',,, 1. 
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Finally, we i3hould briefly look at candidates of'other 
labour bodies. We may divide these into three categories: first, 
candidates of the SLP, who seem to have made-a virtue of opposing 
Labour and Communist candidates (in the latter case often adopting 
the 'Comrwanist'label); second, Communist Party candidates; and 
third, candidates of a variety of organisations, often standing 
with tacit Labour support. SLP votes are shown in table A. 8; they 
I 
Table Socialist Labour Party votes in-Edinburgh municipal 








































































rarely rose above the derisory. Communist-Party candidates generally 
fared somewhat better, as table A. 9 shows, yet where there was no 
official Labour candidate, they do not seem to have won the support of 
4u4 
all Labour voters; whilst on the single occasion the Party fought 
against a Labour candidate, its vote alumped. Contests by other 
Table A. Communist Party votes in Edinburgh municipal 
elections, 1919 -1927 
Year Ward Communist vote Labour vote 
1921 St. Leonard's 930 
1923 St. Leonard's 865 (61: SLP) 
Leith SOuth 408 (154: sLp) 
1924 St. Leonard's 172 3373 
Source: The Scotom. an, as table A-7- 
organisations are shown in table A. 10. On no occasion were these 
opposed by official Labour candidates. The St. Giles Unemployed 
candidature was de facto (and in 1922 de lure) recognised as a 
Labour contest in all but name; even by 1921 the ex-service vote was 
of declining importance; whilst the Railway Workers learnt their lesson 
in 1921, and their candidate stood for Labour in the following year. 
Table A. 10 Municipal election performance-of miscellaneous labour 
bodied in Edinburgh3 1919 - 1927 
Year Ward Organisation 
1921 Canongate Railway Workers 
Broughton Ex-Service 
St. Giles Unemployed 
1922 St. Giles Labour mid Unemployed 







Source: The Scotsman, as table A-7- 
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Appendix B 
The Railwaymen's Intervention in Electoral Politicsi 1921 
In 1921, as the economic basis for industrial militancy eroded, many 
socialists who had previously embraced an industrial road to 
political power began to-seek other routes. Yet, in general, 
they did not turn entirely from their former methods; rather, 
they built on and adapted them. Here we discuss, briefly, 
the intervention into electbral-politics made by the Edinburgh 
No. 1 branch of the NUR in 1921, and we reproduce some key 
documents. 
We have seen that the No. 1 branch was strongly committed 
to the notion of the NUR'as an industrial union; this general 
commitment was supportive of (and supported by) an important 
element of the branch's active membership, which espoused 
revolutionary syndicalism and Marxism in various forms. One 
example will illustrate the branch's mood. When, in mid-1920, the 
NUR's Head Office issued a circular to branches pointing out that 
an increase in pilfering was 'reflecting on the character of 
railwaymeni, the tranch resolved that the circular 'lie on the 
table' (i. e., that no action be taken): 'Petty thefts Z-si2c 
was the natural result of capitalism, and it should be no concern 
of the Unions'. 
' Yet, even in 1920, questions were being raised 
about the branch's role: 'as the railwaymen were concerned in 
everything in industry ... Could we be always striking 
Z-? 2, I one 
member asked when Leith's dockers asked Sor support. 
2 In June 1920 
1. NUR No. 1 branch minutes, 4 July 1920; this resolution was 
carried by 25 votes to 24. 
2. Ibid., 23 May 1920: the dispute had arisen over the question 
of involvement in the Russo-Polish war, and, in replying, 
another member thought it their duty to 'use the Trades 
Unions to save the Revolution! I 
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an EC member, responding to criticismmaintained that it had 
received a 'whole spate of requests ... for sympathetic action', 
and that the EC 'had decided it was not the function of one 
union to fight the struggles of every union'; the EC had suggest- 
ed a reorganisation of the TUC 'along new lines to meet new 
3 
conditions'. 
In response to this, an important debate on union strategy 
ensued: 
Bro Stobbie moved 'That we think and instruct 
our E. C. that the only way to clear the pitch, 
is through the Industrial Union. ' ... The Trade Union-Z-he continued2 was cracking up 
and was fast becoming obsolete. The N. U. R. 
cannot fight their own battles not to speak 
of other Unions' battles. Industrial Union- 
ism does not mean fighting for wages, but it 
meant fighting for the railways. As the class 
struggle gets more acute you must organise to 
abolish the present system. ... Bro Niven Cthe EC member-7 said that if all were Stobbies 
it would be easy, but there is such a conglomer- 
ation of ideas and ideals that he doubted clarity 
was long and far. Our people is more interested 
in codifying and classifying present conditions, 
than in fighting for Stobbies theory. Bro, Rollo 
... referred to our progress, it seemed rather like 
retrogression. Bro Fraser disapproved of support- 
ers of such motions attitude of getting 'forward' 
motions passed at branch meetings and when sent 
to E. C. to be acted on did not represent the 
membership and when accepted by Central body 
and endeav=ý made to put same in concrete form 
often failed, and explained to some extent the 
unstableness-of our EýC. Bro Stobbie and members 
like him had not done their work - converted the 
rank and fine Z-sic., 7. Bro Stobbie in reply said 
the conditions were ready if the workers were not 
ready. 4 
Despite its opponents' weighty criticisms, Stobbie's motion was 
agreed by 59 votes to nine. Yet the doubts were beginning to be 
expressed. The tide began to turn as the months passed: 'the 
3- Ibid., 20 June 1920. 
4. Ibid. 
405 
workers' became increasingly unready to take action, and a 
realisation seems to have dawned that this was not unconnected 
with 'the conditions'. 
By mid-1921, therefore, Fraser, the branch member who'had 
won so little support a year earlier, could win the branch's 
approval for 'setting up its own political Committee with a view 
of running its own Municipal and other. Council candidates'. He 
held that 'the local conditions of Labour' - presumably, the fact 
that the branch, with its belief in industrial unionism and its 
syndicalist rejection of politics, had consistently refused to 
affiliate to the Trades Council5 _ meant that I this branch 
being a large section of the working class was deprived ... of 
expression hence the need of action'. 
6 
The Committee agreed a 'Platform' and 'Constitution' in 
August. According to the latter, 
The Committee shall make the necessary 
arrangements for running elections to local 
bodies. It will publish election addresses 
on behalf of all candidates, such addresses 
to be submitted to the branch for adoption 
in order that the principle_underlying the 
Committee be kept in tact Z sic-7. 
The Committee shall procure candidates, 
and will submit such names to the branch 
for approval. All candidates will then be 
subservient to the Committee, who in their 
turn shall be subservient to. the branch. 
All candidates must agree to above plat- 
form and to the Constitution. Should a 
candidate be elected, and thereafter not 
conform to the essentials of the constitution, 
the Committee shall summon the person before 
them (and if necessary brinE the matter before 
the branch) and if guilty / he_, 7 will be asked 
5- See, e. g., ibid. 18-December 1918,14 March 1920. 
6. Ibid. i 5 June 1921: the motionstechnically to considerIthe 
advisability of setting up' such a committee, was passed by 
18 vot*es to 3; a committee of eight was elected a fortnight 
later (ibid., 19 June 1921). 1 
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A 
to resign, all financial assistance 
being withdrawn. 
As restriction obtains through 
the NX. R. being affiliated to the 
Labour Party which prevents this 
Committee participating in 
Parliamentary elections their 
activities are thereforZ;, 7 confined 
to ccntesting local elections. 7 
Leaving aside the clear political differences with Labour Party 
socialism implicit in the 'Platform', it is worth noting here the 
concentration on two related issues: the concerns almost the 
expectation, that elected representatives would be tempted from 
their true duty; and the determination that the branch should 
control them. . 
On this basis, the branch decided to contest the Canongate 
Ward at the November 1921 Town Council election. 
8 
Canongate 
. contained a 
heavy concentration of railwaymen: hopes were high. 
Yet the path ahead was far from easy. When the Political Committee 
wrote to the Trades and Labour Council to announce its formation, 
and its intention to run candidates 'on industrial lines', 
9 the 
Council invited two Committee representatives to meet its EC. 
According to the Council's minutes, the representatives said 
they had not received consideration from Trades Council or Labour 
Party, and askedthe Council not to oppose the NUR candidate - but 
declared their int. ention of contesting it in any case. 
10 
'The gist 
of Frasers report' of the meeting, however, (made to the Railway- 
men's branch), 'was that what the Labour men wanted was our 
expression of opposition to their programme, which they got*' 
11 
What the branch got, of course, was considerable pressure fromthe 
Union's higher echelons: the Labour Party's Scottish Secretary 
wrote to the hUR about this 'breach of discipline'; J. H. Thomas 
wrote to the local full-time NUR official. But the branch resolved 
7. Ibid., 14 August 1921: for the 'Platform', see above s-9.4, 
n. 109. 
8. Ibid. 
9. TUC minutes, 31 August 1921. 
10. Ibid. 
11. NUR No. 1 branch minutes, 11 September 1921. 
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12 
to 'go on with the fight its resolve was strengthened when the 
Union's EC 'decided that, neither they themselves nor the Labour 
Party had any power to interfere...., 
13 
In due course, therefore, the campaign was started. The 
manifesto was drawn up (see below), and published despite 
opposition from branch members who held 'It was not in line with 
the rules; nor ... with revolutionary Socialism', and who attempted 
to 'amend the first portion so as to express an industrial form, 
and to wipe ou 
.t 
the last part altogether. ' 
14 During the campaign, 
P-4 meetings were held, all 'orderly' and all addressed by 
Railwaymen. 15 F-53 9s was spent on the campaign; F-87 lis 4d if 
the wages of candidate and agent were included. There was no 
canvass, but the candidate received 1042 votes 'which while we 
could have hoped to see candidate elected, was considered 
satisfactory. ' 
16 
In practice, however, the campaign was to be but a stage in 
the shift of the No 1 branch's politics from revolutionary syndic- 
alism to a reformist labourism tinged by industrial unionism. A 
year later Fraser, the Railwaymen's candidate in 1921, was the 
officially-adopted Labour candidate for the ward; 
17by 1926 the 
18 
whole episode was passed over in-silence by the branch's historians. 
The contest stands, nevertheless, as an important moment in a process 
of political reassessment. The manifesto 
19 is a valuable insight 
into the outlook of men attempting to adapt their revolutionary 
12. Ibid. I 
13- Ibid., 9 October 1921. 
14. Ibid. the attempt was defeated by 42- votes to 11- 
15- Indeed, there was only one 'outside' speaker, Tom Drummond 
of Leith: ibid., 20-November 1921o 
16. Ibid. 
' 
The Scotsman, 2 November'1921, commented thus on the 
campaign: 'The Canongate Ward is usually. active on the day 
of a municipal election, and in past years considerable in- 
genuity and originality have been shown here in the designing 
of striking posters. This year the activity did not appear 
to be so great as formerly, and there was a distinct falling- 
off in the attractiveness of the hoardings and sandwich-boards. ' 
17- The Scotsman, 8-November 1922. 
18. NUR No 1 branch, Jubilee Souvenir. 1876-1926,. 
19. The manifesto is pinned into NUR No 1 branch ninutes, 9 Oct. 1921. 
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methods, formed in periods of industrial strength and optimism, 
to a time of industrial-weaknese - an insight into their shifting 
conceptions of politics. 
DOCUMENT 
. 
Canongate Ward Municipal Election 1921 
Fellow-workers and Electors of the Canongate Ward: - 
You are again being called upon to return to the Town Council 
a member to represent you. We, the Political Committee of No. I 
Branch, National Union of Railwaymen, have pleasure in nominating 
BRO. D. FRASER, as a Candidate. Mr FRASER is a member of our 
Branch, and has been unaminously adopted by them to contest the 
Canongate Ward. Our Branch of railwaymen has a membership of 2000, 
and these are most resident in the Ward. 
-A unique feature in our nomination is that Mr FRASER is 
nominated by a body of Trade Unionists, and is therefore a rep- 
resentative of the rank-and-file, and not that of a pettifogging 
Ward Committee, or exclusive body of politicians. His candidature 
partakes more of an industrial representative than an orthodox 
Ward represnntative - forecasting a new basis of representation - 
the Industrial basis, or the representation of the useful occupations 
in Sbciety in the Local Government of the rising Commonwealth of 
Labour. 
Our Candidate stands for one Union in one Industry. For the 
mass action of the workers against the mass action of the masters. 
On thepoliticýal field, raises the banner of one political party of 
the workers - believing ag we do that it is only the Trade Union of 
Labour that can set up the true political party of Labour. This 
cannot be attained while the vast majority of our fellow-workers are 
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organised in crafts and trades. Division among ourselves defeats us 
every time in wage wars for advances, or against reductions in 
wages - the true vision of Labour being narrowed and stinted 
thereby. We take up this fight in the face of the discomfiture 
prevailing in our ranks to-day, conscious of the fact that our 
defeat is the result of the want of solidarity in our ranks, 
calling upon the working class to organise as they work in the 
shop, railway, etc., and together in one great International Union. 
As a consequence of this unity there shall arise such political 
clearness that a great Labour Party will be the result, which, 
in combination, will sweep out of existence private control of 
our means of livelihood, and the unsolveable problems facing us 
to-day, and set up in its place the Commonwealth of Labour - of 
economically free women qnd men. 
The, situation facing us to-day is unsolveable if we continue 
tot to recognise that the solution lies in thepolitical and indust- 
rial overthrow of the present system of wealth production carried 
on for the benefit of a few men and women, whose sole justification 
is their legal right to own the means whereby Society gets its 
living. Our challenge is that Capitalist ownership has failed to 
organise Industry so as to provide security of life for the people 
- which is the basis of civilised life - as witness the poverty, 
insecurity, and unemployment prevailing now, and that in the 
face of stupendous means of-production; and that they should 
surrender that power of organisation into the hands of the 
organised working class, who alone are capable of organising 
Industry to provide wealth upon which to base the civilised life 
of to-day. 
The-burden'of blame for our deplorable conditions to-day is 
put upon the working men, who must carry the misery also, till the 
evil is undone by the wise "reconstructers. 11 Needless to say the 
blame must be placed where it belongs, not on the workers but on 
the Capitalist system. We believe there is no reconstruction. 
possible for the workers. Despite the desperate efforts of the 
Government and the masters, only one result is shown, viz. :- the 
lowering of the standard of life, and multitudes of unemployed. 
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It would seem the test of "reconstructionallie to be how far 
the workers will tolerate the pressure. In the face of those 
truths only Socialism is the alternative. This cannot be 
secured if you, our fellow workers, persist in putting into the 
hands of the Capitalists the law-making and administrative 
power of the Nation. To continue to turn a deaf ear to this 
appeal is foolish. 
You may ask what has this to do with a Municipal Election? 
And we would reply by pointing you to the demands of the unemployed 
on the Council; and the fact, in face of these demands, Local 
Authorities have strained the Constitution, and even broken the 
law. More and more marked has become the influence of Administration 
on Government in these days, which shows the political nature of 
Administrati6n itself. Therefore, as it is necessary to take 
advantage of every weapon in a struggle, the workers would be foolish 
not to recognise the value of this one. 
We recognise that in a Municipal Election Campaign the 
elector's mind will be turned to "housing", "relief of rates", 
"unemployment", etc., etc., which are "burning questions", and also 
intensely political too. As shown above, with the return of our 
Candidate to the Council we cannot hold out that those ills will 
vanish. On the other hand we would point out these conditions 
are bound up with the present Capitalist system, and will only be 
remedied by its abolition. But our Candidate, if elected, would 
use whatever power he may possess in the Council to the advantage 
of the workers in their struggle to live; and would support such 
measures as would tend to brighten the existence of the army of 
toilers during the period which must elapse between now and the 
workers' emancipation. 
W0MENV0 T-E R S. 
The appea3, "fellow-workers", -applies to women voters just 
as it does to the men. Domestic labour is equally as necessary as 
any other labour, hence it is just as important as any other labour. 
dil 
But it has never been paid for! Motherhood, child-rearing, and 
the making of new generations have never been recognised. 
Economists say that this wonderful and noble function is paid 
for and included in the weekly wages of the labourera. Women, 
vote down this age long degradation! 
Fellow-workers, you will see from the foregoing, with the 
Council in your hands something could be done to prepare the way 
for your final victory over the Capitalist class. 
By voting for our Candidate you will be voting in the 
interest of yourselves and of the working class. 
Yours faithfully, 






A Letter on the Time Demanded of Labour Public Pepresentatives 
At various points in our story, it has been implied that 
membership of the various public bodies might have a significnnt 
effect on the activity and outlook of labour public reprenentatives. 
The letter below has a bearing on this question. It was written 
by a Labour member of the Edinburgh Education Authority to the 
Secretary of the Trades and Labour Council. Thomas Paris had 
been a member of'the Education Authority since 1924, and was a 
partner in a small firm of jobbing printers. 
DOCUMENT 
33 COMELY BANK STREET 
EDINBURGH 
14.5.27 
Dear Comrade Crawford 
Some time ago, Smithies, asked me to give a record of the 
time required by a Representative on the Authority. I have jiist 
recently looked into this and overleaf give such a record as 
affects myself. It is fairly representative of what is required 
to discharge the duties conscientiously. Of course, I can run out 
and in close up to the meeting hours, and no oave considerable 
time in the aggregate. But a representntive in employment would 
require to "get off" forenoon or afternoon Just aa I have noted. 
These could be reduced by zhe employee-representative refusing to 
accept Special and Sub-Committee appointments. 
May I take this opportunity of writing to suggest preliminary 
steps bo taken against the next Election of Education Authority, 
wilich takes place in March 1928. The Political Officer might have 14 
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a special committee appointed to discuss programme and modus 
operandi. This in itself would require time to evolve schemes, 




Record of Time 
Health Committee - Afternoon monthly 
Property & Works Do. 
Continuation Class I; o. 
Fields & Sports - Afternoon off six times and occasional evening mtgs. 
One Sat. forenoon annually. 
Visitation of Schools (5) - Forenoon each, quarterly. 
Sub. & Special Committees - As appointed. I have had a good number 
of these. 
Special Schoolst Hospitals and Homes - Say a dozen per annum. Involves 
forenoon - often extending to whole day. Suchplaces 
as Humbie, Ceres, Dunblane, Dtindee, Glasgow, 
Kirkintilloch, and Larbert having to be visited. 
Meetings of Parents -3 afternoons per ann. 
Meetings of Work People (propaganda for Continuation Classes) as 
required. 
School Closings & Sports - presenting prizes every day fully for 
10 days in July (befote Summer vacation). 
Regular Monthly Meeting of Authority and my Special Meetings - at 
least three per year - Half-day each. 
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